The Weaknesses of the Palestinian Negotiator in Cairo

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

The indirect negotiations that took place in Cairo, seeking a ceasefire in Palestine, were not successful from the Palestinian standpoint, and the Palestinian side was unable to wrest anything substantial from the Israeli side, despite the outstanding military performance the Palestinian resistance delivered. It had been hoped that the political-negotiating performance would match the military performance, but it was clear that the level of the Palestinian political performance was far below the level of the military performance. The political performance was not at the required level, and the cards held at the negotiating table were not commensurate with the cards held on the ground. This is due to a number of points of weakness, which I note below:

First, the composition of the Palestinian delegation

The composition of the Palestinian delegation sent to Cairo was governed by a political-psychological complex that has harmed the Palestinian political scene for decades: the monopolization by the Palestinian factions of everything and every activity, and the denial to the broader Palestinian public of real, effective participation. The fighting and non-fighting Palestinian factions divided up the membership of the negotiating team among themselves, paying no attention to matters fundamental to its composition. For instance, the team ought to have included two experts in international law and law, an expert in international relations and another in political science, and others in economics and psychology. The experts were excluded from the team, and no advisory unit of experts working in the background was formed for the delegation. This is a mistake repeated again and again on the Palestinian scene, with the factions continuing to act in a monopolizing manner that negatively affects the interest of the Palestinian people.

Second: the negotiating environment

The environment in which the negotiations took place was not healthy with respect to the Palestinian resistance, for the following reason.

The environment violated a fundamental principle that Palestinians must always hold to: that the resistance must not accept an Arab state as mediator between it and Israel, because Israel’s mere acceptance of an Arab state as mediator casts great suspicion on that state’s policies and intentions. An Arab state that enjoys Israel’s approval must necessarily be implicated in Palestinian blood or Palestinian land; it is a state of compromise, not a state of principled stance. What, then, of an Arab state that recognizes Israel and maintains normal diplomatic relations with it? Furthermore, the states active in seeking a ceasefire, such as America, Britain, and some Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, stand opposed to the resistance, and wish to wake up one morning to find that every force of resistance in the region has vanished. In other words, the negotiating environment was an environment that favored the resistance’s disappearance, not one that recognized the resistance’s strength. The Palestinian resistance should have insisted on establishing a balanced environment, such that states supportive of and defending the resistance would be present in the orbit of the negotiations. Tehran, Venezuela, and South Africa or the like ought to have been in Cairo. The environment must not be left to an official Western-Arab monopoly, for neither the West nor the official Arab tier can be trusted—

—support the resistance. The resistance needed to open the doors to the media to cover what was being put on the table, so that people would know each side’s positions and the extent of its willingness to defend them. Open, public negotiations act as a kind of deterrent for the strong and an asset for the weak, because they are recorded for history and for human rights, and discourage wars and the killing of innocent people.

Fourth: the failure of international outreach. Resistance leaders, or those acting on their behalf, ought to have toured the countries of the world to explain to peoples, legislatures, and governments the truth of the Israeli massacres in Gaza, in order to win world support for the Palestinian position. During the war, no resistance leaders visited Moscow, Beijing, New Delhi, Caracas, or Rio de Janeiro. Palestinian delegations, equipped with documentation, should also have been formed to tour the countries of Europe, Latin America, and Asia in order to expose the practices of the Zionists.

Fifth: sensible people, in times of crisis, seek out friends, and work to increase the number of their friends and reduce the number of their enemies. Iran and Hezbollah are the two trusted friends of the Palestinian resistance on the international stage. We have not seen Palestinian leaders fly to Tehran or pay visits to Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. Arab states send us flour, while Iran sends us rockets in the face of fierce Arab-regime obstruction. It was a mistake to disregard Iran and its pivotal, fundamental role in the region, and it was not proper to forgo intensive communication with Hezbollah. In time of need, no one stands with us with weapons except Iran and Hezbollah; Palestinians must not remain hostage to differences of opinion over what is happening in Syria.

Sixth: procrastination and delay

Because of the unhealthy negotiating environment, the non-Palestinian negotiating mood was not seeking Palestinian security but rather Israel’s security, and so the goal was to weaken the resistance rather than to seek a solution to the problems of the people of Gaza. For this reason, they pursued a strategy of procrastination in order to afflict the Palestinian people with weariness, boredom, exhaustion, and despair, and to soften the resistance’s military position, which could lead people to disperse from around it, thereby weakening it. The resistance derives its strength, first, from the public rallied around it, and second, from the weapons in its hands; and if the people disperse from around it, it will have lost its sharpest weapon. The intent was to prolong the negotiations through repeated truces that achieved nothing, so that people began to question the usefulness of accepting a truce. The resistance erred in accepting repeated truces, losing the initiative and giving the Israeli leadership room to maneuver and to restore some of its prestige before its own public.

Seventh: personal relationships with members of the Egyptian delegation

It is impermissible for there to be personal relationships with members of other delegations at the negotiating table, especially when the negotiations concern matters of fateful importance, in order to avoid favoritism and embarrassment. Some members of the Palestinian delegation have personal relationships with some members of the negotiating Egyptian team, and some of them maintain relationships with Egyptian intelligence officers. This is impermissible, and any negotiator with personal relationships with members of other teams ought to have been excused. Embarrassment and favoritism were apparent in the comments of members of the Palestinian delegation when they spoke on television screens about the course of the negotiations and Egypt’s role. Hesitation and an inability to give useful answers were apparent, and they often stumbled and fell into contradictions. Favoritism was apparent in their statements, and some of them appeared to be fleeing from telling the truth. Serious negotiations cannot tolerate such a situation, and the matter ought to have been corrected at once, but it was not.

A negotiator must pay attention to the elements of his own strength, in order to make of the table a genuine art. The negotiating dialectic must not operate at a level lower than the military dialectic. The resistance excelled militarily, and the negotiator was not equal to the strength that the resistance provided him.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “نقاط ضعف المفاوض الفلسطيني في القاهرة” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.