The Second War on Gaza

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

Israel is preparing to wage three wars — against Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas — and it has not stopped training, running maneuvers, and updating its arsenal with weapons meant to overcome the weaknesses that surfaced in its two previous wars, against Hezbollah and against the Gaza Strip. Despite the unease hanging over Israel’s military circles — visible in the abundance of war rhetoric alongside hesitation to actually launch a war — Israel has no choice but war. It understands that the balance of power has shifted against it, that the era of quick victories is over, that it must now fight formidable adversaries who do not turn their backs to gunfire, and that it faces two options: gamble now on wars without being certain of victory, or hesitate and let its enemies grow stronger, making the gamble even costlier in the future.

Every war has its own hazards and surprises, but Gaza remains the weakest link, the one most likely to tip the balance toward launching a war. Yet it could also become a back-breaking blow for Israel if it fails to achieve its goals, and its army could turn into a laughingstock if all it manages to do is kill civilians and bring houses down on their occupants. In other words, the weakness of the target does not mean victory, and failure would be a loss both for Israel and for the crooked Arab regimes and Western states that support it.

It appears the Arab regimes are gauging the gravity of the situation through the panic now spreading in their ranks. The leaders of these crooked regimes are busy with intensive mutual meetings and pilgrimages to Washington, hoping the American patron will offer ideas that preserve some shred of Arab face should they end up supporting an Israeli war on Gaza. These activities may well be covering for something I believe to be true: that the Arabs are urging Israel to change the political order in Gaza in exchange for further concessions on vital issues such as Jerusalem, the settlements, and the refugees. In other words, Israel wants a price from the Arabs in return for ending Gaza’s rebellion and returning it to the failed Arab fold.

The war as Israel will fight it

I do not think Israel will repeat the scenes of the “Grapes of Wrath” war (as some call it, the war of al-Furqan) or the “Cast Lead” war, as it named it, because that experience ended in failure, not to mention the horrific images the media carried of the atrocities its army committed against civilians and civilian targets. This time it will follow a new tactic in which aerial bombardment does not run in tandem with a ground advance. My assessment is that it will carry out intensive, long-range strikes against selected targets — installations, individuals, and commanders — hoping to: 1) create severe disarray within the resistance’s ranks by killing military and political leaders; 2) reduce the intensity of Palestinian fire to the lowest possible level so that Israeli tanks are kept safe and soldiers can leave their tanks with the fewest possible losses; 3) open the way for Palestinian elements who collaborate with Israel and America to overturn the situation from within.

This requires precise information about the whereabouts of political and field commanders, the locations of rocket-launching platforms, and the movements of anti-armor rocket units. It also requires accurate knowledge of the types of weapons manufactured inside the Strip and those smuggled in, as well as the field military tactics the resistance factions — Hamas in particular — will follow. Without precise information, Israel will be fighting a blind war that fails to achieve its objectives.

Israel is invested in a quick war ending in a quick victory, because a prolonged war would lead to: 1) a sharp drop in the morale of the Israeli army — indeed a worsening of a decline already underway; 2) further embarrassment for the Arab regimes allied with Israel, and more insults and curses hurled at them across satellite television; 3) a rising toll of Palestinian civilian casualties, which would burden Israel with an even uglier image; 4) an intensifying accumulation of Arab popular resentment, and a rising tide of popular movement in Europe against Israel and in support of Gaza; 5) a longer war means more losses without achieving objectives. In other words, if Israel fails to achieve its goals within the first four days, the chances of achieving them afterward become remote.

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…it will try to establish “sanitized” squares, as it describes them, in sensitive locations within Gaza City, in order to expand them gradually and swiftly. That is, it will proceed to occupy some squares by means of helicopters, then close these squares in on the places believed to be most heavily fortified. Israel will use missiles or bunker-penetrating bombs to strike underground hideouts without causing extensive destruction. In other words, it will use weapons capable of killing commanders or destroying depots and launch platforms while reducing harm to civilian targets as much as possible. I do not know exactly what munitions Israel and America have developed in recent years, but they certainly serve this direction.

The war as the Palestinians will fight it

The Palestinian side will most likely rely on a war that does not move above ground, using hideouts and camouflage as the two main means of overcoming Israel’s superiority in firepower and its intensity. In all likelihood, the Palestinian side will be capable of moving underground through winding or spiral routes it managed to build over the past year. Such movement forms a trap for Israeli tanks, prevents Israeli soldiers from leaving their tanks, and will thwart most aerial bombardment operations.

The Palestinian side managed to smuggle in high-technical-level weapons over the past year, capable of inflicting losses on the Israelis and disrupting the army’s advance. I do not know what these weapons are, but they are what prompted America to build the steel wall in Sinai to stop the smuggling. The number of anti-tank rockets held by the resistance has also increased, and they can be used outside the last fortified square in central Gaza. The numbers of these rockets were few in the previous war, and the resistance kept its surprises in reserve until the final confrontation from which Israel retreated; now, however, the numbers may allow for more generous use.

Gaza is now stronger militarily and security-wise than before, and it is quite plausible that it holds weapons unknown to Israeli intelligence circles — something that will confront the Israelis with a significant military challenge and place the Arabs at a difficult historical juncture. This is in addition to the fact that the resistance is now extremely careful on the security front, and has learned to operate underground without statements or verbal heroics.

The Palestinian resistance is marked by a rigid fighting creed unavailable to the Israeli soldier. Its fighters will hold their ground with valor and courage and will not fear martyrdom. I do not think a Palestinian fighter will be struck in the back, and Israel will find before it men whose resolve cannot be softened and whose legs will not tempt them to flee. If it is the soldier on the ground who decides the battle, then the battle is already decided, and in favor of the Palestinian resistance. The Israeli soldier cannot leave his tank, while the Palestinian fighter is prepared to live underground for days on water and a few dates without his morale being scratched. Gaza overflows with faith, and it is this faith that will crown its military tactics with success.

As for the rockets that can be fired at the Zionist settlements, they do not constitute a strategic factor, even though their use will add to Israel’s political and security burdens.

Gaza will hold firm, God willing, even if Israel manages to strike at its military and political leaders. There are alternative leaders, alternative command centers, and alternative media centers, and Gaza will be able to remain alive and pulsing even if Israel succeeds in most of its strikes.

What if Israel occupies Gaza? It is possible that the Israeli army will enter Gaza City and other Palestinian cities, but this will not amount to occupation unless it becomes settled. Israel’s army will not be able to settle in because the resistance will continue, and Gaza is prepared for this continuation; indeed, the resistance fighters may draw the occupying army further in, should it wish to advance, so that the blows against it become even more painful.

The outcome of the war

The war is expected to drag on if Israel decides to wage it against the Strip, and with every additional day, the likelihood of Israel’s failure grows.

Great destruction will befall Gaza, and immense harm will befall its people, but this is the fate of the Palestinian people: before them lies the choice to stand firm and endure, or to surrender.

The resistance knows that the Palestinian cause hangs on its steadfastness, and that its own death would be the death of the cause. In all likelihood, Israel will not succeed in changing the political order in Gaza, and I expect that its hope — which is also the hope of its Arab and Palestinian allies — will be disappointed.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “الحرب الثانية على غزة” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.