Political Elections in Light of Local Elections

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

On 20 October 2012, the Palestinian Authority held local council elections in the West Bank only, without the Gaza Strip, because of the state of division that the Palestinian scene in the West Bank and Gaza is experiencing. Elections were held in 93 electoral bodies, while lists in 179 bodies won by acclamation for lack of competition. Some bodies did not hold elections because of internal problems, and elections were expected to be held in them on 24 November 2012.

Following the elections, what came to my mind were the local council elections of the Jordanian era, when people were preoccupied with their family and personal rivalries, far removed from touching on the public issues that affect people’s lives. Election day was dominated by the traditional Arab atmosphere imposed by Arab political regimes: programs were largely absent, professional competence was absent from candidacy, while family, tribe, and local rivalries over leadership were present. This atmosphere can be summed up in the following points:

The absence of a democratic atmosphere from the local elections because of the non-participation of the Palestinian opposition, specifically the Hamas movement. Political conditions in the West Bank do not allow Hamas or Islamic Jihad to participate, because the Palestinian Authority’s security services pursue their members, and it was expected that their lists, had they decided to participate, would have been subjected to pursuit and arrest. The West Bank witnesses this in student council elections at universities, where Hamas and Jihad youth are pursued by the security services, and sometimes by university administrations loyal to the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian Authority said the elections were democratic, but it needed to prove that.

The absence of competitive electoral programs with strategic dimensions for achieving the progress and prosperity of villages and towns. Naive programs devoid of intellectual and methodological competition and of priorities were put forward, and it appears their sole purpose was to give the elections the appearance of having programs and to glorify the holding of the vote itself.

The emergence of familial and tribal loyalty as an essential and vital component of Palestinian society in the West Bank, at the expense of the concept of the broader society. The elections constituted a major social regression that returned West Bank society to the years of the Jordanian era, which regarded family loyalty as a vital component of stable rule. This explains why most electoral bodies won by acclamation, as the family components of these villages and towns reached understandings guaranteeing representation for each family according to specific factors.

The absence of any national slogan from the elections, with electoral propaganda confined to arrogant slogans devoid of practical content, such as “Oh mountain, no wind shall shake you.” The Palestinian did not hear a single slogan against the Israeli occupation, nor did he read anything about how to address the restrictions the occupation imposes on the development of villages and towns, whether in terms of water or electricity supply.

The low turnout in the elections, which reached about 54 percent. This is a high rate by current global standards, but it appears meager when we see the low turnout in the cities set against its rise in the villages. It was the villages that raised the rate, because the elections were mostly conducted along family lines, and it has been shown that families in Palestine are more capable than political parties of mobilizing voters.

The victory of factions through the family, particularly the Fatah faction. Family loyalty overwhelmed the electoral alliances, and factions that decided to contest the elections had to ally with families in order to be able to win. This explains the absence of purely factional lists, and the transformation of the faction into a tool in the hands of families — families from which the wise elders were absent, and which were largely dominated by people weak in scientific and social standing.

The Impact on Political Elections

The opposition does not agree with the Fatah solution to the division, out of fear of defeat. The Fatah solution is to resort to legislative and presidential elections to overcome the division, so that the people can decide through them what they want.

But if we set the media aside, Fatah and the Palestinian Authority that emerged from it must inevitably reflect on a number of fundamental points, among them:

Legislative and presidential elections are supposed to be democratic, opening the field for the opposition to compete freely, without oversight or pursuit by the security services. In that case Fatah would be bound by the requirements of democratic competition in terms of the caliber of candidates, the programs put forward, and the composition of candidate lists.

Given the participation rate in the elections, and the share of votes obtained by the winning lists, we find that the chances of Fatah winning a majority of the legislative seats are weak, and that its chances of winning the presidency are not high, especially if the opposition judges well in choosing its candidate. The participation rate in the local elections in major cities such as Nablus, Hebron, and Tulkarm was low, which gives the impression that the major cities are not leaning toward Fatah. As for the villages, their alignment with Fatah is also in doubt, because of the mercurial, interest-driven pattern that determines the orientation of families — assuming, that is, that family spirit prevails at all.

The family spirit that prevailed in these local elections may be temporary, owing to the political stagnation prevailing in the West Bank, and it is likely that this spirit will shrink back to its normal proportions if a competitive political atmosphere prevails and overtakes family loyalty. There is an estimate that family loyalty accounted for about 30 percent of the votes in the 1996 elections, bearing in mind that competition was absent because the opposition did not contest those elections. It is possible that this percentage will decline if competitive elections are held on political and national grounds. This is with the caveat that family loyalty is not decisively in Fatah’s favor, since we have seen families vote for Hamas in the 2006 elections.

The difficulty Fatah faces in contesting political elections with national and political slogans that are convincing to people, because of the Authority’s failure to achieve accomplishments regarding the fixed national rights of the Palestinian people. The negotiations, for which Fatah is responsible, have failed; corruption has persisted even though it has become less visible; salaries are subject to successive shocks; and dependence on others is worsening. The Authority’s failure directly affects Fatah and weakens its chances of winning the elections.

The division and the internal fighting have negatively affected all the Palestinian factions, specifically Fatah and Hamas. Both factions have lost some of their support in the West Bank and Gaza, and it is important for each side to gauge the extent of its loss if it is to calculate its chances of winning in political elections.

Fatah needs to search for figures of high scientific standing and persuasive credibility to contest political elections, and it will be harmed if it contests them with faces already well known to the public, or with faces similar to most of the names that appeared on the local election lists.

Conclusion

It will be difficult for Fatah to wage a successful political election campaign, especially if independents of scientific and political standing come forward to contest the elections. There may be no rise in support for Hamas in the West Bank, but Fatah has not learned the lesson of the 2006 elections, and has continued the same conduct that cost it so dearly. For this reason, it is not expected that the Palestinian Authority’s drive, led by Abbas, to theorize about elections as a way out of the division will continue. There will be no theorizing against elections, but the pace of calling for them will gradually slacken. In other words, the impact of the local elections on pushing toward political elections is a negative one.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “جدلية الانتخابات السياسية في ضوء الانتخابات المحلية” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.