The Defensive Strategy of Palestinian Resistance

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

Multiple resistance movements have appeared on the Palestinian scene, whether before 1948 under the British Mandate or after the 1967 war, but no clear Palestinian defensive strategy has ever emerged that could serve as a foundation for the various military and political tactics usable toward achieving Palestinian goals and demands — or, at the very least, for providing some measure of security for the Palestinian people wherever they may be, especially in the land occupied in ‘67.

The most recent war — the War of Devoured Straw, or the July 2014 war — revealed that the Palestinian resistance had developed a strategy forming the basis for military and security tactics that together constitute an integrated whole, one capable of shifting the balance of power and, from there, achieving some Palestinian demands or easing the pressure on the Palestinian people in the land occupied in ‘67. This development carried a powerful logic, one that expressed a rational, mature response to the totality of conditions the Palestinian people are living through — conditions that can be summarized as follows:

First: Israel went to great and unchecked lengths in its aggression against the Palestinian people, coming to behave as though the Palestinian people did not exist, carrying out repeated acts of aggression and facing nothing but a few trivial phrases of condemnation that Arab masses everywhere had grown weary of. Israel went to great lengths in confiscating land and expanding settlements, intensified its arrests of Palestinian citizens, the demolition of their homes, and the uprooting of their trees, plundered their water and ravaged their farms, and controlled the details of their daily civilian life. It cut them off from the sea, which is a major source of livelihood for Gaza’s fishermen, tightened its siege on the Gaza Strip, controlled the flow of money into the West Bank, and blocked development projects. On top of all this, it went to great lengths in violating the sanctity of Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Islamic holy sites, and it became clear that its steps toward taking control of the mosque were accelerating. Israel did everything that would lead to the Judaization of Jerusalem and the West Bank, without facing any resistance capable of limiting its aggressive measures.

Second: The Palestinians found themselves alone on the field in confronting Israel, since some Arab states had come to recognize Israel and establish diplomatic relations with it, and most Arab regimes were normalizing their relations with Israel and building extensive commercial ties that strengthened the Israeli economy and Israel’s capacity for military development. More importantly, the Palestinians found that some among their own recognized Israel, normalized relations with it, and cooperated with it on security matters, at the expense of the Palestinian people.

Third: The Palestinian cause receded, both in the Arab world and internationally, and it appeared that the world was no longer concerned with the rights of the Palestinian people, apart from a few stale, insignificant resolutions traditionally issued by the UN General Assembly. The Palestinian cause receded in Arab news broadcasts, sinking to the bottom of states’ priorities, and even the great powers that are supposed to defend the rights of peoples — India, China, Russia — no longer uttered a word in defense of Palestinian rights.

Fourth: The Arab uprisings in a number of Arab countries stole the media spotlight, confining Arab public awareness, in general, to the concerns of the Arab regimes and their opponents, and the Palestinian cause largely dropped out of Arab consciousness — even dropping, to some degree, out of Palestinian consciousness itself, particularly in the West Bank. The Palestinian cause appeared at its worst since 1948. Writers and intellectuals became absorbed in the Arab uprisings and internal Arab conflicts, and their attention drifted away from the troubles Israel was manufacturing, doggedly and deliberately.

Fifth: The internal Palestinian division exhausted the Palestinian people and left them adrift, materially and morally. The Palestinian people had hoped for an Arab unity that might help them recover their rights, only to find Palestinians themselves unable to unite, turning their own guns on one another. Corruption spread widely across the areas of the Palestinian Authority, the social fabric was negatively affected, the Palestinian system of values deteriorated, and Palestinians became unable to rely on themselves, so that their daily bread ended up in the hands of their enemies. The internal Palestinian situation deteriorated so dangerously that the people grew weaker upon weaker, more emaciated upon more emaciated, until the Palestinian lost faith in the future, in himself, and in the very possibility of escaping the difficult internal impasses.

For these reasons above, the Palestinian resistance — specifically, the Palestinian resistance factions in Gaza — decided to shoulder a historic responsibility: searching for ways and means of defending the Palestinian people and keeping the Palestinian cause alive, by developing effective defensive capabilities that could give the Palestinian people hope for the future. The resistance factions set before themselves a strategy summarized in the following points:

…the opposite led to repeated defeats, and to further Israeli arrogance. The Palestinians believed others would fight on their behalf, and that these others would defeat Israel for them, but they learned the lesson well, and concluded that the best way to prove oneself is to rely on oneself — and that without Palestinian arms, no achievements can be secured.

For this reason, the resistance factions, over the years of the Palestinian division, focused on developing military capabilities and on developing every tactic connected to this task, drawing heavily on Hezbollah’s experience. The resistance does not refuse aid that Arab or non-Arab states might offer, but it does not wait for it as a savior of the Palestinian situation. Any aid states choose to offer is welcome, but self-reliance remains the fundamental basis. That is, such aid constitutes a supporting factor, not the backbone.

Second: security fortification. The Palestinian scene suffered, over the years, from Israeli security infiltration. The Palestinian factions were infiltrated, and so was Palestinian society and its various institutions, and these breaches provided a great deal of information about Palestinian activities, until Palestinian society — with its factions, parties, and institutions — became thoroughly infiltrated by spies and collaborators. Israel spread its spies everywhere, and managed to sabotage Palestinian plans and paralyze their capacity for confrontation. Israel would strike cells and groups intent on resistance preemptively, thanks to the information available to it, and managed to defeat the resistance this way. For this reason, the resistance in Gaza decided to pursue spies and collaborators physically and personally, and through technical and electronic development. It achieved a great many gains in this field, to the point that Israel began its most recent war without sufficient information at its disposal. Israel began a war that was, to a large degree, blind, and found itself fumbling in defining the war’s objectives and in identifying influential military positions. Israel was caught off guard by the sheer number of weapons and military tactics it encountered, and had the resistance not possessed this security fortification, Israel would have inflicted far greater losses on the resistance’s military strength.

Third: scientific development. In the past, improvisation and slapdash cleverness prevailed over the Palestinian resistance, and the resistance factions were known for a great many fiery statements, heated speeches, and abundant claims of achievements. The resistance in Gaza cast aside this false rhetorical heritage and began relying on scientific research, laboratories, and workshops to develop weapons and explosives, so as to stand as an equal to Israel — or, at the very least, as a force capable of posing a challenge and turning Israel’s wars into an arduous affair rather than a mere outing. This scientific development led the resistance to work on neutralizing Israel’s most lethal combat sectors, especially its air force, in order to limit its effect in battle. Here too, the resistance drew on Hezbollah’s experience. The resistance worked to develop tunnels impervious to aircraft, and to develop ground tactics capable of paralyzing infantry forces backed by tanks and armored vehicles. The resistance built an extremely complex tunnel network, and the Israeli air force was unable to reach the fighters or the weapons depots, and the war turned into a dirty game, as dirty as the Israeli army itself, which bombed civilians and destroyed homes.

The resistance established scientific research centers, and began relying on minds and on scientists, abandoning entirely the language of improvisation and slapdash cleverness, and managed to develop rockets, rifles, and tools for disabling tanks. Nor did the resistance neglect the matter of smuggling weapons wherever possible, but scientific research and technical development achieved a great degree of independence for the resistance from the Arab regimes, which are never enthusiastic about fighting Israel, and which stand ready to pursue the resistance and its fighters in accordance with the wishes of the colonial powers, especially the United States of America.

Military Tactics

Tactics always serve strategy. The Palestinian resistance proceeded in implementing its strategic principles, while at the same time working to train its sons in harsh, advanced training according to global standards, forming combat units — fedayeen — that were seasoned, brave, aware, and capable of carrying out missions with a high degree of professionalism. The Palestinian fedayeen units outperformed Israeli special forces and drew them into numerous lethal ambushes. The Palestinian soldier has become trained, organized, rational, thoughtful, and endowed with high-level capabilities. Beyond that, the Palestinian soldier possesses a high level of human, national, and moral awareness, a clear and fully internalized combat doctrine, and a firm creed built on the principle of victory or martyrdom, and on the belief that life and death rest in the hands of God Almighty. The Palestinian soldier embraces death for the sake of life, so that the people of Palestine may live, and he does not take a bullet in the back — he takes it in the chest, or in the head.

The resistance has thought, planned, researched, scrutinized, and deliberated, and the Palestinian mind has triumphed over Israeli muscle.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “استراتيجية المقاومة الفلسطينية الدفاعية” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.