The War on Hamas

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

No sooner had the Hamas movement won the legislative elections than activities disrupting Palestinian public life began, along with acts of defamation and manipulation aimed at causing Hamas to fail, bringing it down, and returning the political situation to what it was before the elections. Nearly daily, these activities proceeded, through the cooperation of multiple external and internal parties, ranging from general strikes to bombings here and there, from killing and bloodshed to media manipulation campaigns. These activities were so intensive that they consumed the Hamas government’s efforts and prevented it from implementing any general program.

From the very start, it was expected that several parties would cooperate to turn back the clock: internal Palestinian forces, Israel, the Western states, America foremost among them, and the Arab states orbiting Washington. A financial siege on the Palestinian people was expected, using people’s suffering and their food and daily needs to pressure Hamas, and keeping internal conditions tense with the aim of dragging Hamas into internal infighting. Global media mechanisms were also expected to be mobilized for manipulation, placing the blame for the deteriorating Palestinian situation on Hamas. As a close observer of the situation, I noticed how media outlets, satellite channels specifically, were used to lie to and incite the Palestinian public, and I also noticed the extent of the spiteful indoctrination the Palestinian Authority’s apparatuses were carrying out against Hamas, especially within the ranks of the Fatah movement.

Of course, Hamas’s course was not free of its own mistakes, and I have previously written about these mistakes myself, including the red headband, contenting itself with reactions instead of taking the initiative, monopolizing responsibility and excluding its friends, and being wary of involving its rivals. But Hamas would have faced various pressures even had it been free of every error, because its program does not align with the Israeli-American program.

Expelling the Security Apparatuses

The security apparatuses in Gaza made great efforts to destabilize civilian security and place the blame on the Hamas movement, in order to turn people against the movement and drive it to submit under the weight of popular pressure. Hamas was very cautious about being drawn along by provocations, but anger overtook many of its members, some of whom surrendered to a desire for vengeance and retaliation. Acts undermining civil security escalated with every violent reaction from Hamas members, and matters reached the point of widespread infighting and the mass shedding of Palestinian blood at Palestinian hands, before the lenses of world news agencies and satellite channels. Great harm and shameful disgrace befell the Palestinian people.

What was expected happened: Hamas moved to take control of the security apparatuses. It was never expected that the security apparatuses would hold firm against Hamas, or against any fighting Palestinian faction believing in what it was doing, because these apparatuses are not institutions of war, but institutions for negatively affecting the social and moral fabric of the Palestinian people and enabling the Americans and Israelis to proceed with their negotiating project. Moreover, most members of these apparatuses are not prepared to fight for an unholy cause — they are there for the salary, not for strife and internal conflicts.

American circles were stunned by the speed of the security apparatuses’ collapse, even though Israel was not surprised, being more knowledgeable about the level of discipline and commitment among both Hamas members and Palestinian Authority members. The Americans judged that their project regarding Palestine had suffered a major defeat, which would inevitably affect their general project in the Arab-Islamic region. They had barely recovered from their shock over the Israeli army before Hezbollah before the events in Gaza shocked them too. The American project, and the Israeli project alongside it, rests on the necessity of turning the Palestinian people into individuals searching for daily bread within a Palestinian entity acting as a security agent for Israel, and there is no doubt that any imbalance in the internal Palestinian military balances would forcefully affect what has been achieved and what the Americans and Israelis aspire to achieve in the future.

Dayton’s Problem

Israelis were not satisfied with the performance of Keith Dayton, the American security coordinator between Palestinians and Israelis. They found him a person lenient with Palestinians, giving the Palestinian Authority and the security apparatuses ample time to implement the security tasks assigned to them. Dayton preferred not to pressure the Authority and its security apparatuses more than necessary, so they would not be embarrassed before the Palestinian people and lose more of their popularity, and preferred to have the Palestinian people swallow the matter of defending Israeli security gradually, under a thick veil of financial bribes.

Israel was not impressed with Dayton’s approach, believing the Palestinian Authority should operate according to the agreements concluded openly and clearly, that the pretext of embarrassment should be dropped, and that whoever enjoys Western money should be bold in meeting Western demands. Israel demanded Dayton be removed, but the United States preferred to wait, especially since it was beneath its dignity to dismiss one of its senior officers because of poor performance.

Hamas’s takeover of the security apparatuses’ headquarters came to reinforce the Israeli analysis of the necessity of striking hard at those called “enemies of peace” — the terrorists and those who provide them material, moral, and ethical support. Israel and America began thinking about searching for another means besides the security apparatuses, and for new methods of recruitment for the Palestinian security apparatuses. The security apparatuses failed in their previous composition, and alternatives must be found that can hold firm and preserve the weapons Israel or Arab states friendly to Israel provide. What are these alternatives? My strong suspicion is that they focus on manufacturing a new apparatus of mercenaries who worship money, pleasures, and desires, to entirely replace the leaderships and Fatah-affiliated members with national orientations or leanings. There will be new security leaderships who know neither God nor homeland, loyal to nothing but their own interests, leading an army of fools, scoundrels, and manipulators who think they are doing well and defending the homeland.

A New Prime Minister

While the president of the Palestinian Authority busied himself describing what happened in Gaza as a coup Hamas must reverse, Israeli and American security circles were thinking about the coming strategy of action. These circles saw in a new prime minister a fresh opportunity to further ride the Palestinian people and implement what they wanted under a Palestinian banner, especially since years of financial siege had pushed many Palestinians to prioritize the salary over national and religious values. The goal was to attract financial support for the Palestinian people in the West Bank as cover for security campaigns dressed in national slogans.

The president of the Palestinian Authority stepped aside before the Western support extended to his prime minister, keeping for himself, or being permitted to keep, media presence. This does not mean the president of the Authority is not concerned with taking security measures — rather, the Americans and Israelis judged him weak and incapable of effective leadership, and decided they needed to try a new leadership. The salaries arrived, and the prime minister gained some standing before the Palestinian people thanks to this money, becoming the Palestinian face for Dayton and for whatever security and military activities Israel might carry out.

The War

Israel agreed to Dayton’s continuation, especially after he was reinforced with a general American security coordinator at the regional level. Dayton embarked on a new pattern of security work, becoming bolder in touring Palestinian cities, and harsher and more serious in dealing with the Palestinian security apparatuses. He now issues orders and gives directives, while world and local media try to mislead people and attribute the security measures to the prime minister.

Dayton decided to wage a war on Hamas and all Palestinian resistance fighters from the various Palestinian factions. His plan appears divided as follows:

1. Reinforcing security coordination between Israel and the Palestinian security apparatuses, insisting on its openness, and committing the Palestinian leadership to it as a legitimate act required for the Palestinian national interest. Security coordination is a matter plain for all to see, practiced daily. Now the security apparatuses and Israel trade off roles in carrying out security tasks, and it is quite likely security activity will become joint in the future. Now, for example, the Authority arrests some Hamas members, and afterward Israel steps in to arrest Fatah members; or the Authority releases a Palestinian detainee only for Israel to arrest him the next day.

2. Coordinating roles in Gaza with the aim of bringing down the Hamas government, either through force or through popular uprising. This rests on the following axes:

a. Tightening the economic and financial siege on Gaza to the degree that does not cause people to collapse from hunger and destitution. This is a global effort in which Arab states, the Palestinian Authority, Israel, and Western states all participate.

b. Threatening internal stability in Gaza through assassinations, bombings, and manufactured incidents, so that Hamas remains occupied with daily concerns related to civilian internal security, and people remain in a state of tension that could lead them to rebel against Hamas. Certain groups have carried out acts of this kind in Gaza, and recently individuals were caught trying to plant a device at a pilgrims’ celebration, and a person was caught carrying an explosive belt.

c. Intensifying Israeli military actions to reach cadres, individuals, leaders, institutions, and centers affiliated with Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Resistance Committees, in order to inflict heavy losses on people that drive them to question Hamas’s fitness to lead and remain in power. This is what we have witnessed over months in Gaza, and its pace has increased recently, especially after Bush’s visit to the region.

Through these axes of action, Israelis, Americans, and some Palestinians hope people in Gaza will rise up. In other words, America and Israel use people’s concerns, pain, and grief to achieve political goals. This is terrorism itself, according to their own definition of terrorism.

3. Striking Hamas in the West Bank by Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and striking resistance fighters from the Fatah movement by Israel. The Palestinian Authority is waging a fierce campaign against the Hamas movement in the West Bank, arresting many individuals and confiscating some weapons, while Israel arrests or kills members of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades. Through this, Israel and America try to eliminate Hamas, strike its infrastructure, and provide the appropriate political and social atmosphere for a new Palestinian leadership entirely aligned with the American-Israeli project. There is no longer any democratic thought circulating in the West Bank — instead there are now tools and methods of repression, violating freedoms and silencing people, and local media is employed to serve this purpose. It is important to note here that the media does not object, and no voice rises from it crying out in defense of the Palestinian people’s freedom.

The Other Factions

Despite the weakness of the other Palestinian factions that support the Authority, the plan has reserved some money for their leaderships, to pay salaries, provide cars, and cover office expenses. Many factional leaderships entirely disown the principles of their factions and the idea of liberation and resistance, standing instead in defense of the Israeli-American project through flimsy national justifications.

Nablus

Nablus has suffered greatly from the security lawlessness the Palestinian Authority created. If the Authority is truly concerned about Palestinian security, it must first silence lawlessness, even temporarily, as a prelude to justifying steps of security cooperation with Israel. The security apparatuses, on higher orders, silenced the lawless and unruly, pursued stolen cars, and Nablus residents felt a sense of relief. There is no doubt people in Nablus are pleased with this internal development.

The Palestinian Authority is now trying to exploit this development to take further coordinating steps with Israel, relying on the good image it has crafted for itself. People in Nablus these days witness Israelis entering the city on a nearly nightly or daily basis, and witness the Authority’s efforts to arrest those suspected of being Palestinian resistance fighters.

Will They Succeed?

My assessment is that the Authority is engaging in acts that harm it and lower its popularity. Americans and Israelis believe the repressive operations currently underway will achieve their goals, but in truth they do not learn from their own experiences. It is true people want the salary, and want to feed their children, but most of them are not prepared to trade the homeland for a salary. Some people will praise the current government in the West Bank and thank it for the money it collects, but this will not last long as long as the general policy does not serve the recovery of Palestinian rights. In other words, they will succeed only partially and temporarily.

The acts they carry out generate hatred, animosity, and grudges among people, generating desires for vengeance and retaliation. They succeed in spreading intense hatred between the sons of Fatah and the sons of Hamas, which will have bad consequences for Palestinian society. The people of Palestine now pay a heavy price in their internal conflicts, and will pay a further price in the future.

The Resistance

Whoever thinks the current negotiating table will lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state does not understand the foundations and principles of negotiation, and does not understand the dialectical relations imposed by the balance of power, and imposed by the moral order resting on mass strength.

Palestinians have not yet grown strong enough to be led to a real negotiating table where the enemy hears the sound of the cards being slammed down. The Palestinian people has no choice but to return to itself and reorganize its internal conditions. And since resistance is a fundamental method of gaining and demonstrating strength, the Palestinian people must hold fast to every resistance fighter, even if it differs with him ideologically and politically. Whether you are Muslim or non-Muslim, nationalist or patriotic, partisan or non-partisan, it is your duty not to abandon Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the fighters of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and the Popular Resistance Committees. Indeed, it is a duty to support the resistance fighters and their allies, and if we have ideological and political disputes with them, the day of settling scores does not come before liberation.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “الحرب على حماس” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.