Hezbollah: A Model to Follow, Not to Bring Down

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

The Egyptian accusation leveled against Hezbollah, and against Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah in particular, is devoid of intelligence, and it is not grounded in a good understanding of Hezbollah’s policy — or it is trying to avoid understanding that policy. The Egyptian regime accused the party of recruiting agents to create internal security problems in Egypt with the aim of destabilizing the regime, and announced the arrest of about fifty people brought under the circle of suspicion so far. The Egyptian press and various media outlets close to the authorities launched a fierce campaign against the party, and against Sayyed Hassan in particular, dwelling at length on the party’s subordination to Iran, and on Iran’s use of it to unsettle conditions in Arab states.

Such accusations do not reflect an understanding by the Egyptian regime of Hezbollah’s strategy of operation, nor of the mechanisms leading to the achievement of the goals the party seeks. The party does not pursue a policy of conspiracy at all — neither against the Lebanese, nor against Arabs and Muslims, nor even against foreign states such as America or Britain. It has never been the party’s policy to destabilize any state whatsoever, and it has resorted neither to secret cells nor to arms smuggling in an attempt to extend a hand to forces hostile to a ruling regime. The party is committed only to fighting Israel by every possible means and method, within what it considers legitimate from the standpoint of Islamic law. If the party, for example, were to smuggle weapons to Chile, that would be for the sake of an operation it might decide to carry out against Israel and its interests, not in order to overthrow the government in Chile or take revenge on it; and if it smuggled weapons to Gaza, that would be to support the Palestinian people against Israel, not to take revenge on the regime in Egypt. This is with the understanding that the party is not fundamentally concerned with fighting Israel on the territory of other states; it prefers to fight it from Arab soil. The party might only consider carrying out military operations against Israel outside the zone of direct confrontation if Israel itself took the initiative and launched military operations against the party. Israel assassinated Hajj Radwan, Imad Mughniyeh, in Syria, and accordingly the party might consider striking Israel outside the sphere of direct geography.

The party says, as Sayyed Hassan stated in his speech of 10 April 2009, that its problem with Israel is tied to Lebanese land and to aggression against Lebanon, and that if Israel were to withdraw from all Lebanese territory and Israeli aggression against Lebanon became entirely out of the question, then military matters would be reassessed. It is only on this point that Hezbollah remains, to a large degree, evasive. In my own assessment and analysis, the party will not reassess its resistant existence as long as Israel exists. Hezbollah speaks of Lebanon and Lebanese land because talk of Arab unity and the unity of the Arab homeland is now regarded by the Arab regimes and their hypocritical accomplices as one of the great sins and as interference in internal affairs, and constitutes fertile material for attacking Hezbollah and intensifying campaigns to distort its image. The party sees silence about the fragmentation of the Arabs, as peoples and as a homeland, as preferable to confrontation, at least under the current circumstances. The party is doctrinally, patriotically, and nationally committed to the Palestinian cause, and whoever imagines that the party will lay down the arms it points at Israel is entirely mistaken; the party will struggle to persist and endure even if every Palestinian signs treaties of peace and affection with Israel. Neither the party nor Sayyed Hassan tells the whole truth about this matter. They are not lying, but not stating the truth now is more useful than stating it.

The party focuses on reaching its goals through preparation, readiness, vigilance, toil, and exertion, relying on scientific methodology in research, planning, and implementation, and it always works to balance matters so that decisions do not tilt toward excess or tyranny, nor toward deviation and deficiency. In its relations with the Lebanese, with Arabs, and with Muslims generally, the party relies on a policy of leading by example. It works with alertness and awareness to form a pioneering partisan and leadership model on the Arab scene, in a manner Arabs have not been accustomed to before. Hezbollah’s motto in this regard is tireless work according to sound, scientific foundations, and letting achievements speak for themselves. Over the years we have observed that Hezbollah does much and says little, and sometimes speaks only in proportion to what it does. The party’s mouth is not large, its words are no bigger than its size, its statements are no wider than its capabilities, and it does not carry a stick longer than its own height.

The party enters the hearts of Arabs and Muslims through its work and its ability to achieve results, whether at the level of internal Lebanese affairs or at the level of confrontation with Israel. It understands that the path of leading by example needs more time, especially in an Arab region whose peoples the policies of the regimes have robbed of trust in individuals, parties, and policies — but it also understands that the path of bluster and resounding noise has no future and quickly collapses. The party has proven a very high degree of credibility with both enemy and friend, and it continues on its path, one that will carry it to ever higher standing in Arab hearts.

The difference between the Egyptian regime and Hezbollah in this latest controversy is the difference between regimes of disinformation and the new path the party follows. The Egyptian regime entangled itself in blustering accusations against the party that it cannot substantiate, while the party’s response to the accusations came measured, analytical, and precise. Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah admitted that he works to smuggle weapons into Gaza, but he stressed Egypt’s responsibility for doing the very same thing.

The Arab regimes see the party’s achievements, and a good many of them wished Israel could have shattered its bones in July 2006; they now find it increasingly intolerable, because it contributes greatly to changing people’s moods across the Arab region, to introducing the moral factor into political activity, to spreading a new Arab resistance mindset, to new military and civil construction, and to achieving justice among the people who stand with it and offer sacrifices. Hezbollah is dangerous to the Arab regimes because it presents a new model in thought and practice, and offers moral standards without which no nation can succeed. It does not want to fight the regimes, but it is enough for it to act properly to be hated by the corrupt. The trustworthy man exposes the corrupt man’s shame; the strong defeats the weak; the honorable man spoils the traitor’s pleasures. This is why the Arab regimes are constantly keen to dig beneath Hezbollah, and busy themselves searching for any small slip on its part. Hezbollah’s small mistake turns into a mountain, and numerous Arab media outlets mobilize to defame it, aiming to divert the Arab gaze away from the party and to breed hatred of it. And we see how eager these misguided regimes are to spread strife between Sunni and Shia — not out of concern for the Sunnis, but in order to preserve their own continuation in power.

The party is not concerned with the method of bringing others down. Bringing someone down may expose the flaws of others, but that does not mean the one who brings them down is without flaws himself; achievement, on the other hand, constitutes the model that inevitably leads to the downfall of the failures.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “حزب الله: القدوة وليس الإسقاط” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.