The Hariri Assassination in the Strategic Balance

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

What would have happened if Rafik Hariri had been a Nasserist, a Baathist, or an Islamist? Indeed, could Hariri even have been a target for assassination had he been a nationalist or an Islamist?

Many nationalist, Palestinian, and Islamist leaders have been assassinated inside and outside Lebanon, and none of that uproar ever occurred, and what is called the “international community” never rushed to search for who carried out the assassinations. Many Lebanese leaders from various factions have been assassinated, but the international community’s interest was confined merely to condemnations, media reports, or political statements.

Five years on, the Hariri case still tops the news bulletins, draws attention, and causes a great deal of friction and tension at the level of internal Lebanese politics and at Arab and international levels.

There is no sign on the horizon that the case is heading toward being forgotten, or fading into old news. My assessment is that it will remain an important headline as long as the forces of resistance in the region remain unconvicted of the assassination.

Syria’s Policy on Assassinations

Syria reached a state of severe tension with Palestinian leaderships when the PLO made Syria and Lebanon its administrative and military base. Several Palestinian leaders directed harsh criticism at the Syrian president and the Syrian leadership generally, with Arafat and Hawatmeh foremost among those directing such criticism.

Matters in the Syrian-Palestinian relationship reached the point of infighting in Lebanon, and hundreds of Palestinians and Syrians fell in clashes and wars that served no purpose. Despite this, Syria never resorted to assassinating Palestinian leaders, neither on Syrian soil nor on Lebanese soil.

The most it ever did was decide to expel Arafat from Damascus when statements and counter-statements intensified. Syria was accused of assassinating the commander of the Palestinian forces, Saad Sayel, but it became clear over time that Syria’s name was dragged into the assassination by Palestinians accused of carrying it out.

Syria is accused of orchestrating or ordering the assassinations of Bashir Gemayel and President Moawad, but without conclusive evidence of this.

In any case, the Gemayel and Moawad era was entirely different, strategically, from the era of the Hariri assassination, since Lebanon was on the verge of falling completely into Israel’s hands, and Syrian national security and the security of Syria’s allies in Lebanon faced an imminent danger. Indeed, it was clear Syria itself was about to come under new military threat and pressure from the Lebanese flank, and its allies were threatened with extinction.

This is why the leaderships of the French and American forces in Lebanon were struck, along with the May 17, 1983 agreement, and the resistance was reinforced through diligent, sustained efforts until it became a decisive force in Lebanon.

Had anyone spoken, in that period, of a Syrian interest in assassinations, it could be understood, but in the Hariri period, matters were not troubling for Syria, since its forces were stationed in Lebanon, and it enjoyed influence, sway, and the ability to steer Lebanese political affairs, and the Lebanese resistance had risen as a major center of power not just in Lebanon but in the region.

It is quite likely that Hariri constituted an annoyance for Syria because of his alliance with Saudi Arabia — he held Saudi citizenship, and only reached the premiership with Saudi backing — but this did not constitute a danger to Syria, nor to its interests, nor to the interests of its allies in Lebanon.

Hariri was not an obstacle for Syria, and Syria was fully aware that had it wanted to eliminate Hariri, this would not have produced a Sunni prime minister in Lebanon with a policy different from Hariri’s own, given the direct Saudi and American intervention in naming Lebanon’s prime minister.

Hezbollah’s Policy on Assassination

It is not Hezbollah’s policy to assassinate political leaders, nor is it its policy to use weapons against internal forces, and if it did use weapons on May 7 [2008], this was the result of being cornered in a dangerous position exposing it to Israeli security services.

Even on that day, Hezbollah did not touch the leaders of the March 14 movement, keeping them confined to their palaces for only a short period of time.

Hezbollah believes internal tension and infighting feed on its readiness to confront Israel, scattering focus and attention, and it always works to resolve problems through dialogue.

Hezbollah might use weapons at the internal level, but not assassination, if there is persistent insistence on exposing the resistance’s back and deliberately laying it bare to the Zionist enemy.

From this, Hezbollah had no interest in assassinating Hariri, especially since he was not a strong prime minister, was not aggressive, and did not hold real decision-making power.

If Hezbollah had a problem with Hariri’s policy, the problem fundamentally remains with Saudi Arabia and those who ally with and support it, not with the earlier or later Hariri. And if Hezbollah wanted to dominate, control, or bully, there is no one in Lebanon capable of deterring it.

The Imbalance in the Balance of Power

It is quite possible that Hariri was a victim of the shift that occurred in the balance of power in the Arab-Islamic region, and that his blood was a means or a tool to push the clock’s hands backward.

The strategic shift arose from two angles: the angle of the Iraqi resistance, the Taliban, and al-Qaeda, expanding over time across the region’s geography, and the angle of Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas.

From the first angle, Westerners became entangled in wars and losses, expanding the circle of their enemies, and now face major challenges without having a strategy for escaping the region without future costs to pay.

From the second angle, it is clear their dominance over the region’s strategic areas and commodities is seriously threatened, and Israel’s survival as a state has itself become threatened, because of Iranian technical development and Syria’s insistence on remaining an ally of Iran and a strategic link between Iran and Hezbollah.

The Western states — the United States and Israel foremost among them — are on hot coals over what the strategic military situation in the region might develop into, and are deeply fearful of broad Iranian influence in the Gulf region, and of Hezbollah’s ability to stir up Sunnis, especially in the states neighboring the Zionist entity.

For this reason, these states have no choice but to search for means and methods to halt Iranian progress and to weaken and eliminate Hezbollah. Toward this end, the following policies have been tried:

First: the policy of siege. Iran has been under siege by the United States and some of its allies since 1979, especially regarding certain strategic goods such as spare parts for military and civilian aircraft. This siege developed to become international, backed by United Nations resolutions.

Iran’s policy toward Israel had the greatest share in imposing the siege, since it is well known that Iran expelled the Israeli ambassador in 1979 following the revolution’s victory, and turned the Zionist embassy into a Palestinian embassy.

Second: war between the region’s states. The Western states ignited a long war between Iraq and Iran that drained both the Arabs and Iran financially, and led to the deaths of about a million Iraqis and Iranians.

Their goal from the war was to topple the regime in Tehran and return to the Shah’s era, reinstalling Iran as the policeman of the Gulf region.

Third: stirring internal unrest in both Iran and Syria, such as inciting armed groups to carry out bombings, or encouraging opposition forces to manufacture instability, along with the necessity of establishing an atmosphere of freedom and allowing the opposition to operate — even though the Western states’ concern was never, in fact, with Arab or Muslim freedom, but with that particular freedom that preserves Western interests and dominance.

Fourth: the war of science and technology, meaning the attempts by Westerners, America foremost among them, to prevent Iran from scientific progress and technical development. The Western states worked to monitor, as much as possible, the goods heading toward Tehran, and to besiege scientists who might contribute to Iran’s scientific work.

Fifth: fragmenting the Syria-Iran-Hezbollah front. The Western states, with the help of Arab states, tried to isolate Syria from Iran through both enticement and intimidation. Syria was offered money and proposed solutions regarding the Golan, and was also subjected to repeated threats and warnings, the most recent in July 2010, to push it away from Iran and Hezbollah.

Westerners believe Hezbollah will weaken greatly if Syria closes its doors to it and to Iran, and that its ability to continue military and technical buildup will collapse.

There is no doubt this is an important strategic matter, in that Hezbollah would face a siege if Syria closed its notional border with the party, and Iran would lose a strong, essential ally in the region if Syria accepted the offers.

At that point, the direct threat to Israel would dissipate, and Tehran would remain distant, unable to directly engage the Zionists.

Sixth: the siege of Hamas and the war on it. The West and the Arabs turned their attention to Gaza, seeing it as contributing to the strategic threat to American and Israeli dominance, so they extended a helping hand to Israel in its siege of Gaza and its war on Gaza. It is true that Hamas is the weakest link, but it stood firm alongside the various Palestinian resistance forces.

Seventh: the war on Hezbollah. Americans, Israelis, and most Arabs were optimistic about the Israeli attack on Hezbollah in 2006, but they were surprised by Israel’s incapacity, and by the party’s ability to wage a war with professionalism and high readiness.

Eighth: internal strife. Since 1979, most Arab regimes, in cooperation with Israel and America, have worked to stir bloody strife between Sunnis and Shiites — the most dangerous strife Muslims could be exposed to, draining their energies, consuming their youth, spilling their blood, and stirring hatred and animosity between them, which will certainly result in extremely dangerous educational and tribalistic developments.

No one paid attention to the Sunni-Shiite question before the victory of the Iranian revolution, and even in Iraq, the late President Saddam Hussein worked to bury tribalistic sentiments, but faith in this divide began to appear among many Arab leaders after 1979, and many Western states began inciting Sunnis on the assumption that the rise of the Shiites would lead to the decline of the Sunnis.

Incitement toward strife continues to this day, and there are naive Sunnis and Shiites who respond, believing they are defending their sect and their ritual convictions.

There are mutual bombings between Sunnis and Shiites in Pakistan, and in Iraq as well, incitement in Yemen and another in Bahrain, and there are Arab satellite stations specialized in stirring up strife and conflicts.

Arab regimes, Western states, and Israel tried to raise the pace of sectarian incitement after the 2006 war, because of Israel’s failure in that war. The tide of strife reached Palestine, such that large numbers of people, especially those close to the Palestinian Authority, began speaking of “Shiite Hezbollah,” and casting doubt on its military accomplishments.

Israelis began speaking of their defeat in the war, while Arabs in Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and so on insisted that Hezbollah had been defeated, insisted that the “Shiite threat” was coming, and that the enemy was Iran and Hezbollah, not their “friend” Israel.

Lebanon was, and remains, a fundamental hub for sectarian incitement along Sunni-Shiite lines, and over more than thirty years, this sectarian propaganda has managed to influence Sunnis in particular, leading them to shift from the Islamic and nationalist dimension toward the sub-national and sectarian dimension.

They saturated Sunnis with talk of “the cunning of the Shiites, their doctrine of dissimulation (taqiyya), their conspiring against the Caliphs, may God be pleased with them, and their cursing of the Companions, Lady Aisha, and Abu Hurayrah.”

They gathered together every historical evil and wrongdoing, exaggerated them, and added still more, to convince Sunnis that the Shiites are renegades lying in wait for Lebanon and the Arabs, seeking to establish a Safavid empire and turn Sunnis away from their convictions.

The Sunnis of Lebanon were once at the forefront of the nationalist forces defending the Arab nation, and Tripoli, Sidon, and parts of Beirut were at the forefront of the guardians always rising against colonial invasion and domination. Little by little, they were influenced until most of them became forces fully aligned with American interests and the interests of their Arab allies, and aligned with Israel as well.

Hariri’s Blood

From this last point — the policy of strife — comes the importance of Hariri’s blood. They tried very many means and methods to control the shifts in the balance of power, and did not succeed — so why not try bloodshed, if it would serve the interests of Israel, America, and their Arab allies?

They used this blood to pressure Syria, but the attempt failed, and they were unable to prove anything against Syria, and the alliance between Syria, Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas continued. Now there is nothing stopping them from trying the other side of the equation, hoping it might succeed, so they turned to accusing Hezbollah.

Westerners and Israel do not care about Hariri’s blood, nor about the blood of all Arabs — Hariri, to them, is merely a vehicle that can be used to stir strife and infighting in Lebanon.

If strife occurs, Sunnis in Arab countries will be forced to support Lebanon’s Sunnis, and Syria will be forced to retreat from supporting the party because of Sunni pressure. This is what drives Hezbollah to remain on high alert, so that no strife ignites from which no one benefits but the enemies of Arabs and Muslims.

It is now clear that many Lebanese and Arab political and media leaderships are not concerned with searching for the truth, since they immediately rejected the evidence Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah presented against Israel in his press conference on August 9, 2010, saying the evidence did not constitute proof, and therefore what the Hezbollah leader said could not be relied upon.

The question here: why did these leaderships accept the evidence presented against Syria, yet now refuse to accept the evidence presented against Israel?

They campaigned against Syria for four years, and these leaderships’ media outlets went to great lengths hurling accusations at Syria and inciting against it based on circumstantial evidence, not proof — so why don’t they do the same with Israel?

The matter has nothing to do with proof, evidence, or a search for truth — it has to do with the possibility of using Hariri’s blood to stir strife with the aim of destroying the new balance of power in the region, especially since it continues to crystallize further in favor of the forces rejecting Israel and Western domination.

It was clear, from the very first day, that the fingers of accusation were not pointed toward Israel — indeed, they did not even consider Israel at all, but rather Israel’s enemies. This indicates the involvement of many Lebanese and Arab leaderships in planning with Israel to search for reasons to ignite strife.

Even if Hezbollah presented decisive, incontrovertible evidence against Israel, it would not change their policy of exploiting Hariri’s blood.

The Balance of Power and the Changing Face of the Region

Israel failed in its two wars, on Lebanon and on Gaza, and this indicates the possibility of its army being routed in the future, and Jewish population centers falling into Arab hands.

If this happens, and it could happen, Israel would be forced to withdraw from the West Bank, the Golan, and South Lebanon, and to recognize the rights of Palestinians and Arabs. This simply means the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah would fall, and the Jordanian regime would collapse.

As for the Lebanese leaderships playing the same tune as Ramallah and Amman, they would find themselves isolated, and most of them would be forced to flee Lebanon. This is why the fire of strife must be ignited, and Hezbollah, Syria, or Iran must be prevented from achieving victory over Israel.

In other words, the matter, in the end, for Arab and Lebanese leaderships, is a matter of self-defense requiring an alliance with Israel. The matter is extremely delicate and complex, and if some people believe logic alone prevails, they must also think about the logic of one who wants to defend his position, his zones of influence, and his authority.

For this reason, I would not be surprised if news reached me that Lebanese leaderships defending their own positions were the ones who assassinated Hariri. Israel may be involved, and Lebanese leaderships may be involved, and certainly the two sides’ private interests converge.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “اغتيال الحريري في الميزان الإستراتيجي” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.