Assassinations in Hotels

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

With the assassination of al-Mabhouh, we all recall how Israel succeeded in assassinating a number of Palestinian leaders in hotels — the martyr Majed Abu Sharar, the martyr Zuheir Mohsen, and the martyr Fathi Shaqaqi. This assassination method has recurred, and our failure to learn from experience has recurred right along with it, as is the case with most of our activities in struggle and jihad.

With every assassination, we heap curses on Israel and threaten it with harsh reprisals. There is no difference, in this, between one faction and another, and the talk is usually far greater than the readiness and preparation behind it. We describe Israel with every foul epithet, branding it with every term of depravity, savagery, terrorism, and barbarism — but we do not speak of our own failures on security matters, and events pass without anyone being held accountable, and, more often than not, without any lesson being drawn.

We seem to have a problem: we blame the enemy for the losses it inflicts on us, but never blame ourselves for the openings we leave that allow the enemy to strike us. The enemy stays up night and day working to strike us, harm us, and end our existence as a people — this is the nature of any enemy on earth confronting its foe. The enemy works to exhaust and subdue its enemy, and I do not believe history records a single enemy that patted its foe on the back and told him it had no wish to pursue him or kill his soldiers. The enemy does whatever it judges necessary to win the conflict, and we cannot imagine it acting in ways that would make it lose that conflict, unless its own leadership were spies for the other side.

The problem, without doubt, lies with us, because we do not take the appropriate precautions. In every case in which an assassination occurred in a hotel, the martyr was traveling under an assumed name. Have we ever asked ourselves how the enemy reached his real name? Have we opened an investigation into the matter? Of course, it is we who gave out the assumed name, and we who informed the enemy — or, more precisely, the spy or spies roaming among us, who may well occupy leadership positions. The chief of the Zionist Mossad does not sit in on our own decision-making, but it seems he is present, all the same, in a great many of our decision-making sessions.

For decades now there have been constant warnings against using hotels, because they are unsafe places. Hotels are an open stage before intelligence agencies, and it is extremely difficult for a wanted person to stay out of sight, or to escape having his voice recorded or his image captured. Nor is it especially hard, for well-trained people with great skill in infiltration by various means, to enter hotel rooms and halls. Sleeping in the street is safer than sleeping in a hotel, because passersby might witness what happens, whereas in a hotel the assassination takes place silently, hidden beneath the hotel lighting and the music of the dance halls.

Here I should note that the Zionist enemy’s security services do not need to know the assumed name if they already have the wanted person’s voiceprint. They can identify the person and his location through the phone calls they monitor, and can track the phone number, or numbers, from which he speaks. For this reason, a wanted person should avoid using electronic devices or landline telephone networks belonging to Arab governments, if he wants to reduce the chances of being tracked by Mossad or Shin Bet. Disguising one’s name and appearance is useful only if the enemy lacks a voiceprint, and if the wanted person uses non-centralized, non-electronic means of communication.

Al-Mabhouh was martyred in the United Arab Emirates, and there are two objections here: first, the UAE is one of the states of the “Arab Quartet” allied with, or cooperating with, Israel, and its security services cannot be trusted; second, the Emirate of Dubai is a den for the world’s intelligence agencies, including the Mossad. That is to say, the location was thoroughly unsafe, and its rulers and agencies cannot be trusted. As for Majed Abu Sharar, he was martyred in Rome, whose intelligence services frequently work with the Mossad; Shaqaqi in Malta, wide open to intelligence agencies; and Zuheir Mohsen at the Monte Carlo resort. And so it goes.

We suffer from a serious problem: our weak sense of security. Only yesterday, Israel assassinated three of the finest young men of Nablus, less than two days after the announcement of the killing of a Zionist settler. Where did Israel get its information with such astonishing speed? Who passed it the news? Was any investigation opened into the matter? Was anyone arrested pending investigation? This is a chronic problem, stretching from the period before 1948 right up to today. Our sons are killed and arrested before they can carry out their missions, and no investigation follows. All we do is curse the Zionists and damn Israel. God’s curse fall on Israel, day and night — but that curse will not land on its head unless I myself carry out my own duty properly.

There are those who have written at length about these security matters, and I am one of those who has written on it again and again — but has a single faction leader, or deputy leader, or unaffiliated fighter ever asked about the matter or sought clarification? The answer lies with the factions.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “اغتيالات في الفنادق” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.