Syria Between Drunkenness and Idea

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

The revolution in Syria was to be expected, as was the case in the rest of the Arab states, apart from a few Gulf states, and to believe that conspiracy alone is what drives the masses is a form of self-deception. Arab rulers had reached such an extreme degree of injustice and tyranny that revolution against them was to be expected, and it is still coming in the states that have not yet witnessed it. Saying there is a conspiracy against Syria is not enough to explain what has been happening for more than two years now, and I was among those who clearly warned of this back in 2003, when I called for radical political change. In any case, the axe has already fallen on the head, and stubbornness is the worst of judgments.

Riding One’s Own Head

“Riding one’s own head” means that the other side refuses to listen, to reason, or to analyze, and instead insists on clinging to its own opinion, position, and practices. The Syrian regime rode its own head from the very beginning, insisting that the solution in Syria was a security one, while the opposition rode its own head, insisting that the solution lay in the dam’s collapse. The regime did not grasp the scale of the forces that could array themselves against it if it turned to a military solution, and the opposition did not grasp the scale of destruction that could befall Syria if it sought outside help. Both sides decided to chase after their own illusions of ending the conflict within a short time, and the Syrian people were left to taste the bitterness of the ordeal.

It was certain that Israel, the Western states, and a number of Arab states wanted to be rid of the Syrian regime, but at the same time did not want a regime led by Islamists. It is true that the Muslim Brotherhood tends toward accommodation, but Israel and the Western states are looking for a fully subordinate regime, not merely an accommodating one that might lean toward the Palestinian cause against Israel. And if the West wants neither the Assad regime nor an Islamist one, then it is in its interest, and in the interest of the Arab states allied with it, to prolong the armed conflict in order to exhaust both sides and break the back of the Syrian people through destruction, ruin, and bloodshed. Did the West not do exactly the same thing in fueling the war between Iraq and Iran?

Nor did it realize that the West would never provide it with the weapons it asked for, and that the states in the region supporting it would never step outside the will of the Western states and Israel, because that might mean settling the battle in its favor against the regime before Syria had been thoroughly destroyed. The Free Army may have believed the [regular] army would split, while the composition of the Syrian army in fact points to a weak likelihood of any such split.

The Strength of Each Side

The problem is that each side believed the other was weak, and fell under the illusion of a swift, decisive victory. The regime’s statements at the start of the crisis reflected great optimism about a quick resolution to the conflict, and the Free Army gave the regime only a few limited weeks before it would fall. Good judgment favored neither side in these estimates.

The opposition misjudged the strength of the regime, and was perhaps influenced by the Libyan situation, which saw Western intervention without Gaddafi finding any real backers. It failed to anticipate that certain states would throw their full weight behind the regime, while the Western states would not be eager to support the Syrian revolutionaries — both because the regime is militarily strong and capable of inflicting losses on Western forces or their aircraft, and because the Islamic movement in Syria is stronger than the Islamic movement in Libya, and is likely to win any democratic election.

As for the regime, it did not properly gauge the desire of a number of Arab states to be rid of it, nor the willingness of Western states to gamble with the fate of the Syrian people.

As for the Nusra Front — while one must acknowledge the resolve of its fighters, their unshakable belief in what they are doing, and their capacity to keep fighting — it, like al-Qaeda, lacks a coherent intellectual system, and clear programs and goals. It is not enough to be a fierce fighter; one must also be capable, intellectually and politically. This is why the Nusra Front cannot attract outside support, cannot win the backing of the broader public, and will, in the end, find itself standing alone, carrying out military operations here and there without achieving any real goals.

Internationalization and Destruction

Every warring party in Syria has succeeded in internationalizing the conflict and destroying Syria.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “سوريا بين السكرة والفكرة” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.