To the Syrian Leadership
by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem
This is an article written on 14 April 2003
which did not please the Syrian leadership at the time.
But time proves the superiority of academics over politicians.
The Arab homeland is now entering a new historical phase whose features will emerge gradually with the days, according to the guiding efforts exerted by the parties concerned. Multiple forces will compete to shape the Arabs’ future, foremost among them two powers: the American-Israeli power with its English tail, and the power of Arab popular will. The first possesses the tools of domination and formulation, given its military capabilities, its clarity of vision, and its will to act, and given the agents and collaborators it has among Arabs at both the official and unofficial levels. The second power, however, is largely a latent energy awaiting someone to ignite it and lead it toward a clear vision that would pull the nation out of its bewilderment and loss, and out of the humiliation that crushes its being night and day.
The American-Israeli power does not conceal its intentions, nor is it ashamed of its actions before the world, while the second power never stops smoldering, unable to reconcile its heart with the bitterness of its defeats. The Arab masses search for a leadership that would invest their energies for the sake of the nation, its future, and its dignity, yet they find nothing but a few intellectuals and thinkers who voice their tragedies and sorrows on television screens or in the pages of newspapers. Even these thinkers and intellectuals have not yet risen to the level of cooperating with one another to form a rallying banner that draws people in and sharpens their will and resolve. The role of the masses is not limited to modest, seasonal demonstrations in defense of a cause or in rejection of one; it must rise to become the true fortress of the nation, one whose cohesion and firm resistance to every kind of danger cannot be breached. So who, now, is the candidate for this leadership role?
Syria is the candidate. It is a candidate for invasion, or for various kinds of pressure, because of the positions and policies it clings to — and a candidate for leadership for the very same reasons. It would be difficult for any other Arab state to take on this task, since none possesses the qualities of leadership or the positions around which the masses could rally; and it is equally difficult for any party, movement, or grouping to draw the masses in, given the conditions of Arab fragmentation, despotism, and discord among the regimes. Lebanon constitutes an advanced Arab base, owing to the system of freedoms prevailing there and to what the Lebanese people have proven in their insistence on expelling the Israeli occupation and their commitment to Arab causes, but it does not possess the geographic, demographic, and military foundations for leadership. I should note that I doubt Lebanon has any aspiration to lead the Arab masses.
There is great satisfaction in the Arab street — as I sense through the various bulletins, articles, and interviews I follow — with Syria’s political positions, and with the steadfastness it shows in confronting Israel and its concern for Arab interests. But, without diplomacy, there is no conviction that the ruling system in Syria constitutes a suitable environment for leading the masses and directing their efforts toward confronting the American-Israeli power and toward the nation’s advancement, progress, and unity. It is a regime with positions, but not a regime of genuine cohesion. And I do not think that those who say this intend to wound; they intend to call for the modernization without which no launch is possible.
Freedom is the foundation of creativity, and participation is the foundation of achievement. These are two simple axioms of political science that require no philosophers or theorists to affirm before they can be put into practice. Yet they are axioms of the utmost complexity in the science of domination. Slaves are not liberated, and tools cannot bear the responsibilities of their owner. Syria suffers from an absence of the freedoms that would open the door to collective work, mutual cooperation, party and civic organization, and popular participation on the widest scale. This does not mean the other Arab states enjoy the shade of freedoms — but they are not the ones addressed by this discourse.
If the Syrian regime were to open its doors to popular participation, this would bring relief not only to the Syrian Arab people but to all the Arab masses. This call does not arise because of American calls for the democratization of the Arab homeland; rather, it stems from Arab motives that Arab public opinion everywhere holds dear. America does not want to establish democracy in the Arab homeland, nor does it wish to see a free Arab; it is looking for a democracy tailored to its own interests and whims. We, the sons of the Arabs who search for freedom, want to see ourselves free in our homelands — bearing our systems of government as they bear us, defending them as they defend us, and protecting our homelands with our blood as they protect us. We long for the day when a person can speak his word without dread or fear, without intelligence agencies, surveillance, watching eyes, and spies; and for the day when he carries his hoe to build the homeland and keeps his rifle at his side, taking it up only when danger arrives.
Tragedy descends upon the Arab’s head, and he barely awakens from the weight of the defeats surrounding him, internally and externally. Arab intelligence agencies choke him, while the boot of Israel and America crushes the arteries of his neck. Such an Arab is fit neither for war nor for peace, fit neither for building nor for progress; he is qualified only for defeat. And if there is anyone who thinks the army alone is what builds and defends, let him not forget that soldiers are the sons of these oppressed peoples, who have never once tasted the flavor of true, effective belonging — the kind that rests on initiative and cooperation with others.
The strength of nations lies, first, not in the strength of their army, but in the strength of their peoples, from whom the elements of the army are drawn. I do not doubt that the tank matters, and so does the aircraft, but it is quite possible that a soldier will abandon his military tool if he comes to see that his own life matters more than the cause for which he is fighting. This is why successful nations take care that their sons’ loyalty be to the nation as a whole and to its shared causes, which form points of rallying. Failing nations, by contrast, take care to personalize their causes, which strips their sons of the desire for sincerity and concern for the common good. It has been proven, in many historical instances, that nations possessed of will have triumphed over militarily stronger ones, and that vast nations devoid of will have been defeated before small powers.
What is required of Syria now is to translate the feelings of Arab belonging and the desire to close ranks into reality — by nationalizing the political system and taking it out of the narrow, traditional Arab mold that relies on personalization or tribal partisanship. Sweeping political changes are possible, changes that would let the political system embrace the whole Syrian people — in all their individuals, groups, and parties — and embrace as well the various Arab energies wishing to contribute to building Arab power in its many dimensions.
Syria would gain if it took a bold step of this kind, and the Arab masses would gain along with it. Syria would rise culturally and scientifically, because it would draw in intellectuals, thinkers, scientists, and writers; Syrian cities would turn into centers of scientific and literary activity, and Syrian universities would become able to attract the most competent Arab scholars, in scientific and administrative capacity alike. It would likewise draw in Arab capital belonging to those committed to the causes of the nation, to build an advanced economic reality capable of competing and of supporting the Syrian treasury. And militarily, Syria would find that an army of popular resistance fighters eager for jihad would gradually take shape within it, to reinforce the regular Syrian army.
There are problems Syria would certainly face if it chose a new, practical path that embodies cohesion and respects the freedom of the Arab individual — problems coming especially from the United States and a number of Arab regimes. America considers Arab freedom a threat to its interests and to Israeli interests and security. With freedom, the Arab would become braver and more capable of organizing and of engaging with the interests of the nation as a whole, and would thus become someone who takes the initiative and is prepared to make sacrifices in the face of aggression and pressure. America wants a compliant Arab human being, modeled on the kind of person produced by American-funded non-governmental organizations. It wants him free in the sense of pursuing pleasures and personal interests, but does not want him free in the sense of commitment to the causes of the nation and sacrifice for them. His freedom, as far as America is concerned, consists, for example, in divorcing himself from Islam — even from Islamic history — and in becoming estranged from the causes of the nation in favor of the values of globalization and the latest American technology.
As for the other Arab regimes, they will not be comfortable, because Syria will have broken away from the flock and from repressive traditions. But the dangers of this can be reduced by two means: avoiding collision, and letting popular sentiment take its own course, so that it gradually affects the standing of regimes before their own peoples.
On the security front, there will certainly be reservations, because the various intelligence agencies will try to penetrate and exploit the atmosphere of freedoms in order to plant their agents. This naturally requires reformulating security standards, procedures, and tools — but the more important point is that, historically, atmospheres of oppression have proven a more fertile climate for spies than atmospheres of freedom. Oppression defeats a person and drives him toward collapse, while freedom raises a person’s worth and drives him to safeguard his self-respect.
What I am proposing here is not a temporary tactical maneuver to meet the present stage; it is meant to be part of a strategy for building the nation on new foundations and toward clear goals. Nor is it merely a reaction to what happened in Iraq; rather, it is a vision that has been conveyed to Syria over the years by many Arab intellectuals, through articles, conferences, dialogue sessions, and so on. Syria has, to a large degree, curbed its desire for transformation over the preceding years, but hope remains that this transformation will resume, at a pace more courageous and more profound.
Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “إلى القيادة السورية” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.
This English translation was produced with the assistance of AI and may not be 100% accurate.