The International Tribunal: A Tool in the Regional Equation

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

13 June 2007

Nablus, Occupied Palestine

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The UN Security Council approved the establishment of an international tribunal specifically to try the killers of Rafik Hariri, thereby violating a state’s sovereignty at the request of the very people whose sovereignty was being violated. It is not strange for the Security Council to disregard the principle of respecting state sovereignty, nor is it strange for Arabs to throw open their countries’ doors to aggressors. The Security Council is an embodiment of global tyranny that glorifies force, brutality, and domination through the permanent membership of a handful of states, and many Arabs have been brokering away the Arab nation and Arab land for many long years. Injustice and tyranny have met here with baseness and pettiness.

Whom will the international tribunal try? Who is the accused in Hariri’s assassination, so that the tribunal may try him? There is no accused, and the investigation may never arrive at one. The special investigator into the assassination is requesting a one-year extension of his mandate from the Security Council, and the Council has a very long breath, especially given some members’ hopes of directing charges toward Syria. I am not a lawyer, but the question that looms in my mind concerns waiting until a suspect is discovered. And so long as urgency is the watchword, my firm assessment is that the formation of the tribunal is a political matter, especially since the tribunal itself contravenes the Lebanese constitution.

The formation of the international tribunal is a political act, not a judicial one, and what is intended by it is not Hariri’s blood but political purposes that serve the aims of certain states, and the aims of those who facilitate their missions in the Arab region. Certainly Hariri’s blood does not matter to America and Israel, nor to some of the Lebanese factions weeping over him. If Arab blood truly stirred the nerves of the nation’s enemies, they would not have sent us the planes, bombs, and missiles that kill us and kill our children and women across the Arab homeland and the Islamic world. They are using Hariri’s blood to achieve their own purposes, which can never coincide with the nation’s hopes and aspirations. The days have proven that America’s and Israel’s goals feed on the aspirations of Arabs and Muslims, and that their policies bring nothing but destruction and grief. Nor can we forget the recent war on Lebanon, when American-made, American-stocked Israeli warplanes poured their fire on Lebanese civilians, demolished their homes, and burned their farms.

The Regional Equation

America and Israel have lived with an obsession over the shifting balance of power in the region ever since the year 2000, when Hezbollah expelled the Zionist occupier from South Lebanon. Both states took the measure of Hezbollah’s determination to fight and resist, and drew a lesson from the combat spirit that distinguished the party and from the military tactics it followed to inflict the greatest possible losses on the ranks of Zionist soldiers.

America has been watching the situation in Iran closely and in detail for many years, and it is thoroughly uneasy about the policy of self-reliance that Iran pursues in various fields, foremost among them the military field. Iran was determined to develop scientific research and technical development, and it was clear that it was making rapid progress through various industries that surfaced from time to time. The July 2006 war proved that Iran had moved with determined steps toward industrialization, and that the prevailing impressions about the advance of Iranian industries had not been mere speculation. Hezbollah succeeded in neutralizing the Israeli air force through its military tactics, and succeeded in striking ground and naval forces through its weaponry.

If we look at the security trajectory of Israel and the United States, we find that a clear deterioration has occurred, and that developments in the Arab-Islamic region bode no good for either of them. For Israel, the era of lightning wars has passed, as has the era of Arab helplessness — an Arab side unable to plan and unwilling to sacrifice and take initiative. Israel’s intelligence capacity has been damaged, and there are many developments at the level of secret organizations and certain states that Israel is unaware of and that sharply affect its combat readiness; the war is no longer fought only on Arab land, but is also being fought within Jewish population centers. That sense of reassurance Israel felt after the 1967 war no longer exists, and what exists now is an army lacking historic leadership, lacking morale and a spirit of commitment, and a people seeking diversion and sinking into corruption. As for America, it has been invaded in the heart of its own home, and here it is suffering in Afghanistan and Iraq after it had proclaimed the good tidings of victory to its people; it fears the widening circle of attacks against it and its interests beyond its borders. In other words, the results are now coming out contrary to what the two states had hoped for.

There is no sign on the horizon that the American-Israeli project in the region will see the light of day, and it is clear that the Arab and Islamic forces opposing it are gaining momentum and strength. So what is to be done? The solution lies in returning to an old tactic that renews itself continually: sowing discord in the region so that it exhausts its energies in internal conflicts, thereby weakening the states and organizations of steadfastness and resistance — after which the two states return with their abundant advice, focused on the stupidity and backwardness of Arabs and Muslims, returning as masters welcomed by many people in the region.

American-Israeli efforts at sedition are concentrated in Iraq, in inciting Sunnis and Shia against one another through bombings, killing, and bloodshed. The two states have tried hard to recruit as many hotheads as possible in order to manufacture a sectarian war in Iraq that would gradually turn into a war between Sunni and Shia across the breadth of the Islamic world, and turn into a war between Arabs and Iran. Instead of the war being Arab-Israeli or Islamic-colonial, it becomes Arab-Iranian and Sunni-Shia. America managed to draw in Arab regimes that play the sectarian, anti-Shia card, and managed to draw in Arab intellectuals, including court clerics, to defend the Sunnis and stir up zeal in their defense — though of course most of these people know nothing of God and never set foot in a mosque. In the preceding period many anti-Shia sayings spread across the Arab arena and incitement grew sharper, but Arab states, writers, and thinkers stood against this trend, and it appears that the side opposing sedition and internecine fighting has gained the upper hand.

Lebanon and Palestine

The United States, Israel, and many Arab regimes went into a frenzy after Israel’s defeat in South Lebanon in July 2006. Israel thought it would finish off Hezbollah within a few days; America rejoiced and heralded the birth of a “New Middle East”; and the Arab regimes grew optimistic, hoping this would translate into the destruction of Hezbollah, the siege of Syria, and the diminishment of Iran. Things came out the opposite of their expectations, so they set about thinking what they could contrive to achieve what they had failed to achieve by war.

Perhaps some naive Arab will ask why the Arab regimes are dragged into this equation. The regimes of Arab crookedness (called the “moderate” states) had a clear position on the war, one Israel repeated again and again: they incited Israel to continue the war until Hezbollah was destroyed. But the more important point is that Israel does not pose a threat to the Arab regimes — it threatens the Arab nation — and Israel is invested in the survival of these regimes and in resisting anyone who resists them. Israel is invested in the continuation of Arab backwardness, weakness, collapse, and squandered wealth, and the Arab regimes are the best guarantors of that continuation; this is why the Arab regimes remain an objective ally of Israel, despite their timid demands that Israel treat the Palestinians somewhat more fairly.

The Arab regimes, Israel, and America had previously pressed together to force Syria out of Lebanon, after which their attention focused on stripping Hezbollah of its weapons. The results of the war brought more pressure to disarm the party by means other than the Israeli army. Schemes of sedition began following one after another in Lebanon, in hopes of dragging Hezbollah into a civil war that would exhaust and destroy it. Political assassinations followed one after another, accusations against the Lebanese opposition forces and Syria followed one after another, American pressure on Siniora continued in order to run Lebanon without the participation of all the main forces, and figures like Walid Jumblatt and Samir Geagea were recruited to inflame feelings and curse Syria and its allies, with cause and without.

My assessment was that Hezbollah would not be dragged into a civil war, and I wrote, immediately after the war ended, an article advising the March 14 forces not to try to drag Hezbollah into war, because it was alert and wide awake. The certain news came when the March 14 forces attacked citizens on the famous day of the strike and killed some of them. General Michel Aoun stood up and declared the strike over, and Mr. Nasrallah issued his instructions not to respond in kind.

Then came the Nahr al-Bared affair, in an attempt to drag the Lebanese army into a bloody conflict with the Palestinians, whom Hezbollah might rush to rescue. The role of the Fatah movement (Arafat’s) emerged, feigning concern for the camp while trying to fan the flames of sedition in Lebanon, but it collided with a clear position from the various Palestinian factions, and Sultan Abu al-Aynayn retreated, unable to carry out what had been asked of him.

This matter is entirely bound up with Palestine, which is itself witnessing internal fighting. Since the Oslo Accords, internal Palestinian infighting has been expected, but expectations intensified after Hamas’s victory in the legislative elections. Hamas’s victory struck Israel and America like a thunderbolt, because everything the two had planned with the Palestinian leadership over the years was suddenly thrown to the wind. It became necessary to ignite sedition in an attempt to remove Hamas from government and bring their agents back to power. The matter began with a financial siege on the Palestinian people, with the participation of the crooked Arab regimes, and extended to sending weapons and money to the president of the Palestinian Authority. Hamas fell into mistakes that made it easier for Fatah to wage an internal battle, but caution is still warranted given the unrestrained desire of the regimes, Israel, and America to expand the sedition to other areas such as the West Bank and the refugee camps in Lebanon.

What was wanted was to link the sedition in Palestine to sedition in Lebanon, and to combine both with Iraq into a general conflagration. In this way America and Israel would spare themselves the burden of military efforts needed to restore the regional balance to what it was ten years earlier. Through sedition, the people of the house destroy one another, and the field is left open for American and Israeli mischief.

The International Tribunal

The international tribunal comes as part of these American-Israeli-Arab efforts. It is an attempt by the United States to enter Lebanon, search it, and interrogate its leaders under international cover, and also to enter Syria, summon its leaders, and interrogate them. The United States did everything in its power to persuade the permanent member states to approve the tribunal, hoping that no one would object to what is called international legitimacy. Nor did the March 14 forces spare any effort in supporting this tribunal, imagining it would rescue them from the situation they are in. America once made promises of salvation to some Iraqis through war, and I do not think the March 14 forces will reap anything better than what America’s agents among the people of Iraq have reaped.

America is not concerned with Hariri’s blood, nor with the blood of any Arab, whether friend or foe, and all Lebanese will discover this truth soon enough. America is not weeping for Hariri; it is weeping for the bygone regional equation that let it do what it wanted, whenever it wanted. The situation has now changed, and it would be wise for the Lebanese to try to interpret events in their own country based on who stands to gain.

Lebanon’s Sovereignty

Some Lebanese argue that Lebanon’s sovereignty is at stake, and that the Lebanese must struggle for their sovereignty, or for their independence, as some of them like to put it.

State sovereignty is a relative matter, since there is not a single state in the world possessing absolute sovereignty, not even the United States of America. Absolute sovereignty means the absence of any restraint on a state’s will and desires, and no need to reckon with others’ reactions no matter what measures or policies might be taken for or against them. The United States does not possess this kind of sovereignty, because it has to calculate, think, and hesitate even when its measures or policies concern a weak state. It cannot isolate itself from the world, cannot afford to anger the whole world, and cannot achieve independence in meeting all its needs. So if the greatest state lacks absolute sovereignty, then lesser states do not possess it either.

When political scientists speak of sovereignty, they confine their discussion to sovereignty in relation to others, not in relation to things. They do not speak of sovereignty in the face of storms, hurricanes, earthquakes, or the scorching heat of the sun, but rather in relation to other peoples or states, and this is why they focus their attention on a state’s capacity to confront the dangers arising from others’ ambitions, whims, desires, or threats. Is the state capable of repelling enemies, confronting ambitions, protecting its citizens and interests, and cooperating with other states of its own free will and as it sees fit? If it is capable, then it possesses sovereignty and can defend itself; but if it is incapable of defending itself, it will remain under the weight of others, under their tutelage and in their shelter.

America, for instance, can defend itself and its interests, even though, as I have said, it cannot achieve everything it wants in absolute terms; Lebanon, on the other hand, cannot defend itself. It is to be expected that the higher a state’s capacity to defend itself or to successfully attack others, the greater its capacity to achieve its policies and aspirations; and the lower that capacity, the more a state’s ability to implement its policies declines. Lebanon is a weak state that can neither defend nor attack, and it is to be expected that it will remain under the sway of whoever is stronger or more capable than it.

Lebanon speaks today of state sovereignty and insists upon it. Such talk cannot withstand the reality before us: that Lebanon is militarily, economically, and security-wise weak, unable to provide security for its citizens through its own free will and its own capabilities, and unable to secure this except through the will of others such as Israel, the United States, and others. There is a vast difference between the slogan and heated rhetoric on one hand, and the objective reality standing before us — a reality that imposes itself on all wishful thinking and political speeches — on the other. This is why international forces came to Lebanon with the government’s approval and welcome, operating under UN command, which is itself, for the most part, subject to the will of the United States. Moreover, the entry of international forces into Lebanon was an Israeli demand, meant to carry out tasks inside Lebanon, foremost among them preventing the presence of any weapons south of the Litani other than those of the Lebanese army.

There is also talk of the Lebanese army as an institution for protecting citizens in Lebanon and for establishing state sovereignty, talk that comes from the Lebanese government as well as from Israel and other states. In its current state, the Lebanese army cannot protect Lebanon or Lebanese citizens, and it needs someone to defend it should a neighboring state decide to attack Lebanon. The Lebanese army cannot establish sovereignty, but it constitutes an institution that can be considered part of the Lebanese entity, exactly as is the case in most Arab states. Arab armies cannot protect their citizens from the encroachment or aggression of powerful states, and at best they can chase down citizens and fight one another or fight the armies of neighboring states. These are states that are mere entities, that do not rise to the concept of a state in political science. It is true that they have geography, population, and laws, but in reality they largely take their orders from others. Arab armies can only protect citizens by the will of others, not by their own free will.

If we are to seize upon the point of security and protection from attacks and the defense of one’s own decisions, Hezbollah is more capable than the Lebanese army, and it has proven that it constitutes a form of deterrence, despite the enormous losses inflicted on Lebanese civilians and infrastructure. Hezbollah held out for more than a month against the mightiest army in the region, while the Lebanese army cannot hold out for a single day. If Israel were to fight the Lebanese army, it would not have needed to strike infrastructure and civilians, because the army would collapse quickly; this is unlike the fight against Hezbollah, where civilians were struck in order to bring internal pressure to bear on the party, which remained steadfast and capable of striking back at Israel with force.

So if Lebanon truly cares about its sovereignty, it would be better for it to support Hezbollah and provide it with every internal and external means of backing; but if it wants to remain like any other Arab state that trades in hollow slogans, it will keep talking about disarming Hezbollah. This is why the calls of those who insist on disarming Hezbollah cannot be seen as well-intentioned; rather, they should be seen as weakening Lebanon before external powers. It appears that the Arab road to sovereignty runs through subduing the forces capable of defending the nation, rather than through confronting the nation’s enemies.

And if the Lebanese truly cared about sovereignty, one would expect them to reject the international tribunal, which violates Lebanese soil and sovereign institutions. What we see instead is that Lebanese have struggled long and hard to establish this tribunal, which shows that the concern is not with sovereignty but with meeting others’ demands.

The Alliance Under the American Umbrella

The Americans do not hide their support for, and alliance with, the president of the Palestinian Authority, the prime minister of Lebanon, the prime minister of Iraq, the prime minister of Israel, and the states of Arab crookedness, foremost among them Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. The Americans are bold and courageous, and say openly what they want and speak clearly about their friends, but they need to reconsider their friendship with Arabs who lack the courage to face their own public with the truth of these friendships.

The pressure on the other side of the equation — represented by Hezbollah, Syria, the Palestinian resistance, the Iraqi resistance, and Iran — will continue and will grow harsher, but my assessment is that the era of Arab defeats came to an end in the year 2000, and that the coming battle will not be as quiet as the battle of 2006.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “المحكمة الدولية أداة في المعادلة االإقليمية” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.