They Search for Hezbollah's Secrets

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

The National Security Studies Center affiliated with Tel Aviv University published a report on Hezbollah’s military strength, and it confirmed, on the whole, that this military strength has grown considerably since the July 2006 war, though without providing solid statistical information that could be relied upon to understand the balance of power between the party and Israel. Perhaps the question of the number of Hezbollah’s fighters was the clearest of the matters the report touched upon. The report was, on the whole, written in general terms that do not suggest the availability of precise information from which conclusions could be drawn.

The question of information is the thorny issue for Israel, and it is the first element behind the confusion and hesitation of the Israeli military establishment. Israel fought the July war believing it knew, and it and America discovered on the second day of the war that they did not know, and that Hezbollah had prepared well for the war — the best proof of its preparation being that its military capabilities remained secret. The party managed to surprise the enemy, turned all its objectives into a mirage, and forced it to scale its goals down to merely increasing the number of UN forces in southern Lebanon, something that had not been among the originally declared aims. Israel paid the price for its blindness to information, and Hezbollah was able to preserve the elements of surprise because of its intense care in working secretly underground.

The same problem still confronts Israel, since it hates to see a strong enemy in the north growing stronger, by its own estimates, yet it is very hesitant to wage a war to destroy him because it is not confident it can achieve that. Israel is searching diligently, by every means, for ways to learn about Hezbollah’s military and security developments, and its intelligence may have managed to gather some information, but its daily, frenzied harassment of southern Lebanon points to the severe informational distress it is experiencing. Israel does not stop provoking Hezbollah in the south, hoping the party will respond and use some of its new weapons, thereby providing it with valuable information that would enable it to take preventive measures. Israel is waiting for the party to do something that reveals some of its weapons, and for that purpose it tolerates the rebukes of the UN forces and the continuous accusations against it of violating Security Council Resolution 1701.

It is also clear that the Western states, led by the United States, do not raise a stick against Israel to stop its air sorties over Lebanon, or to stop its violations of the colonial demarcation lines between Lebanon and Palestine, because they too want to know about Hezbollah’s armament, and about the latest products of the Iranian and Syrian military industries. The Western states are not concerned with the violations or with UN resolutions; what concerns them is learning the strategic military balance, given its importance for planning and management. It is likely that the intelligence services of the Western states, and certainly of some Arab countries, are cooperating with Israel to clarify what is happening in southern Lebanon and to learn about the latest military developments.

It is clear that Israel has become doubtful about the effectiveness of its air force in any coming war, because it suspects that Hezbollah now possesses a surprise specifically aimed at military aviation, and it is fully aware that its victory in any battle cannot be achieved if its air force is paralyzed. But it is also uncertain about the future, since not waging war will lead to an increase in Hezbollah’s strength and a rise in the level of strategic threat it poses. In other words, Israel is like someone who has swallowed a sickle: unable to throw it up, and unable to keep it down.

…continually preparing for the coming war, and it is difficult to know exactly what it is preparing, because it too is secretive. It does not disclose the new armaments it possesses, nor the training it is conducting, nor the military tactics it might follow in the coming war. But its efforts are focused on methods and means of detecting and destroying Hezbollah’s hideouts. It is certainly concerned with sparing its civilians the horrors of war, but this is a matter of secondary concern, since victory is the primary goal, and it is fully aware that its primary mission lies in its army’s control of the ground and preventing its own rout, not in stopping rocket fire. It will focus mainly on targets that pose a major danger to its military hardware, whether on the ground or in the air.

Israel is expected to lean, in any coming war, toward greater reliance on electronic warfare. It will make heavy use of electronic aircraft, and robotics as well, as advanced sensors, and it has likely developed bombs with enormous concussive force that affect Hezbollah’s hideouts. The coming war will see an Israeli focus on what lies underground rather than above ground, and it is my conviction that Hezbollah has developed new combat methods and means that differ from those it used in the July war.

Is the assumption that Israel will be the one to attack correct? Of course not, but Hezbollah prefers defensive war to offensive war, because offensive war means emerging onto the surface of the ground. Hezbollah has multiplied the number of its fighters several times over, which points to its intentions of a ground advance. The Lebanese front does not need more than a few thousand fighters for an entrenched defensive war, and tens of thousands of forces point to offensive intentions. But the unclear matter concerns whether Hezbollah intends to advance ground forces in a defensive war or an offensive one. Defensive war is certainly the preferred option, and its outcomes are what would enable Hezbollah to correctly judge the chances of success of any ground advance toward the Zionist settlements in the north. If the party succeeds in paralyzing Israeli aviation and routing Israeli armor, the road would open for it to advance to the strip running along the colonial border. This is a matter subject to field assessments, although it is plausible that Hezbollah’s forces have trained well with this scenario in mind.

As for the idea of an offensive war on Hezbollah’s part, it would be difficult for the party to wage one without the readiness of a strong regular army for support.

The home front on both sides factors into the military balance. Israel now suffers from the softness of its people and its soldiers. The founding generation has passed, and the generation of the internet and of trinkets and gadgets has arrived, and that combative spirit that once prevailed no longer exists. Hezbollah, for its part, faces a greater internal crisis represented by the conspiring of part of its own home front, and of some Arabs, against it. Hezbollah is strong in its preparation and readiness, and troubled by the betrayal of some of its own kin. The forces of distortion (so-called Arab and Lebanese “moderation”) will stand against it, and will work to support Israel as much as they can.

The great observation in all of this is that Israel has, for some time now, stopped its bluster and roaring at the Arabs. In the past its hand used to move before its words did; now its words are many and its actions few, and it flexes its muscles only in front of its allies known as the Arab moderates.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “يبحثون عن أسرار حزب الله” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.