Prospects of War in the Region

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

The question of war in the region has been on the table for several years, but the pace of the question rises with every statement issued from this party or that, or with every event connected to armament or to rising tension between the Arab and Islamic forces of resistance and Israel and its allies. People are, on the whole, watching and waiting, and analysts offer plenty of ideas — some think war will break out, others say the opposite, and each has his own evidence to demonstrate that he is right. But the one element everyone can agree on is the tension that exists in the region, and the hunger of various parties for new weapons, and their pursuit of new combat methods that could help paralyze an adversary.

My own opinion is that war will break out in the region in the foreseeable future, not the distant one. Exactly when? I do not know, and I do not think the chiefs of staff of the armies concerned know either. It is not easy to determine zero hour, because the factors and calculations governing it are numerous — political, economic, meteorological, and the positions of many states within and beyond the region.

The War Is Overdue

War in the Arab region is overdue, and the various parties are now playing in injury time. This delay can be broken down as follows:

First: the natural order of things is for Syria to initiate the attack, together with Arab parties, since it is Israel that occupies Arab land, not the reverse. The Arab lands in the Golan, Palestine, southern Lebanon, and the Jordan Valley are the ones under occupation, and the natural order is for the party attacked to fight the aggressor and liberate the land. And if Syria does not do this, then the Palestinian and Lebanese parties remain responsible for liberating the land.

Syria has not been able to overturn the strategic balance in the region, and it remains unable to wage a war and win it without the help of others, and it is not expected to take part in a war unless it is certain that victory will side with it and its allies. Hezbollah, for its part, faces two issues: the division of the Lebanese internal front, and its incomplete capacity to wage a mobile offensive war. The March 14 forces constitute a considerable power in the face of Hezbollah, and could contribute to its failure in a war against Israel, and Hezbollah’s army’s capacity to go on the offensive has not yet fully matured. Hezbollah’s army could move into a powerful offensive if the Israeli army is routed in the air — meaning it is now capable of waging a defensive war that turns into an offensive one, but it is not yet in a position that qualifies it to attack from the outset.

Second: Israel has delayed launching war because it is uncertain of the war’s outcome. The Israelis harbor a deep fear of losing a war, and in this lies a great gamble that could end with Israel’s disappearance — not necessarily as a result of the coming war itself, but as a result of a second war that follows it. Israel is standing on a very thin thread now, because it is no longer confident that the balance of power is tilted in its favor, and it sees in the gamble a wager whose outcome cannot be calculated.

Iran, the Balance of Power

Israeli security doctrine rests on a number of foundations, among them the continuation of Israeli military superiority over hostile states, whether collectively or individually. The Western states, led by the United States, have taken care to translate this foundation into reality, supporting Israel militarily — including the establishment of the nuclear reactor in the Negev — and preventing Arab and non-Arab states alike from developing military capabilities in ways that would threaten Israeli superiority.

It is clear that Iran has caused a major fracture in the balance of power in the Arab-Islamic region, and that Israel is no longer able to do what it once did. In the past, Israel’s strikes preceded its words; now it talks a great deal and hesitates to act. Israel has focused, since 1981, on developing its scientific, technological, and military capabilities, and there is no doubt it has achieved major scientific accomplishments, developing its civilian and military technology to the point that the great powers have grown wary and now think long and hard before deciding anything against Iran.

The 2006 war against Hezbollah proved that Iran’s military capabilities are highly advanced, whether in terms of armament or in terms of tactics, and it offered a lesson: if Hezbollah possesses powerful counter-weapons, then Iran possesses something even more capable and more lethal. And if Hezbollah is capable of keeping the secrets of its weapons, then Iran possesses that same capacity, and what people know about Iran’s military capabilities is far less than what they do not know.

…both of them [America and Israel] are fully aware that the balance of power is no longer what it was, and that the prospect of defeat in any military confrontation is real. What reinforces this is Iran’s continued release of some of its military secrets, as part of a psychological war and as messages meant to deter the other side.

The Gamble, and the Greater Gamble

Iran is the source of strength that has brought about a change in the balance of power, and striking it is therefore the ultimate goal of the powers that want their domination over the Arab-Islamic region to continue — unless these states decide to give up their monopoly on domination and let Iran share in decision-making, at least at the regional level. My assessment is that these states will not incline toward appeasement, and will instead try to undermine the new balance of power and turn history back.

It is possible that Iran will not be the target of the first strike, because there are forces, other than Iran itself, that benefit from Iran’s strength and reinforce Iran’s military standing — namely Hezbollah, Syria, and Hamas. The Israeli and American strategic planners have several targets before them, and I do not think they will strike them all at once. There are criteria taken into account. Hamas, for instance, constitutes the weakest link, while Syria constitutes the connecting link, Hezbollah constitutes the advanced base, and Iran is the wellspring. It would be logical for the planner to choose to strike the weakest link, in order to recover some of his prestige and make his strike a lesson to those still waiting. But Israel struck Gaza and failed to achieve its objectives, and produced for itself a poor global media image — will it repeat the attempt? Israel’s loss, or its failure against Hamas, represents a powerful blow to the Israeli army, and will lead to further deterioration in its image and prestige.

The connecting link — Syria — may be the other target, because striking it would halt Iran’s supply lines to Hezbollah, and would then stir up the Lebanese interior and arm it against the Party, which could lead to its collapse. Striking Syria could get rid of Syrian military power and of Hezbollah at the same time. But Israel is not confident of the results of such a strike, because Syrian territory holds unknown weapons and air capabilities still shrouded in secrecy, and if Israel were to fail in this war, it would be forced to withdraw from the Golan.

The third target is Hezbollah, which continues to threaten and warn, and appears to be waiting impatiently for an Israeli attack so that it can try out its new weapons and change the internal Lebanese equation. Israel is deeply hesitant, like someone who has swallowed a sickle: it cannot bear the Party’s growing strength, yet it cannot strike while confident in itself. And here is the important question: can Israel guarantee that the various forces of resistance will not intervene if it decides to strike any one of them? It is entirely possible that all the forces of resistance would clash with Israel together if any one of them were attacked — and this compels Israel to think a great deal more.

There is a great gamble in striking Iran, but the greater gamble is letting Iran advance technologically, manufacture militarily, and raise the degree of its influence at the regional and global level. If the American and the Israeli refuse to accept a partner in domination or in competition, and refuse to accept the Iranian challenge, then they have no choice but to accept fighting the battle of the lesser gamble, rather than waiting for the greater one. Israel and America lose a little every day they remain patient, because the strength of the other side keeps growing — but they both understand that losing the war could mean a threat to Israel’s very existence, the collapse of some Arab regimes, and the collapse of the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah.

The Totality of the War

It is expected that, if a decision is made to strike Iran, the war will not be a full-scale ground war, but will instead be limited to naval, ground, and air missile strikes against selected targets believed to be nuclear sites and advanced military technology facilities. The same applies to Syria. America has no interest in another ground war it cannot win, and Israel does not want to fight ground battles against a regular army that would inflict heavy losses on it. But the matter is different when it comes to Hamas and Hezbollah, because Israel aspires to eliminate both organizations entirely, not merely to reduce their military capabilities.

In any case, there are warnings that the targets to be struck are not the real targets. The various forces of resistance are taking intensive security precautions, setting up camouflaged, decoy sites meant to mislead the enemy, and it is likely that missiles will be directed at cardboard targets with no activity in them, as happened in southern Lebanon in 2006.

The War and Its Outcomes

From my reading of the Israeli mentality and of American military strategy, there will be military strikes against Iran and its allies, though not necessarily all at once, unless Iran retreats from its ambitions and aspirations. Note that Iran does not aspire merely to be a regional power, but aspires to a global role recognized by the great powers. And as I noted above, the decision for war remains hostage to many factors, but in any case it represents a gamble that will see many surprises, and a great deal of destruction and killing.

From the limited information available to me, gathered from the media and from statements, my assessment is that the Arab and Islamic forces of resistance will hold firm, and will, in the main, win the round. Israel will fail, and even if America steps in to help Israel, its nose will be rubbed in the dirt once again, and it will find itself facing new problems at the global level. Israel will not fail only because of weaponry, but also because of the caliber of the fighter it will face. The age of fleeing the battlefield has passed; for some time now, Israel has been facing soldiers who refuse to be struck in the back while running.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “احتمالات الحرب في المنطقة” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.