Peace and Resistance Amid Current Global Shifts

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

The recent period, stretching from 2006 to the present, has witnessed some important changes on the international and regional stages, changes that call on us to reassess the state of the Palestinian cause and to think through the factors that might push either toward peace via negotiations, or toward the continuation and intensification of resistance in the direction of liberation. Over the preceding years, two approaches have collided: the approach that seeks a settlement of the Palestinian cause across the negotiating table, and the approach of reorganizing resistance in the region to make it more effective — since, according to those who adopt it, resistance is the optimal path toward restoring Palestinian rights. This clash has at times escalated to the point of bloody internal fighting on the Palestinian scene, and even to the point of military reckoning in West Beirut.

In order to offer a scholarly assessment of the future of the two approaches — negotiation and resistance — it is important to examine the regional changes that bear on the balance of choice, and the international changes that may have repercussions for the Arab-Islamic region. At the regional level, it appears that a new balance of power has begun to emerge after the 2006 war; at the global level, it appears that America’s drive to globalize the world according to its own standards has begun to recede, which is bound to affect decision-makers and doers and to push them toward seeking new means and methods, and perhaps new approaches altogether. In the pages that follow, there is a quick review of the most important of these changes, followed by an assessment of their implications for the subject of our inquiry.

Regional Changes

There are various regional changes, some already crystallized and others in the process of crystallizing, that affect the shaping of the future of the Arab-Islamic region. The following are the most important of these changes:

First: Iranian Perseverance

Iran’s military development may be the single most important change on the Arab-Islamic scene, because it poses a major challenge to the Israeli military dominance that has prevailed since 1948. Iran has persisted in scientific and technical development, focusing its efforts on military technology with the aim of guaranteeing its own capacity for self-defense, and of supporting its friends in the region — particularly those who believe in resistance as the sole path to restoring rights in Palestine. (Iran and Israel, Wikipedia) Since the triumph of the Khomeini revolution, Iran has adopted a policy of self-reliance, especially after America’s decision to impose a blockade on it, and has regarded this policy as the sole passage toward preserving national dignity and pressing forward with progress in various fields.

America has imposed a blockade on Iran since 1979, and contributed to waging war on it with the aim of changing its political reality; Iran could barely find anyone to stand with it, or to help it break the blockade and supply it with what it needed in order to hold out against American, European, and Arab pressure. Iranian momentum continued to build until it broke free of its constraints in the field of conventional weapons, and until it achieved a significant nuclear development that may lead to its possession of a nuclear bomb — that is, if it does not already possess one.

The Arab-Islamic region remained under Israeli-American dominance, and the Arab regimes kept begging for defensive weapons, particularly from the Soviet Union, without ever succeeding in repelling an act of aggression or preventing a defeat. Iran overturned this equation, such that begging for weapons was no longer part of its policy, and its own weapons came to bear their weight on the region’s battlefields. The capability of these weapons was partially demonstrated in Israel’s 2006 war against Hezbollah. (Pezeshkpour, “Iran and the Regional Balance of Power”) Iranian weaponry proved highly effective against Israeli tanks and naval vessels, and Israel failed to achieve the war’s objectives. From this arose the question: if Hezbollah possesses effective weapons of this kind, what weapons is Iran keeping in reserve for a war that is more comprehensive and far more intense?

Iran is now manufacturing fighter and bomber aircraft, tanks whose combat capabilities are not fully known, missiles to counter warplanes and helicopters, anti-armor weapons, and surveillance and reconnaissance systems. Beyond that, it possesses submarines and aircraft undetectable by radar, anti-submarine naval missile capabilities, and long-range land-based missile capabilities. (Iran Defense Industry, Wikipedia) Recently it managed to reach into space with a satellite carried by an Iranian rocket. But what matters most in all of this development is that Iran gives some of these weapons to Syria, and to the parties of the resistance — foremost among them Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad — which poses a serious challenge to the Israeli army.

Iran is now asserting itself as a regional power capable, to some degree, of challenging American policies; it is imposing new relationships at the regional level, and has even built a strong, undeclared alliance with Syria and some resistance factions in Lebanon and Palestine. It has become a source of anxiety for a number of Arab states, such as the Gulf states, Egypt, and Jordan, because the balance of power it imposes affects the region’s stability, which could lead to the fall of a number of Arab regimes. (Reza, “How Iran Is Changing the Balance of Power”) Although Iran continually calls on the Arabs to cooperate with it for the sake of the security, welfare, and independence of the Arab-Islamic region, the overwhelming majority of Arab regimes remain deeply suspicious of the situation, and prefer to preserve their relations with the United States and Israel.

The July War and the “Cast Lead” War

Israel failed in its two most recent wars — against Hezbollah, and against the Palestinian resistance in Gaza, specifically Hamas. Israel aimed to destroy Hezbollah, strip it of its weapons, and reduce it to a mere political party, and it deployed enormous military capabilities toward that end, but it collided with a solid, well-armed resistance prepared for bitter fighting. Israel failed to achieve any of its objectives and was forced to accept a ceasefire, convinced that continuing the war was futile. The United States stood with Israel in order to win the war, supplying it with modern weapons, particularly munitions, and urging it to continue the war in the hope of the birth of a “New Middle East,” but Hezbollah’s combat performance convinced all parties of the necessity of halting the war.

Israel tried its luck at war a second time against the resistance in Gaza, on 27 December 2008, imagining that the Palestinian resistance was not armed or trained on the same level as Hezbollah. Military and security circles expected the war to be very short and decisively in Israel’s favor. On the eve of the war, Israel’s foreign minister declared that the goal was to change the existing situation in Gaza — the situation in which Hamas holds control. (Leslie Susser, “Did Israel Achieve Its Goals?”) The Palestinian resistance confronted Israel with solid resistance, and Israel’s hopes were ultimately dashed, as were the hopes of its Arab and non-Arab allies. Israel failed, and contributed significantly to further tarnishing its image at the global level because of the massacres it committed against civilians.

The “Cast Lead” war demonstrated that Israel has been shaken militarily, and that what it was once capable of doing in the past, it is no longer capable of doing now. It could not win a war against the Gaza Strip, whose area does not exceed 365 square kilometers, even though it used half its military strength, according to some of its own military officers. The Israeli military power that once regarded its wars as a stroll has found that the era of the military stroll is over.

It has become clear that the military tactics Israel traditionally relied upon are no longer effective against a resistance whose methods and means have come to differ from those of traditional resistance. Israel used to enter war with its naval, land, and air forces all at once, and used to relish the sight of Arab soldiers fleeing the battlefield; but in its two most recent wars it was forced to rely on air power first, as a prelude to ground operations. The air force carried out heavy bombardment of many military and civilian sites, but the ground forces found that the aerial bombardment did not achieve what was hoped for. The resistance forces remained steadfast and cohesive, their weapons on their shoulders still capable of continuing the fight.

The emergence of a new Arab fighter was among the most important changes to come out of these two most recent wars. The modern Arab mujahid who now confronts Israel does not turn his back and flee; he fights with unparalleled ferocity until victory or martyrdom. Unlike the old Arab fighter who had no cause in the depths of his soul, and did not know what he was fighting for or on whose behalf, before vanishing from the field — a fighter has now emerged who is armed with a solid conviction and a clear awareness of what he is fighting for.

Israel’s security doctrine, which relied on preemptive war and on confining the battlefield to enemy territory, suffered major setbacks, in that preemption proved ineffective, and enemy territory no longer remained the sole theater of explosions. Israel will certainly work to revise its security doctrine and its military tactics, and it — together with the United States — will remain troubled, because its military prestige has evaporated to a great extent, and its army is no longer the invincible force it once was. This is a situation that sets off a red light, in that the resistance forces backed by Iran and Syria have come to threaten Israel’s very existence as a state, especially given the possibility that this resistance may, in the future, shift from static warfare to mobile warfare.

The Popular Shift

It is notable that the Arab street showed some courage in confronting Arab governments during its protests against the war on Gaza. Greater numbers took to the streets compared with previous events, and showed persistence despite the confrontation of demonstrations by Arab security forces. Demonstrators used to flee quickly before Arab security forces, but some measure of popular courage appeared this time, to the point that some demonstrators pelted the security forces with stones.

Accompanying the demonstrators was an unprecedented boldness on the part of religious scholars, to the point that some hundred of them signed a statement supporting the Palestinian resistance and demanding that Arab governments stand with it in confronting Israel. A number of the signatories came from the Arabian Peninsula (from Saudi Arabia), which constitutes an important development in the activity of Muslim imams and their engagement in public life beyond questions of jurisprudence. Sheikh al-Qaradawi emerged as a religious-political leader inspiring other imams, and appeared on television during a celebration of the resistance’s steadfastness in Qatar, holding a sword.

What matters in all this is that the mass of demonstrators and the Muslim imams support the resistance and refuse to accept Israel. They rallied before the media, roused the people, and carried out mobilizing activities against Israel and the Arab regimes that support it; while supporters of the war on Gaza were unable to carry out any activity at all, and contented themselves with timid statements about the destruction and mass killing carried out by Israel, without failing to place the blame for the war and the resulting human and material losses on the Palestinian resistance. The voice of those opposed to Israel rose above every dissenting voice, signaling that Israel faces further losses on the Arab scene, contrary to what some of its leaders imagine — that official Arab normalization is meeting with popular acceptance. This in itself serves the interest of the resistance, and reinforces Arab trends toward adopting resistance as the sole method that Israel understands.

A Palestinian Point of Anchorage

Israel was not at ease with the developments that took place in Gaza following Hamas’s takeover of the Strip, because the idea of preparing and readying for combat gained a momentum that was visible in various training grounds. The resistance factions took their time preparing and training, and smuggling in weapons wherever possible, in order to raise the level of the resistance, and Israel perhaps thought the matter would be easy given its army’s capabilities. Now that Israel has failed to achieve its objectives, Gaza has turned into a Palestinian military point of anchorage. It has been proven on the ground that Israel’s military capability did not serve the goal of eliminating the resistance, and it is easy to conclude that whoever holds out can redouble their efforts toward military build-up.

It is possible to say that the Palestinian resistance has established a point of anchorage in Gaza, or a bridgehead that can be built upon to form a focal point of challenge in the face of Israel. This is a development that means the resistance has gained the opportunity to continue while standing on its own land. Palestinians are no longer at the mercy of the moods of Arab regimes when it comes to resistance; they are now confronting Israel from their own soil. It is true that this point of anchorage is under siege, particularly by Arab states, yet it has still managed to smuggle in weapons and hold out under siege — and whoever tries hard enough is never left without means.

The Israeli Elections

Some reckon that the results of the Israeli elections will greatly affect the course of negotiations, because Netanyahu — expected to form the Israeli government — does not believe in the two-state solution, and sees the need to continue settlement construction in the West Bank and to further Judaize Jerusalem. Others question the usefulness of further pessimism, since successive Israeli governments — whether led by those termed doves or by hawks — have never given peace a genuine chance, and have continued with traditional Israeli policies of land confiscation, settlement construction, wall-building, and so on.

In any case, observers from various parts of the world believe that Netanyahu will place the Palestinian Authority, led by Mahmoud Abbas, in a very awkward position, because he will insist on preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state and will continue with settlement construction, thereby defying the wishes of his Western allies and disregarding the embarrassment this causes the Palestinian leadership, which is supposedly the party championing peace with Israel. The Palestinian Authority is uneasy about the course of the negotiations, and shows a certain embarrassment before people both inside and outside Palestine, and now Netanyahu arrives to add to its pain.

Netanyahu’s intransigence on fundamental issues — even when not phrased as a refusal to give the Palestinian people anything — weakens the arguments of Palestinian supporters of negotiation with Israel, and strengthens the argument of the supporters of resistance. The arguments of the negotiators have weakened over time because they have not obtained Palestinian national rights and have been unable to stop Israel’s aggressive policies, and they will find matters even more difficult before their Palestinian rivals with Netanyahu’s arrival.

On the Israeli Side

I find no differences of any consequence between one Israeli government and another; and if there are differences regarding the Palestinian question, they are differences of language, not of policies and practices. Netanyahu previously served as prime minister while Arafat headed the Palestinian Authority, and he continued the negotiations then, just as he continued to implement Israeli policies that leave no room for Palestinian rights. Like other governments, Netanyahu left the door to donor-country funds open, as a strong means of keeping the Palestinian Authority going. Only Netanyahu uses heavier, harsher language, creating the impression that Israel’s policy has changed.

The Embarrassment of the Regimes and the Maturing of the Resistance

The Arab regimes are living through a genuine predicament from several angles, the most important of which is their diplomatic and normalization relations with Israel. The Arab regimes have utterly failed to restore any Palestinian rights, even though they have offered Israel a great many concessions. Palestinians have recognized Israel and are now coordinating with it on security; Arabs have recognized Israel and normalized relations with it; the 2002 Arab summit put forward an initiative to resolve the conflict, but it failed to persuade Israel even to merely discuss it. The Arab regimes have kept their activity on behalf of Palestine confined to the United Nations and international forums, without escaping failures there either.

The Arab regimes tried to rein in the resistance, and cooperated with Israel in order to eliminate it, but Israel could not manage it. Israel is now waging a campaign against Iran to keep it weak and to deprive the resistance of its current backer, but the Arab regimes can do nothing but rely on Israel and America, at great embarrassment before the Arab public and the various nationalist and Islamic political movements.

This embarrassment forms a double-edged sword: one edge calls on the Arab regimes to pile further pressure on the resistance and deprive it of money and weapons, as is happening in the siege of Gaza; the other edge is one the Arab regimes fear — namely the Arab street, whose rising activity I have pointed to recently. The resistance thrives if the Arab regimes ease their pressure, and the regimes find themselves under further pressure if they escalate their assault on the resistance.

On the other hand, the resistance in the region has gained political maturity and shrewdness, becoming more secretive in its operations and better in its diplomatic performance. It is no longer easy for the Arab regimes to delude the forces of resistance into believing that they are working for the nation’s interest, or that they are serious about restoring Arab rights. The forces of resistance have learned well from experience, and have learned from their own accumulation of strength, and have become more capable of political maneuvering, and of putting the regimes in ever greater embarrassment.

America Stumbles in Iraq and Afghanistan

America has not been able to control Afghanistan, nor has it achieved a stability that guarantees the continuation of the government against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The Afghan resistance is advancing, its military operations against Western forces are escalating, and Western losses are mounting. As a result, America decided to increase the number of its forces in Afghanistan, amid Western opinion holding that winning the war in Afghanistan is a difficult goal to attain.

America also failed to achieve rapid stability in Iraq, and the years passed without the American administration achieving the victory it spoke of immediately after Iraq’s occupation. Domestic American pressure on the administration rose, and there was no escape but withdrawal without achieving the objectives. This is one of the things pushing Arab resistance against Israel toward intensification, since the success of resistance in one place is an encouragement to others elsewhere.

America’s stumbling in Afghanistan has had repercussions on Pakistan, which is living through instability and bloody internal conflicts. America went to Afghanistan to eliminate al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and the two organizations only grew in strength and vigor, extending into Pakistan, where the Pakistani government suffers from a powerful resistance calling on it to grant self-rule to Islamic groups in the Swat Valley. Although Pakistan was the main pillar America relied upon in occupying Afghanistan, it is now turning into a new base of threat to American interests. It is clear that the so-called war on terror has produced yet more resistance across the region, and has placed the Western world in a difficult state of bewilderment.

International Changes

The changes on the international stage do not appear to be large, or to have a major effect on the arena of the Arab-Israeli conflict, yet they ultimately cast certain shadows that may not be so faint. I point here to the following changes:

The Shift in the Russian Position

A change was noted in Russian rhetoric regarding the international situation after Russia took control of South Ossetia and inflicted a swift defeat on the army of Georgia, an ally of the United States. The Russians began to speak of the need for another pole in the world, since it would be unjust for the world to remain under the dominance of the United States alone. They spoke of Russia’s greatness, of its advanced global position, and of the fact that it would be the second pole, and they took a number of steps that greatly disturbed the United States, such as conducting new missile tests, announcing the development of modern, high-technology weapons, sending naval units to the region of the Horn of Africa, and stepping up naval patrols on the high seas. Russia escalated its show of muscle by sending some of its warships to Venezuela to conduct joint naval maneuvers with the Venezuelan navy, and information leaked regarding the possibility that Russia might acquire a logistical base in the Syrian port of Latakia.

There is no doubt that the emergence of a Russian pole rivaling the United States affects the Arab-Islamic region, and provides at least a morale boost to states and movements opposed to America and Israel. It is difficult, at present, to build much on this possibility, since Russia has a long distance yet to travel before it truly becomes a second pole — this requires developing a Russian vision for polarity, and empowering itself economically and financially, given the obligations that come with such a polar role. To date, Russia has not developed its relations with states that see no justice in American policy in the region, such as Iran and Syria, and it remains very quiet in asserting its presence.

What matters, though, is that Russia may not support resistance factions such as Hezbollah and Hamas, because these are Islamic movements that stand alongside Islamic movements fighting Russia and demanding the separation of certain regions from Russia, such as Chechnya, and from Serbia, an ally of Russia. We have noted how the Russian position has remained critical of Hamas, and has considered Israel’s war on Gaza a defensive war against the rockets launched from Gaza. Russia’s foreign minister recently visited Israel and Egypt, but did not visit Gaza and did not meet Hamas leaders either inside or outside Gaza. It is clear that Russia supports the American approach to resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict (Putin, 14 February 2008), and that it will act as a restraining factor on the resistance through its support for the agreements the PLO concluded with Israel and for the continuation of negotiations.

The American Elections

Bush left and Obama arrived, and the world breathed a sigh of relief because of the wars and bloodshed Bush had caused. Bush was an unbalanced, unsteady phenomenon who entangled America in many foreign adventures. Obama arrived promising new approaches to international relations. He spoke of the need to strengthen the approach of dialogue and rein in the approach of wars, and promised further talks with Russia, Iran, and other states to resolve outstanding problems. But does this apply to the Arab-Israeli conflict?

Judging by the statements Obama made during his election campaign, he does not appear to bring anything new regarding the Palestinian question, nor does his enthusiasm for supporting Israel appear any less than that of his predecessors. Obama arrived with a new tone on various global issues, but he did not change the tone of his predecessors on Palestine, nor did he choose a secretary of state carrying a new outlook on how to resolve the conflict. Mrs. Clinton is extremely enthusiastic about Israel (BBC News, 3 March 2009), and expressed this enthusiasm again and again during her election campaign against Obama and during her tenure as a senator. (Clinton, “All Americans Behind Israel”) It is very difficult to imagine that Obama will change American policy toward Israel and the Palestinians, especially since the matter now has deep roots in American society, in the movements supporting Israel and the Zionist Jews, and in the American Congress. Support for Israel in America is an institutional matter, not subject to individual moods, and it requires a long time to bring about any change of real substance in its content. This means that Obama’s policy in the region will not calm nerves, and supporters of negotiating with Israel will not get the chance to bolster their negotiating argument in the face of the argument for resistance.

The Rise of China

China is crowding the industrially and economically advanced states, and its products are conquering the world; at the same time it is working to increase its military spending. (Al Jazeera Net, 3 March 2009) There are signs that China is trying to push forward to become an effective global pole and a rival to the United States, but its military and economic conditions do not yet appear to qualify it to play this role. For this reason it is difficult to conclude that China will have a role in supporting the negotiating track or the resistance against Israel; it will content itself with turning a blind eye and approving whatever the international Quartet arrives at.

Contact with the Resistance Factions

The people of the West and their Arab helpers imposed a siege on the Palestinian people from the moment Hamas won the Legislative Council elections, and tightened the siege further after Hamas took full control of Gaza, and encouraged Israel to wage a war in the hope of ending Hamas’s rule. It appears that the results of the war have dictated to the West a rethinking of how it confronts Hamas and the Palestinian resistance in general. Western voices have emerged calling for the establishment of a Palestinian national unity government, encouraging Egypt to host the Palestinian dialogue with fresh momentum, and calling for the necessity of talking to Hamas.

Along the same lines, Britain announced on 5 March 2009 that it would resume contact with Hezbollah’s political wing, after having classified it, alongside other Arab states, as terrorist. Other Arab states may well follow suit.

I do not see that anything has actually changed, in line with Western and Israeli wishes, such that we should find calls for contact with the resistance factions — since Hezbollah and the Palestinian resistance have not abandoned the rifle, nor have they decided to walk the path of negotiations in the Western style. On the contrary, the Palestinians and the Lebanese insist on continuing the resistance and on regarding it as the sole means of restoring Arab rights. The only factor that can explain these calls is the steadfastness of the resistance fighters and their thwarting of Israel’s attempts to eliminate the resistance. Perhaps they have begun to think that it may be possible to eliminate the resistance through soft methods instead of traditional harshness, and this is what the spokesman for the British Foreign Office expressed in a television interview. (Al Jazeera, 5 March 2009) This is logical, historically speaking, since whoever cannot achieve victory through war tries to outflank through other means.

Conclusion

From the above, we may conclude the following:

There are important regional changes indicating that the resistance has gained a momentum it never had before, the most important of these changes being the shift in the regional balance of power brought about by Iran.

Israel’s failure in two consecutive wars reinforces the resolve of those who favor resistance to continue it, and to make further efforts in armament and tactics.

The Arab regimes and Israel will insist on continuing the negotiating process despite the absence of real progress regarding Palestinian rights, because the rise of the resistance threatens both the official Arab side and the Israeli side. The Arab regimes will try to distance the resistance from Iran and to draw it in to align with the negotiating track, but their success is not to be expected.

Israel will rethink all of its military methods because of the failure it has suffered, and we may well witness new Israeli methods in its coming wars.

It appears that the international factor is not working in favor of the resistance, particularly regarding American policy, but America carries so many military and economic burdens that it cannot afford to become further entangled in acts of war, or to gain more enemies, or to place the Arab regimes in further embarrassment.

In general, conditions are now ripe for a further tide of resistance, and the failure of the negotiations pushes those who champion them into a corner of frustration.

Sources

Farzad Pezeshkpour, “Iran and the Regional Balance of Power,” 5 March 2007. www.mianeh.net/en/articles/?aid=041

Leslie Susser, “Did Israel Achieve Its Goals?” Jewish News, January 23, 2009/Tevet 27 5769, Volume 61, No. 18. www.jewishaz.com/issues/story.mv?090123+gaza

Reza Hossein Borr, “How Is Iran Changing the Balance of Power in the Middle East?” 21 May 2008. www.globalpolitician.com/24787-iran

RIA Novosti, “Russia Backs US Peace Efforts in Mideast,” 14 February 2008. www.debka.com/article.php?aid=1358

“China Increases Military Spending,” Al Jazeera Net, 3 March 2009. english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2009/03/2009344953877430.html

BBC News, “US Israel Support Unshakable,” 17:05, 3 March 2009. news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7920210.st

“All Americans Behind Israel, Says Hillary Clinton,” 2 August 2006. www.bignewsnetwork.com/forum/showthread.php?t=241

“Iran-Israel Relations,” Wikipedia, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran-Israel_relations

“Defense Industry of Iran,” Wikipedia, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_military_industry

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “السلام والمقاومة في ضوء المتغيرات الدولية الآنية” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.