The Draft Cairo Agreement

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

I read the text of a draft Palestinian agreement, called the “Palestinian National Project.” I have the following observations, some of which Dr. Ibrahim Hammami has also pointed to:

First: the drafter must be sent back to elementary school to learn Arabic spelling. There are numerous spelling errors that give a poor impression of the writer’s scholarly level, and of the level of those who assisted him. It is a calamity for a matter as great as this — reconciliation between warring Palestinians — to be entrusted to a person or persons who cannot properly write the Arabic language. Here are some examples (drawn from the errors in the Arabic original, which affected the precise legal meaning of several words and letters through misspelling, missing hamzas, confusion between similar letters, and other basic errors that no drafter of a document of this importance should make).

These are errors within a single sentence of the original — imagine the rest of the text. This is a disgrace and a shame, and if it indicates anything, it indicates the writer’s lack of scholarly rigor, his indifference, and his carelessness. In a document of this kind, errors of this sort are unacceptable.

Second: the draft contains major conceptual problems that indicate either a weakness of awareness on the writer’s part, or intentions to alter concepts considered fundamental to the Palestinian cause. For example, the draft says: “the geographic and political unity of the Palestinian territories, and the rejection of their division under any circumstances.” What are the “Palestinian territories”? The writer most likely means the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and uses this expression to erase occupied Palestine of 1948. The draft adds: “democracy is the sole option for the principle of the peaceful transfer of power, within a framework of respect for the rule of law, order, and respect for legitimacy.” What is the “legitimacy” the Palestinian people is supposed to respect? There is the legitimacy of the PLO, the legitimacy of Abbas, the legitimacy of the Legislative Council, the legitimacy of the Oslo Accords, the legitimacy of the Quartet, and the legitimacy of jihad in the path of God. Which of these legitimacies is the strongest? My assessment is that Oslo’s legitimacy is the strongest, and as long as it remains standing and respected, the Palestinian people will never agree.

There is the expression “Palestinian national interest,” an expression subject to many interpretations, readings, and analyses. The national interest must be defined for the term to have meaning, or it must be defined before drafting an agreement toward it.

The expression “achieving the national goals” also appears. What are the Palestinian national goals? We disagree over them, and they must be defined first, so we do not end up disagreeing halfway down the road. This applies to the draft’s very title: “The Palestinian National Project.” What is this project, and who defines it?

Are we searching for a Palestinian agreement or a Palestinian consensus? Consensus is usually fragile, and easy to rebel against, whereas an agreement is governed by clear, explicit texts.

Third: the legitimacy of the PLO is unclear — is it the legitimacy of the organization as it currently exists, or its legitimacy after it is rebuilt? This ties into the idea of “national consensus” mentioned in the draft. The PLO as it currently exists does not enjoy national consensus, so must we wait until an organization enjoying this consensus is established? Or is the currently existing organization exempt from the idea of national consensus?

Fourth: since when has the Palestinian resistance been subject to national consensus? We know resistance is a legitimate, lawful right of the Palestinian people, so long as we speak of the legitimacy granted by international law. What is meant by “national consensus” regarding this matter? Does the objection of a small faction, whose members do not even number fifty, constitute a decisive opinion in halting the resistance? It is clear this clause is nothing but a dry attempt to render the resistance illegitimate.

Fifth: the security apparatuses. The draft assigns the task of defending the homeland and its citizens to the Palestinian security apparatuses, once they are rebuilt on professional, non-factional foundations. When will this happen, and how? Will these apparatuses work against the Israeli occupation? If the answer is yes, what is the Palestinian position on the Oslo Accords, which require security cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis? Of course, we must not forget that the weapons of the Palestinian security apparatuses are licensed by Israel — can these apparatuses stand against the very party that permits them to possess weapons in the first place? If the answer is yes, then the draft agreement wants to annul the Oslo Accords. This matter needs clarification.

Sixth: the draft assigns the Palestinian government the tasks of lifting the siege, running the people’s daily life, preparing for new presidential and legislative elections, and overseeing the rebuilding of the security apparatuses. These tasks contradict the clause authorizing the PLO to conduct negotiations. The security apparatuses are the offspring of security agreements born of the negotiations, so will Israel and the West allow the government to rearrange the security apparatuses? Won’t the PLO object to this rearrangement, so as not to have the government obstruct the course of the negotiating process?

Seventh: the dating used in the document follows the Latin calendar at the expense of the Syriac calendar. May is Ayyar, February is Shubat. Our ancestors labored over crafting the names of the months, and it is up to us to preserve this authenticity.

Eighth: the document does not answer an important question: how can the Palestinian people agree and decide freely, if the donor states, whose financial decisions are controlled by America and Israel, are the ones paying the employees’ salaries? The people are now captives in the cage of salaries — so what is the way out? How can the party with the lower hand, begging from the enemy, be the one who holds the decision?

In short: it does not appear that the writer of this draft is searching for Palestinian consensus, but rather searching to increase disagreements and cause further internal Palestinian tension. In the Cairo and Mecca agreements, there was a documenting of Palestinian disagreements, and consequently the two agreements did not produce a lasting solution; in this draft, hostility toward the Palestinian people is clear. There is an inversion of concepts, and a manipulation of wording, aimed at multiplying verbal disputes in the Palestinian arena and keeping the Palestinian people preoccupied with its internal disagreements, leaving the Palestinian cause behind its back.

I do not see any need to travel to Cairo in search of solutions to our problems, since it is clear the Arab regimes lack the capacity to help, because of their political subservience. There are plenty of places within Palestine itself that could host our meetings.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “مسودة اتفاق القاهرة” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.