The Arab Movement and the Toppling of Democracy

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

The search for freedom was a powerful cause of the outbreak of the Arab movement against a number of Arab political regimes, and since people had developed convictions that a democratic system could provide them freedoms and lift the yoke of despotism from them, they began looking toward bringing about political change toward establishing democratic political systems that would guarantee the Arab human being his freedom, security, and stability. For this reason we found Arab youth embracing the idea of democracy, hoping it might be achieved as a result of the Arab movement and the enormous sacrifices that accompanied and continue to accompany it.

But the winds do not seem to be blowing as the Arab citizen wishes — rather, it seems they have swept democracy away in a number of Arab locations, and struck down the hopes and aspirations of Arab youth. It also seems that some Arab peoples, or segments of them, have begun to look back fondly on the days of the despots who were toppled, because, as the justification goes, they were more merciful to the people than the new power-holders.

The results the Arab movement has produced are not satisfactory so far, nor are they encouraging for youth in the Arab states that did not witness an Arab movement.

The Authoritarian Reversion

There are tangible manifestations on the ground and in daily practices showing that the margin of freedoms available to Arab citizens has shrunk, that the Arab has fled from despotism into tyranny, and perhaps also indicating that the Arab is now less secure than he was under those who were toppled. Among these manifestations, I record the following:

First: in Tunisia, social discord developed, and liberal factions emerged wanting to impose themselves on society, alongside religious factions that deny the other and want to dominate affairs and lead people according to their own vision rather than the people’s choices.

From the start, many people in Tunisia were uneasy with the results of the democratic elections, which gave political priority to the Ennahda Movement. Tunisians did not differ, in this respect, from other Arab countries that held democratic elections and did not allow the winners to assume power. Social discord persists to this day, and the Tunisian army remains deployed across Tunisia, searching for those who threaten Tunisian security.

As for Egypt, there is much to say. A number of power-holders in Egypt did not accept the results of the elections that brought Mohamed Morsi to the presidency. Even those writers and thinkers who used to defend the principles of democracy strongly found themselves opposed to democracy’s own outcomes, and contributed directly to the coup against Morsi and the formation of a new government outside the democratic framework.

Here I am not defending Morsi, who made mistakes, but I believe the principle was set aside in Egypt’s political struggle in favor of personal and partisan positions. The collapse of democracy in Egypt did not stop at the toppling of Egypt’s first elected president — it went further, to mass killing and mass trials, and the banning of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, considered one of the oldest parties or groups in the Arab arena. How can we speak of democracy while banning the activity of those who won free elections? Hosni Mubarak did not engage in these practices.

Yemen bears witness to the retreat of democracy and then its collapse before aerial bombardment, the demolition of homes, and the killing of people. Syria and Libya are no exception to this deterioration, which has displaced people and ruined homelands.

Second: the bias of media outlets intensified, and their classification of writers and intellectuals as desirable or undesirable in their opinions intensified as well. Arab newspapers, channels, and radio stations witnessed a kind of openness to various opinions and positions before the Arab movement, but the retreat began to show after the Arab movement, and media outlets became more precise in classifying opinions and positions, opening their doors to those who align with them, and closing them to those who do not.

This trend applies to social media platforms as well, particularly those that open their pages to writers and intellectuals. There are social platforms run by intellectuals who used to defend democracy that have begun refusing to accept other opinions, restricting their published material to that which expresses their own positions. In other words, the margin of the Arab writer’s ability to publish or express his opinion freely has begun to shrink, becoming subject to more restrictive instructions.

Third: the retreat of Arab causes in Arab consciousness. Because of the state of instability and the absence of security that developed in a number of Arab countries, the Arab’s attention turned away from Arab causes and the challenges Arabs face, and he began to focus on his own difficult daily circumstances. The Arab no longer knows whether he will return home alive or not, and is no longer confident he will be able to secure his children’s daily bread if he goes out to work. The Arab has become threatened at every moment, even if he stays home and does not go out, and I do not think a person living under such difficult circumstances can attend to the causes of his nation.

Arab causes have retreated, foremost among them the Palestinian cause. Palestinians were optimistic that the development of democracy would bring the participation of peoples in decision-making, and that peoples would ultimately be more loyal to the Palestinian cause than rulers. But their calculations were not precise, and the Palestinian cause lost a great deal of its luster and the Arab peoples’ interest in it. Matters reached the point that Arab states intensified their efforts to besiege Gaza and prevent weapons and money from reaching it. Many Arab rulers are now allied with the Zionists, and we do not see an Arab movement standing against these capitulationist developments.

The Intensity of Polarization

The Arab movement raised the level of political and social polarization in the Arab arena, and also raised the intensity of religious and sectarian fanaticism. People differed in their assessment of internal affairs and developments, the level of foreign intervention in the internal affairs of the Arab movement’s states increased, and severe hostilities developed between the various centers of polarization.

Supporters of the threatened regimes entrenched themselves around the existing system, and opponents entrenched themselves in an opposing corner, with everyone’s hands on the trigger. Those hoping for change split according to what each faction saw as the best arrangement for the political system that might emerge after the regime’s fall.

A factional, partisan, religious, ethnic, and sectarian consciousness developed rapidly in the Arab arena, feeding at astonishing speed on Arab nationalist consciousness or Islamic consciousness — each faction worked to raise awareness of factional identity, and incited its sons to bear arms and prepare to defend themselves. If there were once sectarian, doctrinal, and religious sentiments tinged with resentment and grudges, under the Arab movement they turned into sentiments overflowing with resentment, grudges, a love of killing and revenge, and settling scores.

The intensity of polarization includes rejecting the other and considering him an enemy who must be eliminated — it means excluding the other and refusing to accept his opinion and point of view, and this means the divisions in the Arab arena have begun to widen, heralding further clashes and bloodshed. Factional consciousness and polarization have torn apart Arab identity, and the Arab no longer knows whether he is an Arab, a Sunni, a Shiite, a Yazidi, a southerner, or a northerner, and so on. And when identity is torn apart, belonging is torn apart with it, and as belonging is torn apart, the individual and the state alike become weaker, more helpless, and less inclined to consider national and patriotic interests.

Under these conditions, there is now great doubt as to whether Arabs are capable of developing a democratic political system that survives coups, flaws, and internal conspiracy.

Foreign Intervention

States intervene in other states out of a motive to preserve their own interests, or to develop interests specific to themselves. They do not intervene out of love for the other state or its people. There is no state prepared to spend its money and deploy its soldiers for the sake of another people — it is done for the sake of reaping benefits. For this reason, states are supposed to be very cautious in dealing with external powers, so as not to become entangled in something even worse.

The problem with the Arab movement is that it appealed to the outside world and invited it to intervene in internal affairs. This is what happened in Libya, Yemen, and Syria. The call for outside intervention was not limited to a single side — several Arab parties, foremost among them the Arab League, invited others to poke their noses into our affairs.

It is true that internal disputes exist in every Arab arena, but foreign intervention brought us further disputes, and brought strife, killing, and bloodshed. NATO intervened in Libya, and Libya ended up mired in internal conflicts, and the same thing happened in Yemen and Syria. It is the peoples who pay the price, not the political or media leaderships who summon the outside world.

Ruin has befallen the peoples of Yemen, Libya, and Syria, while the political leaderships watch from afar as the displaced set out in search of security and daily bread.

Summoning foreign intervention is a very dangerous matter, because it carries within it the surrender of the Arab future to whoever seeks his own interests, not the interests of the Arab nation. What is unfortunate is that media outlets usually stage a celebration of joy and rejoicing over foreign intervention, and this affects Arab consciousness, leading people to begin thinking their future is in the hands of others rather than their own — and this is the gravest danger we face.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “الحراك العربي والإطاحة بالديمقراطية” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.