War Is Coming

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

Will a war break out in the Arab-Islamic region in which America, Israel, Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah are parties, or some of them are parties? Yes.

A wide debate is underway about the possibility of war breaking out, and most of it revolves around the likelihood of America and Israel attacking the parties mentioned above; it is rare to hear anyone discuss the possibility of Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah launching an attack themselves. Some rule out America attacking Iran, judging that it will instead resort to tightening various sanctions through the Security Council; others believe sanctions will do little good for America and Israel, and that a military resolution is the only way to eliminate the Iranian threat to Israel and to American influence in the region. Some see a strong possibility that Israel will attack Syria and Hezbollah, while others believe Israel will content itself with the arrangements made in southern Lebanon in 2006, while pushing to grant further security powers to the multinational force and the Lebanese army.

Preemptive War

Preemptive or preventive war is considered a fundamental element of Israeli security doctrine, which remains in force to this day, and there is no sign on the horizon that Israel will abandon it under the current military conditions in the region. It is also a cornerstone of the hegemonic thinking of the neoconservatives who largely control the White House at this stage. This is a security philosophy holding that the enemy’s power must be destroyed before it grows and becomes an actual military threat, ultimately forcing the adversary to surrender and accept the required terms. Israel used preemptive war in 1967, striking Arab military positions before they were capable of military maneuver, such as the Iraqi nuclear reactor; and America used it against Iraq in 2003.

Preemptive war is not launched against just any state, but against a hostile state that is accumulating military power that gives off the scent of a threat to interests or hegemony. Egypt, under Abdel Nasser, posed a threat to Western influence in the Arab-Islamic region and gave strong signs of its hostility toward Israel, so the West and Israel attacked it in 1956, and Israel did not withdraw from Sinai until it had obtained certain security guarantees, foremost among them a ban on resistance activity in the Gaza Strip. Israel also attacked Palestinian resistance bases in the Karameh refugee camp in 1968, and America attacked the Dominican Republic and Panama.

It has become clear that Iran manufactures advanced weapons, as proven by Israel’s 2006 war against Hezbollah. Iran also continues to press ahead with its nuclear program, unconcerned by the various international positions supportive of the United States. Hezbollah held firm in southern Lebanon, inflicted heavy losses on the ranks of the Israeli army, and foiled the Israeli military campaign. Syria, for its part, is working at an increasing pace to raise its military readiness, whether in terms of armament or training. These are three parties that do not conceal their hostility toward Israel, nor their defiance of American hegemony over the region — and in this lies what justifies preemptive war.

Between Preemption and Deliberation

Certainly, America and Israel, together and separately, are working to assess every possibility and to weigh the merits and drawbacks of each option. There is enormous risk in waging war, but the alternative to war is the continued growth in strength of the three powers, which means greater defiance of the two of them in the future. So what will they choose? Will they choose the gamble, with all the losses, destruction, and uncertainties it entails, or patience, waiting out the continued rise of Iranian power, which may culminate in an atomic bomb? The present contains risk, but the future holds even more risk.

Restraining Factors for America and Israel

There are restraining factors that push both Israel and America toward further deliberation before launching a war, which I summarize as follows:

The element of Israeli-American apprehension rose sharply after the July war, which ended in Israel’s failure. Hezbollah surprised the world, and no one believes the Iranian military arsenal holds only the surprises that Hezbollah displayed. If Hezbollah revealed some of its weapons, then by inference Iran possesses far more;

America and Israel suffer from a scarcity of information about the armament of Iran and Hezbollah and the military tactics that might be followed, and there is a significant weakness in intelligence penetration. Israel fought a blind war with little information about Hezbollah, and it and its ally still suffer from a shortage of spies and collaborators;

There is a real gamble concerning Gulf oil, whose exports would be affected, leading to a sharp rise in prices worldwide. There is a possibility that Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz, which would sharply reduce the flow of oil to markets, and the matter would be even more severe if Iran struck oil facilities on the western shores of the Gulf;

Iran and Syria hold cards they can use to pressure the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan;

Iran might manage to sink American warships in the Gulf. Israel, for its part, would suffer heavy losses in soldiers, civilians, and infrastructure.

If the price of oil rises above a hundred dollars, an enormous global uproar against the United States would erupt, whether at the level of states or at the level of the street, especially the American and European street. And if a single American warship were sunk with hundreds of American soldiers aboard, outrage would spread across every sector of the United States. Israel, for its part, would find itself in grave crisis if it failed to bring the war to a decisive end within a week.

Driving Factors

Despite these very costly restraining factors, there are driving factors pushing toward war, which I summarize as follows:

American hegemony in the region depends on insisting upon comprehensive change. Iran in particular, together with Hezbollah, aspires to bring about political, social, and economic change in the Arab-Islamic region, which threatens the Arab regimes and, with them, American and Israeli interests. If Iran manages to achieve a breakthrough in the region and succeeds, hardship will befall the Arab regimes, forcing them to make peace with Iran, which means an increase in its influence at the expense of American and Israeli influence;

Patience toward Iran means standing by and watching it advance with steady steps toward a nuclear bomb, which would balance out Israel’s nuclear deterrent power;

Patience toward the strength of Hezbollah and Syria means diminishing Israel’s prestige and achieving a military balance that ultimately threatens Israel’s very existence;

The Arab regimes play an instigating role because they fear for their own survival, and they are concerned with ensuring there is no power in the region that threatens the stability imposed by the force of Arab security apparatuses.

The strength of Iran and Hezbollah stokes Sunni-Shia rivalry, which encourages Sunni resistance forces to work in a correct, scientific manner different from methods of bravado and improvisation. This means more problems with those whom America calls terrorists.

Spreading Sedition

America, together with a number of Arab powers, may at some point have considered spreading sedition in the region, especially after the July war and Hezbollah’s victory, which would lead to the draining of energies at the hands of internal actors, as happened in the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. Attempts were made to play the Sunni-Shia and Arab-Persian card, but success does not appear to have been their ally. Men of religion and politics carried the banner of sedition and tried to drag people into the trenches of sectarian and nationalist infighting, but the response remained weak. Sectarian troubles receded somewhat in Iraq, and Hezbollah thwarted every attempt to drag it into civil war. Only the Palestinian factions answered the call, sinking into internal fighting that inflicted further weakness on the Palestinian arena.

Internal sedition constitutes a good American and Israeli alternative, should it be achieved, because it spares them the burden of entering embarrassing internal and external wars with uncertain outcomes.

The Outcome of the War

Neither America nor Israel can guarantee the outcome of a war should it break out, and both have a powerful lesson in the July 2006 war. The two states cannot guarantee the final outcome of the war, nor can they guarantee the destruction of the enemy’s power, particularly with regard to Iran’s nuclear facilities. Hezbollah and Iran are well entrenched, and it is not certain that falling bombs and missiles will be able to destroy their targets. It is likely, indeed certain, that Iran and Hezbollah have prepared many decoy sites to draw attacks that would occupy the minds of the attacking military forces. In other words, a large part of the American and Israeli war effort will be wasted in vain and to no avail.

Syria is the weakest link, and its weakness stems first from the regime’s inability to achieve genuine national belonging. The regime has remained trapped within a mentality of loyalty to the ruling power, and has kept its security apparatuses engaged in the traditional Arab practice of pursuing citizens. Despite this, Syria has developed a missile industry, has obtained advanced equipment from Iran and Russia, and possibly possesses a modern air defense capability able to shoot down modern aircraft.

Preemptive war may succeed against Syria, but it will not succeed against Hezbollah and Iran, because the preparation in Lebanon and Iran is built on absorbing enemy attacks while preserving the capacity to retaliate. Syria has been trying for some time to adopt Hezbollah’s defensive model, but preparation spanning a year or two cannot achieve the results of preparation spanning seven years or more.

My assessment is that heavy losses will be inflicted on the triangle of resistance [Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah], but they will not be fatal. This triangle will hold firm and will retain its capacity to retaliate, even though Syria will suffer some military weakening. Endurance in itself is a victory. But I also believe Israel will suffer a heavy loss if Syria and Hezbollah manage to shoot down its aircraft, because its army would then be exposed and it would become possible to defeat it on the ground.

The Scope of the Front

Will Israel and America open the Iranian and Syrian fronts together? This is highly unlikely, because wisdom dictates narrowing the circle as much as possible while achieving the best results. Iran constitutes the primary source of concern; it is the center of nuclear activity, and striking it and destroying its military facilities means depriving Hezbollah and Syria of their primary source of arms and funding. If Iran loses, both Syria and Hezbollah lose.

Yet the July 2006 war showed that holding back from striking Iran was wise, because of the emergence of weapons in Hezbollah’s hands that had not been anticipated; had war been ignited against Iran, America would have fallen into a major trap in terms of military losses.

Striking Syria and Hezbollah first serves as a trial balloon to gauge some of the weapons Iran possesses, particularly with regard to air defense. And if Israel manages to end the strength of these two parties, Iran will be left isolated and the world’s nations will be further incited against it. But the question is: will Israel accept being the trial balloon, or will it insist on direct American support should war break out? The region’s temperature rises with each passing day, and with it rises the heat of the debate and discussion over where the war will be fought, when, and how it will be conducted.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “الحرب آتية” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.