Social Obstacles Facing the Arab Movement

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

Some, displeased with the results of the Arab unrest, have taken to calling it the “Arab Autumn,” as the opposite of “Arab Spring,” and many are those who wish for the past to return and deliver them from the evils of the present. A large proportion of the nation’s masses now ask themselves about the nation’s future, its direction, and the fate it will end in.

Millions were hopeful at the start of the Arab unrest in North Africa and its spread into the Arab East, but the degree of that hope has gradually receded, reaching a point of frustration and despair.

There are certainly several reasons explaining the haziness of the Arab popular vision and doubts about the nation’s future and its re-emergence, but it seems to me that social obstacles and impediments have been, and remain, among the most important factors behind the Arab movement’s wavering and its failure in a number of Arab locations.

The problem is that Arab social conditions, across the various Arab countries, have not yet risen to a level capable of absorbing fundamental political, social, and cultural transformations, remaining behind the requirements of change, so that they themselves have become a powerful brake on the change people look forward to. People search for change across the various fields of life, but do not yet possess the mentality or culture proportionate to the requirements of achieving that change. What follows explains this hypothesis:

The Youthfulness of the Arab Movement

Arab youth are the ones who carried the Arab movement, took control of the street, and forced political regimes to leave. This expresses the strength of Arab youth, and their determination to bring about change capable of making the Arab nation a living nation, capable of rising, advancing, and confronting its enemies.

But the youth, despite their concern for the nation’s interests, do not possess a clear vision of how internal conditions can be arranged smoothly and calmly, and steered toward clear goals around which the mass of people can rally. Youth are armed with sufficient motivation to care for the nation and defend it, but lack sufficient scientific knowledge and experience to manage it.

The Arab movement was launched by youth who got ahead of the various political parties and social institutions. The parties of the Arab homeland lagged behind the street movement and remain behind it, unable to lead even now. The parties possess clear social, political, and cultural programs, and it would have been possible to manage the Arab movement far more effectively had their leaderships lived up to their responsibilities.

Arab party leaders are, generally, cowards, trying to avoid the arrests and repressive measures the official authorities practice, and are not prepared to sacrifice their own interests for their principles and programs, and some of these leaders have been absorbed by the political system, becoming pot-bellied, capable of nothing but theorizing and issuing feeble statements.

Youth hold varied and multiple aspirations, and suffer from a hazy picture, and so the Arab movement fell into chaos, mutual mudslinging, and division, ultimately leading to fragmentation, displacement, and bloodshed.

Two real-world examples come to mind here: one is the Iranian revolution, marked by a deeply rooted, strong leadership known for its confrontation with the Shah of Iran, undeterred by every measure the Shah took against it. The revolution proceeded on a single track within a comprehensive vision, and the revolutionaries managed to defeat the Shah.

The second example is the Palestinian intifada of 1987, carried out by youth without a clear vision or program of goals. The Palestinian leadership, during the intifada, recognized Israel — a matter contradicting the youths’ own national aspirations — yet these very youths went out celebrating the decisions of the Palestinian National Council, rejoicing over decisions that included the recognition of Israel.

The Arab Social Structure

The Arab social structure remains loosely organized, fragmented at the joints, built on foundations of division and destructive rivalry that obstruct construction and progress. This structure is built on the fanatical tribal system, marked by feelings of superiority over others, social encapsulation, and a weak desire to cooperate with others.

Fanatical tribalism always focuses on its own tribal interests over the interests of the broader society, and if its interests contradict those of the broader society, it chooses its own interests, casting the interests of the broader society aside.

Fanatical tribalism sees in other tribes nothing but rivals for leadership and command, and does not accept following other tribes except by force, showing no readiness to acknowledge others’ leadership or capabilities. Even the sheikh of a fanatical tribe does not acknowledge the capabilities of members of his own tribe, since he is supposedly the one who knows everything, and no ordinary tribe member is permitted to instruct the tribal sheikh.

Fanatical tribalism does not believe in political and social competition, does not believe in the other opinion, or in individual independence. There is no elder but the tribal sheikh, no one of sound opinion but him; he is the one who commands and forbids, and there is no opinion but his opinion, and other opinions are an assault on the great sheikh’s prestige and standing. As for the members of the fanatical tribe, they are mere tools who hear and obey — whoever obeys shares in the tribe’s bounty, and whoever disobeys and rebels is cast out of the sheikh’s mercy, losing protection and daily bread. The individual, stripped of personality, can be nothing else, and anyone who tries to have a distinctive personality and opinion on various matters of life is quickly boxed in.

Since every tribe carries the very same culture, leaderships multiply without any consensus among them, and every tribe invests its efforts and time in contesting other tribes and proving itself above everyone else. And since no one considers himself shorter in stature than others, policies of conspiracy, corruption, and sabotage aimed at bringing down the sheikhs of other tribes will prevail. This means the culture of fanatical tribes is divisive, believing neither in unity, cooperation, nor collective work. It is no surprise that Arabs are divisive in their social structures, which ultimately spring from this very tribalism.

The Arab parties have not deviated from fanatical tribalism, and party leaders have carried with them — as a result of their tribal culture — every negative product of tribalism, and the parties have turned into modern-day tribes, no different in their conduct from traditional tribes except in appearance and empty theorizing devoid of content.

And just as the tribes were absent from the Arab movement, or took part in the bloody conflict, the parties took similar positions, contributing directly to corrupting the Arab movement. Tunisia’s Ennahda movement may have differed from others, but it was an anomaly compared to the practices of other Arab parties.

The situation does not differ radically in the various Arab institutions, nor in the conduct of officials within them. The head of an institution is a tribal sheikh who believes the institution is his own private property, entitled to fill it with employees from among his relatives and friends, according to standards of favoritism that kill the employee’s own personality, making him docile, submissive, a slave to his salary. And we Arabs identify an institution by the official heading it, so the electricity company becomes “the son of al-Bitar’s company,” and the water company becomes “Jou’an the Never-Satisfied’s company,” and so on. And in our side conversations and private talk, we accept these labels and descriptions, because our social-cultural makeup absorbs and finds them palatable.

Religious Thinking

Even though Islamic thought does not occupy a wide space in our study and scrutiny, our religious thought remains always confined to jurisprudential rulings. We have not yet studied Islamic thought properly, and there remains a great gap in our research and studies, extending across more than fourteen hundred years of the Hijri calendar.

Our problem with this matter is that we consider every jurisprudential ruling absolute, the sole voice of truth, and everything else is error, falling within the realm of unbelief, requiring eradication. In our jurisprudential rulings, we rarely take into account the circumstances of time and place, or the development of human values and world civilizations.

Since our rulings are absolute, everything others say is rejected unless it agrees with us, and since it is rejected, and our rulings consider it unbelief, fighting it becomes obligatory and required. Accordingly, the other who does not agree with us is an unbeliever with no right to exist among us — we must either kill him or expel him.

This does not apply only to other nations or people outside our society — it applies also to our own kin, to fellow citizens who live alongside us across the days. It applies to Marxists, nationalists, Ba’athists, socialists, and capitalists, and to every party that does not take Islamic jurisprudence as its starting point, and to many resistance organizations against Israel, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The verdict of unbelief also extends to every school of thought that does not follow our own school, and every other denomination, and perhaps other nationalities as well.

These are divisive religious ideas that divide rather than unite, leading to ruin and destruction. They are not incidental or newly invented ideas — they are built into the religious teaching the Arab receives from childhood. The adherents of this jurisprudence believe paradise is exclusively theirs, that God’s mercy extends to no one else, and that the houris are reserved for them alone. So can an Arab clinging to this jurisprudence ever accept another Arab, a fellow Muslim, who disagrees with him on certain matters? It is clear we stand ready to wage long, grinding battles against one another, in the manner of the wars of al-Basus and Dahis wal-Ghabra.

Seeking Foreign Help

If tribal “sheikh-hood” over the sons of the homeland is desired, and if the tribal mentality does not accept the other, insisting on remaining in the forefront ahead of others, then that tribal mentality welcomes supporters, backers, and helpers from outside the nation, society, or people. As long as the interest of the homeland and the citizen is not supreme, sacrificing it remains constantly on the table, even if that serves the interests of enemies or external powers.

The enemy is whoever opposes the tribe, and the friend is whoever lends the tribe a helping hand, and there is no enemy but the internal rival trying to outdo the tribe and leap over it. So if Israel extends a helping hand to a Palestinian “tribe,” that tribe does not hesitate to support Israel’s policies, and the same applies to the individual, as long as Israel’s efforts support him in becoming a notable, a leader, or a chief. The matter is no different in other Arab states. And since the foreigner is concerned with weakening the nation to make it easier to control, many of the Arab regimes’ external relations make it easier for powerful states to dominate, exploit wealth, and prevent Arab unity and progress along the path of construction and development.

The Arab Movement Came Too Soon

The Arab movement against the Arab regimes is necessary and inevitable, and the Arab nation cannot stand on its own feet as long as the Arab regimes currently prevailing remain seated on the thrones of power. Most Arab regimes are tribal, including the republican ones, and constantly work to reinforce their own rule through various means of repression, buying consciences, and relying on colonial states to provide security and protection — but the Arab peoples are not yet ready to absorb change, and are not culturally and socially prepared to march in the caravan of change, which is bound to contradict what they are accustomed to.

The word of customs, traditions, and narrow, encapsulated upbringing still holds sway, and the Arab peoples ultimately lean toward imitation, despite their demands for change. This is why we see stability moving away from the Arab states that have witnessed unrest, and the pace of hatred and animosity rising, and instead of the Arab movement leading to solidarity and cohesion, it has, in most cases, led to further conflicts and destructive rivalries. If an Arab movement is to succeed, a social and cultural environment different from what currently exists must be developed.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “العراقيل الاجتماعية أمام الحراك العربي” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.