Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia: Routine Meetings

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

Political coordination between Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia is returning these days to its former rhythm, after having suffered a severe blow of discouragement as a result of the aggression against Iraq. Observers and interested parties across the Arab world are optimistic about this return, and the media speak of hopes pinned on this new beginning. There are those who believe that these regimes together form a strong Arab pillar capable of influencing the course of events, shaping them and directing them in a manner that, at least to some degree, matches Arab interests — given the roles they play at both the Arab and world levels. They believe that life may begin to stir again around the twin ideas of Arab solidarity and reform of the Arab League, which would push toward establishing a new Arab political order that preserves some measure of Arab dignity and allows Arabs to take part, however modestly, in global decisions.

I believe this optimism is nothing more than mere wishful thinking that will not find its way to practical realization on the ground, given the political situation currently prevailing in each of these countries. These regimes have coordinated their political efforts before, but failed to accomplish anything of value either at the Arab or the global level, and I do not think they have now become qualified to play a role different from before. This is for several reasons, foremost among them the following:

First: these regimes are fundamentally different from one another in how they approach various Arab problems and issues, and each has its own lens, differing in its foundations, its starting points, its tools, and its methods from the lenses of the other two regimes. Let no one be deceived by the kisses and embraces on the airport tarmac, for this is merely an Arab custom that signifies neither love, harmony, accord, nor agreement — nor should anyone be deceived by media statements or press conferences. There is a pan-nationalist regime, a tribal regime, and a state-centered regime, all of which come together over internal security and part ways over national security and the security of the nation. It is true that all of them are police regimes built on the suppression of the Arab citizen, but each has its own particular way of navigating the Arab and global situation with the least possible damage to itself. One regime bases its legitimacy on varied forms of American support; another begs favors from the Americans and finds nothing to do but submit to the American will; and a third tries to rebel, in vain.

Second: judging from past experience, these regimes have never tried to touch the heart of the matter, which is that they are top-down, repressive regimes that do not allow for effective popular participation, and do not permit the establishment of the various political institutions that would give the people a voice. They are personal regimes that represent neither the popular Arab will, nor Arab ambitions, nor Arab hopes. They are regimes that swim with a current entirely different from the current of the Arab people, and that harness their security apparatuses to pursue people, terrorize them, and intimidate them, all for the benefit of those running the regime. In other words, these regimes have not worked to bring about the required change that would allow important decisions to enjoy popular protection, and so their decisions have remained within a certain pattern that does not provoke American or European anger.

Third: although the idea of Arab solidarity is itself a defeatist idea that came to replace the idea of Arab unity, which all the Arab regimes have done a disservice to, solidarity nonetheless requires taking important decisions if there is to be genuine solidarity superior to the verbal solidarity that appears in the media. Solidarity requires, for instance, establishing a genuine common Arab market, opening the borders between the Arab fiefdoms, establishing a joint military force, and abandoning relations with Israel, and so on. These regimes, and others, are not prepared for that now, and even if they became prepared, they would not pursue implementation and commitment.

Fourth: Arab decisions, whether at the level of the summit or of bilateral and trilateral meetings, find no respect, nor do their own authors insist on respecting them. For example, the Arab initiative for resolving the Palestinian cause went under the bulldozer treads of the American road map, and the Arabs neither mourned their own initiative nor rejected the new one. In fact, the regimes accepted the road map, which gives only the most timid nod toward the Arab initiative. This takes us back some thirty-six years, to when the Arabs decided there would be no peace, no negotiations, and no recognition of Israel — and then, just two months later, accepted Security Council Resolution 242, which calls for the very reverse of those three “no’s.” These three regimes are no different from the general body of Arab regimes, which have previously abandoned their own decisions in favor of American pressure or some newly emerging practical reality against which they had no political will to stand firm. A single regime may perhaps have the will to chafe against a given political reality, but its position is weakened the moment it coordinates with other regimes.

Fifth: regarding Iraq and the position on the Interim Council, I do not believe these regimes will hold firm to their position that it lacks legitimacy. If the United Nations were to issue a decision tomorrow declaring the Council legitimate and calling for it to be dealt with as the body temporarily representing Iraq until a new constitution for the country is ratified and elections are held, these regimes would rush to accept what they call “international legitimacy,” and would deal with the Council as the legitimate body representing the Iraqis, swallowing all their previous statements and treating the matter as a decision of a single state that does not rise to the level of decisions of the international body.

Sixth: these regimes cannot issue a decision supporting the Iraqi resistance, encouraging it, and calling for its support, out of fear of the United States and in deference to its policies in the region. A given regime might sympathize with the resistance in its heart, or turn a blind eye to certain activities taking place on territory under its control; but as a group of regimes, they will not recognize the Iraqi resistance as representing the will of the Iraqi people, and will not deal with it openly, because, at least from the perspective of the Saudi and Egyptian regimes, they are bound by interest to the United States. It is even likely that these regimes will be asked to take steps to weaken the Iraqi resistance, such as tightening surveillance of the border with Iraq to prevent smuggled Arab supplies from individuals and to prevent the infiltration of volunteers wishing to fight the Americans. It would not be strange if they comply, since experience confirms as much. And just as Palestinian martyrdom-seekers became, in the official files of these regimes, “suicide bombers” and the resistance fighters became “terrorists,” so too will the Iraqi resistance become “terrorism.”

In short, all the experience so far indicates that the Arab regimes are too feeble to defend even themselves, and there is nothing to give an Arab reason to believe that a new Arab era will emerge, or that any bold step will be taken to face the challenges. There is only one gate whose crossing by the Arab rulers would invite some measure of optimism, and that is the gate of returning to the people. When tyranny stops, and a radical change takes place in the systems of governance such that the citizen gains his due respect and his institutions gain their due importance, it becomes possible to speak of a new stage that will inevitably lead to progress across various fields. And when the decision comes to rest in the hands of the people, through their representatives and their various institutions, people develop the courage to challenge and to confront danger, and it will no longer be easy for other nations to tamper with the fate and security of the Arabs, because they will know that the people will neither give up nor lay down their arms. But if the security apparatuses remain the ones with the final word, and the ruler remains the holder of a sacred divine mandate, then this nation will remain under the lash of both kin and stranger alike.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “مصر وسوريا والسعودية: اجتماعات نمطية” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.