Our Luck with the Coming Israeli Elections

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

Israel is now heading toward legislative elections following the dissolution of the 19th Knesset, which had been led by a Likud coalition with some right-wing parties and parties classified as centrist.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu decided to dismiss two ministers from his cabinet: Yair Lapid, head of the Yesh Atid (“There Is a Future”) party, and Tzipi Livni, head of the Hatnua (“The Movement”) party. Netanyahu was angry with some of his ministers for openly attacking his policies and expressing dissatisfaction with a number of foreign and domestic policies. After warning them, Netanyahu set conditions for them, and for Lapid in particular, that Lapid had no choice but to reject.

Even though it was the Labor party that submitted the request to dissolve the 19th Knesset, the Likud party had been waiting for this very step to support it. It was decided to dissolve the Israeli Knesset and call on party leaders to agree on a date for holding elections, which will most likely take place in mid-March 2015.

Weak Government Stability

Israel is heading toward electing the 20th Knesset in its history, which will naturally be followed by the formation of the 20th government. Statistically, the average lifespan of Israeli governments has been three years — one year less than the legally mandated term — while the current government lasted only 21 months.

“Israeli governments in recent decades have been marked by instability and rapid collapse, as a result of the political fragmentation Israel is experiencing. And although Israel does not suffer internal political fighting, its political parties have multiplied over time because of splits within the larger parties.”

Israeli governments in recent decades have been marked by instability and rapid collapse for reasons related to the state of political fragmentation Israel is experiencing. Israel does not suffer internal political fighting, but its political parties have multiplied over time because of splits within larger parties such as Likud and Labor, and because of broad disagreements among these parties regarding the Palestinian territory occupied in ‘67.

The strength of the religious (Haredi) political parties has also developed over the years, and they have come to matter in forming coalition governments, and to have the power to bring down governments quickly. These parties have exploited their presence in the Knesset to become a decisive factor in forming and toppling governments, despite the small number of their members in the legislature. The multiplicity of political parties has kept governments extremely fragile, vulnerable to collapse as a result of the position of just one or two Knesset members.

Political fragmentation in Israel has raised the intensity of Israeli political feuding, affecting government projects across various fields of life, and rivalries have become a major headline in Israeli media.

Arabs and the Israeli Elections

For decades, the Arab regimes, together with the Palestine Liberation Organization, have awaited the coming Israeli and American elections, hoping they might produce Israeli and American leaderships ready to respond positively to Arab concessions on Palestinian rights.

With every election, Arab hopes have been dashed for the emergence of leaderships that might soften Israeli positions on the question of the territory occupied in ‘67. They awaited the American elections across many electoral cycles, but no American president ever emerged who satisfied Arab wishes for pressuring Israel to withdraw its forces — on the contrary, every American president competed to offer every kind of support to Israel, and all of them affirmed their intense concern for Israeli security and for fortifying Israel militarily, so that it would remain the strongest military power in the Arab-Islamic region.

The situation regarding the Israeli elections was no different, and Arab leaderships awaited the victory of one party over another, always preferring the victory of the Labor party, or what was once known as the “Alignment,” over Likud. It even reached the point that the Palestine Liberation Organization adopted certain electoral activities among Arabs in the land occupied in ‘48 in favor of the Labor party, and an unofficial accusation was directed at some Arab leaderships of receiving money to support Shimon Peres’s electoral campaign.

But the Liberation Organization’s hopes were always dashed, because the winner never factored Palestinian rights into his calculations. Peres won, and Israel’s traditional policies of confiscating land, building settlements, and waging wars continued unchanged, to the point that Peres practiced mass killing in Lebanon and bore responsibility for the Qana massacre. Barak came to the premiership, classified as a “dove” by the Liberation Organization, but he did not take a single step toward accepting Palestinian demands, and then came Livni, and Israeli positions remained unchanged.

“The collapse of the current Israeli government did not come out of nowhere — political discontent in Israel rose to a level where a weak coalition government could no longer continue. The level of disagreement rose for several reasons.”

The Arabs’ problem is that they classified and divided the Israelis into hawks and doves, backing those they called “doves” on the premise that they were seeking peace with the Arabs. Time has proven this classification worthless, a product of the incapacitated Arab mind. Because of their own weakness, the Arabs deluded themselves into believing there were “doves” in Israel who could save them from their own weakness and offer them a solution that might save some face — but this illusion has now been thoroughly exposed, though some Arabs still prefer to cling to it.

Internal Israeli Disagreements

The collapse of the current Israeli government did not come out of nowhere — political discontent in Israel rose to a level where a weak coalition government could no longer continue. The level of disagreement rose for several reasons, including:

1. There is an accusation against Netanyahu that he is a despotic, exclusionary prime minister, who worked, over the preceding period, to entrench the pillars of personal rule that does not believe in pluralism or in others’ participation in governance. They accused him of being a tyrant working to pressure his ministers into being subordinates rather than partners in decision-making, always using threats, warnings, and patriotic one-upmanship to silence his opponents or those who disagreed with him.

2. Israel’s security situation deteriorated under Netanyahu, and Israelis’ doubts grew about their government’s ability to provide them security and prevent external threats. The war on Gaza was not successful, and Israel could not repel the rocket attacks of Palestinian resistance, which kept Israelis in shelters.

The ground army also could not enter Gaza, retreating in flight with its first steps testing the resistance’s readiness to wage a ground war. Israelis became certain that Israel’s capacity to provide them security has shrunk over time, that the oasis of security they were promised is not safe, and that they could find security anywhere in the world except Israel. Israel’s deterrent power has contracted very dangerously, and with it, Israelis’ hopes in Israel’s ability to confront a resistance growing stronger by the day.

3. Israel has come to suffer greatly from a shift in global public opinion against it, particularly in Europe, because of its political intransigence and its refusal to give Palestinians any part of their national rights. Europeans have begun to feel that Israel could pose a threat to their interests, because its policies constantly push toward wars and instability in the Arab-Islamic region.

Europeans see that instability in the region will reflect back onto them, negatively affecting their interests in the region and in the European continent itself, and for this reason they have recently grown bolder, with their legislative bodies taking decisions, non-binding on their governments, to recognize a Palestinian state. Europeans have grown weary of Israel, and have decided to take another political direction that might push Israel to soften its positions. This may encourage the Americans to reconsider this spoiled child and pressure it to accept a political solution to the Palestinian cause.

4. Jerusalem took its share of the acceleration in Israeli politics, because Netanyahu made matters worse when he showed contempt for the reaction of Jerusalemites toward Israeli assaults on the holy sites. Netanyahu believed he could please the settlers through the assault on Al-Aqsa, and did not factor in the reaction of the people of Jerusalem.

“The coming Israeli government is not an Arab government but an Israeli one, and the Arabs should not wait for a superhuman Israeli force to save them from their own weakness. There are no doves and hawks in Israel — there are only hawks, and if the Arabs are not hawks themselves, they will remain under the claws of their predators.”

Instead of matters settling down, with settlers enjoying the continuation of the assaults, the people of Jerusalem rose up in defense of their city and its holy sites, putting the settlers on the defensive and causing a major security deterioration. Jerusalem paralyzed the settlers’ movement, making them hesitant in their Judaizing projects for Al-Aqsa Mosque. This affected Netanyahu, constituting a second failure for him after his failure in the war on Gaza.

5. It is clear, from public opinion polls, that Netanyahu conducted pre-election negotiations with right-wing and religious parties to guarantee their standing by him in forming a new government coalition. The Likud party was quick to respond to the request to dissolve the Knesset and proceed to legislative elections, even though it was the Labor party that had initiated this project.

It has become clear, according to public opinion polls, that Likud and its allies will gain more seats in the Knesset — that is, Likud’s popularity is now better than it was in 2013, and the popularity of some parties that will stand against Netanyahu has declined, such as “Yesh Atid.”

Some religious parties that were not previously in the government coalition, such as Shas, are also moving toward cooperation with Netanyahu. This means that had Netanyahu not been confident of the results, he would never have moved so quickly to dismiss some of his ministers and accept his rivals’ initiative to dissolve the Knesset.

What Should the Arabs Expect?

In principle, the Arabs should not wait on the results of the Israeli elections to solve their problems. The Arabs ought to seek to solve their own problems themselves, not through their enemies. The Arabs’ record in this field is a corrupt and poor one, driving their enemies to mock them, and to harden their political positions instead of offering concessions.

The coming Israeli government is not an Arab government but an Israeli one, and the Arabs should not wait for a superhuman Israeli force to save them from their own weakness. There are no doves and hawks in Israel — there are only hawks, and if the Arabs are not hawks themselves, they will remain under the claws of their predators.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “حظنا مع الانتخابات الإسرائيلية المقبلة” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.