The Cost of Hezbollah's Slowness

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

Hezbollah works very hard to affirm its concern for Lebanon and its civil peace, repeating over and over again its insistence that it is merely a resistance movement with no ambitions for power, that it seeks neither prestige nor domination, and that it has no wish to take on the roles of others. It affirms, with tedious and excessive repetition, that the weapon of resistance exists to confront Lebanon’s enemies, and will never be used domestically inside Lebanon except in self-defense, as happened on May 7 [2008]. It appears that Hezbollah lives under the constant anxiety of losing popular support, or of internal rivals exploiting its arming and its ties to Iran in order to defame it and turn people away from it, and so on. It is preoccupied — far more than it should be — with appearing before all Lebanese as the resistance of Lebanon, all of Lebanon, and not of a single sect, alliance, denomination, or region. Frankly, I think Hezbollah’s fixation on this question goes beyond reasonable bounds, as if the party wanted to claim it is more angelic than the angels themselves.

Hezbollah has no need for all this effort, and it is certain that the other parties hostile to it will not be won over even if Sayyed Hassan were to go pray for Samir Geagea, Saad Hariri, and Amine Gemayel. They would accept neither prayer nor fasting from him — not because he is insincere, but because they have other programs, different from and contradictory to resistance, that they want to carry out, programs tied to Arab states that call themselves “moderate,” to the United States, and directly or indirectly to Israel. If the party wants to remain within the circle of action while closing the doors on the accusations leveled against it, this effort will certainly never end — every time it closes one door, they will open another, and so on. Quite simply, they are against resistance, whatever its form, wherever its location. They are against Hezbollah, against Hamas, against the Iraqi resistance in all its Sunni and Shia currents, against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, against Red Indians and Blue Indians and Green Indians, against resistance at the South Pole and on the surface of Mars.

The party’s patience has grown long

…pushed the party toward focusing on Lebanon’s internal problems, on bickering and faultfinding, and the like.

Hezbollah had several opportunities to translate some of its words into action, and to prove its strength and effective presence on the Arab and Islamic regional stage. Hezbollah could have carried out some military action in support of Gaza during the winter war of 2008/2009, but it did not. It could have kidnapped the Lebanese false witnesses, or some of them, and subjected them to public interrogation. It could also have done something had the Zionists attacked the Lebanese ships heading to Gaza, and so on. There were several opportunities, any one of which could have been seized without fear of Israel, since Israel’s calculations right now do not go beyond a circle of confusion, doubt, and hesitation.

It is understandable that Hezbollah has its own internal calculations, and that it tries to avoid accusations, incitement, and distortion, but it pays a double price for this: first, its internal opponents will not be satisfied with it regardless, as I noted, and second, the morale of its own supporters is negatively affected. Finding the point of balance remains one of the party’s tasks.

Two governments in Lebanon

In Lebanon there are two governments that meet officially under the single name of “the Lebanese government.” There is the March 14 government and the March 8 government, and the two meet in a kind of fragile or doubtful accommodation, unable to work together except in the sphere of the daily civil life of the Lebanese. They amount to little more than a caretaker government, wary of internal collision, unable to work at the strategic level — such as adopting strategic economic plans to develop the Lebanese economy, or military-building plans, or plans for social change, and so on. Were it not for each party’s desire to court internal support, we would see a wide paralysis of the daily affairs of the Lebanese people.

Circumstances have forced the formation of this government, and its continuation remains bound to those same circumstances. This government was not born of genuine accord, and it is not to be expected that a serious accord will develop on the basis of Lebanon’s independence and confrontation with Israel. It is clear from the conduct of the Lebanese government’s affairs and the statements of its ministers that harmony is very far off, and that trust in the other side is not on the table.

It is important to preserve this fragile accommodation, but it is also important that it not become an opportunity for relentless work against the party and the resistance. The Lebanese have been much preoccupied with the matter of the international tribunal, and Hezbollah has recently busied itself with this issue as though it were an open front draining away its strength and energies. Rethinking the approaches currently at play on the Lebanese scene is necessary — and the heart weakens the wider it is stretched.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “ثمن تباطؤ حزب الله” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.