The Summit Controversy

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

Although the Arab summit will not convene until a late date in the coming month of March, the media and political controversy surrounding it has already begun. But it is not an intellectual controversy on a theoretical or historical level; rather, it is a controversy tied to procedural matters and to hopes that some of them, perhaps, will be realized. It is clear that the matter of [Imam Musa] al-Sadr casts its shadow over Gaddafi’s attendance at the summit, as does the Israeli forces’ detention of Arafat. From these, commentary arises over whether the summit will convene at its designated time and place, and the media, together with analysts, busy themselves probing the depths of expectations and the positive and negative developments that might accompany it on the Arab scene. At the level of official Arab media, however, there are abundant assurances that this summit will be historic, given the exceptional circumstances in which it is convening, and that the Arab leaders will shoulder the responsibilities they are fit for.

The controversy over the summit reflects the condition of the Arab nation, and does not differ in its level from what is to be expected of the summit itself. The nation lives in a static condition, within political, social, cultural, and economic patterns that bear down on the various activities of life, drawing their character from them, never departing from their rules. Our nation is sluggish, does not possess itself, does not control its own resources, and does not make its own decisions, and the eye that cannot see the truth will remain lost in the romantic illusion that things will develop for the better. It is no surprise, then, that this hope-driven controversy repeats itself, only for us to find, in the end, that the hope was nothing but a mirage.

Looking at the overall history of the Arab summit, I see that its convening is a piece of news, not an event. An event carries consequences, while news does not necessarily entail them. Many summits have been held, and their course is known to the ordinary Arab citizen just as it is known to their own heroes. The media will busy itself with coverage, and the Arab citizen will hear many repeated statements he already knows by heart, and there will be a closing communiqué that may or may not contain some new phrase of little real substance. As for the ordinary Arab citizen, he will find nothing exciting in following the summit’s news or dwelling on its results. The reasons can be summarized as follows:

First: The Arab leaders will not break through the objective circumstances surrounding them and the nation, especially given how little time remains for any attempt to substantially affect these circumstances. These circumstances can be summed up in the fact that the Arabs are the raw material of events, not their makers; they are too powerless to make a history for themselves, so others make a history for themselves at the Arabs’ expense. Our contemporary history is not what our own hands have shaped, but what others have imposed upon us, done to us, or plundered from us. We cannot, within this article, go into the details of the causes that ripened these circumstances against the Arabs’ interest, except to say that the subjective factor remains far more important than external factors in bending the Arab self toward serving others. The Arabs have not developed a vision or a policy built on self-fortification while maintaining relations of mutual respect with others, and it appears that private interests have triumphed over public interests, so that dependency has triumphed over independence.

Second: Current Arab aspirations are not equipped to move the Arab summit to a qualitatively different level, one capable of influencing general conditions in the region or the policies of the major powers active in it. For example, Arab leaders still look to the United States to solve the Palestinian question, and glorify it as the honest broker of peace in the region, even though their own senses perceive the sharpness of American weapons in Israeli hands, and witness the veto America wields on Israel’s behalf. They still speak of Sharon complicating the peace process, as though Israeli policy rested on one man alone.

On another note, the leaders look forward to resolving the crisis between the Amal Movement and Colonel Gaddafi, and look to Israel in the hope that it might release Arafat so he can attend the summit. A nation this vast, reduced to such feeble aspirations in the face of pitfalls it dug with its own hands, is incapable of confronting real challenges.

Third: Most Arab leaders are now preoccupied with the terrorism issues troubling America, not with the issues of the Arab nation. They understand how closely the threats directed against the United States are bound up with their own fates, and they have their own private interests in confronting them. On one hand, they must comply, as we have grown accustomed to seeing them do, with American demands; on the other, they must confront those they call “terrorists” who threaten their own thrones. The point is that there are priorities here, and I believe the Arab street has grown accustomed to private interests taking priority over public ones. It is clear from the course of events that America’s priority now is not resolving regional conflicts, but confronting armed organizations it says practice terrorism, and pursuing the states that harbor them or extend them a helping hand. In other words, the heads of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad may well be more wanted than any action against Israel.

Fourth: No general Arab intention to make changes in Arab policies has been announced, nor have any central states declared an orientation toward breaking with the past in favor of the future. The talk still revolves around futile generalities, such as Arab brotherhood, shared destiny, and Arab solidarity. All the poems and verses expressing mutual solidarity and support are worthless in the face of existing Arab conditions, or in the face of action that contradicts speech.

Fifth: The absence of harmony among the Arab regimes continues to overshadow the regimes’ relations with one another, and I do not expect it to disappear over the coming two months. The regimes diverge in their internal and external political orientations, and in their own particular visions of how to order social and economic affairs, and they can agree only on matters relating to internal security. Suspicion and doubt are important headings in explaining much of the relations among the leaders of Arab states and the regimes they preside over, while mutual trust plays a marginal role and does not push toward independent cooperation within a distinctly Arab strategy. It is well known that great efforts are exerted outside the official summit meeting hall to overcome these divergences.

Sixth: Aside from decorative rhetorical phrases, the decisions of Arab summits remain conciliatory in nature, so as not to satisfy one regime at another’s expense, or to anger one in order to appease others. Decisions of this kind can never be fruitful, because they satisfy the participants verbally without uniting them behind a single course of action. For example, one need only observe the decisions of the two previous summits regarding dealings with Israel, and how each regime was allowed to hear what it wanted to hear, and then left to do as it pleased.

Seventh: Despite the presence of new figures who inherited leadership from their fathers, they have not shown that they have turned their backs on the past or on what they inherited. They resemble their fathers in most of their conduct, and largely carry visions that give no indication that harmony among the youth is possible.

In short, the coming summit will not differ in substance from the summits that preceded it, whether Gaddafi and Arafat attend it or not. And whether the leaders of the first rank attend in person or send representatives in their place, the expectations will not change. It is futile, and a form of self-deception, for one to hope to surpass what he has made of himself, and to achieve more than he is equipped for. We Arabs place ourselves in a cage, and the responsibility for our confinement does not rest on the Arab leaders alone, but also on those who consented to have these men as their leaders. And with every summit, there stirs in some of us an appetite for supplication, a craving for some metaphysical intervention that would lift from us the bitterness of humiliation and torment. I supplicate along with those who supplicate, but I am certain my prayers will not be answered.

If we want a prayer to be answered, we have no choice but to work toward change. Change requires exhaustion, effort, sweat, suffering, and long patience. But if we imagine that divine providence will intervene and hand the Arabs comfortable solutions to their predicament, then we are certainly not reading history, and we do not wish to learn from what other nations have done in order to advance and lift oppression and humiliation from themselves. Yet divine providence may well hover over our heads if the intellectuals, the patient, and the thinkers gather their strength, unite it, and press for change across the various social, political, and economic fronts. A nation may be set straight by its political leaderships, but it is certainly set straight by the minds of its sons and its thinkers.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “جدل القمة” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.