Hamas's Internal Relations After the Elections

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

Great optimism prevailed among Hamas’s ranks and those who had elected it after its election victory, and they expected a new Palestinian policy, especially on the domestic front, hoping that what corruption had damaged and ruined would be set right. People did not vote, generally speaking and under these difficult circumstances, on the basis of the requirements of liberating Palestine and expelling the Jews, but rather voted mainly out of their desire to correct the internal Palestinian conditions that had been struck by policies of corruption and had suffered great devastation as a result. People looked forward to improving their social conditions and raising the moral level, pursuing the security chaos and car thieves, entrenching the ethics of bearing arms, and improving conditions of education and health, and so on.

None among the voters raised their voice demanding that Hamas work directly and swiftly to liberate Palestine; rather, the masses of people raised their voices demanding an end to corruption and the achievement of justice through administrative measures and through the establishment of a respected judiciary. People were fully aware that a collapsed or fragmented society cannot muster the strength to face challenges, and that the matter of rebuilding takes priority over the matter of liberation. How can one who is subject to injustice, and who suffers from the deteriorating condition of institutions and individuals, liberate a homeland, or be capable of carrying out effective acts of resistance? For this reason, people expected new patterns of internal relations, radically different from those that prevailed under Fatah’s authority.

What Was Expected of Hamas

Any political leader who wins an election is expected to attend first and foremost to people’s concerns and to address the issues on the basis of which people elected him. These two matters are usually addressed in the electoral platform through which the candidate markets himself, and there is no sane electoral platform that fails to speak to people’s concerns and the ways of addressing them. Accordingly, it was expected that Hamas would attend, from the outset, to the following matters:

Achieving the broadest possible political participation in government, so as to include all those who had backed it at the organizational, personal, and popular levels. Indeed, from the scientific standpoint that holds it necessary to minimize harm and maximize benefit, it was expected that Hamas would content itself with the legislature, and would ask its independent supporters whom it trusted to form the government. Hamas could have gained a number of benefits from such a step: increased popular respect, escape from the charge of terrorism that various parties were expected to level at the government, and sparing the government’s leading figures the suffering of Zionist pursuit.

During the consultations to form the government, it was expected — as is customary in every state and society — that Hamas would gather together all those who had supported it, that is, bring its supporters together under one roof so as to have a solid, strong household.

That it attack corruption with force, courage, and without hesitation, without pausing to debate where to begin the attack. The country is utterly submerged in chaos and corruption, and any step taken against corruption would be a success.

Focusing chiefly on internal conditions, and working to distract the Arab governments with the margins of political ideas. The internal situation takes priority, because all efforts ultimately go to waste if society is not cohesive.

Putting in place a program built on mutual solidarity and support on an Islamic basis, in order to secure a dignified livelihood for the people and to overcome the anticipated financial and economic siege.

That it look into the matter of the enormous numbers of employees who provide no services to the Palestinian people, and take steps to curb the power of the security apparatuses and their bloated numbers.

That it offer moral example so as to develop its capacity to lead the street, and to provide the world proof that Islamic movements are pioneers in thought, giving, and progress.

That it make the refugee cause a global cause, and focus its international activity solely on the refugee issue, considering that it is a cause that touches the very core of current Western teachings, which emphasize human rights.

What Was Expected from Hamas’s Opponents

From the very first moment, it was expected that Hamas would face several opponents, who can be classified as follows:

Palestinian opponents who had tied themselves to America and Israel, and who see their interests as bound up with the interests of the occupation. These are the people of Oslo and all the forces of “September 13th,” including the fronts affiliated with the PLO. It was expected that these would resort to every forbidden means to make Hamas fail, or to obstruct its efforts toward reform and rebuilding.

The Arab governments loyal to the United States and Israel, who are the majority, so as to tighten the noose on Hamas’s leaders’ movements and besiege the government, cutting off water and food from it.

Israel, which possesses many options and diverse means for influencing Hamas and its government, fully shackling and weakening it.

The United States and Europe, who provide the money and support Israel with all their strength on every front.

Dialectically speaking, these groups form a single axis or alliance, and must, with regard to the affairs of the Arab-Islamic region, function like an orchestra in which roles are distributed according to the notes required. It was understood that the Palestinians themselves would form the strongest link in confronting Hamas, since they are the people of the household and can play the role of the woodworm in the wood.

Hamas’s Performance

The fields of performance are many and varied, and here the discussion is confined to Hamas’s performance with respect to internal relations, particularly in light of what was expected of it and the pressures that were, and continue to be, exerted against it. I should not fail to note here that the matters raised below are debatable and admit of weighing, turning over, and scrutiny, but they certainly do not admit of justification. For decades, a mentality of justification has prevailed in the Palestinian arena, one that evades responsibility by casting it onto others and onto circumstances external to the human self — a defeatist mentality that reinforces loss and retreat, and strips a person of any sense of his own role and importance. The Palestinian leadership entrenched this mentality of justification in order to free itself from responsibility, and used money and media to root it and spread it until it came to look like a kind of human ingenuity.

I discuss the question of Hamas’s performance regarding internal relations from two angles, the formal and the practical; from the practical angle I discuss several axes: relations with friends and with rivals, with the general public and the handling of their concerns, and with the Palestinian factions.

The Formal Angle

From the very first day of its formation — the day it took the oath of office — the Hamas government created a psychological barrier between itself and the public in terms of form. Hamas’s ministers lined up wearing expensive civilian suits and red and crimson neckties. It was also noted that the prime minister arrived at the site of the oath-taking in a luxury car.

This behavior fell in line with the wishes of Western states, and carried a clear message to the people of the West that Hamas was eager to engage in protocol-bound work requiring diplomacy in dress, speech, and behavior. In other words, Hamas gave signals geared toward foreign relations, without taking internal relations into account, as though it wanted to say it was ready for diplomatic activity. This impression was reinforced by Mr. Khaled Mashal, who showed no patience in issuing statements addressed to the world of diplomacy.

The Palestinian public expected different formal signals — modest dress that expressed the new representatives’ feelings toward his concerns and problems, and cars that appeared acceptable but not luxurious. The people of Palestine do not much love those who wear expensive formal attire, and luxury cars have caused them a complex, since they are seen as a symbol of corruption and the theft of people’s money. The ordinary Palestinian may develop an unconscious reaction to these matters, but the intellectual, whose opinions and statements people hear, tries to weigh things precisely.

This is what drove me, for instance, to write immediately and publicly an article entitled “Hamas’s Necktie.” For me, this behavior was highly dangerous, and I found that I had to warn Hamas publicly so that the matter would not get lost in phone conversations. It was not driven by hostility, but by a desire to defend the vote I had given to Hamas. I felt I had been wronged, and perhaps others felt the same way alongside me.

It was also expected that Hamas’s ministers would abstain from Fatah ministers’ behaviors, forgoing the cars and certain special privileges such as bodyguards, but the ordinary citizen noticed that the same cars simply had different drivers. The negative impression intensified when the president of the Palestinian Authority distributed, on the Palestinian street, copies of a letter addressed to him by the Speaker of the Legislative Council, Dr. Aziz Duwaik, demanding the armored car back.

Forming the Government

Hamas was not successful in its attempts to form the government, and gave a strong impression that it lacked genuine knowledge of the whole web of internal and external relations to which individuals and political forces cling. The movement occupied itself long and heavily with forming a national unity government, or forming a government with Fatah, and devoted great effort and exhausted the entire legal timeframe searching for a formula that would bring Fatah into the government. In the end Fatah did not agree, and neither did the other factions.

And there are individuals who carry far more weight on the Palestinian street than some of the factions do — figures such as Bassam al-Shak’a, Haidar Abdel-Shafi, and Abdul-Jawad Saleh — who were not consulted about anything at all. Hamas did not realize that it had not won through its own efforts alone, and did not acknowledge that there were those who had backed it, supported it, and stood with it. I myself was among those who spoke with Hamas on this matter, but the movement did not accept the view; according to one Hamas activist: “We won the election, and we will remain in the front seat.” Hamas formed a Hamas-only government, and it did not merely fail to consult those who had supported it — it ignored them entirely. It consulted the Popular Front, the Democratic Front, and Fatah, and it consulted Islamic Jihad, which had boycotted the elections. This is a strange thing in the history of the search for strength, since a person is strong first through himself, then through his friends, then by neutralizing his enemies, and then by winning over his rivals.

After the Mecca Agreement, Hamas thought that the Palestinian national unity government would be a lifeboat, but this assumption should have taken into account the pillars of American policy in the region, the intentions of that policy’s agents, and Israel’s policy toward the Palestinians. It was expected that the Palestinian prime minister affiliated with Hamas would be marginalized, and that the international community would deal instead with individuals in the government who acted in isolation from it as an institution. It does not appear that the results are now coming as Hamas wanted or thought they would turn out, and perhaps it has now reached the conclusion that international relations are not built on good intentions and good-heartedness.

A number of Hamas leaders expected that Arab regimes would take decisive decisions regarding the siege after the signing of the Mecca Agreement and the formation of the new Palestinian government. But it is now clear that this expectation was nothing but an illusion, and that Arab regimes are too powerless to pursue a policy independent of the United States. Arab foreign ministers had earlier taken a decision to lift the siege on the Palestinians immediately, but this “immediately” has not yet arrived. The Arab position only deepens Hamas’s frustration and dismay.

Government Appointments

There was a major grievance against Fatah, that it appointed its own members to government jobs, representing the popular demand for competence to be valued and standards of fairness upheld. Hamas did not correct this situation, and made things worse by employing thousands of its own members within the administrative apparatus, and it was clear it was racing against time to compete administratively with Fatah. This harmed Hamas’s image, and Fatah worked to exploit the matter to deflect the charge from itself and pin it on Hamas instead.

It was necessary for Hamas to observe the standard of competence and fairness in order to improve the performance of the corrupt administrative apparatus, and in order to reinforce its electoral achievement and win broader popular support. The standard of being a role model is important to the success of any political leadership, and it appears Hamas overlooked this matter, preferring to act in a partisan manner, which made it, in the eyes of many, equal to Fatah on this front.

Corruption

People expected that Hamas would take bold, forceful steps to fight corruption and establish a clean administrative apparatus free of mediation, favoritism, bribery, embezzlement, and the obstruction of citizens’ interests. This did not happen; Hamas did not wage any limited or comprehensive war on corruption whatsoever. It was expected, for example, that the government would recall the official cars that consume Palestinian money — it did not; that it would work to reduce the administrative apparatus and expand productive employment — it did not; that it would distribute official institutions across the various villages and towns of the West Bank and Gaza instead of concentrating them in Gaza and Ramallah — it did not, and so on.

Hamas’s argument in this regard says that fighting corruption leads to strife, because Fatah will not surrender easily and will fight to preserve corruption. This is a strange claim, and rests on no political or religious logic. God, exalted is He, said that strife is worse than killing, and the Palestinian people have been afflicted by strife to the point of ruin because of corruption. It would be more fitting to wage war on corruption, because its existence leads to killing, and it is clear the Palestinian arena bears witness to Palestinian blood being spilled.

Corruption is a Western and Israeli demand, because agreements with Israel are not signed by Arabs, Palestinians, or Muslims who are respectable and loyal to their nation, and are not implemented except by one who is without conscience and cares for nothing but his own personal interests, whims, and appetites. It was not possible to establish the Palestinian Authority in accordance with the Oslo and Taba agreements using people who were not corrupt and who refused security coordination with Israel, and it was expected that Hamas would fully grasp this argument.

This is in addition to the fact that Hamas based its electoral platform primarily on reform and change, and it is people’s right to ask about the implementation of this platform. I hear it constantly on the Palestinian street: “Where is the reform?” A promise exists to be kept, and if a person is unable to keep it, he ought not to make the promise in the first place.

Security

Security chaos is among the most difficult issues that concern the Palestinian citizen, and Hamas addressed it in its electoral platform and promised to deal with it. Security chaos disturbs citizens’ peace and makes them feel fear and terror for their lives, their property, and their rights in general, and confronting it is considered a vital demand that whoever bears responsibility must fulfill.

Security chaos is the specialty of Fatah and the Palestinian security apparatuses. It is very rare to find lawlessness originating from outside Fatah’s circle and the apparatuses that emerged from it, and it is well known that the Palestinian leadership let chaos spread across the Palestinian arena because it is one of the tools for concentrating authority and threatening the citizen. It was laughable when Arafat used to speak of his intention to rein in the lawless elements, and even more laughable that Abu Mazen offered many promises regarding this situation.

It is well known that Hamas does not use weapons against citizens, and does not consider it a means for resolving any internal disputes, but the government thought it possible to address the chaos by establishing an executive force to help the interior minister maintain security. Hamas erred in forming the Executive Force, because it handed Fatah and the security apparatuses a gift for dragging it into internal fighting. It was never to be expected that Fatah would respect the results of the elections, or respect the orders of the interior minister, and it was expected that it would use every avenue of its influence to obstruct Hamas.

Hamas erred because Fatah is backed by America and Israel, and the American president repeatedly announced his financial and military support for the Palestinian presidency, and Israel announced it would provide weapons to the presidential guard, and it is no secret that Israel provides weapons and assistance to people who call themselves leaders within Fatah. Hamas, however strong it becomes, cannot match this support, and remains dependent on arms dealers who obtain their weapons from Israeli intelligence. Hamas went down this road, became entangled in the fighting in Gaza, and made itself equal to Fatah in the court of public condemnation.

There is no internal Palestinian solution through the force of arms, only through the force of morals. It would have been better for Hamas to bear the harm of Fatah’s assaults on institutions and individuals, and to use those very acts to rally public opinion against them, and then isolate them, which would have made it possible to bring them under control. We noticed, at the start of the government’s formation, that the media focused on the assaults being carried out by Fatah, which harmed it further still. Things are different now, and the ordinary citizen no longer goes out into the street to find out who started the fighting, but is content merely to curse those doing the fighting.

Conclusion

Since forming the government, Hamas has not acted with a leader’s spirit, but with the spirit of the doubtful and the hesitant, who does not fully know what to do, and so it has remained cornered, absorbing blows from every force hostile to Palestinian rights, internal and external alike. The pressures on Hamas are great and immense, but a political leader does not stop at merely being reactive or a recipient of blows; he must take the initiative and work to create the conditions that force others to react. The Palestinian people saw, at the start of the Hamas movement’s tenure, how Fatah began taking precautions to hide its corruption, but such acts vanished after a while, once Fatah became certain that Hamas would not accomplish anything. As for the citizen’s burning desire for a better society, it began to fade gradually, and despair took the place of hope.

Hamas thought that outside hands might help, but these hands, represented by Arab regimes, cannot stand against America and Israel, and will only ever be an aid against Hamas, not with Hamas — and this was proven after the Mecca Agreement. Hamas may also have thought it was showing mercy to the Palestinians by offering concessions in the Mecca Agreement so that the money would come. This too was mistaken, because whoever gives out the money will not give it to Hamas, and will give it only to one who strips off his own clothes and flays his own skin.

Hamas won by the strength of the Palestinian people, despite the powers of the earth standing against it in the elections, and if Hamas wishes to succeed, it has no choice but to return to the Palestinian people. Outside powers may help at times, but the Arab regimes and their like will not. For this reason, what is required is that Hamas return to square one, the point from which it set out, and reassess its policies in order to achieve the popular rallying around it — and it has, in Fatah’s loss in the elections, a lesson to learn.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “العلاقات الحمساوية الداخلية بعد الانتخابات” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.