War and the New Balance of Power

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

The Arab-Islamic region has entered a new balance of power whose features were clearly displayed in the July 2006 war, and confirmed by the war on the Gaza Strip in 2008-2009. Israel had already withdrawn, fleeing southern Lebanon, in 2000, and that was a clear signal that Israel no longer insisted on its own terms, and that it could yield under military pressure imposed by Hezbollah; it was also a strong signal that the era of Israeli victories had ended and passed forever, unless it wished to fight lovers of defeat. As for the 2006 war, it confirmed that Israel was no longer capable of achieving what it had achieved before, and that it was unable to secure victory despite unlimited American support and that of many Arab regimes. Israel subsequently failed to change the situation in Gaza despite the massive destruction and mass killing it carried out.

Hezbollah, for its part, managed to bring new and advanced weapons into military service in 2007, and Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah confirmed this when he spoke of a great surprise in any coming war, without disclosing what it was. My assessment at the time was that there is no greater surprise than the existence of new systems for downing aircraft, or something akin to an air force. Then Sayyed Hassan spoke of tens of thousands of recruits within the Party, a number not necessary for defense but rather for offense. Sayyed Hassan continues to speak of vast, formidable military capabilities, including weapons that threaten ships heading toward Israel across the Mediterranean. If this is plausible — and I believe it is, since Sayyed Hassan neither lies nor exaggerates — it means the infrastructure needed to operate such missiles is in place: satellite surveillance, systems for receiving and analyzing information, and electronic and human guidance systems. Does Hezbollah truly possess such infrastructure, or is the infrastructure in Syria while the missiles are in Lebanon? I do not know, but I am aware that Israel takes this matter seriously.

Israel’s bewilderment

Since the end of the July war, Israel has been developing weapons, conducting various military exercises, and forming new battalions and brigades whose missions correspond to what is expected of Hezbollah’s military methods and maneuvers. It labors to build battalions for storming military hideouts, works hard on re-armoring its tanks, on producing new bunker-and-mountain-penetrating bombs, and on developing combat robots that advance ahead of tank columns or attacking infantry units, and so on. It works around the clock preparing for offensive and defensive war, calculating, adding, subtracting, discussing, and studying in order to assess the outcomes of any confrontation with Hezbollah or Iran, and perhaps Syria as well, whether in an offensive or a defensive posture.

It is notable here that Israel now behaves in a manner different from what we are used to. In the past, Israel would threaten, attack, and win, and war for it was a kind of game, almost a form of entertainment. Now Israel thinks, and thinks again, and thinks again, and is still thinking. In the past, Israel conducted offensive exercises and occupied enemy land and cities, and its soldiers trained to storm cities and besiege enemy forces and their defenses; today it adds to those exercises on how to expel enemy forces from occupied Israeli areas, how to shelter a panicked populace, and how to limit the effect of collapsing civilian morale on the morale of soldiers at the front. In the past, Israel used to facilitate the media’s work during military exercises, but today it appears keen on secrecy, at least in some respects. In the past too it used to speak of an Israeli deterrence that no one could confront, whereas now it speaks of mutual deterrence and of the possibility that its air force could be neutralized because of Hezbollah’s missile deterrence.

The biggest problem that shocked Israel in the July war was the lack of information about Hezbollah’s armament. It was repeatedly surprised, and so was the United States alongside it. It fought a blind war, whereas its wars with Arab regimes had always been fought with full knowledge — even if the regime itself did not supply Israel with information about its own army, Israel had enough spies and eyes on the ground. Hezbollah surprised it before, and it now fears surprises, especially after the tremendous progress made in Iranian and Syrian military industries. What does Hezbollah possess? Are they anti-aircraft missiles, laser-guided weapons, or types of weapons difficult even to guess at? And Israel’s questions multiply further when it sees Nasrallah speaking with calm, composure, and confidence.

Perhaps the great question Israel poses to itself concerns the reaction of parties not directly under attack. Will Hezbollah come to Hamas’s aid if Israel attacks Gaza? Will Syria enter the war if Hezbollah is attacked? What of Iran’s reaction? And what will be the position of the Palestinian Authority and some Arab regimes if war breaks out? Will Israel even be able to achieve results, or achieve victory quickly? The questions before it are many and perplexing, and it is very difficult to find definitive answers unless war actually breaks out.

The prospects of war

I believe Israel has no escape except war. There is no doubt that Israel waging a war now is a great gamble, but waging war in the future is an even greater gamble. Israel does not fully know the strength and scale of the enemy it might face should it wage war on any of the four fronts — southern Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, and Iran — and it is not certain of victory even with unlimited American support and American participation in the war. But its knowledge may be even more limited in the future, and its enemy will certainly have developed more lethal weapons by then, especially since the Iranian and Syrian technical level is accelerating geometrically rather than arithmetically.

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…and proving that Israel is far more capable than the resistance organizations, Iran, Syria, and everyone near and far imagine. This plan involves nuclear bombs, but they may be suitable for use against Iran, or against Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor, and Raqqa, while they are not suitable for use against Nabatieh, Tyre, Maroun al-Ras, Gaza, or Rafah, because of their proximity to Jewish population centers. But Israel must also calculate the other side’s response should it decide to exercise this option. Iran and Syria can absorb strikes from tactical nuclear bombs, but Israel cannot absorb a barrage of conventional missiles, especially if directed at the central region known as Gush Dan. And does this plan guarantee that the other side will not retaliate with chemical or biological weapons? Note that Israel’s area is roughly 21,000 square kilometers, of which the inhabited area is roughly 15 percent, whereas Iran’s area is 1,600,000 square kilometers, with an inhabited area of roughly 8 percent.

It is possible that Israel and America have developed serious destructive weapons we know nothing about, and Hezbollah may be surprised just as it will surprise Israel. But the assessment is that America and Israel have, in recent years, focused on developing means of combat that reduce human casualties, on bombs capable of penetrating underground defenses, and on electronic aviation and the electronic soldier. How much have they achieved in these fields? I do not know. But it remains true that Israel’s strategic planning poses many questions to itself, some of which it can certainly answer and some of which it cannot, and in all cases it remains under constant pressure from the political level, which is searching for a way out of this security and military impasse.

By contrast, Israel’s failure to wage war, and its remaining under the weight of a lost deterrent power, means it must respond to a new situation that entails accepting positions it would not have accepted before. For example, Syria might insist on an unconditional withdrawal from the Golan, and Israel might be forced to do so, just as it did in 2000. This would mean the Syrian army returning to the Golan Heights, and the Syrian Ministry of Agriculture sitting on the shores of Lake Tiberias. It is also possible that Israel would submit to certain Palestinian conditions in order to ease the embarrassment of the Arab regimes, and to strengthen the bonds of the current Arab-Israeli-American alliance. But this could be subject to a domino effect, whereby one concession leads to another, and so on.

The decision to go to war is not easy, and Israel will think it over many times, especially since its home front has changed and shifted; the Israel of the state-building era is no longer the Israel that exists today. Israel now suffers from rampant corruption that has reached the presidency of the state at least twice, from moral flabbiness, a consumerist culture, and an aversion to sacrifice. But in the end, Israel has no choice but to defend itself, and it is aware of the gamble involved.

The changing balance of power

The balance of power in the Arab-Islamic region has changed, and every balance of power imposes its own particular relationships. The old balance of power, in which Israel was the unconquerable power, no longer exists, and the new balance of power imposes new alliances and new challenges. Those who formerly held dominance face two options: either recognize the new balance of power, or work to strike it down and return to the old order. Historically, those on the defensive resort to war.

Assuming those on the defensive decide not to fight, what will those who overturned the balance do? Perhaps they will do nothing if the formerly dominant powers respond to their demands and conditions, but they will fight if there is no response. Israel is now required to withdraw from Lebanese territory and from the Golan Heights, and to allow the refugees in Lebanon to return to Palestine — will Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran stop at merely repeating these demands, or will they take military action?

My assessment is that Hezbollah is preparing to move to the offensive, if it has not already reached this stage. Hezbollah now has enough of a mobilized reserve (ready fighting numbers) to qualify it for an offensive, and my assessment is that it has the capacity to neutralize Israeli aircraft, and perhaps to shoot them down, thereby having covered considerable ground toward the requirements of offensive war. But it would be better for Hezbollah to attack from behind enemy lines, which is possible if it develops means and methods enabling it to enter certain Jewish towns in a swift, lightning strike, such that the enemy cannot bring its heavy ground weapons into play, giving Hezbollah time to establish protected bridgeheads that would surprise the enemy with their numbers.

Militarily, Hezbollah can launch an offensive if it secures the Syrian army’s ability to provide ground support — but will the Syrian army do so before it is reassured that Hezbollah is achieving battlefield gains? What remains important is that it is the Arabs who must attack, not Israel, because it is their lands that are occupied and their peoples that have been displaced.

Conclusion

The Arab-Islamic region is boiling, and many forces are preparing for war morning and evening, sometimes covertly, sometimes openly. Many forces are manufacturing and developing weapons, developing their armies, conducting military exercises, mobilizing, threatening, and issuing warnings. This ferment will not be left to cool, and nothing will cool it except an explosion.

My final assessment, based on the technical and field developments I follow, is that Israel will receive powerful blows. The losses on the Arab side will certainly be huge and enormous, but Israel’s losses will also be severe, and it will be forced, as a result, to accept what it was previously unwilling to accept. Israel may not be destroyed in the coming war, but its very existence will remain in question.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “الحرب وميزان القوى الجديد” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.