Palestine in the New Balance of Power

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

The traditional players in the Palestinian cause — Palestinian leaderships, Arab regimes, the Zionist entity, and a number of Western states — continue their traditional activities in the search for a solution to the Palestinian cause. They hold meetings following traditional patterns that have seen a fixed master and a fixed servant, they hold press conferences and take part in international meetings, and they issue repeated statements about the effectiveness of bilateral and collective talks, about each side’s understanding of the other’s demands, and in praise of the rationality and wisdom shown in handling the matters of disagreement or dispute.

The period after the Second World War witnessed a certain diplomacy regarding the Palestinian cause, punctuated by a number of wars in which the Arabs were the constant losers. The Palestinian cause proceeded gradually toward liquidation through a blend of diplomatic action and military measures, and the Arabs possessed no will of any kind except the will to justify the concessionary steps they took. From the slogan of Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine, the Arabs arrived at the point of putting forward an Arab initiative in Beirut that surpassed every taboo they had once taken as a foundation for handling the Palestinian cause. As for the Palestinians, they abandoned the slogan of liberating the land of Mandatory Palestine and reached the point of conscripting their own sons to defend Zionist security. This came about through many factors, foremost among them a balance of power that remained skewed in favor of the Zionist entity and its allies.

The balance of power, inescapably, imposes itself on the whole set of relations among its parties, even at the personal level. The balance of power determines the relationship between the strong and the weak, and forces the weak to soften, to appease, to concede, and to accept the terms of the strong; the weak may even be forced to feign, to lie, and to work at not provoking whoever is stronger than himself. The strong, for his part, tries to dominate the weak, exploit them, plunder their wealth, humiliate them, and buy their minds and souls — by fair means if possible, by force if not. These are relations that find their expression throughout history and in every corner of the earth, at many levels, foremost among them the level of states. The Arabs have roared, thundered and foamed at the mouth across time, but objective reality has imposed itself, and they have found themselves abandoning many positions and commitments. Wisdom required a measure of scientific thinking and the taking of the necessary steps for their words to be heard, but they preferred that wisdom consist of accepting what the adversary wants.

The Shattering of the Balance of Power

Hezbollah overturned the equation to some degree in 2000, and confirmed the overturning in 2006. Hezbollah halted Israel’s victories in the region and thwarted its efforts to achieve its goals in southern Lebanon. The Iraqi resistance entered the fray in 2003 and thwarted America’s ambition to dominate the world. America believed its easy control of Iraq would prove to many states that it was the undisputed leader, and that its program to globalize the world according to its own vision would become effective — only to find itself sinking into the mire of Iraq, with no one extending a hand to help it. As for Afghanistan, where the world had seen weakness and humiliation, the resistance forces returned to control Afghan territory and to pursue the invaders throughout the country. On the Iranian front, America threatens a great deal and hesitates even more, because it cannot know what Iran’s response would be if it attacked; it is virtually paralyzed in the face of the growing Iranian military capability. And finally, the Russian bear has stretched itself and proven to America that it is still alive and capable of the hunt.

The traditional balance of power, at least in the Arab-Islamic region, is shattering, and America and Israel are no longer able to achieve what they want and enforce their policies. The action of the two states in the region, sometimes even under the shadow of the Soviet Union’s existence, used to precede their words, but now they talk a great deal and hesitate to take action. America has threatened Iran for years without striking; Israel stood at Gaza’s gates for several months threatening a broad military operation, but in the end agreed to a truce. America decides on a particular step aiming at particular results, only to find the results the opposite of what it expected. America has lost in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, and was severely frustrated when Rice declared that the 2006 war would usher in the birth of a “New Middle East,” only to find that her ally was a bloated giant before Hezbollah.

Repercussions of the New Balance

The new balance of power in the region, still in the process of taking shape, imposes a number of things:

First: the reformulation of alliances. As the traditional balance of power shifts against the interest of the traditional dominant powers, these powers must work to reformulate their alliances in a way that makes them better able to face the coming or emerging danger. All the powers harmed by the new balance will seek each other out to forge an implicit or explicit alliance to defend themselves and their interests. Their interests may not fully coincide, but they converge. The powers opposing the traditional order, for their part, must come together to form a declared or undeclared counter-alliance to entrench the new historical course.

Second: developing military capabilities. Every party is absorbed in studying new and potential developments, and every party works to develop lethal weapons that surprise the adversary or destroy his weapons and neutralize their effect. The transition period from one balance to another witnesses a heated arms race, with each side inventive in its assessments of the other side’s strength.

Third: developing military and security tactics. New developments require a new kind of military and security tactic, since the previous tactic was suited to a previous era. Military operations rooms and intelligence departments are absorbed in studying new ideas in this field, and try to draw on the experiences of past nations and the histories of difficult wars.

Fourth: reformulating bilateral, regional and international relations. Here economic, social, political and legal standards come into play, aiming to isolate the adversary and establish new friendships or new cooperation with the greatest possible number of states, or to isolate the adversary from other states and surround him with a group of enemies who can contribute to besieging and weakening him. Here media propaganda becomes active, and along with it experts in various fields of life work to attract others to oneself or to distance them from the adversary.

Palestine on the Scale

I do not consider the traditional pattern of approaching the Palestinian cause — based on the idea of a two-state solution through negotiations and respect for so-called international legitimacy — to be of any use, because the balance of power that allowed it to continue is facing serious, real challenges. This pattern could have ended, several years ago, with a solution between Israel and the negotiating Arab parties, had Israel softened its positions somewhat and given the Palestinians some of their national rights; but now it cannot end in a solution even if Israel gave the Palestinians a real state. The powers challenging the traditional balance of power do not believe in the two-state solution, and have no willingness to recognize Israel even if they sometimes maneuver with diplomatic language on the subject. These are powers looking toward reordering the Arab-Islamic region through a free political will independent of American and Israeli will.

Shifts in the regional balance of power are accelerating, tension between rival powers grows sharper by the day, and the possibilities of confrontation are real. The various parties are mobilizing their forces and developing their military arsenals, intensifying military maneuvers that rise to the level of simulating a comprehensive war, and deepening their alliances and coordination among the parties to each alliance. Each camp senses that its future in the region depends on the shifts underway in the balance, and each works tirelessly and diligently to ensure the decisive outcome favors it.

In the midst of this ongoing race in the region, and the tension largely absent from the media, the Palestinian cause does not occupy a large space of attention on the part of America and Israel. This is logical, since Israel and America are not prepared to invest their efforts and time in meeting the demands of the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah while their interests across the whole region are under challenge. I believe the Americans are clear in telling the Palestinians that the Palestinian cause now receives only marginal attention, and that American officials are occupied with matters more important and more dangerous; nor do I believe the Israeli government — I do not believe the Israeli government will be following the news of the Palestinian negotiator while many of its own writers are now discussing the great threat to the very existence of their state.

I believe the Israeli security and military circles are now preoccupied with what a broad military operation against Hezbollah or Iran could entail, and with what the Israeli home front would look like if Hezbollah decided to fire some rockets at the Tel Aviv area, around which about 60% of Israel’s population lives. They are certainly preoccupied with matters far greater than the matters of those who are struggling hard to prove their ability to fulfill their security commitments toward Israel.

The Palestinians’ Position

Many Palestinians have for some time been preoccupied with proving that Hezbollah was defeated in 2006, and in doing so they are trying to belittle others in order to deflect blame from themselves. They are heavily preoccupied, along with many Arab regimes, with the idea of Sunni-Shia rivalry, and they try to pour fire on oil that ignites sometimes in Iraq and other times in Pakistan. This is an escape from a reality that is gradually and increasingly taking shape. This segment of Palestinians still bets on the peace process that began at Madrid, and sees no other opening on the horizon for Palestinians to obtain part of their national rights.

By contrast, there are Palestinians — whether at the level of the factions or opinion leaders — who believe that things are developing contrary to what Israel and America wish, and that Palestinians must bear the harshness of the siege and the bitterness of life a little longer, because relief is near.

Regardless of these two contradictory Palestinian approaches, historical experience calls on all Palestinians to study the shifts in the region scientifically, and to adapt Palestinian positions and policies in a way that achieves the greatest benefit and the least harm for the people. At a time when Israel hesitates to undertake new military adventures, it is unacceptable for Palestinians to keep believing that Israel’s army is invincible, and that they must search for solutions within the bounds of this “truth.”

Israel’s Defeat

The probability of Israel’s military defeat in a coming mobile war is very great. If a confrontation occurs between Israel and the northern front, I do not believe it will be static on Hezbollah’s part, as it was in 2006. Hezbollah’s next war will be a mobile one, and the party will enjoy defensive cover protecting its fighters and civilians from Israeli aircraft. According to the data I possess, based on analysis, the party will wage a mobile war unique of its kind in any coming confrontation, and Israel will fall captive to numerous tactical surprises.

If, on the other hand, Israel decides to content itself with threats and refrains from launching a war, it will likely find itself in a defensive position.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “فلسطين في ميزان القوى الجديد” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.