Russia's Political Superiority in Syria

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

Russian support for the Syrian regime has not stopped since the events in Syria began, and Russia has not stopped providing political and diplomatic support for the regime, using its veto in the Security Council to defend it. It is difficult to imagine the regime holding out through this entire period without Russian and Iranian support, just as it is difficult to imagine the opposition and the armed groups holding out without Arab, Turkish, and Western support. But Russia was cautious in its tone, continuing to exercise its support quietly, without noise or threat, and has proven its strong presence on the scene, militarily and diplomatically.

Russia is now escalating its measures and activities in support of the Syrian regime under the umbrella of the war on terror, thereby breathing life into Western diplomacy, which is gradually waking up to its own failure in Syria, beginning to think anew about a solution that would restore calm to Syria, and perhaps to Iraq as well. It appears Russia’s calculations regarding the Syrian matter are more scientific and precise than Western calculations, because they are rational, not swept along in a current of hostilities and grudges. Russia’s calculations were never random or improvised, never driven by Arab whims or internal Arab grudges, remaining marked by deliberation until the Russians judged that conditions had become ripe to take the lead on the Syrian matter — and indeed they are now leading, forcing the Western states to scramble behind them. There are factors that helped the Russians seize the opportunity to prove their strong presence, not only on the Syrian scene, but across the Arab-Islamic region and the international stage as well. Among these factors:

First: the failure of the war on terror. The Western states, European and American, have failed to achieve victory over terrorism since the invasion of Afghanistan. On the contrary, terrorism has spread everywhere in the world, multiplying like cancer, so that there is no longer a single state that does not reckon with the possibility of terrorist operations on its own soil, and the specter of terrorism has come to haunt peoples and ruling political systems alike. The Western states have reaped disturbing, negative results from their war on terror, becoming, after all these years of pursuing terrorists, less secure and less at ease. This makes the Russian argument regarding terrorism logically stronger, and more acceptable on the international stage. Russia has noted, more than once, that terrorism arises from a feeling of injustice and persecution, and from the Western states’ exploitation of peoples and states, and that establishing justice among peoples is the best remedy for limiting and eliminating terrorism. As an alternative to the Western vision, Russia now raises the banner of fighting terrorism, but not through external mobilization — rather through strengthening local armies fighting terrorism, since these armies are more capable than foreign armies of handling internal affairs. That is, it prefers supporting the Syrian and Iraqi armies to overcome the terrorist organizations in the two countries.

Second: the failure of the Western coalition in its war on ISIS. Even though this coalition, led by the United States, has been waging an air war on ISIS for more than a year, it has not achieved tangible results, and ISIS has remained strong on the ground, capable of achieving military gains from time to time in Iraq and Syria. Here, many doubt the seriousness of the United States and its allies in this war, and perhaps they want ISIS to remain strong in order to justify future military measures, such as ground military intervention and the elimination of this or that political system. And if Russia says it is working to fight terrorism, then the West’s failure, and that of its Arab and European allies, means they cannot stand against the Russian argument because of this very failure.

Third: Russia has no interest in a new Cold War with the United States, and understands that the United States has no interest in this either, particularly under current circumstances. America suffers from enormous economic and financial problems, and also suffers politically and diplomatically, because the international stage has grown somewhat too narrow for it. For this reason, Russia prefers to play quietly, without roaring or flexing muscles in any unusual way, so as not to provoke the Western states. The Western states, generally, have no interest in fueling rivalry or conflict with Russia, so as not to incur further losses, or at least fall under the weight of secondary concerns that distract them from the national concerns of their own peoples.

Fourth: the Europeans’ preoccupation with the twin concerns of terrorism and refugees. Europe is, in this period, deeply preoccupied with the matter of terrorism, which now threatens it from within, and the matter of the refugees flowing toward it. Europeans feel the danger of terrorism more acutely than Americans, because of their geographic proximity to the Arab region, and it is they who now bear the weight of the Arab refugees moving toward them in the tens of thousands. Europeans are concerned about their own social fabric, which could be affected by other cultures and by infiltrators among the ranks of refugees. For this reason, Europeans no longer have the same readiness they once had to fall in line with United States policies, which are sometimes aimless.

Fifth: the Europeans and Americans have not formulated a clear vision for Syria that can be implemented on the ground. From the very beginning, they were hesitant in their measures to bring down the regime, and in their military support for the armed and terrorist groups. The West does not want Bashar al-Assad to remain, but it does not want Islamic rule established in Syria either, and it has been unable to find an alternative to the regime and to the opposition, so it has continued to flounder. By contrast, the Russian vision has been entirely clear, consistent with what is called international law. The Russians have held, from the very beginning, to peoples’ right to determine their own fate and choose their own officials, and that President Bashar al-Assad remains by his people’s will and departs by that same will. The Russians stood against calls to bring down the regime, and held in their hands a strong argument, consistent with the rules and foundations of international acceptance, and this is what made the Russian argument far stronger than the arguments of the Western states.

Sixth: Russia’s recognition that America has no interest in a war it would take part in in Syria. America has generally failed in its wars — it failed in Afghanistan and Iraq, in its war on terror, and in its air war on ISIS, and the American people no longer has the appetite to support new wars in the region, particularly amid a financial crisis whose specter has not yet vanished. The Americans paid steep prices, in lives and money, in wars that achieved nothing, coming out without victory and without achieving their declared goals, and for this reason it is not easy for an American president to justify a new war in Syria before his own people. The Russians recognize this matter, and have a prior assessment that increasing the scale of their military support for the Syrian regime will not drag the United States into a confrontation with Russia, whether in Latakia or elsewhere. The Russians sense that America is largely shackled by its repeated failures and by its people’s current mood, which rejects wars.

Seventh: America fell in line with Arab states playing important military, security, armament, and financial roles in Syria. A number of Gulf states specifically still contribute to fueling the internal war in Syria — states that defend the establishment of democracy in Syria while themselves lacking democracy, maintaining tribal political systems belonging to the dark ages. America’s falling in line with the Arab states has damaged the American argument on the international stage, because whoever defends democratic values must defend them everywhere, not in one place and not another. For this reason, the question is constantly raised: does America truly want to establish democracy, or does it use democratic principles to achieve its own private ends, unconcerned with peoples? Looking at the sum of American policies in the Arab region, America has not been far removed from supporting despotic Arab regimes, and had previously turned to Syria to take part in the war against Saddam in Kuwait. What makes despotism good at one time, and bad at another? The absence of principle in the conduct of international relations.

Syrian-Syrian Dialogue

The Syrian regime has not managed to decisively win the battle in Syria, and the war still rages, with the Syrian people paying its price. All the Russian and Iranian support across the years has not enabled the regime to achieve victory, and Syria has continued to suffer continuous destruction. The Russians spoke, at first, of the necessity of dialogue among Syrians, on the premise that it is the sole way out to stop the war and the bloodshed. The Arabs and the people of the West were not convinced by this argument, preferring to insist on Assad’s departure as a precondition for beginning any dialogue. Positions have now begun to change, because of the spread of terrorism and the flow of refugees, and the Western states, together with Turkey, have begun reconsidering their traditional positions, and we have started hearing statements different from what we used to hear before. What matters is that Russian policy has exploited the development of events, including some Western support for certain terrorist organizations, to press toward searching for a solution to the Syrian knot, and has begun justifying its growing support for Assad on the basis of a policy of containing terrorism. Of course, the Russians are concerned with eliminating terrorism, as the Europeans are, because of the significant proportion of Muslims in Russia, who could be affected by terrorist ideology and create trouble for Russia.

Russia is intensifying its military efforts in Syria to push the Western states, and their Arab supporters, toward encouraging internal Syrian dialogue. Russia hopes its policy in Syria will lead to pressuring the armed groups in Syria to accept dialogue with Assad remaining on the table, and to cutting off financial and military aid to ISIS in both Syria and Iraq.

The Logic of Power

Historically, the logic of power is stronger than the power of logic, and Russian power could well change the logic of the warring parties in Syria and the external powers playing on the Syrian scene. If the West has no interest in confrontation, and Russia has no interest in pushing matters to the brink, then it is highly likely that the various parties will lean toward an internal Syrian dialogue leading to a result everyone accepts. For this reason, it is possible that power will achieve what political and regional balances have failed to achieve, and restore stability to the Syrian Arab country. Power is sometimes necessary in order to arbitrate between minds and search for a solution to problems through scientific methods, entirely free of fanaticism and the total exclusion of others.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “التفوق السياسي الروسي في سوريا” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.