Departing from Palestine

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

In those days it was the Zionists alone who killed people, drove them from their homes, and scattered them, and to this day they have not stopped expelling people and pursuing various policies that, in the end, are meant to force people to leave. But they are no longer the only ones adopting such policies — some Palestinians have become partners in this through policies of their own that push Palestinian youth, forcibly, out of the homeland.

The Zionists will continue their displacement policies because they believe that Mandatory Palestine must be a Jewish state, and they do not recognize any Arab or Palestinian rights in it. It is clear that Israel is now working hard and diligently to Judaize the West Bank by reinforcing Zionist settlement blocs and turning them into hubs around which Palestinian village “satellites” revolve. Their policies will also reach the Palestinians in the Land Occupied in ‘48, who make up about 20% of the population. But what about us — we who talk night and day in the media against Zionist policies?

Between Steadfastness and Departure

In years past we used to talk a great deal about steadfastness (sumud); we held conferences, symposiums, and lectures about it so that the people would stand firm and hold their ground against the policies of the occupation. The slogan came down to this: whoever cannot resist can at least remain on the land. And yet, despite this, thousands of Palestinians emigrated every year, finding residence in Arab countries — Jordan in particular — or in Western and other countries. A demographic drain took place from the Land Occupied in ‘67, particularly the West Bank, ever since 1967; had this not happened, the population of these two areas today would, by my estimate, have reached about six million.

The policies of the Palestine Liberation Organization concerning the people’s steadfastness never rose to the level of the aspirations, and much of the money never reached those entitled to it. The same was true of Jordan’s policies, which opened the bridges and accepted the gradual emigration of Palestinians, and which likewise used funds to strengthen the regime’s supporters. Policies in general were oriented toward the interests of the leaderships rather than the interests of the people, and the cries in support of steadfastness were, for the most part, dissipated in an atmosphere of financial corruption.

It seems that the slogan of steadfastness has receded in recent years, overtaken by the slogan of departure. Growing numbers of Palestinian youth look toward leaving, searching for ways to emigrate to countries such as Sweden, Norway, Canada, Australia, and the United States. There are those who have already emigrated from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but we have no statistics — not even approximate figures — that would give us an indication of how responsive the countries concerned have been to the applications submitted by Palestinians.

This talk of departure comes together with a clear decline in the meanings of steadfastness, patriotism, and sacrifice for the homeland, in the meanings of shared destiny and the right of self-determination, and in the retreat of a mentality of giving and liberation in favor of a consumerist mentality and private interests. The values of patriotism and commitment have receded to the point that security coordination with Israel has become acceptable to broad sectors of the people, and to the point that recognizing Israel has become, for many, a rational matter, such that whoever rejects it deserves nothing but to be accused of extremism and of belonging to an old, fossilized mentality.

There are Palestinian expulsion factors that dovetail with Israel’s displacement policies; I list some of them here:

They sacrificed and were imprisoned for the sake of national, liberationist goals. The agreements have debased the various meanings of patriotism and the lofty values for which the Palestinian people struggled, and have turned the fighters into marginal figures at the tables of those who attached themselves to something other than the homeland, and to strangers from outside the homeland.

Second: The Oslo agreement was accompanied by further factional polarization and internal Palestinian tension, and matters ended in bloody infighting that led to the disintegration and division the people are in today. Before the agreements we used to disagree over the methods and means of national struggle; after the agreements, we came to disagree over national struggle itself.

Third: The idea of resistance began to come under continuous internal attack, to the point that some of us started calling it terrorism. Resistance became a charge that would land its bearer in Zionist prisons and in Palestinian prisons alike, and the resistance fighter was turned into a painful state of alienation in which he no longer felt himself to be in his own home or homeland.

Fourth: Factional fanaticism stood in the way of establishing Palestinian cultural, social, and intellectual programs, and the cultural and social atmosphere turned into factional marketplaces emptied of content and substance, ultimately leading to further Palestinian confusion and loss.

Fifth: The policies of the Palestinian factions stood in the way of seeking out the competencies of the Palestinian people, and employment became tied to factional affiliation rather than national affiliation, to submission and loyalty rather than competence and qualifications, to hypocrisy and charlatanism rather than sound judgment and the capacity to give. The ignorant, the incapable, and the opportunists came to dominate the public scene, while people of knowledge and learning receded and were, in many cases, humiliated by those who have neither minds in their heads nor morals in their conduct.

Sixth: On the whole, there is a form of tribalism practiced within Palestinian society — the tribalism of faction, the tribalism of supporting or opposing the agreement with the Zionists, the tribalism of wearing the headscarf or not, the tribalism of place of residence, and so on. This is a tribalism that serves policies of divide and rule, without which whoever clings to the seats of power could not remain in his seat.

Seventh: There is a struggle over salaries and rank, naturally among those who enjoy favor with those who control the money, and those who do not take part in this struggle have no option but withdrawal or flight.

Eighth: Political and security suspicion was already a basic fact of life among people in years past, owing to the infiltration of various intelligence apparatuses into the ranks. But suspicion increased after the agreements with Israel and after the division, until the Palestinian no longer trusted his own brother. A life of suspicion is harsh and difficult, and there is no longer reassurance even in the walls around us.

Steadfastness for the Sake of the Homeland

Did the Palestinian people fight for status or money? Or was it jihad for the sake of God, for the sake of the homeland? We must keep holding on to the burning coal; we must stand firm and continue to absorb the pain and the suffering. The dawn of freedom is coming, and with it will surely come the liberation that sets things right. There is no doubt that internal conditions are very difficult and harsh, but this is a homeland, not a piece of land that we can simply abandon. Our homeland is ours; upon it we stand firm and live; upon its soil we make history; and in the embrace of its earth our bodies will be gathered. We do not struggle for personal gain, but for the sake of God, for the homeland of the generations: the homeland of our young daughters and our blessed sons, of our promising children, and for the sake of our women and our elders across the years.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “الرحيل عن فلسطين” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.