The American Bull and Its War Adventures

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

It is not difficult for anyone familiar with American culture and the various dimensions of American global policy to conclude that Americans, more often than not, think with their muscles rather than their minds, and that in many moments they resemble nothing so much as a raging bull, convinced its horns can gore through any wall, however reinforced. This reflects a deep, historic structural trait of American society, one marked by adventurism, a headlong drive toward acquisition and profit, and the treatment of profit-making as the supreme value governing all other values. This structural trait has been reflected in America’s foreign policy, and continues to weigh heavily on relations between states, giving rise to military, political, security, and moral crises at the global level. It is no surprise that Americans always arm themselves with moral rhetoric, imagining that their own moral system — governed as it is by the value of profit — constitutes the absolute moral truth that ought to prevail worldwide. Many states and peoples, Arab states foremost among them, have submitted to them in a manner that has only reinforced these delusions and encouraged them to continue their aggression against peoples.

The Americans learned a harsh lesson after their crushing defeat in Vietnam, and retreated into quiet, licking their wounds — but they returned to their old arrogance by the end of the 1980s, and began moving their armies in campaigns of war, and do not appear to have learned anything from their failed adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan. They succeeded in Panama, when they arrested its president, and in the Dominican Republic, but these two cases hardly constitute a real measure of the United States’ capacity to drive the world with a stick.

The Adventure in Syria

It is not certain that America will bomb Syrian sites, but the likelihood is high and very real. America has trapped itself in al-Mutanabbi’s predicament — a poet who boxed himself in with grand words he could not escape from, for fear of eternal humiliation. America issued repeated threats and warnings, saying that the Syrian regime’s use of chemical weapons constituted a red line that would lead to the regime being punished or subjected to a military campaign. Now it accuses the regime of crossing that line, and the credibility of its own words is on the line before the whole international stage. Will America swallow its own words, or will it prove its commitment to its own statements?

Out of sheer arrogance, America declared red lines, and then, before any verification, declared the Syrian regime responsible for crossing them, following this with a firm threat to attack Syria.

Preparing for the Adventure

As usual, the United States follows a number of steps before launching a war:

Pointing the finger of accusation — which may well have been preceded by a conspiracy to entrap the intended target in the desired charge. We have already witnessed a conspiracy against Iraq, one that pinned a charge on it to justify American aggression. It is not far-fetched that America worked in cooperation with other parties — some Arab and Islamic states among them — to have chemical weapons used in Syria, so that it could then meet the insistent Arab demands to attack Syria. It is not wise to assume good faith in this world of interest-seeking.

Launching a broad global media campaign to establish the sins of, and demonize, the targeted party — global media outlets, most of which are controlled by American corporations, are always ready to make an effective contribution to distorting facts and spreading lies, or to focusing on one point of view to the exclusion of all others.

Winning over domestic public opinion and mobilizing it to support aggressive decisions.

Seeking allies in the aggression, in order to reinforce the American point of view, influence global public opinion, and instill the conviction that America is seeking the good of nations — even though these allies’ military participation carries little real weight.

Using international organizations, chiefly the United Nations, to obtain resolutions that support the American point of view and endorse military aggression.

Massing military forces and preparing for the attack, particularly naval forces.

America tries to achieve success in the steps above, but in the end it carries out whatever it wishes, even if it fails in all of them.

The Constraints on an Attack on Syria

The United States has come under sustained pressure from Israel, from certain Arab states, and from Turkey to take military action against the Syrian regime, or to provide substantial support to the forces fighting the regime. But America has fixed in its mind that: it does not want the regime to survive; it does not want an elected government led by the Muslim Brotherhood; and it does not want Jabhat al-Nusra. Its allies among the liberal opposition and its own clients are not likely candidates to win any elections that might be held, and it therefore has not felt reassured about who would actually succeed the regime.

America wants to eliminate Hezbollah, and wants to isolate Iran, and eliminating the Syrian regime is a pivotal condition for achieving that end. It also does not want Hamas’s government in Gaza to continue, and the strength of the resistance in Gaza is bound up with the strength of Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah, even though part of Hamas has turned its back on these forces. It appears America has concluded that prolonging the destructive fighting in Syria is the best means of killing off the resistance forces across the Arab-Islamic region.

Accordingly, America sets the following constraints on its attack on Syria:

Preventing the collapse of the existing political order, so as not to erase one side in favor of another — even though it may target President Assad personally.

Maintaining a balance of power sufficient to sustain the destructive fighting in Syria.

Taking care that the scale of the attack does not provoke a military missile response from Syria and its allies.

Keeping the level of provocation toward both Russia and China low.

The Unknowns

But America is ignorant of many things it cannot factor out of its calculations before undertaking a military strike, namely:

What will Syria’s reaction be? Does Syria possess air defense capability sufficient to bring down attacking aircraft? America likely already has an answer to this, which is why it is unlikely to use aircraft, and will instead confine itself to standoff missile strikes. Will Syria strike American military bases in the region, particularly in Jordan and Turkey? Syrian missiles can certainly reach the bases in Jordan, but the range of Syrian missiles needs careful consideration when it comes to hitting targets inside Turkey. Or will Syria fire missiles at Israel, pushing Israel to respond in a way that sets the entire region ablaze? And what would follow from that conflagration, particularly with respect to the Israeli entity itself? Syria also possesses anti-ship missiles, and it is important to examine the range of these missiles and their capacity to strike American warships.

Will Hezbollah help Syria by firing rockets at Israel? And will the Party confine itself to firing rockets, or will it drag Israel into a ground battle?

What will Iran’s position be? Will it help the Syrian regime militarily by striking American targets in the Gulf, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Gulf states? Will it close the Strait of Hormuz? Will it strike strategic oil facilities? Will it aim its own missiles at Israel? And what about oil prices? Will the price per barrel reach $150, or exceed that? And what effect would that have on the fragile global economy? And how would the positions of the states economically harmed by America and its acts of war ultimately take shape?

America is asking itself whether the circle of war will widen, or whether it will end with the firing of a limited number of missiles at Syrian sites. It is calculating how many missiles might be enough to provoke the Syrian regime and its allies. Or would a single missile be enough to unleash the Syrian missiles, and those of its allies, from their restraints?

What will Russia’s position be, given that it has already affirmed that Syria possesses enough weaponry to respond to any aggression? Could Russia accept an American proposal to fire missiles at marginal sites, simply to save America’s face and guarantee there is no Syrian response — bearing in mind that, following Britain’s decision not to participate in the fighting, America already appears, under internationally established law, to be something of a rogue state?

What about the reaction of the Arab street? And what would be the position of Arab regimes such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Qatar, were the Arab street to rise up against the aggression?

And the greatest unknown of all is the date on which such a war, should it break out, would actually end.

The unknowns are many, and the answers are far from conclusive.

Prospects for Victory and Defeat

There are a number of possible scenarios for how events might unfold, and each one points toward either success or failure. Here I venture the following assessment:

America will be the loser if it decides not to attack, because it will thereby have swallowed its own words — something that will affect its clout on the international stage and diminish its standing. The Syrian regime will achieve a victory through this American retreat, and its standing will be strengthened both domestically and across the Arab world; along with it, the standing of Hezbollah, Iran, and the resistance in Gaza will be strengthened, while the standing of the Arab states that supported the aggression will decline.

America will be the loser if it attacks and faces a military response, however limited, whether against its own bases or against Israel. It will lose still more if it decides to respond to that response, since it would then be forced into a war far harsher than its war on Iraq.

America will win in one scenario only: an attack not followed by any Syrian or allied response. In that case, America will bolster its global standing, and the axis of resistance — Hamas included — will be negatively affected. America will win even if a deal is struck that involves bombing secondary targets without any response following.

Defeat for America

America has entrapped itself. We despise bloodshed, but patience with the forces of oppression only leads to continuous bloodshed. For this reason, it is better for the axis of resistance not to soften its tone; it should direct its media efforts toward mobilizing Arab and Islamic public opinion, and it may even be better to provoke America further, since an American attack would constitute a historic turning point for the region’s future.

In all likelihood, America will attack, and this is supposed to be the axis of resistance’s opportunity to prove its strong presence in the region. Many Arab states and Arab parties will not halt their conspiracies and their alliance with Israel except through the historical logic of the struggle of powers, and this is the important opportunity before the axis of resistance to assert its presence, even at heavy cost — for its defeat lies in its silence, not in its defiance.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “الثور الأمريكي والمغامرات الحربية” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.