The Unity of Palestine's People

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

Every Palestinian says that the unity of Palestine’s people, or Palestinian national unity, is a source of strength, and its absence a weakness. But this is the statement of individuals or scattered, separate factions, not a statement of consensus, of factions agreed upon a single vision or charter. Concepts of national unity have multiplied along with the multiplicity of factions, and also with the multiplicity of individuals who carry this concern upon their shoulders. Everyone agrees on glorifying national unity, but the thing being glorified has not yet taken shape.

Palestinian national unity has suffered numerous predicaments over time, and Palestinian factions have fought one another for decades, and we have not witnessed genuine unity except on the battlefield — the field of confrontation with an external enemy, specifically the occupation. Resisting the occupation forms a fundamental pillar in bringing together the Palestinian people, not necessarily the whole people, but most of its groups, parties, and factions. The people united in the years 1978, 1982, 1987, 2000, and 2012 — years of confrontation; and split apart in the years 1974, 1983, 1985, 1988, and 1993 — years of searching for political solutions to the Palestinian cause. It should have united in 2008/2009 because of the war on Gaza, but the gap between the factions widened at that time instead.

Respecting Covenants

Perhaps the violation of Palestinian covenants constitutes the most important element of Palestinian disintegration or division, given what it reflects of unilateralism and disrespect for what the people and its various factions have agreed upon. Differences among people occur everywhere, and disputes can arise, but conscious peoples and responsible political administrations work to settle matters through their agreed-upon official frameworks, which form an axis around which everyone gathers. A constitution, for example, forms a basis for governance among people, and the judiciary then rules on matters calmly, after which everyone accepts the judiciary’s ruling. And if there is someone who dislikes the constitution, he can present his reservations to the people in order to gather sufficient support leading to amending or changing the constitution. The point is that there are covenants that people gather around, that form a reference point for everyone, and that ultimately preserve the unity of the people.

On the Palestinian scene, the PLO was the umbrella under which people of all persuasions gathered, and the Palestinian National Charter formed a reference point for everyone. But the Organization suffered from a lack of democracy, was marred by unilateral decision-making, and lost its unionist luster intermittently from 1968 until now. As a result it was subjected to various shocks marked by factions leaving it for periods of time, and by a drift away from the texts of the Palestinian National Charter, which caused disruption on the Palestinian scene from time to time.

Unilateralism, or the absence of democracy within the Organization, led to the violation of the provisions of the Palestinian National Charter many times, and with each violation the Palestinian scene would flare up with disputes, some of which led to armed conflict. The Palestinian National Charter was violated in 1970 when the PLO’s Executive Committee announced its acceptance of establishing a secular, democratic state in Palestine encompassing Muslims, Christians, and Jews; in 1974, in the program of phased stages; in 1983, with Arafat’s visit to the Egyptian president; and in 1985, with Arafat’s declaration renouncing terrorism. As for 1988, the Palestinian National Council, which is supposed to be the guardian of the Charter, violated its own charter by agreeing to Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and recognizing Israel. And the violations reached their peak with the signing of the Oslo Accord and the beginning of its implementation, in total disregard for the Charter.

The problem is also that the Palestinian National Charter did not provide for the establishment of a constitutional or charter-based court, nor for mechanisms to hold accountable those who do not abide by what the people of Palestine have agreed upon, and matters remained subject to personal and factional whims. The result is the continuation of Palestinian fragmentation and internal fighting, and then the search for ways to unify the ranks.

Weakness and Flight from Reality

Perhaps what happened on the Palestinian scene in terms of divisions can be explained on the basis of the state of weakness that Palestinians suffered from, and the absence of a horizon for the advancement of Palestinian resistance to become a force to be reckoned with in confronting Israel. Or, as some Palestinians have grown accustomed to putting it, the Palestinian attempts were within the circle of salvaging what could be salvaged. That is, the failure to abide by the rules of Palestinian collective action stemmed from a desire to achieve maneuvering freedom for the Palestinian leadership, which was searching for even a modest way out of the tragedy of the Palestinian people.

That is, weakness led to a flight from reality in search of other means of helping the people of Palestine besides self-reliance. So instead of searching for the best ways to achieve Palestinian unity, which forms the first source of strength for the people of Palestine, the leadership went searching for solutions to the cause in the pockets of others, particularly enemies. This further strained conditions on the Palestinian scene, until the people reached the point of bloody internal fighting in Gaza.

Strength and the Return to Reality

After three wars, it has become clear that Israel is not that invincible octopus, nor is its army the one led by Sennacherib of Assyria. Israel failed in its war on Lebanon in 2006, in its war on Gaza in 2008/2009, and in its second war on Gaza in 2012. This colossal army, armed with the latest types of weapons and ranked fourth in the world, appeared a laughingstock before the world in these wars, as armed organizations whose numbers did not exceed a few thousand managed to hold firm and thwart all of Israel’s objectives.

[Palestinian resistance must build on this] so as not to become a subject of mockery, not only before the peoples of the region but also before the Zionists, who have always pinned their hopes on their military might.

Since history has begun to set itself right with respect to the forces of resistance, all Palestinian factions ought to begin responding to this historical logic and return to their reality, which affirms that rights are not begged for but rather seized. More than twenty years of negotiations and of searching in the American bag for a solution for Palestine ought to have convinced all the factions that others do not give unless forced to; and the experience of three wars ought to have taught everyone that defeating Israel is possible, and that Palestinians are capable of solving their problems with their own hands and with the help of their friends who believe in the justice of their cause, if they so decide.

The Unity of the People First

Over the years of estrangement and fragmentation, factional talks — particularly between Fatah and Hamas — took place to end the division. A number of agreements were signed in this regard, most notably the Cairo Agreement of 2005, the Mecca Agreement of 2007, and the Doha Agreement of 2012. All these agreements failed because implementation was not possible, and remains impossible to this day.

The core problem in all attempts at Palestinian reunification to date is the exclusion of the people from the equation of the search for unity, confining it instead to just two factions. And the same question is always posed: what will become of reunification if the two large factions disagree? Collapse, of course, because the guardian who ought to remain alert to defend its unity — the people — is absent. That is, the experiment of a unity dependent on factional moods has failed, and a broader reconciliatory framework must be sought.

So that the people of Palestine may unite at home and abroad, and at the level of the factions, it is hoped that work will proceed on the following:

First: it is necessary to draft a Palestinian national charter that constitutes a moral, political, and struggle-based reference for the Palestinian people. There is no reference point for Palestinians, wherever they may be, after the destruction of the Palestinian National Charter, and matters remain subject to personal and factional whims. Every faction speaks of Palestinian national unity and the supreme Palestinian interest, but each faction has its own definition of unity and of interest, and with the multiplicity of factions, definitions multiply.

Who drafts the Palestinian charter? The factions should agree on a committee of Palestinian experts in various fields to undertake this drafting, after which the draft would be put before the factions and before the Palestinian public, and a mechanism would then be determined for making amendments and ratifying the final version.

Second: based on the new charter, the PLO would be rebuilt in a manner that includes everyone — factions, trade unions, and intellectuals, etc.

Third: a constitutional or charter-based court would be formed to monitor compliance with the provisions of the charter, and would possess the authority to issue rulings against anyone who violates it. As for the mechanism of enforcement, it would be entrusted to a non-factional force affiliated with the PLO, present in Palestine and in the Arab states that might allow its presence.

Fourth: pursuant to the new charter, the administrative structure managing the affairs of the population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would be redrawn, independent of the Zionist occupation.

Separating the Political Level from the Resistance

The Palestinian people paid a heavy price as a result of merging political leadership with resistance leadership, and leaders were pursued everywhere, which caused turmoil on the Palestinian scene. In light of the lessons learned from the previous three wars, political leaderships should distance themselves from the resistance in order to remain capable of continuing to operate, and a secret leadership for the resistance should be established, carrying out its work secretly, in a secret location, somewhere in this world. It has been proven that secrecy and security fortification form the backbone of the resistance’s success, and building on experience constitutes a fundamental factor in the continuation of success.

Gaza in 2008/2009 proved that it was capable of improving its resistance performance, and managed, with limited capabilities, to thwart Israel’s war, which lasted 22 days. And it clearly benefited from that experience in the 2012 war, so that the occupation decided not to prolong the war, shortening the time to eight days.

The New Balance of Power

The entire negotiating process the Palestinians entered, along with the Arab regimes, unfolded within a balance of power entirely tilted in Israel’s favor. And according to the justification of Palestinian and Arab leaders, Arab weakness pushed them to plead, and to entertain the illusion that America might decide to establish justice in the region.

The balance of power in the Arab-Islamic region has now changed, and Israel is no longer capable of carrying out the military strikes it once did, nor is the United States. Israel is now conducting maneuvers on how to protect its home front, and on how to expel Arab forces from their population centers. That old balance has ended, and there is now a new balance forged by Lebanese and Palestinian resistance.

What worked in bygone times no longer works, and continuing to efface the self in reliance on what others might grant the Arabs is of no avail. For this reason it is necessary that the Authority in Ramallah acknowledge that what once was no longer is, and that adapting to the strength of the resistance is a virtue that hastens the achievement of the unity of the people of Palestine.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “وحدة شعب فلسطين” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.