The Nile: A Heavy Arab Burden

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

The Nile’s headwater states have been speaking about their shares of the river’s waters, and since 1995 they have begun holding conferences on the matter, putting forward ideas and demands whose weight falls squarely on Sudan and Egypt. I do not believe these attempts came to an end with the recent Sharm el-Sheikh summit, which ended in failure. The upstream states will continue their negotiating efforts to obtain shares of the river’s water, and the failure of negotiations does not mean they will refrain from using the river’s water in ever-increasing amounts as the days go by. These states are expected to form alliances among themselves and decide to take water-related decisions independently of Egypt and Sudan, and it is likely they will find backers and supporters on the international stage, secretly or openly.

It is quite plausible that the water troubles of Egypt and Sudan will grow progressively worse in the future if practical solutions are not found to the water problems facing both the upstream and downstream states — and, alongside them, Libya as well, which enjoys a large quantity of groundwater in the southeast of the country thanks to the Nile. And if the upstream states are supported in their efforts to use increasing proportions of the river’s water, the Arabs will face a great catastrophe that could rival or even exceed the catastrophe of Palestine. There are about 120 million Arabs who depend on the Nile’s waters for their lives, and they — or a large portion of them — will wander in thirst if the flow of the Nile’s water decreases. Sudan may be able to manage its situation partially, thanks to rainfall over its southern regions and to certain springs that rise from its soil, but the catastrophe in Egypt would be devastating.

Recognizing the Rights of Nations

Egypt currently receives, under the 1929 agreements, about 55 billion cubic meters of the Nile’s water, while Sudan receives about 18 billion cubic meters. These agreements were drawn up with Britain, which was the dominant power at the time, and they are regarded as the legal reference point for any discussion of dividing the river. It is well known that there is no clearly defined body of international law governing the division of river waters among the states concerned, but it is an established international custom for the various states through which a river passes — whether upstream or downstream states — to agree that the river itself should retain a share, which by custom amounts to about 25%.

The shares allocated to Egypt and Sudan are no longer sufficient, and Egypt now needs more than 10 billion additional cubic meters. Populations are growing in the various countries, and so are water needs, owing to the expansion of agriculture, industry, and services; the water shortage will inevitably continue to worsen.

We Arabs acknowledge the right of nations to river waters, and we certainly do not want to apply a double standard, whereby we demand that Turkey ease the flow of water to Syria and Iraq while, at the same time, denying Burundi, Uganda, Ethiopia, and other states their rights to water. But this acknowledgment must take into account the needs of Egypt and Sudan, because for us this is not merely a matter of luxury, or simply of expanding the area of arable land, but a matter of life or death. For many countries, the concern for better exploitation of water is tied to questions of agricultural and industrial development and increasing national income, but for Egypt, the waters of the Nile mean life itself, and for Sudan they may mean half of life. For this reason, solutions must be sought that satisfy everyone and keep the specter of confrontation at bay.

A Possible Water Solution

Africa is home to one of the world’s largest rivers, the Congo River, whose water flow is about 42,000 cubic meters per second, or about 1,350 billion cubic meters annually. The Nile’s flow, by comparison, is about 2,830 cubic meters per second, or about 90 billion cubic meters annually. The Congo is a water giant compared to the Nile, and it could irrigate the whole of Africa if its waters were exploited with high efficiency. Almost all of the Congo’s water flows into the Atlantic Ocean, and because of the strength of its current, a sailor can drink nearly fresh water as far as 500 kilometers out into the ocean.

Although the African plateau that forms the watershed divide between the Nile and the Congo is extremely rugged, marked by high mountains and deep valleys, overcoming some of these natural obstacles is not out of the question, and conditions could improve over time. There is global technical progress capable of cutting through nature and overcoming many difficulties, and it remains possible to improve the exploitation of the Congo River’s waters, though this requires a great deal of study and money.

The Arabs possess the financial capacity to support African states in general, and the Nile’s upstream states in particular. It is well known that African states are generally poor and unable to invest broadly in the water sector, and it would be easier for the upstream states to exploit the Nile’s waters on their own; but they would not object if the Arabs came forward with practical solutions that provided them with water while preserving Egypt’s and Sudan’s shares of the Nile’s waters. In other words, the solution requires channeling oil money to support the water sector in Africa — will the Arab oil states agree to fund this? Perhaps they would agree partially, but they will not go the whole distance to spare Egypt and Sudan their troubles, which means that a collision with the upstream states remains a real possibility.

…by replacing old methods with newer ones, such as drip irrigation.

The Pressure to Come

Both Egypt and Sudan will face pressure to renegotiate the signed agreements, and to have both states recognize the rights of the upstream states and cede some of their shares of the river’s water. This pressure, given the current international circumstances, will be tied to the interests of the Western states, particularly the United States. I do not believe, for now, that America and the European states will incite the upstream states to carry out water projects that affect Egypt’s and Sudan’s shares, but this is tied to circumstances; and should Egypt’s political positions toward Israel, Iran, Arab unity, or the acquisition of advanced technology change, the West would then take other positions. This is not mere fantasy — it happened during Abdel Nasser’s era, when America incited African states to affect the course of the river.

The greatest pressure expected on Egypt and Sudan will come from Israel, because it is concerned with reinforcing its positions and its leverage against the Arabs, so that they will not try to pressure it in the future. Israel may not currently harbor incitement-driven intentions, but it is working to improve its relations with African states in order to increase its influence within them, so that the waters of the Nile become, to one degree or another, a card in Israel’s hand, to be brandished should Egypt or Sudan adopt political and military positions that could negatively affect Israel. Israel is not happy at present with Sudan’s political positions, but Sudan is drowning in enough concerns and problems of its own; and should Sudan manage to restore its national unity, Israel will not lack the means to stir up new problems. And should Sudan be punished through the Nile’s waters, it is Egypt, not Sudan, that would suffer the greater harm.

Israel has played this game before through southern Sudan, and the doors to that game remain open even now. Israel incited the southerners against Sudan and armed and trained them, and it is not unlikely that it will use them again in the future, particularly if they separate and establish an independent state.

Measures Required of the Arabs

I believe the following measures are required of the Arabs, particularly of Egypt:

First: at the Egyptian level, Egyptian diplomacy is expected to become active in order to obstruct any collective position by the upstream states aimed at drafting a new water agreement to replace the 1929 agreement. Egypt will conduct its contacts with the upstream states and with the United States and the Western states, and I believe these contacts will bear fruit temporarily, but will not eliminate Arab anxiety.

Second: improving Arab relations with African states, and restoring the climate of Arab-African harmony that largely prevailed during the era of President Abdel Nasser and in the wake of the 1973 war. The Arabs have been remiss in this regard, and they must raise the level of Arab-African dialogue and increase the value of financial assistance to African states and the value of investments within them; the oil- and gas-producing states bear the responsibility for this spending.

Third: encouraging the role of social and cultural common ground across the various African states.

Fourth: working to improve conditions in South Sudan, correcting the mistakes committed by Arab politicians against the southerners, and working to halt the process of secession. The secession of South Sudan is dangerous, particularly because Israel will turn the south into an operational base for penetrating Africa and harming Egypt and Sudan.

Fifth: halting Ethiopian intervention in Somalia, because the Arabs have given Ethiopia a strong impression that it is the power to be relied upon in confronting their internal rivals, and it finds nothing to stop it from further inciting the upstream states and creating a state of tension with the Arab regimes.

Arab Unity

The measures above are very important, but they do not offer a strategic remedy. The strategic remedy lies only in Arab unity, because through it the Arabs would safeguard their homeland, their interests, and their sources of livelihood. The Arabs are not progressing toward anything better, and most statistics indicate that deterioration is occurring across many fields, foremost among them the field of national unity. The Arabs have failed to achieve unity, and they have failed to preserve national unity within their own countries, tribal and non-tribal alike. The Arabs are torn by internal disputes, other nations look down on them, and their problems and troubles keep multiplying. Certainly there are many reasons behind this, but I believe that the Arabs’ failure to achieve unity draws all of us into a maze of frustration, powerlessness, and defeat, which in turn raises the pace of our internal quarrels, our mutual recriminations, and the trading of accusations and counter-accusations. It has been proven that the individual Arab nation-state as it exists today is the opposite of independence, and the twin of backwardness and internal conflict.

If we want a solution to our problems related to water, or education, or foreign occupation, or the preservation of our wealth, or respect, and so on, there is nothing before us but Arab unity. This is no easy matter, but the journey begins with a single step — provided that step is taken by experts and specialists to whom the Arab rulers hand over full authority for whatever measures they see fit. Otherwise, we must expect further Arab deterioration, and further troubles that will eat away at us piece by piece. Yesterday it was Palestine, today it is Iraq, and tomorrow it will be Egypt and Sudan. This is not to mention those states that believe themselves independent, while in truth possessing nothing more than the powers of a village mukhtar (headman) acting in harmony with the policies of his foreign master.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “النيل: همّ عربي ثقيل” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.