Did Turkey Open a Door to Normalization with Israel?

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

Turkey is facing broad criticism from opponents of normalization with the Zionists over its signing of its recent agreement with the Zionist entity. Critics say Turkey is opening a new door to normalization with the entity, and encouraging Arab and Islamic states to normalize, or to continue normalizing, for those states already doing so.

On this basis, they conclude that Turkey — which has said it stands with the national rights of the Palestinian people — is, through this agreement, doing the Zionists a service at the Palestinian people’s expense.

I believe this criticism overlooks two matters:

1. Turkey has never actually been against normalization with the Zionists. It is well known that it was the second Islamic state to recognize the Zionist entity, in 1949, after Imperial Iran, and Turkey has remained firm in that recognition ever since, working to develop its economic, political, and tourism relations with the entity, and developing cooperation in the military and security fields as well. Relations were affected only over the past six years, because of the Zionist attack on the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara.

2. Palestinians, at both the popular and official levels, are themselves among the most normalized with the Zionist enemy. Most Arab countries have followed the Palestinians’ lead and begun establishing normalized relations with this enemy. The official Palestinian level feels no shame in maintaining security relations with the Zionists, and stands ready, always, to arrest and mistreat Palestinians in defense of Zionist security — and if opponents of normalization, among whom I count myself, wish to direct arrows at those who normalize, they ought to direct them first at the Palestinian Authority, and second at the Arab countries.

The Objective Truth

Linking dialectical relations to one another forms the strongest basis for reaching sound conclusions, and the writer or politician who does not understand dialectical relations, or how to connect them, cannot reach a sound conclusion. It is a plain fact that Turkey is a member of NATO, and NATO is tied, in one way or another, security-wise and militarily, to the Zionist entity, and whether we like it or not, Turkey is tied, directly and indirectly, security-wise and militarily, to Israel. This security and military tie is far stronger than the economic and tourism tie, and is not easy to dissolve. And if Turkey wished to dissolve its security commitment toward the Zionists, it would have to leave NATO — and as long as Turkey preserves its NATO membership, it preserves its security commitment toward the Zionists, and we ourselves should not be surprised by a subsequent normalization of relations.

The second truth is that Turkey never closed the door on its relations with the entity; it kept the door ajar over the preceding years, so that the opportunity for dialogue with the entity would remain open. That is, it never turned its face entirely away from the entity, but kept its eyes fixed on the possibility of mending the rift that had occurred. Turkey never removed the entity from its calculations, and set conditions for restoring relations to their normal course — meaning the readiness for things to return to their proper place remained in place all along.

Another truth is that we should not expect the Turks to be more Palestinian than the Palestinians themselves. Whoever demands sacrifice from others must be at the forefront of those making sacrifices.

The Predicaments of the Parties

The parties directly concerned with what happened between Turkey and the entity are Gaza, Turkey, and the entity, and it is clear each party suffers its own particular predicament, and hopes, or had hoped, that the agreement would overcome these predicaments:

Gaza suffers from an extremely serious predicament: the siege affecting every detail of daily civilian life for the Palestinian people in Gaza. Gaza is in dire straits, lacking drinking water needed for daily and household tasks, and lacking the electricity indispensable to every household in the world.

It is summer, the heat in Gaza is intense, and people cannot even use fans. The financial distress is also severe, because of the ban on transferring money into the Strip, with the whole world watching the banks and preventing them from transferring funds. This is on top of the shortage of fuel and life’s necessities generally. For this reason, Gaza was awaiting the lifting of the Zionist siege so that people could breathe. Gaza is being strangled by the Zionists, by Arabs, and, quite likely, by Palestinians who continually incite for the siege to be kept in place and tightened.

Turkey, meanwhile, boxed itself into a corner when it abandoned its “zero problems with neighbors” policy. Turkey does not enjoy good relations with its neighbors, and these relations have continued deteriorating since the start of the Arab upheaval, particularly in Syria. It suffers tense relations with Syria, Iraq, Iran, Russia, Armenia, and Greece, has lost a great deal of trade with many states, and has lost enormous numbers of tourists, particularly from Russia and from the Zionist entity itself.

It is clear the Turkish president finally came to realize the consequences of tense relations with others, and realized he needed to open windows toward others, the entity being the first among them. It has been rumored that Erdoğan apologized to the Russian president over the downing of the Russian plane over Syria. Continued tension will certainly harm the Turkish economy and affect the popularity and standing of the Justice and Development Party, and the results of any coming election.

The Zionist entity, for its part, saw that mounting pressure on Gaza could lead to an explosion that might drag the entity into a new war. The Gaza Strip once exploded against Egypt in 2008 because of the tightening siege — people exploded against the colonial border standing between Palestine and Egypt and forced their way into Sinai, buying whatever supplies they needed. The entity does not rule out Palestinian resistance factions firing rockets or infiltrating through tunnels into Zionist population centers, which could provoke the entity into starting a new war against Gaza.

The Zionist entity does not want a new war against Gaza right now, because its home front is not ready, and because of the international position on the situation in the Strip. The Zionist home front is frayed, and the Zionist army appears to be suffering a kind of fatigue following its failure in its successive wars on Lebanon and Gaza.

International parties, for their part, are searching for ways to ease the pressure on Gaza so that matters do not explode into a war whose negative results would reverberate across the region as a whole and affect Western interests.

This means all parties need a solution to the siege on Gaza, or at least an easing of it, in order to avoid something worse.

Lifting the Siege

Some were optimistic that the siege on the Gaza Strip would be lifted, ending this humanitarian catastrophe, but that optimism was misplaced. A journalist was forced into a long debate with me over the lifting of the siege. The reporter was optimistic, and I tried to convince him that Turkey cannot lift the siege on Gaza, because it does not constitute a decisive military and economic weight capable of influencing the Zionist decision, and that the Zionist entity cannot lift the siege for security reasons.

The entity is convinced that Palestinians will work to smuggle in weapons and money if the siege is lifted, and that the resistance in Gaza will build an enormous arsenal of rockets if the doors are opened. And Turkey does not operate according to the political definition holding that politics is insistence on what is possible, but according to the definition that politics is the art of the possible — and this second definition is consistent with a readiness for concessions, deviation, laxity, and compromise.

In the end, the agreement emerged without including the lifting of the siege. And even if the Zionists were to lift the siege, would Egypt also move to lift it? Gaza’s problem is not only with the Zionists, but with the Arab Zionists as well.

Turkey backed down from its condition regarding the lifting of the siege on Gaza, but it also achieved certain gains. For instance, it secured the Zionists’ agreement to compensate the families of the Mavi Marmara martyrs, and secured the privilege of providing humanitarian services to Gaza, foremost among them developing the water and electricity situation, and supplying Gaza with humanitarian necessities. And to underline that the siege was not being lifted, the entity stipulated the inspection of Turkish goods at the port of Ashdod, and Turkey agreed to this.

The Position of the Hamas Movement

The Zionists always demand the expulsion of Palestinian resistance from the territory of any state that concludes agreements with them — this demand even extends to the Palestinian Authority. The Authority must pursue Hamas members, confiscate their weapons, and arrest them if it wishes to remain on the political map in the territory occupied in 1967, and the same demand must surely have been directed at the Turks, even though nothing of this kind has been announced.

My assessment is that the matter was subject to debate and discussion between the two sides, and that Turkey most likely agreed to prevent any security or military activity by Hamas on Turkish soil, while the entity agreed to allow Hamas administrative offices to remain in Turkey. These administrative offices are free of weapons, organizational activities, and the preparation of training courses — meaning these offices may be limited to certain cultural and social activities, including scholarships that, on the whole, do not affect the ongoing conflict. Hamas has no say in the matter, and it appears the Turks kept Mr. Khaled Meshaal informed of what was agreed upon.

Palestinians are expected to feel reassured whenever they hear a leader make statements in their favor; Palestinians react quickly to political statements supporting their demands, and rush toward those making the statements, hoping they might be the ones to liberate Palestine. Palestinians should not base their decisions on momentary or fleeting circumstances, but should build their relationships according to strategic assessments. It is good that Erdoğan supports Palestinian rights, but can he sustain the journey all the way to the end?

The second concern occupying Hamas’s mind is the prisoner exchange, and the role Turkey might play in this field. Based on experience, it is better for a non-Arab state to play a role in completing such an exchange.

The Palestinians tried Egypt, but Egypt did not honor its role — the proof being that the Zionist entity arrested many of those released in the Wafa al-Ahrar exchange and refused to release the fourth batch. Egypt, as mediator, accomplished nothing, and did not press to hold the entity to what had been agreed. Turkey may perhaps honor its role, and remain vigilant in monitoring Zionist violations and any lapse in commitment.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “هل فتحت تركيا بابا للتطبيع مع إسرائيل؟” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.