Palestinian Reconciliation Between Hope and Frustration

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

For years, Fatah and Hamas have preoccupied the Palestinian people, diverting its attention from the Palestinian cause, immersing the citizen in bickering and squabbling that pleases no one but the Zionist occupation. The two movements have previously signed reconciliation agreements in a number of Arab countries, but have failed to implement what was agreed.

The leaders of the two movements would meet with warm embraces, exchanged kisses, ornate phrases, and perhaps delicious meals, but upon returning to the wounded homeland’s expanse, they exchanged accusations and contempt, each telling the Palestinian people it was his rival who failed to honor the agreements.

Despite this, neither side ever sought to form an arbitration committee to judge which of them had violated the agreement more. This is another ominous sign, in that both marginalize the Palestinian people, granting it no role in steering its own internal affairs — perhaps both sides fear the people.

The Danger of Failed Agreements

Every time Fatah and Hamas meet, a flood of varied political statements pours out from officials of both movements about pure intentions, the seriousness of the position, and the insistence on ending the Palestinian division, and alongside these statements, the media of both movements — joined by Arab media — rushes to broadcast programs about the anticipated Palestinian reconciliation and the new Palestinian horizons about to dawn.

Politicians and media figures used to create an atmosphere of high expectations, promising the Palestinian people the good that was coming and genuine national cohesion. The level of optimism would rise sharply, and you would find the Palestinian street smiling, happy about what was about to happen before it even happened. But matters never unfolded according to the media narrative, nor according to the optimistic, promising political statements — a month or two after the reconciliation agreement was announced, matters would flip, and the Palestinian people would find no flour on the table.

This is a dangerous record for the Palestinian people — it is not easy to raise people’s level of optimism and then cast them to the ground, terribly frustrated. This produces psychological crises, declining morale, further bickering among people themselves, and further divisions ending in social disintegration and disbelief in the homeland and patriotism.

It is clear neither faction consults experts in education or psychology, and neither bears the slightest degree of responsibility toward the importance of psychological balance and moral stability among people. This is not strange, given that we find no one in Palestinian history who appreciates the importance of social cohesion and moral resilience, and who adopts appropriate policies to reinforce collective work, mutual cooperation, and mutual trust.

There is always a Palestinian know-it-all, resembling the Arab know-it-all who never lets anyone speak because of a knowledge no one else can grasp. For this reason, the weight of the agreements’ failure has always fallen heavily on the Palestinian people, driving it, again and again, into corners of frustration and feelings of weakness, abasement, humiliation, and exclusion.

The Latest Reconciliation Attempt

A dialogue is now under way between Fatah and Hamas in Cairo, after having begun in the Gaza Strip. Nothing substantial has leaked so far about the dialogue’s agenda, and no one has made statements about what has been agreed upon or about the points of disagreement. All that has been conveyed through the media is a summary of an exchange of courtesies between the two sides, and an expression of passionate feelings about care for the homeland and its citizens.

People are very optimistic, and Palestinian media has not let a single opportunity pass without pumping more optimism into people’s souls, without caution about the possibility of failure.

The most important thing about this new attempt is that it surfaced suddenly, and arrangements were hastily made for the Ramallah government to enter Gaza, welcome and reception activities proceeded quickly, and meetings between officials of the two movements appeared as though nothing had ever happened between them.

This speed in achieving the crossing into Gaza was justified on the basis that the United States had given the green light to the (illegitimate) president of the Palestinian Authority to reconcile with Hamas, and that the Zionist entity had closed its eyes and granted the West Bank delegation facilities to enter the land occupied in 1948 and cross into Gaza.

This is precisely what raised many questions about this attempt, and whether something is being cooked up for Gaza. How could the United States give a green light, and the Zionist entity close its eyes, while Gaza still possesses weapons aimed at resisting the Zionist occupation?

It is well known that the siege on Gaza is imposed because of the presence of Palestinian resistance, which has previously stood firm through three Zionist wars and defeated the entity’s army. Had there been no Palestinian rifle in Gaza preparing to confront and resist the occupation, the Arabs, the West, and the Zionists would never have imposed a siege on it, and would never have squeezed people’s lives and livelihoods.

The parties to the siege have practiced terrorism against Gaza’s population, hoping they would rise up against the Hamas movement and topple it, so that Gaza would then recognize the Zionist entity and accept the conditions of the international Quartet. At that point, a surrender agreement could be reached covering the West Bank and Gaza Strip, under which the Palestinians would remain guards over the Zionist kingdom.

Reasons for Rushing the Dialogue

Neither the United States nor the Zionist entity was previously enthusiastic about Hamas-Fatah meetings — indeed, both were quick to comment negatively on the dialogues that took place. Matters differed this time — what happened, and why? There are several reasons; I note the most important:

First: the Zionist entity feels great distress given the developments in the Arab homeland, particularly in Iraq and Syria. The Zionists and the Americans feel they have been defeated in the battle to reshape the region according to their wishes — indeed, what has happened points to the defeat of the new fragmentation projects, and of the projects aimed at embracing the entity so that it becomes an inseparable part of the region.

There is a great likelihood of military axes forming against the entity, placing it in existential danger. The entity no longer faces a single military front in southern Lebanon — it now sees a new front forming in the Golan, and another, extremely difficult front in the Yarmouk basin, one that could threaten the Jordanian regime. And since Gaza could constitute another front confronting the entity should war break out, it is better to contain it and disarm it, or at least neutralize it.

The Zionists and Americans calculated that intense pressure on Gaza would produce an explosion, one that could well erupt against the entity rather than against the Hamas movement. This means the goal is to contain the Hamas movement and Gaza’s Palestinian resistance as a whole, and to drag Hamas into recognizing the conditions of the international Quartet, which views the Palestinians as the ones occupying the Zionist entity, not the reverse.

Second: there are rapprochement activities under way between Hamas and Gaza’s Palestinian resistance as a whole, on one side, and Iran and Hezbollah on the other. The Iranian axis is gaining clear strength given the achievements made in Iraq and Syria, and because of the rapprochement with both Russia and Turkey.

The West’s allies have grown weaker, and the states of the Arab coalition and the Arab Quartet (represented by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the UAE) are afflicted with dizziness because of the crises they have entangled themselves in over Yemen, against Qatar, and against the states of the Arab uprising.

This axis — which now includes a number of states, even if informally — constitutes a great temptation for the Palestinians, and Hamas has no choice but to search for a way out through it. Note that this axis is the one with sufficient courage to fund the movement, supply it with weapons, oversee the training of its members, and provide the scientific and technical information needed to develop weapons in Gaza.

The other axis may offer some money, but does not dare challenge the Zionist entity. The Zionists and Americans now see that reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas could cut off the path to a Hamas-Iran rapprochement — a rapprochement that has become clear, and without Iranian conditions on Gaza’s resistance.

The Question of Resistance Weapons

Hamas says the question of weapons has not yet been opened at the dialogue table, adding — through a number of its officials — that it will not accept dialogue on the matter, and that resistance weapons will remain, never to be relinquished, however great the pressure grows. And if the resistance is to keep its weapons, we should expect a Zionist and American reaction.

The siege was originally imposed on Gaza because of the presence of resistance weapons, and if resistance weapons remain, the siege will remain, and the Palestinian Authority will not be able to take measures to ease it, because of the American and Zionist punitive measures it could face. The Palestinian Authority possesses no free political will in this field, and has previously complied with sanctions during the formation of a Palestinian national unity government some years ago. This means we will return to square one.

It is possible that those concerned with the matter will offer the people of the Gaza Strip some enticements, temporarily easing the siege. It is also possible that pressure will begin on Hamas to relinquish its weapons once people in the Strip feel the bliss of this easing. Pressure from the Gaza street on the resistance is expected to escalate if it feels relaxation and comfort, given the heavy pain that would come with the return of a full siege.

It is not easy for someone who has relaxed after intense tension to return to that painful tension. And if people move against the resistance’s weapons, the Palestinian street will witness new and painful sorrows. In the end, the matter hinges on Hamas’s tactical political capacity — does it have sufficient capability and political shrewdness to outmaneuver whatever political scheme is now being prepared against the Gaza Strip?

The Palestinian Authority will speak of “legitimate weapons,” on the premise that its own weapons are the sole legitimate weapons. Here I would note that there are three types of weapons in the West Bank and Gaza: first, the Authority’s weapons, which are not legitimate, because they are licensed by the Zionists, and any weapon available with Zionist permission cannot be legitimate Palestinian weaponry — it exists to defend Zionist security.

Second, the weapons of thugs and enforcers, also illegitimate, because they are directed against Palestinians, used to terrorize them and for showing off at weddings and festivals. Third, the weapons of Palestinian resistance, the sole legitimate weapons, defending Palestinians.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “المصالحة الفلسطينية بين التفاؤل والإحباط” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.