Gaza Between Mourning and History's Movement

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

It was to be expected that Arabs, and Palestinians in particular, would weep over what happened in Gaza, and it is hard to imagine that anyone possessed of national, patriotic, or religious loyalty would approve of it or praise it. Internal fighting is a great tragedy that brings grief and pain, plants malice and hatred, and raises the level of feeling for vengeance and retaliation. Nations have known the meaning of internal wars, and have realized they are heavier in burden than external wars, deeper in their wounds, and the ugliest means of spreading a spirit of terror and fear among citizens. A person may feel at ease fighting an external enemy, and may even feel proud of it, but he hides in shame and embarrassment before internal fighting, which produces nothing but the defeated on all sides.

Many eyes weep over what happened in Gaza, the Palestinian people bow their heads in shame at what took place, and the Arab peoples grieve reproachfully over what happened, as though the Palestinian people had lost their balance and equilibrium. Condemnation of what happened is on the tongues of the overwhelming majority of people, and grieving over Palestinian blood is a lament that wrings the soul.

Reason before the event occurs

Emotions run high, and the pain is general and overwhelming, but in the end this does little good. It may help a little in psychological release, and may ease the grief with time, but it does not produce solutions that prevent a repetition of what happened, nor does it chart a future dominated by mutual cooperation and collective work.

Living nations think of solutions before an event occurs; indeed, they try to shape the event according to their own will, through advance planning grounded in awareness, analysis, and a scientific weighing of matters. Nations scientifically sense the concerns and problems that may confront them, and work to put in place plans and strategies to avoid them, and to move themselves from crisis to relief. But if a nation wanders aimlessly and does not believe in science, scientific thinking, and objective analysis independent of whims and desires, it falls into a maze and pays a heavy price — in tears, blood, fear, and hunger.

I was among the Arab intellectuals who warned, again and again, through articles, television and radio screens, and in the alleys and streets, that the Palestinian situation was inevitably heading toward internal fighting, and that Palestinian blood would be shed by Palestinian hands — but no one wanted to listen. I wrote, through the Al Jazeera website, about the causes that were inevitably driving toward Palestinian internal fighting, and I proposed multiple solutions to avert this fighting, whether on the economic and financial level or on the political and security level. No one responded to any project or any solution, whether it came from within Palestine or from outside it.

Applying solutions before a tragedy occurs is always far easier than applying them after the tragedy has occurred. Before the tragedy, one tries to keep away a tragedy that has not yet befallen; after it occurs, the matter becomes one of escaping a great predicament whose parts have grown tangled. As I read the thinking of the Palestinian leaderships currently in place, I do not see it as being at a level high enough to break free from the grip of factionalism and private interests, whether personal or factional — it is a mindset that is truly suited to nothing but infighting and unseemly factional bickering, which the Arab watches daily on television screens. I do not see reason receiving much attention on the Palestinian scene; it is in retreat in favor of cleverness, improvisation, and narrow-mindedness.

Oslo is smaller than Palestine

Ever since the Oslo Accord was signed, the specter of internal fighting has loomed. Limited internal fighting occurred in 1994, clashes took place between the security services, and the Palestinian Authority arrested numerous people accused of resisting Israel. The small events were a prelude to the great ones. The Oslo Accord cannot possibly contain the Palestinian cause; it leaps over Palestinian taboos and accepts arrangements far lesser than those accepted under the Camp David Accords and the Palestinian Village Leagues that Israel established at the start of the 1980s. The Palestinian people have fought for their rights since 1917, at the very least, and the results of Oslo matched neither the level of blood that was shed nor the level of aspirations.

If the Palestinian cause is bigger than the Oslo Accord, then the tailored garment will not cover the body and will certainly tear. The tailor cannot forcibly stuff the groom into a wedding suit that does not fit, or else the groom will hide from people in shame at what shows of him. Oslo gave the Palestinians nothing but some of the very things they had rejected over time, such as accepting the international resolutions, self-rule, and the renunciation of terrorism. Oslo tried to impose what was utterly unacceptable to Palestinians, and the result was not unexpected.

This same logic applies exactly to the Arab initiative, which is far smaller than the size of the Arab nation and its history, civilization, religion, and achievements. The Arab initiative is a mouse issuing from a giant passing through a sickly condition. Such a giant cannot bear to be this weak and feeble, and in the end the Arab initiative cannot succeed as a basis for a solution with Israel. (If only) the Arab rulers had read history, they would not have put forward this initiative, and they would not have imagined in the first place that Israel deserves initiatives.

The theory of defeat

…establishing a Palestinian state through the negotiating table.

This Palestinian side overlooked the fact that the negotiating table becomes meaningless without a balance of power — it loses its meaning and turns into a table of supplication — and it overlooked a historical truth: that whoever accepts reality relinquishes his share in the making of history, and becomes the subject of events rather than their maker. It is the victors who make history, while those who accept reality find themselves stuck in the past, with no relation to the future. Reality changes according to objective conditions and according to the will of whoever is strong or determined to change it, while the one who accepts reality is merely a tool — and tools have no rights except those which their user finds it in his interest to grant them.

This camp fell into a great predicament when it discovered that the negotiations it believed in were a ridiculous farce aimed at passing time with something of no value. This strengthened the position of the other camp, which insisted on rejecting reality and continuing to try to change it. Historically, the one who moves overcomes the one fixed in place, and the forces of change ultimately prevail over the forces of stagnation. Objectively, the young man displaces the middle-aged man, just as the middle-aged man displaces the old man. The past cannot defeat the present or the future, and the past remains in retreat no matter how much we inflate it with tales of heroism or sing of its glories, simply because it has passed. Only the middle-aged man can prevail over the young man if he keeps pace with the times and continues to renew his youth, regardless of his chronological age.

Fatah’s retreat in Gaza

It was not surprising that Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip so easily. Regardless of what is heard through the media about a “coup” and “coup plotters,” Fatah’s young men were not at all prepared to wage internal battles in defense of positions that did not convince them, or of people they did not admire. As someone who lives in Palestine, I am fully aware that most of the young men working in the security services care about their salaries, and are not the least bit concerned with defending Israeli security or carrying out American requirements. I have heard it many times from a number of them, saying that Israel sends them weapons to fight Hamas.

Fatah’s young men are ready to fight Israel; they are courageous and willing to sacrifice, but they found themselves facing a moral and national dilemma that carves pain into the soul. They saw developments that did not allow them to abandon everything they had believed in over time, and that contradicted their moral outlook, so they preferred to stay home and rest.

It was not strange that leaders fled even before the fighting began, because whoever gives loyalty in exchange for money does not sacrifice money for the sake of loyalty. America bought loyalty from some Palestinians, but it did not buy belonging. Those who hold mere loyalties do not fight; only those who hold true belonging believe in paying the price of blood to achieve the goal. For this reason, no one should try flexing their muscles in the West Bank, because the result will be similar to what happened in Gaza, even though the military tactics will differ. For this reason, all Palestinians must think carefully and strive earnestly to put reason to work instead of stubbornness and pig-headedness.

The predicament of America and Israel

I have not the slightest doubt that Israel and America are now at a moment of comprehensive review of the measures they have taken over past years. Their goals will remain in place and will not change, but they will think about reshaping relations on the Palestinian scene, and perhaps also at the level of some Arab states. It is logical for a politician who provides money, training, and weapons to think of a new way of delivering them, and with new agents, if all his gifts have collapsed in moments and brought him no benefit. These two states invested in the Palestinian scene, believing they could achieve what they wanted, but the results came out contrary to their desires.

It is clear that America places its money and its weapons in locations it later discovers were the wrong address, or that it is using the wrong tactic. So it was in Iraq, and so it is in Palestine.

Arab media buzzed, as Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip, with warnings that the Strip would starve, that Hamas would face difficult days, and with optimism that Abbas would get everything and that the emergency government would turn the West Bank into paradise. This was media dust, not media in search of truth. It is Abbas who will be held to account, and the money will not be given generously to the emergency government. Abbas will be asked about the reasons for the failure that occurred in Gaza, despite the security services’ superiority in numbers and equipment, and he will be asked what he intends to do about the West Bank so that Hamas’s strength does not grow there too. And the money will be rationed according to the results yielded by giving it. America looks for results that serve its policies, and it will provide money according to progress in that direction. But if Abbas fails to deliver something new, the money will become hard to obtain.

America and Israel are now thinking of alternatives, and I believe the idea of speaking with Hamas directly, or indirectly, is now on the table of discussion among politicians in both states. Perhaps the amended positions of a number of Arab states indicate that wisdom calls for calm and a return to dialogue. But America may resort to the intellectuals who have worked with it over the years through non-governmental organizations, as a substitute for the military and security services. Yet the question remains: can these intellectuals, who are viewed with suspicion on the Palestinian street, accomplish what the armed men failed to accomplish?

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “غزة بين التباكي وحركة التاريخ” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.