The Limits of Obama's Foreign Policy

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

Enough months have passed to judge the direction of the foreign policy of American President Obama, and the researcher can now identify the pillars and starting points of this policy for the coming years that will make up the Obama era. The American president was active at the international level from the beginning of his term, and gave strong impressions that his foreign policy would differ from that of his predecessor Bush, encouraging optimism among many leaders and ordinary people about a new global order in which tensions would ease and wars would decrease.

Obama made a number of statements aimed at easing tension, and encouraging states and groups hostile to, or at odds with, the United States to open the door to dialogue on the basis of mutual respect and mutual interests. He also made many visits considered necessary in order to get to know the leaders of states, to develop a sense of the responsibility of his position, and to sample the atmosphere of public relations that characterizes international meetings. During his tours, the president spoke about what he intends to do, both in terms of goals and approaches, leaving only a small margin for speculation. What follows is a summary of what I have concluded about what can be expected in the coming years:

Iraq and Afghanistan

During his election campaign, Obama made withdrawal from Iraq a top campaign issue, through which he drew the support of Americans who had begun moving in increasing numbers against the war and the American presence in Iraq. Obama said he would withdraw his country’s forces from Iraq, considering the war fundamentally futile and one that had cost Americans a great many losses; in this he went further than his Republican rival’s position on gradual withdrawal from Iraq. It now appears, after roughly two-thirds of his first year in office, that he is attempting a gradual withdrawal from Iraq, and has not decided on a final, all-at-once exit.

Perhaps Obama found that leaving is not as easy as election propaganda made it sound, and that the United States is far more entangled in Iraq’s internal affairs than he had imagined. The American president found that his country had created many complicated problems and burdens for Iraq, and that turning its back on them would not serve the interests of the United States; he may now believe that remaining in Iraq, in one way or another, contributes to stabilizing conditions inside Iraq and organizes Iraq’s relations with its neighbors. Iraq’s internal conflicts are varied and numerous, and fears regarding Iraq’s neighbors are real and threaten American interests. So where does wisdom lie? Is it in facilitating the establishment of a Kurdish state, which would lead to a deterioration in relations with Turkey? Or in handing Kirkuk over entirely to the Kurds, which would inflame the Sunnis and anger America’s Sunni allies? Or in supporting the Shiite majority, whose loyalty in terms of alliance with Iran cannot be trusted? Or in angering Iran, which would push it to raise the level of its covert operations in Iraq? Stability in Iraq requires a delicate strategic balance to maintain equilibrium among the various forces, and a balance among the interests of the region’s different states, which will push Obama to search for a formula that allows him to keep some of his forces in Iraq.

Obama’s foreign policy in Afghanistan is clear: the continuation of the war, with an attempt to search for a political exit. For this reason Obama decided to increase the number of American forces in Afghanistan, with the necessity of pushing NATO toward increasing its numbers and equipment. But Obama is now running into widespread Afghan resistance, and into mounting losses among his country’s forces and those allied with it. It is not unlikely that these mounting losses will produce a reaction on the American street demanding the withdrawal of American forces and the abandonment of the idea of the war on terror in its current form. American policy in Afghanistan now follows in Bush’s very footsteps, and even the military policy Bush set in confronting the Taliban in Pakistan is the very same policy now in place.

The Palestinian Cause

The official Arab regimes were optimistic after Bush’s speech at Cairo University, and after his affirmation that he was serious about ending the Arab-Israeli conflict. Some Palestinians believed that statehood was now at the door, and that American punitive measures against Israel would be launched. But it is clear that American policy on this matter, up to now, does not go beyond statements, and does not go beyond calling for a freeze on settlement in the West Bank. It is true that Obama’s rhetorical tone against settlement is harsher than that of Bush and Clinton, but Obama has not, so far, departed from the traditional American position that settlement is an obstacle on the road to peace — a position with no practical value whatsoever.

If Obama were working seriously toward establishing a Palestinian state, the correct required position would be the removal of settlements, not merely a freeze on settlement, followed by practical punitive measures against Israel should it refuse. But Obama does not stop at merely freezing settlement; rather, he tries to soften his own demand by affirming that the Palestinian state he speaks of will be demilitarized, and by demanding that the Arabs normalize relations with Israel. It is historically well known that the Arabs respond to American demands, whereas Israel considers itself to be in the position of coordinating with America, not of listening to it.

Obama’s strong tone against settlement stirred the Europeans, who felt a new boldness descending upon them to confront Israel verbally over the very same issue. Most European states began speaking forcefully in favor of a settlement freeze, but they too have not taken any practical measure to achieve that demand.

On another note, America, together with the European states, continues to coordinate strategically with Israel on vital issues such as the war on terror, confronting the Iranian nuclear program, and confronting Hezbollah’s rising strength. In other words, these states speak about a very small matter, criticizing Israel over it, while working diligently and continuously with Israel on very large matters bearing on the future of the region as a whole — which points, confirmingly, to the fact that the United States still embraces the very same American policy it has followed for decades.

Russia

There was an impression that the Obama administration would deal with Russia in a new way, different from Bush’s approach, given that it is a militarily powerful state with the capacity to influence international politics, particularly after it attacked the Georgian army with resolve and force. Obama himself gave rise to this impression when he visited Russia and issued a number of statements about the necessity of Russian-American cooperation. But so far we have not observed any development in bilateral relations, and have heard nothing but an abundance of pleasantries that define no policies or measures.

There is an assessment in the United States that Russia is not qualified to be a global pole on the model of the Soviet Union. Its current system, according to American assessments, does not allow the Russian government to act as the Soviet Communist Party once did, nor does its economy, which relies heavily on oil resources. The Americans believe that the Russian leadership is under pressure from the Russian public, which looks forward to a better standard of living, and that it takes public opinion into account, which places on its shoulders priorities in economic construction that draw on the financial requirements that come with claiming pole status. Even if Russia decided to become a rival pole to the United States, its available and expected economic capabilities in the foreseeable future do not qualify it to do so.

The meaning is that dealing with Russia under the Obama administration does not rest on the idea of mutual respect so much as it rests on the question of the balance of power. Russia is militarily strong, but its economy does not enable it to act in the way the military would wish, and so its military strength remains latent, without a real capacity for sustained confrontation, and the war on Georgia would not have taken place had the Russian leadership judged that it would be a long war. In other words, those principles Obama voiced to the world are gradually retreating in the face of facts and interests. It is possible, however, that Obama will reconsider the missile shield issue, as well as America’s attempts to gain entry into the states bordering Russia, because both of these matters directly and violently provoke Russia.

Detention and Respect for Democracy

Obama’s policy shows a kind of relaxation regarding the detention and torture of foreigners, and his decision to close the Guantanamo detention camp supports this. He promised to close the camp, which had greatly damaged the reputation of the United States, particularly among human rights organizations, and he is now working to carry that out. He recently issued a decision establishing a committee to investigate the torture of detainees, which contributes to reinforcing the democratic idea that America claims to defend.

Obama also took a major step in respecting democracy when his administration criticized the military coup in Honduras that overthrew the elected president, Zelaya. Even though Zelaya’s government was not to America’s liking, and even though the coup plotters were sympathetic to America, Obama defended the principle, if only rhetorically. America demanded that the coup plotters step back, and that the deposed president be returned to his post. In this there is a shift in American policy, expressing a new vision of democracy that did not exist under President Bush.

Europe

It appears that Obama has repaired the damage Bush caused in relations with Europe, and restored to Europe its standing in American foreign policy. Bush used to believe that America was the mother of the world, and that others should cling to the hem of her garment, and his administration did not hesitate to describe Europe as “old” as a way of dismissing its views, but it appears that Obama will return to the traditional American posture, which always seeks coordination and consultation with the Europeans on various international issues. For this reason we will witness, during Obama’s term, a revival in European-American relations, which will also help Europe adopt unified positions. This American policy is expected to contribute to improving America’s image among Europeans.

Iran and Korea

Obama does not appear to be working to change United States policy toward Korea or Iran, despite expressing a desire to open a dialogue with Tehran. His position on the Korean nuclear program is clear, and he has expressed it by saying that America will not allow Korea to possess nuclear weapons, because that would threaten the security of the East Asia region and American interests there. American policy in this regard remains fixed, working with the countries of the region to persuade North Korea to stop its nuclear development, and working within the Security Council to tighten sanctions on North Korea.

The very same position keeps repeating itself toward Iran, and Obama does not differ on it from his predecessor Bush. America threatens to escalate sanctions, and holds that diplomacy is the best means of stopping the Iranian nuclear program. But the matter is not without threats, or at least the brandishing, of a military strike.

Conclusion

Obama’s foreign policy affirms one vital point: that United States foreign policy is an institutional policy, not a personal one, and whoever thinks this policy changes with the change of president is mistaken. It also affirms that a president’s personal touches inevitably appear, but they are not significant enough to bring about a radical change in foreign policy. It is clear that Obama pursues the very same foreign policy on the vital and important files that Bush pursued, and that Clinton pursued before him, and if any marginal change has occurred, it lies in the matter of respect for human rights and the conditions of detention.

It is clear that Obama’s approach differs from Bush’s approach and from Clinton’s approach, and is closer to winning the heart of the listener, or the party concerned, than Bush’s blunt approach was. Obama possesses smoothness of speech, and the academic’s skill in conveying information, but in the end he is bound, like any other American president, by the interests of the United States and its institutions, and by American perspectives on the various global issues.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “ِحدود سياسة أوباما الخارجية” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.