The Future of Palestinian Resistance in Light of Arab Developments

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

Palestinian resistance has gone through a number of stages and varied circumstances, and its performance has fluctuated according to the givens of each stage and each circumstance. Resistance rose at times, and waned at others; it passed through many crises, and had times of calm. But in all cases it did not develop into a solid challenge to the occupation, nor turn into a revolution or a war except in one instance — the case of the Gaza Strip in the Cast Lead war of 2008/2009. Palestinian resistance troubled Israel, but it did not constitute a genuine strategic challenge for which Israel prepared strategically, and it did not become a military phenomenon except during the phase of martyrdom operations, which was prominent in the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century.

The crises of Palestinian resistance oscillated between internal and external factors, but internal causes were always the more dangerous, and worked more insidiously within the body of the resistance. There was no seriousness in Palestinian resistance work when it came to training, security fortification, military tactics, and armament, nor were faction leaderships prepared for revolutionary work committed to the practical moral requirements of resistance. Nor was the resistance spared from external forces that were always concerned with causing the resistance to fail and tearing apart the Palestinian body, turning the Palestinian people into a population of beggars. External and internal forces coalesced against the resistance and in support of Israel.

Many Arab regimes worked to cause Palestinian resistance to fail, just as they worked to keep their own peoples under the yoke of backwardness and poverty, and the resistance suffered numerous setbacks because of the policies of Arab regimes. Now that the wave of change has begun on the Arab stage, and some regimes have fallen, it is expected that the resistance will pass through new and different circumstances from those of the past, and will be affected by them from several angles. The writer attempts here to speculate about what can be expected for the future of this resistance.

Levels of Resistance to the Occupation

Resistance to the Israeli occupation consists of several levels, namely:

Boycott, the lowest level of resistance, which includes economic, political, cultural, and social boycott, etc. This is a level of boycotting within the ability of every person, and no one can say they are incapable of it. Every person can refrain from buying Israeli goods, unless there is a national decision that some commodity absolutely cannot be avoided from the enemy. This is a level that Palestinian resistance has not yet achieved, despite dozens of years having passed since the usurpation of Palestine and the 1967 occupation. On the contrary, Palestinians persist in the process of normalization with Israel and security coordination, raising a weak-content slogan — the slogan of “popular resistance.” Even those who coordinate security matters with Israel raise this slogan.

Partial civil disobedience. People under occupation can engage in partial civil disobedience such as refusing to pay taxes or refusing to license cars. This is no longer effective now because the occupation handed over civil administration to the Palestinian Authority.

Total civil disobedience, which includes not carrying Israeli identity cards (the ID the Palestinian now carries in the West Bank bears an Israeli number), and non-compliance with all laws linked to the occupation, or that serve its security interests. This is possible now, and it should have been implemented long ago. Note that such a level of resistance requires a people conscious enough to respect the internal general order so that chaos does not occur, and requires forming popular committees with a level of professionalism and willingness to sacrifice in order to organize people’s civil affairs.

Armed resistance, the most elevated and most violent level, and historically the most effective. Historically, armed resistance has been the most successful in expelling occupation and colonialism, and achieving the right to self-determination and national independence.

Palestinian resistance has not achieved any of these levels, and has only carried out scattered military operations across time, never constituting a daily or life-encompassing phenomenon that would make the occupation a difficult matter. Only the combination of popular pressure with some acts of resistance formed a barrier against the continuation of the occupation of the Gaza Strip, and Israel ultimately decided to withdraw.

The Intifada

The intifada is not an act of resistance but rather an act of protest; it is a spontaneous popular reaction arising from intense frustration and the existence of a great vacuum in confronting the occupation. The field is empty of resistance fighters, and empty of any horizon for ridding oneself of the occupation, so people go out expressing in various ways what churns within them of constriction. Since 1920, roughly twenty-five intifadas have erupted in Palestine, and the Palestinian people achieved nothing through any of them.

Basic Requirements for the Success of Resistance

For resistance to occupation or colonialism to succeed, certain fundamentals on which the resistance rests must be present; I mention some of them:

Security fortification. The resistance should possess security precision and intense security vigilance so that corrupt, ignorant, or collaborating elements working for the enemy do not enter the organization. Security breaches are extremely dangerous, more dangerous than the enemy’s ability to gather information through its technical means. Agents and spies are a very dangerous plague that destroys fighters, supporters, and backers. The Palestinian factions failed at security fortification, and only in recent years have some factions begun to focus on it.

Exemplary leadership. It is important for the resistance leadership to be at a lofty moral level if the resistance wants to mobilize support for itself. Leaders must be composed, possessed of sound judgment and virtue, and permanently prepared to sacrifice and take the lead in action against the occupation. Moral leadership can gather people around it so that all segments of society become supportive of the resistance, not merely masses detached from the fighters. The resistance has produced many moral leaders, but it seems that leadership living in the cities and enjoying a comfortable life is what ultimately took the front positions.

Properly preparing fighters so they are capable of practicing the arts of guerrilla combat — hit-and-run fighting, surprise, and ambush.

Clarity of purpose, and working to achieve it. Lack of clarity negatively affects the fighter, exposing him to disorientation and loss, and he may easily abandon continuing the resistance as a result. This requires clarity on the part of the leadership, and cultural programs at the national level so that everyone speaks with the same purpose. It is preferable to have a document containing the goals that enjoys the consensus of the various groups engaged in the resistance.

In the Palestinian case, continuous work to win the support of the Arab peoples who host the Palestinian resistance, for the sake of mobilization, protection, and strengthening. And for this to be achieved, it is the Palestinian’s duty not to set himself up as a leader over his host, and to incline toward gentleness and good treatment, and to practically entrench the matter of being a good example, along with seriousness in confronting Israel.

The Arab Environment and Palestinian Resistance

The Arab environment has not been favorable to Palestinian resistance, at least since the defeat of June 1967, because Arab regimes remained either within the circle of Western influence or domination, or within an approach of bluster that focuses on the ring of words without real action. It was not expected that a favorable environment would exist for genuine resistance launched from Arab countries against Israel, because all Arab regimes feared Israel, feared Western and Israeli measures against them, and were all too impotent to mobilize their peoples to face the problems or pressures that arise from supporting the resistance or providing a suitable atmosphere for it. The monarchical regimes generally revolved within the Western-Israeli orbit, while the republican regimes remained within the orbit of empty bluster.

The unsound Arab environment met with unsound Palestinian leaderships, whose talk was greater than their stature, and whose deeds were far beneath their words, and matters ended with a Palestinian resistance that recognizes Israel and carries a Kalashnikov rifle under Israeli license.

With this wave of change now sweeping the Arab homeland, the following points can be noted:

An Arab is always more concerned about his interests, dignity, and honor than his ruler is. The ruler is subject to the pressure of interests, especially the interest of clinging to his seat, and it is possible, as has occurred in all Arab states, that he will pursue a path of deals and conspiracy against the nation in order to remain in power. The people now, especially in Tunisia and Egypt, hold the reins of affairs and constitute an element of oversight and control, and it is difficult for an official to manipulate matters as was possible before. The people may sometimes be misled, but the unfolding of events reveals what had been hidden, and the people quickly correct the wrong.

Arab peoples are more concerned about the nation’s independence than their rulers are; they have grown weary of a life of dependency, humiliation, and control by Western states, and they will certainly continue to assert themselves before these states once internal conditions stabilize in the countries where the revolutions succeed.

Arab peoples are closer to one another than Arab rulers are to one another. Arab rulers are, for the most part, at odds, for several reasons, foremost among them the lack of independent decision-making power and subservience to external moods, and for this reason the nation has remained torn apart to the extent that Arab solidarity even on secondary matters has not risen to the required level. Arab peoples harbor within themselves feelings of unity, brotherhood, and shared destiny, and these feelings will crystallize into practical policies that will change much in the essence of Arab cooperation, and will inevitably be reflected in the work of the Arab League. Arab peoples will bear their concerns in an almost collective manner, and the hopes that grew in Arab hearts in past decades will find a path toward growth.

The features of new Arab regimes will be determined according to standards of elections and freedom of choice, and while it is true that the idea of freedom of choice needs some time to become a habit, merely beginning is better than remaining under the tyranny of a ruler and the sway of security apparatuses. Periodic elections have the capacity to correct course if the people go astray.

The wave currently underway in the Arab homeland will not bring change only in the states where the ruling system changes, but will also include change in Arab states where the masses have not moved, because what is happening in revolting states constitutes a pressuring factor on rulers in quiet states. That is, the wave of change will touch various parts of the Arab homeland.

It is noticeable that Israel is an entity accused, rejected, or shunned by the crowds of the revolutions. The masses of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and Bahrain raised slogans, or issued cries, against Israel and against those rulers who deal with it, and it is not expected that it will be acceptable to the new ruling regimes.

The most important point in all the Arab revolutions concerns the moral dimension, in that the masses went out to defend their freedom, and stood firmly against theft, dependency, tyranny, corruption, and conspiracy against people and their exploitation. The revolutions aspire to a moral upheaval that will distinguish a new stage in modern Arab history, and those who hold to the values of collective work, mutual cooperation, freedom, and self-cohesion cannot squander their causes, or acquiesce to forces that strip them of their rights, or dominate their countries.

Palestinian Resistance’s Interaction with the New Arab Situation

The question posed now is: does Palestinian resistance possess the elements needed to adapt to a new Arab situation marked by the features noted above? The arena of official Arab bluster and conspiracy is now turning into arenas of freedom, liberation, and change — so will Palestinian resistance develop new concepts of action, and follow methods and approaches different from those of the past? And will this resistance be able to address the Arab masses in new dimensions leading to the mobilization of Arab energies in support of the resistance?

As I noted above, Palestinian resistance was not serious in the past, and lost the masses of the nation, and became entangled in the conflicts of regimes and their shifting alliances — so will planning be different now? I expect that those who wish to benefit from the changes will adopt the following steps:

Extracting the Palestinian cause from the confines of “Palestinization,” that is, from restricting the cause to Palestinians alone. Palestinization has harmed the resistance, and has made the masses of the nation feel that there is no trust in it, and that Arab regimes are the pillar for finding a solution to Palestinian national rights.

Focusing resistance from within Palestine, in which the Gaza Strip will have the pioneering role. In the West Bank, negotiations must be halted and there must be a return to the idea of resistance. The masses of the nation will not stand with a Palestinian party that coordinates security matters with Israel.

Developing programs aimed at making Palestinian resistance an inseparable part of the nation’s efforts aimed at liberating Arab land and expelling Western colonialism from the Arab region.

Behaving with the ethics of a model to be emulated, and abandoning entirely bluster, fanaticism, and extortion. This requires developing the ethics of bearing arms, the ethics of security fortification, and the ethics of respecting the geographic location in which the resistance is present.

Achieving Palestinian national unity built on the thinking of resistance and not the thinking of compromise, and also unifying Palestinian resistance under a single secret military leadership that believes in the necessity of confronting Israel, and does not respond to political bargaining over the Palestinian cause.

Expectations

There is what can be expected in the short term and the long term, and I see the following:

In the short term, the masses of the Egyptian people will press for a gradual disengagement from the Camp David agreement’s provisions on Sinai, and for ridding themselves of the gas agreement signed with Israel. We can already observe this through the bombing of the pipelines that carry Egyptian gas to Israel. Also, the interim Egyptian regime will begin easing pressure on the Gaza Strip, and easing the pursuit of smugglers who move money and weapons into Gaza through the tunnels. We have already begun to see this, and Arab resistance in Sinai and Palestine has begun to breathe air less polluted than before. As for Syria, the idea of resistance will begin to flourish whether the regime falls or does not fall. The masses of the Syrian people will surge toward the Golan if the regime falls, and part of this surge will involve developing a Syrian resistance in cooperation with Palestinians; and if the regime does not fall, then the regime itself will be forced to develop its own approach in order to recover the occupied land, and will no longer remain sheltered only behind the Lebanese resistance.

In the long term, Palestinian resistance will enjoy freedom of media and educational work in various Arab arenas, and will be able to interact with the masses with ease and facility, which will provide the resistance with better popular moral and financial support than it currently has. The new regimes will be subjected to new pressures from Western states to halt the resistance’s open work in Arab countries, but the will of the Arab peoples will be the stronger, and will open the field for Palestinian resistance to take on its Arab dimension at various official and unofficial levels. This will ultimately be reflected in various Arab institutions, such as the Arab League, which will begin to deal with the resistance camp rather than the Oslo camp. That is, the resistance will gain Arab legitimacy, not the negotiating table with Israel.

Conclusion

The greater responsibility for benefiting from the new Arab situation falls on Islamic resistance, specifically the movements of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. If they act well, especially in shedding the garb of fanaticism and selectivity in dealing with others, they will achieve gains on the Arab stage that will automatically be reflected in the resistance’s capabilities and performance inside Palestine, and in any other Arab arenas that may develop. This requires developing a new strategy for Palestinian resistance, and paying attention to the levels of resistance without neglecting any of them.

As for the other, non-Islamic forces, foremost among them the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, they will remain in place if they do not step out from under the cloak of the Oslo agreement and develop a new intellectual dimension for dealing with the new Arab situation. As for popular resistance, it is important to understand the enemy that the resistance faces, and to stop normalization with this enemy, and with those who provide it support.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “مستقبل المقاومة الفلسطينية في ضوء التطورات العربية” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.