The Reasons Behind Hamas's Electoral Decline

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

The results of the third round of the Palestinian local council elections, held on September 29, 2005, showed a decline in Hamas’s share of the vote compared with what it had won in the two previous rounds. It had outperformed Fatah in the first and second rounds, but Fatah came out far ahead in the third round. So what changed, that Hamas ended up with such a low share? The causes may be many, but I highlight the following here:

First: in recent months, Hamas gave a large segment of the Palestinian public the impression that it had somewhat retreated from its resistance program, despite the rockets it fired at Zionist settlements in southern Palestine. It intensified its meetings with the official Palestinian and Egyptian sides, and appeared to be negotiating indirectly with Israel over military and security matters. In other words, it appeared before the public just as Fatah had appeared in the 1970s, searching for a means of negotiating with Israel. And if Hamas was going to walk in Fatah’s old footsteps, why bother switching allegiances at all?

Second: statements issued by Hamas clearly confirmed the movement’s desire to establish relations with the United States, and its attempt to join the official Arab chorus in its pilgrimage to Washington. It was as though Hamas wanted to convey a message to the Americans that it represents a moderate Islam, distinct from the Islam of other extremists who practice “terrorism.” Hamas reinforced this conclusion, which had begun spreading across the Palestinian street, through its clear rapprochement with the Arab regimes and with the Palestinian Authority.

Third: in recent months, Hamas suffered from a crowding of statements, at times contradictory and at other times simply losing their bearings entirely. It said it wanted a truce, yet it signed a period of calm with the Palestinian Authority without that being binding on Israel; it said its responses to Israeli aggression would be earth-shattering, yet no earthquake ever came. At one moment it says Israel’s actions mean the calm has ended, and at another it says it remains committed to the calm; at one moment it denounces the breakdown of law and order, while at the same time brandishing weapons and parading them through the streets. It fell into contradictions with itself that left the ordinary person with an impression of chaos and a lack of clear vision.

Fourth: Hamas overdid its military parades, which do not enjoy popularity on the Palestinian street. The unspoken sentiment of the street is that weapons, under occupation, are not meant for parading or for factional rivalry, but must be aimed at confronting the occupation; and the more secret a weapon remains, the more effective it is in achieving its purpose. Military parades and gunfire into the air provoke revulsion on the Palestinian street, especially since they lead to casualties and expose certain security matters to the enemy.

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…Hamas paid the price for the explosion that occurred during its rally in the Jabaliya refugee camp, in which people were killed and wounded. Hamas attributed the explosion to Israeli rocket fire, but it appears that a large proportion of the Palestinian public is convinced the explosion originated from within, without any Israeli aircraft involved. Hamas failed to clarify the matter, and left an opening for the Authority to exploit.

Sixth: Hamas was unable to free itself from the Muslim Brotherhood mindset, which rejects outside friends and resists expanding activities beyond the circle of its own members. It deals with people according to the logic that whoever is not with us cannot be our partner. It behaves in the very same Fatah-like manner that only remembers the existence of other factions on the scene in times of crisis, thereby reflecting the very same bigoted mindset the Palestinian people have long suffered under.

Seventh: Hamas is being subjected to a powerful campaign, both in the media and militarily, waged by Israel, the Palestinian Authority, the United States, and a number of Arab states. America, Israel, and Arab states are pressuring the Authority to carry out a military campaign against Hamas, with the aim of stripping it of its weapons and turning it into a mere political party without resistance. The Oslo Accord, and the agreements and initiatives that followed it, demand that the Authority pursue what is called terrorism, and the Road Map, which treats man as the guiding beacon of the peaceful solution, explicitly calls for striking at the infrastructure of the Palestinian resistance movements. This is precisely what both Israel and America focus on in their attempts to resume negotiations. Indeed, both states, along with other Western states, tie the continuation of financial support for the Palestinian Authority to the measures it takes against Hamas and the rest of the resistance factions.

The recent arrests of Hamas leaders fall under the heading of weakening the movement, stripping it of its ability to manage its internal and public affairs, and depriving it of the leadership talents that could otherwise contest elections competently.

In service of this purpose, the Palestinian Authority is waging a broad media campaign against Hamas aimed at tarnishing its image, exploiting certain Hamas-related activities in order to denounce and condemn it, deter public support for it, and thereby justify pursuing it. This was evident in the Authority’s focus on the Jabaliya explosion, even as the errors and sins the Authority itself has committed — such as security coordination with Israel and covering up the smuggling of cement to enable Israel to build the wall — would require whole teams of security and judicial personnel just to investigate and hand down verdicts.

There are a number of parties invested in weakening Hamas, and they spare no effort in searching for the most effective and forceful means of doing so, no matter how much good will Hamas displays. What matters, though, is that Hamas be careful in how it deals with the Palestinian street, since it is the street, in the end, that has the final word. Hamas’s recent mistakes were no help to it, and they did affect its popular reach — though they may yet serve as lessons to be learned from.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “أسباب تراجع حماس الانتخابي” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.