The Battle of Gaza

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

Hell is raining down on Gaza, and will continue to do so. Many casualties will fall, and great Palestinian sacrifices are required, and they are available through conscious will and firm conviction. Israel is not seeking a mere arm-twisting; it wants to destroy Hamas entirely, and all Palestinian resistance in the Strip. Israel is not seeking a halt to rocket fire; it aims to overturn conditions in Gaza so that Gaza returns to the “house of obedience” represented by the Israeli-American project to liquidate the Palestinian cause. But what can Israel actually do? I see the following:

First: militarily, Israel has the following options:

Using aircraft intensively, which is what it is doing now. The air force will succeed in striking many military and civilian targets, and will claim many victims, and this is what has happened so far. But air power is constrained by two things: (a) the information available to intelligence services about locations of security and military importance; (b) air power does not decide the battle on the ground. Regarding the first point, it is clear that Israel suffers a shortage of information, in that losses among Palestinian resistance fighters are small compared to the losses suffered by police forces and civilians. Regarding the second point, it is becoming clear to Israel now that the intensity of the aerial bombardment has not succeeded in pushing Palestinian resistance toward surrender.

The second military step consists of limited ground incursions on the outskirts of cities. These incursions, too, do not achieve the goal of changing the existing situation in Gaza, and have previously failed despite the large losses they inflicted in lives and property. It is possible that Israel will use this tactic in order to probe the resistance’s combat and armament capacity. Israel is wary of lethal weapons that might be in the resistance’s possession, and it does not want to repeat the failure of the 2006 war against Hezbollah. In any case, incursions of this kind achieve nothing but inflicting large losses on the Palestinian side.

The third option consists of a comprehensive ground invasion. This option carries many drawbacks:

The tactical military capability of any regular army in the Gaza Strip is weak because of residential and population density, while the tactical capability of the resistance is high. Population density hinders the movement of a regular army, while it helps the resistance fighter in hit-and-run tactics. This means that Israeli army losses would be high, while losses among Palestinian civilians would also be high. Losses among the army would bring about general discontent among Jews in occupied Palestine of 1948, while losses among Palestinian civilians would bring the weight of global media coverage because of the media reports that would fill screens with images of children’s remains and women’s wailing. Israel wants neither of these outcomes.

Israel is not confident about what weapons the resistance has in its possession. What if it turns out the resistance has weapons capable of destroying tanks? What if it turns out the resistance is well entrenched, such that Israel cannot extricate itself from the trap? If Palestinian resistance is entrenched (and it is indeed entrenched) and possesses anti-tank weapons, then Israeli losses are expected to be large, and Israeli soldiers are expected to be taken captive. The capture of prisoners would turn the tables on Israel and on the regimes of Arab crookedness.

Invading the Gaza Strip does not guarantee Israel calm in the Strip, even though it is possible to control the matter of rocket fire. Israel remained in the Gaza Strip for about 39 years and could not eliminate the resistance — will it be able to eliminate it within a few months of occupation? Israel is fully aware that Palestinian resistance is not merely a limited number of individuals, but a resistance extending deep into the population.

And if the invasion happens and Gaza falls, to whom will Israel hand over the Strip, and will the new recipient be able to control the situation?

Israel also calculates the damage that could reflect on the regimes of Arab crookedness, which it calls the “moderate” regimes. These regimes have so far received enough insults and abuse across the length and breadth of the Arab homeland to last them several years — so how might Arab demonstrations and protests develop if the ground invasion happens and civilians begin falling in terrifying numbers? Israel is protective of these Arab regimes, and is fully aware that the survival of these regimes serves its tactical and strategic interests. There is no doubt that these regimes are in constant contact with Israel, asking it to be quick in accomplishing its mission while minimizing losses among Palestinians, and stressing to it the necessity of avoiding putting them in more embarrassing positions.

[There is something] making Israel confident of victory, and of changing conditions in the Strip as it wishes. It is clear now that Israel’s military and political leaders are absorbed in assessing the situation on the ground, and are being very cautious with every step they take.

Second: at the popular level

Israel, together with several Arab regimes, believes that bombardment and killing will incite the street in the Gaza Strip against Hamas, and will move it to bring the movement down. This was the goal of the siege that has continued for about eighteen months. Israel and the regimes with it believed that Hamas would fall within a period extending, at most, to three months, but the months passed and Hamas remained. Perhaps the belief has now developed that people will move under the weight of the enormous losses.

From what I have observed recently, I doubt that people will rise up against Hamas because of its broad popular base rooted in ideological conviction. It is true that there are people opposed to Hamas, who hate it intensely, and some who feel relief at the Israeli bombardment, but I do not see that they have the capacity to move the Gazan street against Hamas, nor do I see that they have the capacity to confront Hamas’s supporters should they take to the streets in protest.

The Arab street constitutes strong support for Hamas, even if indirectly. The Arab street is now demonstrating in support of the people of Gaza and the resistance of Gaza, and since Hamas is the one overseeing the Strip, it in one way or another reaps the great benefit of the Arab protests, making its oversight of the Strip stronger and more accepted. The movement of the Arab street forms a deterrent to Israel because it is a movement that threatens the Arab regimes, or at least places them in embarrassing positions, and Israel may find itself under pressure from these regimes to ease its military campaign or halt it entirely.

On the other hand, what about the resistance? I see the following:

First: it is clear that people in the Gaza Strip are holding together despite the enormous losses they are enduring. The Palestinian street appears united and in solidarity, and prepared to absorb shocks and blows. It appears that people in Gaza have largely set aside the self, and are dealing with one another on the level of “we,” such that hands of help extend mutually.

Second: there are indicators that Palestinian resistance’s readiness in Gaza is good; I mention some:

Al-Aqsa satellite channel managed to continue broadcasting despite its main building having been destroyed.

The overwhelming majority of martyrs are from among police and civilians, while losses among professional resistance fighters are very few. This indicates the latent readiness within the resistance.

The observer notices no showy military presence in the streets of Gaza, and this is new behavior in the history of Palestinian resistance.

The reckless boastful talk about the resistance’s capabilities is absent, and this points to a silent effort that may be concealing great surprises.

What about the Palestinian Authority?

My assessment is that the Palestinian Authority is the biggest loser in this battle. If conditions in Gaza change and the Palestinian Authority takes over responsibility, it will remain under intense accusation because it relied on the occupation to return it to Gaza. And it will not be any better off if the resistance remains steadfast, given that the arrows of the resistance will strike at it once conditions stabilize — not to mention the arrows of the people.

Outcomes

Where will matters end up? I see the following:

Palestinian resistance will hold firm, and will display unparalleled combat ferocity despite the scarcity of weapons and the enemy’s military superiority. The longer the resistance’s steadfastness lasts, the more support for it grows at the popular levels, and perhaps at some official Arab levels. We have observed in previous incursions that Palestinian resistance fighters do not abandon their positions, and this is what frightens Israel most. The fighting spirit among the resistance is very high, and we will find Palestinians blowing themselves up against Zionist tanks.

Palestinian resistance understands that this battle on Gaza’s soil is a decisive, historic battle, and that the Palestinian cause cannot bear a defeat or a retreat, for otherwise Palestinians will lose their pioneering role in liberating their homeland.

Israel cannot bear a long war because of the fragile state of the Arab regimes, and it recognizes that the regimes of Arab crookedness are now a great burden on its shoulders, and that it cannot continue the bloody fighting if the steadfastness is prolonged. The Arab regimes are more eager than Israel to end the fighting, but they are not the ones fighting on the ground.

The steadfastness of Palestinian resistance is victory in itself, and if it is achieved, Palestinian conditions will change, just as the dealings of many Arab states with Palestinian resistance will change.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “معركة غزة” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.