Palestinian Intellectuals Who Don't Commemorate the Nakba

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

There is no longer any Palestinian consensus on the need to commemorate the memory of the Nakba, and there are Palestinians who have abandoned the memories and immersed themselves in the rush of ordinary life and their own personal affairs. Among these stands out a category of people described as intellectuals, who believe that the Nakba has become a thing of our past, and that there is no need to keep chewing over the pain, or searching for pains that make the weight of life heavier and more bitter. They believe that the Nakba happened and is over, that it is not a unique catastrophe in history, and that its yearly commemorations must be gotten past. Nations have gone through many catastrophes, but they did not remain stuck at them, and their peoples resolved to press forward on their paths, abandoning their tears, forgetting their dead, and forgoing their claims to their rights. They left the past with its groans and calamities, and decided to march toward the future.

What I mean by commemorating the memory of the Nakba is the carrying out of performative acts, or of practical, systematic steps that contribute, in one way or another, to keeping alive the memory of the 1948 Palestinian Nakba, reinforcing the idea of return, and urging practical steps toward the return of the displaced Palestinian people to their homes and properties in the territory occupied in 1948. That is, mere performance is not enough; the act of commemoration must be purposeful, and the purpose is the return of the refugees. But if commemoration is limited to weeping, wailing, and cataloguing sorrows and pains, detached from any orientation toward return, then it is not a genuine commemoration so much as an excuse.

Many Palestinians do not commemorate the memory of the Nakba, and for some of them the occasion passes without their even being aware of it. Most people are busy searching for their daily bread; some do not find enough time to follow such occasions; and some see the matter as a collective duty to be discharged by certain men of learning, literature, politics, and media. This is understandable and common among all nations. But it becomes unusual, and perhaps strange, when an intellectual turns his back on a great tragedy, regarding it as an event of the past with no future. An intellectual is supposed to be the bearer of people’s concerns and pains; if he strays from this, and public responsibility is absent from his activities, then a bewildered standstill becomes a fact of life.

Defining the Intellectual

It is not easy to formulate a comprehensive, precise definition of the intellectual that would win the consensus of those interested and of thinkers. There are many differing definitions, differing according to those who take pains to offer one. The author of this article has a book titled The Graves of the Arab Intellectuals, in which he classifies intellectuals according to the standpoint in which they place themselves, and concludes that the number of true intellectuals is very small, according to the definition he sets out, which is:

The intellectual is one who looks at his reality with a critical, analytical eye, tries to devise solutions to people’s concerns, and works to push society toward the positive change that leads to liberation and progress in various fields. He is there among the masses of the people, interacts with them, stands by them, and shares in their joys and sorrows, becoming aware of the human dimensions of their conditions and reflecting them in his writings, lectures, and seminars. This is a costly, genuine cultural stance that demands sacrifices, but this is the intellectual’s duty, if he wants his nation to shake off the garment of humiliation and backwardness, and to set off toward new horizons that fulfill its hopes and aspirations. This intellectual does not reject everything in his society, is not fanatical in his positions, and is not tense or agitated in the way he handles and addresses matters, but he is principled, refusing to compromise on the higher human values, on human solidarity, or on the unity of people.

The definition given above does not fit this paper, which speaks of intellectuals who do not commemorate the Nakba, since such intellectuals do not engage with the concerns of their people even at the lowest levels. Palestinian cultural models are numerous, and are generally not gratifying, being largely similar to Arab cultural models that see the flaws and the concerns but try to keep their distance from them, out of apprehension, fear, self-interest, or the pursuit of money, status, or reward of any kind, etc. Palestinian cultural models are distinguished by several traits, the least present of which is the stance of the true intellectual, who sees the flaw and the public concern and stands in its defense regardless of the sacrifices that entails. Among us have appeared the intellectuals of the sultan, who saw things through the eyes of the political leader who can grant and withhold, give and take. These were the intellectuals most capable of achieving their own private interests. And there are the intellectuals of the factions, in whose eyes the deeds of their own faction always appeared rosy, while the deeds of others appeared ugly, or were given no flowers at all.

The definition adopted in this paper is that loose, popular definition that regards the educated person holding an advanced university degree, and active in political, social, economic, academic, or scholarly fields, as an intellectual who influences those around him, and whose opinion can be relied upon for guidance. This loose, popular definition includes university professors, lawyers, and specialists in sociology, psychology, geography, history, the humanities, the social sciences, administration, and media in general, and it sometimes includes physicians, engineers, and accountants. Sometimes the popular definition also grants the status of “cultured” to people who hold no university degree, if they possess qualities that prompt the popular impression that they are intellectuals — such as poets who never studied at universities, or experienced administrators lacking academic credentials.

That is, this paper deals with university professors, lawyers, administrators, and everyone the popular impression regards as intellectuals, and it focuses on some of them who no longer commemorate the memory of the Nakba in any way, on the grounds that the right of return has already lapsed, or that return is impossible to a degree that makes commemoration merely a form of performance that wastes effort and time.

The Reclusive Intellectual and the Active Intellectual

There is the reclusive Palestinian intellectual who isolates himself from public life, and prefers not to participate in public activities related to the Palestinian cause, regardless of who is organizing them; and there is the active intellectual who takes part in public activities concerning the cause, and sees for himself a role, however small, in liberation or in the search for a solution to it. This paper focuses only on the active ones who see no benefit in commemorating the anniversary, and sets aside the reclusive or isolated ones, despite the consequences that follow from this isolation. The reclusive intellectual’s effects may be positive or negative, depending on one’s point of view. His practical contribution sometimes seems necessary, from a certain vantage point, because of the services the reclusive intellectual might provide were he to awaken; while at other times it seems destructive, because of the damage the reclusive intellectual might cause were he to awaken.

The Disillusioned Intellectual and the Conscious Intellectual

There are Palestinian intellectuals disillusioned by developments on the external scene, owing to external and internal factors, who see in the matter of commemorating the Nakba a performative exercise of no use. These are sometimes active, in certain public fields, but their awareness has been affected by disillusionment, which has produced intellectual confusion. And there are activists who know exactly what they want and carry a clear ideology and clear concepts about what they want. The disillusioned intellectual is not covered in this paper; the focus is solely on the conscious intellectual, possessing a clear vision and defined concepts, who sees the Nakba as something of the past that cannot be brought back to the right of return.

The Challenge to the Right of Return

The Nakba is displacement, and commemorating the Nakba is an annual reminder of the great tragedy that befell the Palestinian people, and a renewal of the pledge to work for the return of the refugees to their homes and properties in the territory occupied in 1948. Commemorating the memory of the Nakba draws its meaning from commitment to the recovery of Palestinian rights, and to ending the suffering of Palestinians that has stretched across decades. And if there is anyone who sees in this commemoration a form of escapism, a plea addressed to what is impossible, or a mere formal activity that ends when the ceremony ends, then he trivializes the right of return and challenges it. He sees no place for the application of this right, or he rejects it altogether and regards Israel as an established fact, or as possessing a right to Palestine for historical, religious, or humanitarian reasons.

A major challenge to the right of return comes from certain Palestinian intellectuals. Some insist on the right of return, but audible voices in the media, or in certain international forums and conferences, find insisting on the right of return not a rational position, but rather a form of extremism that threatens peace and harmony. A fair number of Palestinian intellectuals, especially some of those working for Western-funded NGOs and those working with the Palestinian Authority, do not consider the return an issue worth discussing, and call for a “rational” solution for the camp residents that centers essentially on resettlement in Arab states. There are intellectuals occupied with insisting that the refugees do not want to return, because they have interests outside the homeland, and that, practically speaking, they do not see return as serving their interests. There are intellectuals occupied with searching for alternatives to the right of return, in order to present them to the refugees. The academic assumption is that the refugees have been oblivious to alternatives all these years, and now need thoughtful minds to come up with creative housing solutions. These intellectuals see the refugee problem as merely a housing problem, solvable by building a number of towers wherever space is available.

There are those on the Palestinian scene who believe that insisting on the refugees’ right of return falls within the circle of extremism and fanaticism — futile, even destructive — because Israel considers this position extremism and terrorism, and because applying the international covenants, written by Westerners, on the return of a refugee to his home and property, or applying the UN General Assembly resolution on the return of refugees, is no longer convincing to them, since it is impractical. They are not convinced that we should engage the world through this door, especially since it concerns a humanitarian situation and falls directly within the subject of human rights, which the West sometimes uses as a means of attacking governments and challenging their legitimacy, and they believe our movement should begin from whatever is possible to discuss with Israel. That is, their ceiling is whatever Israel sets as open for discussion or negotiation.

There are those who think of settling the refugees in the West Bank, on the grounds that this would constitute a return to Palestine, if not to private property. Israel will not accept this either, because it does not want a large Arab population next door that would threaten its security. Israel might accept settling Lebanon’s refugees in the West Bank, as a solution to an internal Lebanese problem and as a pretext for attacking Hezbollah.

On the Palestinian scene, there is a theorizing called “realist” theorizing, whose premise is that the Palestinian reality is very bitter, that Israel is strong and backed by America, and that the Palestinian people have no choice but to accept this reality. It is a harsh, unjust reality, but wisdom demands accepting it, since we have no alternative entry point. These people call themselves realists, without distinguishing between accepting reality and acknowledging reality with the aim of changing it. They think that the realist is the one who accepts what already exists, but if realism were like that, history would never have changed at all. Realism means reading reality as it is, in order to plan properly with the aim of overcoming difficulties and setting off on the road of progress. And so they see the demand for the right of return through Nakba commemorations as an act that falls outside realist logic.

Palestinian political mobility. Whoever accepts Israel and recognizes it legally, without making the return of Palestinian refugees a condition, in effect treats the right of return as interference in Israel’s internal affairs, and considers himself to be at odds with the legal requirements of recognition. This existing reality has penetrated the ranks of the Palestinians to the point that Palestinian refugees no longer insist on, or believe in, the right of return. For this reason, commemorating the memory of the Nakba, for them, is a form of entertainment, and attending the ceremonies is a temporary assertion of presence that carries no further consequences.

The Rules of Cultural Transformation

Intellectuals did not shift away from invoking the Nakba to confront Israel, and abandon the right of return, out of a vacuum, but because of multiple cultural and intellectual programs they were exposed to, whether from internal or external political levels. Since the Nakba until now, the Palestinian people has been subjected to concentrated, multiple cultural and intellectual attacks, aimed at severing it from its cause, making it give up its rights, and accepting the status quo as a permanent reality it lacks the means to change. These attacks worked to change many national, religious, and human concepts held by people, since these concepts are considered the practical starting points in various fields, and if a person’s thinking is reshaped, his political, social, and moral positions will shift and change. A number of parties — such as the Palestinian leadership, the Arab regimes, Israel, and Western states — wanted to penetrate Palestinian thought and culture, in order to make it easier to push through political programs, foremost among them recognition of Israel and the abandonment of certain Palestinian rights, such as the right of return.

The Defeat of Concepts

We Arabs always speak of the defeats we suffered in the twentieth century, dwelling at length on them and trying to draw lessons and morals from them, but we overlook a defeat that may be more painful than military defeats: the defeat of concepts. Nations may lose battles, and may lose wars, but they do not lose themselves if they hold firm to their convictions, remain committed to their principles, and stay faithful and true to their rights, their honor, and their pride — and this is what gives them the capacity for renewal, for shaking the dust of defeat off themselves, and then trying again to recover what they have lost of rights, respect, and pride. Nations are not broken apart by defeats, however severe their impact and however great their effect, but they disintegrate from within when their social, moral, cultural, and intellectual concepts become disordered, so that a person turns against himself, brother confronts brother, the compass is lost, and the goal is obscured.

Nations are known by many things, foremost among them culture, since it is what distinguishes nations from one another, and it is what gives each nation the character by which it is recognized. Despite the difficulty of defining culture, it represents a civilizational accumulation that links the past to the present and lays the foundation for the future, defines concepts of behavior and public and private relations, and roots the ethics of activity in various fields. Each culture is distinguished from another in its concepts, performance, and concerns, and each of them forms an integrated whole, capable, in one way or another, of receiving and transmitting, and of building bridges with different cultures.

For this reason, powerful states and empires have found that the best means of controlling a people or a nation lies in its cultural transformation, such that its character dissolves and its internal cohesion disintegrates. Many colonial powers tried military occupation and economic domination, but in the end faced the revolt of those living under colonialism, and it has become clear from the lessons of history that the continuation of colonialism, or the subjugation of peoples, can only be achieved through cultural takeover, which turns the original culture into a thing of the past, of no value beside a new culture manufactured by the dominant state.

Methods of Changing Concepts

The methods of states and parties seeking cultural and intellectual hegemony through cultural invasion are numerous, and we cannot enumerate them all here; but there are prominent points, set out as follows:

Inflicting repeated defeats on the targeted party, so that a person comes to belittle himself, abandon his own identity, and see in the victors his ideal role model;

Economic impoverishment, so that the target remains in need of the one imposing hegemony, pleading with him and accepting his advisors and his methods for handling economic conditions;

Sowing a spirit of self-contempt among the targeted, so that they develop inferiority complexes that ultimately push them toward imitation. This works to strip away self-confidence, and confidence in local scholars, experts, and thinkers. We notice that Arab thinkers have indeed emerged during this period, but we Arabs rarely elevate them to the rank of foreign thinkers, even though our own thinkers and scholars may well be of a higher caliber than others;

Using scientific and technological achievements not for the purpose of human cooperation, but to dazzle and overawe others — and here enters condescending treatment of backward or less developed nations;

Installing leaders who chase after personal interests and appetites, and who are always ready to mortgage the nation, with all its resources and culture, in favor of others.

Developing educational and cultural programs in the targeted states in a manner consistent with Western thought and culture, as is happening now in many Arab states, and establishing centers and NGOs that promote the concepts of others at the expense of the authentic concepts expressing people’s concerns. Western-funded centers, run by Arabs in exchange for foreign money, are now spreading across most Arab countries.

Examples of Changed Concepts

The concepts that have been changed in favor of new concepts are very numerous, and I will try here to highlight a few important examples:

Arab unity: The concept of Arab unity was dominant in the period following the Second World War, and was a fundamental part of the culture of the people from the Ocean to the Gulf; popular, intellectual, and political Arab discourse focused on this concept and the means of implementing it on the ground, and enormous efforts and immense energies were mobilized toward achieving the goal of unity. Things are different now, to the point that talk of Arab unity has become a form of fantasy or illusion, and the Arab street is no longer concerned with it as part of its thinking or its political conduct. On the ruins of the concept of Arab unity, new concepts have appeared, such as Arab solidarity and joint Arab action.

The idea of national unity has now replaced Arab unity, and what has become important is how to keep a single Arab country united. We have reached a stage in which we have become convinced that the great ambition must recede in favor of resolving the immediate calamities battering us, and the unity of Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Sudan, Somalia, and Algeria has each come under threat.

The liberation of Palestine: it seems it has become shameful for a person to call for the liberation of Palestine, and patriotic to recognize Israel, with the call for the liberation of the holy land now regarded as a form of hallucination, agitation, and narrow-mindedness. The person who calls for liberation now hides himself away, because the call has become an accusation, taken to express dull, superficial thinking. After 1967, the Arabs replaced the matter of liberation with the slogan of “removing the traces of aggression,” and then that slogan collapsed in favor of direct negotiations, and then in favor of Israeli security and normalization with Israel.

The Arab boycott of the Zionist entity: the slogan of boycotting the Zionist enemy once prevailed to the extent that Arabs would walk out of the United Nations halls when Israel’s representative took the podium. Now the slogan of normalization is the one raised in practical terms, and there are many Arab regimes normalizing relations and pushing in that direction, and there are Palestinians normalizing and recruiting young men and women to normalize with their generation of Zionists. Israeli officials now tour the Arab homeland, and Israeli goods flood the markets.

This applies to other terms and concepts too, such as “the Zionist entity,” which has become “Israel,” and “the Zionist enemy,” which has become “the neighbor,” “the brother,” or “the other side.” As a writer, I sometimes feel embarrassed to use the authentic terms, because I anticipate that some readers will not finish reading if they do not find the new terms present.

Resistance: the Arab arena now witnesses the concept of “terrorism” prevailing over the concept of “resistance,” and it has become common for figures in the media to label resistance fighters as terrorists, and to hold them responsible for Arab suffering, instead of holding occupation or colonialism responsible. A piece of reasoning has developed, one we sometimes hear on the tongues of Arab leaders, to the effect that the resistance fighters provoke a painful military response from Israel and America, inflicting heavy losses on the Arabs, and since we will not defeat these powers, we must refrain from practicing “terrorism” and instead run after the negotiating table.

Moderation: what used to be known on the Arab scene as treason has now become moderation, and what used to be known as moderation has now become extremism. Recognizing Israel is moderation, going down the path of globalization is moderation, as is opening the country to foreign investment on very generous terms, favoring consumption over production, and relying on others instead of developing one’s own capacities.

“Israeli Arabs”: in origin, Israel is a usurping, intruding entity, but this term is now invading people’s minds, and carries within it a hostile stance toward the Palestinians in the territory occupied in ‘48, because it implies that the Zionists are the original inhabitants, and the Palestinians are the newcomers.

Ordinary vocabulary: alongside the abandonment of vital, fundamental concepts in the Arab structure, new words have appeared in the language that have well-known alternatives. For example, many people now use the word “agenda,” which means schedule, calendar, outcome, or program, depending on the intended usage. As for the word “September,” meaning Aylul, it has invaded Bilad al-Sham and Iraq, which originally use the Syriac Arabic month names.

National Bewilderment

A visitor to France or Germany might notice a pride in the national language, and see people insisting on using their own language because it is part of their dignity, their pride, and their cultural identity. A foreigner visiting our countries, on the other hand, might notice that people try to charm him with a few English phrases meaning “how are you” and “where are you from.” In our countries, many people who know a few foreign words try to use them to display something of their own psychological complexes of inferiority. I have noticed, on some Arab satellite channels, an attempt to force foreign words into Arabic dual and plural forms. “Bonsoir” gets a dual form, “bonsoirayn,” and a plural, “bonsoirat.”

Holding fast to the authenticity of concepts and of the language in general expresses an awareness of national identity, and a desire to push the nation forward. This does not mean closing oneself off from other cultures, but rather taking care to protect against dissolution and the loss of self. We must strike a balance between openness and preserving authenticity, so that we neither isolate ourselves nor lose our way.

The Task Is Arduous

The Palestinian cause has become complicated over time, not because of the strength of the enemies, but because of the fragmentation of the internal Arab and Palestinian front, and the Palestinian cause and its accompanying Palestinian rights are no longer the object of Palestinian consensus. With time, the sphere of the battle has widened, its arena has expanded, and its reach has stretched out, and the Palestinians no longer face a single enemy to defeat. Defeat has now nested itself within, and the internal defeat must itself be defeated first, before the external enemy can possibly be defeated. There are intellectuals now providing great, significant services to foreigners in exchange for money and certain material privileges, and they are not withdrawn or embarrassed by what they do; rather, they argue with wide-open eyes for abandoning the traditional demand for recovering the rights of the Palestinian people, and see economic prosperity as an alternative. Simply put, they say: what is the use of returning to Palestine if poverty will be the master of the situation? Is it not better for a person to live a prosperous life, rather than live on a piece of land he loves but which impoverishes him? Whoever wants return must first defeat these people.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “مثقفون فلسطينيون لا يحيون النكبة” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.