Israeli Interference in the Palestinian Elections

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

It would not be wise to assume that the arrests Israel has recently carried out against Islamist activists in the West Bank fall under the security explanation and security escalation that the Gaza Strip has witnessed. A large number of the detainees are active in the political and social fields, and do not appear to have any connection to security matters. Of course, as a writer, I cannot know who is active in security affairs, since security activity by its nature takes a secretive form, and it is possible that even intelligence agencies are unable to know this — but experience teaches the observer that someone politically and socially active in the Islamic movement in the West Bank, as opposed to the Strip, is generally far removed from security activity. Most of its security activists in the West Bank did not operate openly, and astonished people with security activities that led a number of them into detention and others to martyrdom. This does not apply specifically to Fatah, since most of its security activists operate openly.

Reading the names of the detainees from the Islamic movement — Islamic Jihad and Hamas — one notices that the detention is political rather than security-related, especially since a number of them had laid down the staff of field combat long ago owing to advancing age, while others are not in conflict with the Palestinian Authority and work to build relationships that spare the Palestinian street factional chaos or inter-factional conflict. Some of them have stayed away from the corridors of prison for a long time, which indicates the absence of any security concerns about them, whether through electronic surveillance or through confessions and intelligence reports.

It may be in Sharon’s mind to use these arrests to shore up his leadership within the Likud party, given the shakiness that has afflicted it following his decision to withdraw from Gaza. He may want to send a message to the Israeli right that his withdrawal from Gaza does not mean leniency toward the Palestinians, nor that Israeli concessions in the West Bank are coming. Sharon won part of his popularity over the years by focusing on Israeli security, describing himself as the most capable of providing this security, always giving the impression that he carries the heavy stick in the face of the Palestinians, and that Israel’s security is at its best when his security position is at the forefront of the chain of responsibility.

Perhaps this applies to American desire in most regions of the world as well.

Most of the Palestinian detainees from Hamas are figures of influence within their local communities, and some have influence at the national level. They have served the movement, strengthened its footholds, and raised its power, and have managed to achieve good organizational competence. Despite everything the movement has been exposed to in the way of shocks, pursuit, and constriction, it has held firm, and these men were one of the reasons for its steadfastness and its advance at the popular level. This does not mean that mistakes were not made, or that missteps did not occur; it means they achieved accomplishments despite all obstacles and difficulties.

Hamas achieved a major success in the Palestinian local elections, which shook the image of the Palestinian Authority before the world and affected optimism about the success of the political project adopted by Fatah. Since a new round of local elections had been set for September 29, 2005, the imprisonment of Islamist leaders has indeed contributed to limiting their influence on rallying local opinion in favor of Hamas’s candidates.

The most striking point is that a number of detainees are expected to be among Hamas’s candidates for the legislative elections, whether on the lists or in the districts. A number of them enjoy popularity within the movement and on the Palestinian street, and have good chances of winning. It is true that the vote is for the movement, and that alternatives are available, but personal differences remain important, and so does the image imprinted in people’s minds of a given individual. Detaining a number of the movement’s leading figures will weaken Hamas’s list, and will lower the movement’s chances in the district elections, given that this type of election focuses on the individual rather than the list.

Each movement is expected to contest the elections with a list headed by a small number of figures with strong popular standing, and to field most of its strong figures for the district elections in order to improve its chances of winning the largest possible number of seats in the legislative council. Hamas will be negatively affected as a result of the arrests.

Israel and America would prefer that a Palestinian law be issued barring certain movements and individuals from running in elections, on the grounds that they deal with, or incite, what is called terrorism. Both states demand that the Palestinian Authority work to strike at the Palestinian resistance factions, foremost among them Hamas, as a basic condition for completing the negotiating process, and allowing Hamas to run in elections would mean recognizing it as a legitimate force, making the matter of dismantling its infrastructure a non-option. The Palestinian Authority has so far taken no significant step toward meeting the negotiating demands, and I do not think it will take an extreme step in line with Israeli demands. This is why Israeli measures may well escalate, in order to fill the existing vacuum and limit the influence of the Palestinian opposition in general on the political scene.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “التدخل الإسرائيلي في الانتخابات الفلسطينية” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.