Russian Silence on Gaza

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

Did Russia even find out that Israel had waged a war on Gaza? It seems the Russians deliberately ignored the war on Gaza, even though they are a member of the international Quartet that is supposed to bring solutions to the Palestinian question. During the war we heard nothing from Russian leaders but the faintest of comments, nothing amounting to a Russian policy or a clear Russian position that Moscow adopted and defended. One Russian leader said Hamas should stop firing rockets at Israel, but this statement never rose to the level of a Russian policy producing political movement and diplomatic activity.

The Russian media, apart from the Russia Today satellite channel broadcasting in Arabic, fell silent, and some minor outlets sided with Israel and defended its goals of striking the resistance and eliminating the rockets, saying in sum that Palestinian terrorism was the cause of the war, and that Israel had the right to defend itself by whatever means. Russia Today, for its part, stood with the Palestinians, and its editors did not hesitate to highlight the killing and destruction Israel wrought in Gaza against the civilian population.

Russia did not fall silent because it wanted to be absent; rather, I believe several factors led to this position, one that could well change in the future. Among these factors:

The Pursuit of Polarity

Russia is now in a quiet phase of building toward recovering part of the prestige of the former Soviet Union, working calmly to build the pillars of an effective global role. A global role, or the development into another global pole, requires advanced military capability of high caliber, a program of action or ideology, or a set of goals, and considerable economic capacity. Becoming a pole is no easy matter; it is not expected to crystallize overnight, and it requires clarity of vision, the capacity to spend, and the ability to draw in supporters.

If Russia has this ambition — and Russian President Medvedev has indeed expressed it — then Russia is not expected to place itself in a position where it loses face. That is, Russia is not expected to throw itself into situations in which it cannot achieve some kind of accomplishment, because failure would reflect negatively on its global image, particularly among those who look to it as a future player they can rely upon. This may explain the declining pilgrimage to Russia by leaders of states wishing to rid themselves of the American yoke and looking to Russia as a lifeline.

We noticed that after Russia routed Georgia, with America limiting itself to mere condemnation, some state leaders — including those of Syria and Venezuela — grew enthusiastic and paid visits to Russia, hoping there might be a change in Russian foreign policy; these leaders returned to their countries without the degree of optimism with which they had set out. Russia is certainly not yet ready to play the role that the leaders of certain states look to it for, and it is not ready to adopt policies that might meet strong Western resistance capable of defeating them.

Membership in the Quartet

Russia is aware that it is a marginal member of the international Quartet concerned with implementing the roadmap related to the Palestinian question. Russia is fully aware that America and Israel monopolize the search for a solution with the Palestinians and the Arabs, and that the two of them enlist other states only according to interest, not out of any desire to cooperate with others. Since 1967, the two states have worked to push aside the influence of other states as much as possible, and have continually pressured the Soviet Union to keep the balance of power between the Arabs and Israel tilted in Israel’s favor, and have worked to bypass international resolutions, sidestepping the United Nations wherever possible, or using it wherever convenient. This situation was made plainly clear in Security Council Resolution 338, which affirmed the necessity of seeking a solution through appropriate or suitable frameworks, without any mention of the United Nations.

Involving other states in the search for a solution has never been anything more than diplomatic courtesy on the part of Israel and America, so that states such as those of the European Union would not feel excluded or neglected. What confirms this is that the European role has remained marginal to this day, confined for the most part to paying the bills for rebuilding what Israel destroys, partial oversight of the disbursement of Palestinian civil-servant salaries, repeated visits to the region, and statements of very limited political value. Russia’s involvement is not fundamentally different from that of the Europeans, but it is also marked by a good deal of condescension. Russia is very far removed from global concerns, and its role does not match its military strength; the West has given it only the role that fits the mold it has placed itself in. Russia decided to carry limited weight, and so it obtained only a limited role in the Quartet, its participation confined to attending the Quartet’s official sessions without any real influence on decision-making. Russia gave itself only the right to approve whatever America proposes, just like the other members.

Russia still attends the Quartet’s meetings to this day, but exercises nothing more than the right to approve whatever is proposed by America. It usually masks this indifference, or this incapacity, by repeating its position in favor of establishing a Palestinian state on the Land Occupied in ‘67, without ever giving any detail of what it means by “the land” or by the nature of “the state.”

Support for Israel

[Russia does not want to risk] adventuring into a military confrontation with the United States. The Soviet Union stood by the establishment of the State of Israel and by its continuation, even though it sometimes flirted with the refugees’ right of return. In the same fashion, Russia stands by the continued strength of the State of Israel, and by the international policies aimed at preserving its security and taking the measures suited to achieving that goal. Russia may not now be playing an effective, practical role in this direction, but it is with it, at least in theory. For this reason, it does not appear ready to defend Palestinian rights whose fulfillment might expose Israel’s security to danger.

The meaning of this is that the Arabs should not read too much into their analyses if Russia decides that America should not remain the world’s sole pole. Russia may challenge America in many fields, but this challenge remains highly doubtful when it comes to Palestinian rights.

Russia’s Distrust of Islamic Parties and States

Russia is not at ease with states that embrace Islam, such as Iran, or with Islamic parties such as Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood, because Islamists seek to establish Islamic rule that would affect the secular, free-capitalist fabric Russia has come to believe in as a way of life. Russia is not enthusiastic about the devout of any religion, even though it is not against the freedom to practice religious rites, and it views the Islamists as a movement bent on overturning the order capitalism has built, or at least as a movement posing a major challenge to the capitalist and liberal order. Some Russian writers hold that the ambitions of the Islamists do not stop at the borders of their own countries, but extend toward global ambition, such that the Islamists dream of expanding the Islamic call until Islam becomes a substitute for all political and social theories and systems.

Russia is suspicious of the Islamists because they support Islamic movements everywhere, including the Islamic movements in the republics of the collapsed Soviet Union, and in certain regions within Russia itself, such as Chechnya and Ingushetia. It is difficult for Russia to stand with the Islamists in their confrontation with colonialism or with the Zionist occupation, because it sees them as a party inciting rebellion against Moscow, and as a source of political and security troubles for Russia. The matter requires no great deliberation, since the Islamists stood with Muslim Bosnia against Serbia, and with Chechnya against Russia, and they are prepared to take part in the military effort in those regions until independence is achieved.

Can Russia, then, take a stand against Israel if the Islamists are the other side of the equation of conflict? Perhaps Russia will come to trust Iran once the truth of Iranian intentions becomes clear to it, along with the truth of Iranian capabilities. If Iran holds firm and proves its capacity for scientific discovery, technical development, and modernization in all its aspects, then Russia will find itself facing a great interest in deepening relations with Iran. In any case, Russia will remain cautious in developing its relationship with Iran, so as not to provoke American hostility too greatly.

The Soviet Experience with the Arabs

The Soviet Union suffered a great deal because of the Arabs, for several reasons, among them:

The Soviet Union remained exposed to the conspiracies of many Arab regimes, even though it offered the Arabs military support to defend themselves against Israel;

Arab regimes receiving Soviet military support would go on to pursue communists and throw them in prison;

The Arabs extended their hands to the Soviet Union to obtain weapons, while spending their money in the Western countries hostile to it;

The Arabs failed to respect Soviet weaponry, both by failing to use it according to sound scientific principles, and by handing over samples of this weaponry to Israel — either through spies recruited by Israel, or by fleeing the battlefield and abandoning weapons to the enemy;

The Arabs reneged on the Soviet Union when Egypt decided to expel the Soviet experts, for an obvious reason, and thereafter aligned itself with the United States and followed the path of a settlement brokered through the United States.

The Soviet experience tells us that the Arab regimes are not to be trusted, and there are those who say that the Arabs themselves are not to be trusted. So does Russia draw lessons from the Soviet experience, and consequently hesitate to court the Arabs? I believe the answer is yes. Russia is cautious, and I do not think it is about to take any major, strategic step with the Arabs before it is certain that Arab political character has changed, and that the Arab regimes have become worthy of trust.

Conclusion

It was never to be expected that Russia’s nerves would flare up against Israel as a result of its aggression, and there are those among the poles of Russian governance who believe that Hamas and the Palestinian resistance are the aggressors. Russia has its own regional and international calculations, and it does not wish to make decisions whose continued course is in doubt. Russia is not yet ready to have a voice heard across the whole earth: there are things it can manage, such as Georgia, and there are things that call for restraint, such as broad intervention in South America. This applies to our Arab-Islamic region as well, compounded further by the Arab regimes’ abandonment of their own peoples, and by their lack of seriousness in confronting Israel. If I were Russia, I would ask myself: why would I offer support to an Arab resistance that Arab regimes themselves stand against, and that they encourage Israel to fight?

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “الصمت الروسي حول غزة” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.