Iraq

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

America is trying not to appear as an occupier, and is straining, within what its security calculations allow, to fix the image of savior rather than occupier. It needs to appear before the world as a state that is not a new invader or colonizer, especially since it has not proven that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction, and it needs to avoid the development of a spirit of resistance among the Iraqi people and whatever American and Iraqi losses that might in turn produce. It is certainly trying to preserve the victory achieved so far, and has no wish to become entangled in a guerrilla war that would turn against it should it break out, transforming its euphoria into defeat before nations who long to see America’s nose rubbed in the dust.

America faces the following options:

First: to remain in Iraq for whatever period is needed to fully secure its oil interests, and to install a political system that submits to it and guarantees its interests, along the lines of most Arab regimes. This requires a long time and a large military force capable of spreading across the various Iraqi population centers. It also requires elevating certain political leaders at the expense of others, whether among those who arrived with the invading forces or those already present inside Iraq.

This is an option that carries within it the seeds of its own undoing. The presence of American forces in Iraqi population centers generates and deepens an awareness of occupation the longer it lasts. America knows perfectly well that such awareness is the first prelude to revolution or resistance. Beyond that, its backing of certain political figures generates popular, partisan, and religious reactions against those figures. It is quite likely that the Iraqis will not long tolerate those who cooperate with or appease the American side among political and religious leaders, and that they will move quickly against them, as happened in Najaf and Mosul. In other words, an intensive, prolonged American presence amounts to a direct invitation for Iraqis to take up arms and fight for liberation.

Second: American forces could vacate the population centers to reside in outlying camps, and content themselves with military control of the oil sites. There is certainly no shortage of advice being offered to the American president by many voices about the necessity of staying away from residential areas, especially Arab ones, whether Sunni or Shia.

But this too is not safe for American forces, because the media in this age does not leave many things concealed. The kind of foreign presence that prevailed in Arab countries for decades without stirring popular resentment will not succeed in Iraq. Iraq is somewhat more advanced in terms of political awareness compared to other Arab oil states, and it senses and feels things keenly; it will not be easy to put such disguises past the Iraqis.

This is in addition to the difficult security problem that an American military withdrawal could create for those who cooperate with America and who are supposed to run the country’s administration in one form or another. Who will protect them? Iraq is not Afghanistan, and it has no ready army to fight Iraqis on behalf of the Americans.

Third: to remain an occupying power in the shadows, through two means:

Bringing in forces from other countries such as Romania, Turkey, and Poland to carry out what is called “peacekeeping.” In exchange for a little money, such states agree to rent out some of their soldiers to the United States to play a role that spares the United States from being seen as a brutal occupying state. These forces are armed as needed, while American forces are stationed in bases somewhat removed from Iraqi population centers, or in an Arab country ready to lend a hand should the need arise.

Forming an Iraqi army similar to Antoine Lahad’s army in southern Lebanon, or the Palestinian Authority in Palestine, that serves American tasks and interests in exchange for money and for remaining in power. Such an army would carry out the security tasks tied to what America calls “terrorism,” and would be obligated to hunt down Iraqis and throw them into detention under justifications such as extremism and terrorism.

Third [as numbered in the original]: America could hasten to democratize Iraq by holding free and fair elections as quickly as possible and then leave the country. America was careful, in its global media, to denounce Saddam Hussein’s despotism and to insist on its concern for the freedom of the Iraqi people, and it is supposed to prove the truth of what it says in practice. Indeed, the United States government would find itself under worldwide moral pressure to hold these elections.

This option puts America in a bind, because it is not interested in the democratization of the Arab homeland. Arab freedom poses a danger to American interests, because it would sweep away most of the Arab regimes currently in existence and bring in other regimes committed to Arab causes rather than to American interests. And who would win elections in Iraq? In all likelihood, the Islamists, Shia and Sunni, with the Shia weight prevailing in representative councils. Results of this kind carry two dangers:

[The text here is damaged in the original and resumes mid-sentence:] …ablaze, exhausting both sides materially and morally, and inflaming feelings of hatred between Arabs and Iranians. So will America allow elections that lead to fresh troubles?

As for the second danger, it lies in Iraq joining Arab and Islamic efforts against Israel. If the Islamists win the elections, it is expected that the eastern front would rise up in a powerful, qualitative resurgence against Israel. It is true that Saddam Hussein’s regime was against Israel, but it became mired in so many military engagements that its military capacity remained far from directly challenging Israel, keeping Iraq a latent power more than an active one.

Fourth: it is not far-fetched that America would resort to pitting Iraqis against one another if it finds that the various options do not deliver what it came to Iraq for. America might resort to a policy of divide-and-rule, spreading sectarian, tribal, and nationalist conflicts so as to distract the Iraqis from their external enemy, which would then become an arbiter or an Iraqi demand for controlling global disputes. This too carries its own contradiction, in that America, which wants to appear as liberator, would become unable to achieve security stability in the country, putting it in an awkward position before the world and perhaps before American public opinion itself.

There are dangers here for the Iraqis themselves. It appears that Iraqi Sunnis and Shia have moved past the question of sectarian rivalry and are on their way to working together toward establishing a normal daily life and struggling against the occupier. If the Americans try to sow the seeds of strife, the matter could backfire on them, in that Muslims generally would find a new justification for fighting. There is concern regarding Barzani and Talabani, who might respond to the devilish idea, and Iraqis, Arab and Kurd alike, ought to pay attention to the gravity of what these two leaders have done so far in their cooperation with the Americans. Some Kurds may see this moment as working in their favor, but history has proven that the Kurds are used by Israel and America without any regard for Kurdish interest. The Americans will find non-Kurds to cooperate with them as well, particularly those leaders who returned to Iraq on the back of the American tank, but these will not leap into the open unless they are certain of the weakness of the religious leaderships.

In other words, America will find itself in a genuine predicament. It will face Iraqi resistance in any case, though not necessarily immediately. Resistance needs time to organize, train, recruit, and gather the other requirements of jihad. But this does not mean that some acts of resistance will not appear — indeed they have already appeared, and will increase with the days. There are clear factors pushing toward resistance, some of which can be summarized as follows:

The Iraqi people, the Arabs in particular, will not accept occupation regardless of their view of the previous regime. I do not exclude the Kurds absolutely, but they will join the ranks of the resistance once they become certain that America is using them without respecting them.

This is a historic opportunity for the Shia to have an influential voice in Iraq. Despite their large population share, their portion in the political arena has not been commensurate with it. I believe they have reached, at this stage, a degree of awareness and political maturity that will not allow them to remain neutral or mere spectators, especially since they possess organizations capable of leading action at both the political and religious level.

The Sunnis have no option but to adopt the resistance, especially since they are the biggest losers in the current phase. But the Sunnis’ problem is that they are fragmented and lack a clear leadership, whether at the political or the religious level. Still, the means will not remain impossible for one who decides to fight the invaders.

Military and combat experience is available in Iraq as a result of the conscription system that was in place and as a result of the continuous wars Saddam Hussein waged. Note also that Arab and Iranian expertise ready to support the people of Iraq is abundant and eager. There is expertise in Palestine, Lebanon, Iran, and perhaps Pakistan that wishes to fight the Americans, considering it jihad in the path of God.

As soon as it gets underway, the Iraqi resistance will receive tens of thousands of Arab and Muslim volunteers, who will reinforce its combat operations with various skills and sacrifices.

The masses of Iraq will remain under great popular Arab and Islamic pressure to resist the Americans. We will find Arabs speaking and writing across the various media outlets, urging and demanding that the people of Iraq rise up and expel the Americans. The Arabs will create a current that pressures the Iraqi public, or fires it up, to set out. The Palestinian and Lebanese experiences will be two lessons repeated over and over, with the conclusions drawn from them placed before the ears and eyes of the people of Iraq.

It is likely that the American experience in Iraq will end up where the Israeli experience in Lebanon ended up. Israel expelled the Palestine Liberation Organization from Lebanon in the hope that Lebanon would turn into a Western colonial and intelligence base, but its handiwork turned against it, and Lebanon instead became a solid Arab fortress in confronting aggression. And just as Israel came to regret expelling the PLO from Lebanon, America may come to regret its military campaign against Iraq.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “العراق” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.