What If Arab Regimes Normalized Relations with the Zionists?

by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem

Various media outlets bring us, day after day, news of normalization activities between Arab regimes and the Zionist entity, and visits by Arab intellectuals and writers to the entity. They report to us news of Zionist activities in Arab countries, especially at conferences held in these countries to which Zionist experts, media figures, and security officials are invited.

These outlets do not spare us their analysis of the harm these activities could inflict on the Palestinian cause. It is noteworthy that lamenting the cause’s standing is abundant, and spreading feelings of sorrow and pain over the people of Palestine is intense. Yet these outlets, in most cases, do not carry out their necessary role of raising awareness to keep the flame of the Arab street’s rejection of the Zionists burning.

These same outlets appease the normalizing Arab regimes and host normalizers among writers, intellectuals, and former and current officials, and certainly some of these outlets do not want to anger the Zionist entity and America, hoping for gains the days may bring. The entity’s and America’s satisfaction constitutes a good economic and financial gain, if not today then tomorrow.

The Firstborn of Normalization Tendencies

What could happen to the Palestinian cause if the Arab regimes normalized, or did not normalize? If we survey official Arab positions over time, we cannot deny these regimes have provided abundant financial assistance to the Palestinian people, and have stood with the Palestinian cause in international forums and in conference halls and corridors.

The Palestinian people, languishing under occupation, has received financial assistance that partially contributed to helping it survive, and Arab states have also provided financial assistance to UNRWA (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees).

At other times, Arab states such as Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and Libya provided military and security assistance to the Palestinian factions in their fighting against the Zionist entity. But military assistance remained very limited, within the bounds of not provoking Zionist retaliation.

On another note, Arab states waged wars against the Zionist entity that were not planned — improvised and haphazard, more akin to trading on the Palestinian cause. The primitive Arab armies waged a war against the entity’s state in 1948 and failed in it, but not because of the Palestinians — because the Arab armies were not prepared for war, neither organizationally, in training, nor in armament, and their conduct was arbitrary.

Farouk (then king of Egypt) supplied his country’s army with defective weapons, while Nuri al-Said (Iraq’s prime minister) changed the Iraqi army’s field commanders, appointing military leaders carrying a recommendation to retreat to what became known as the West Bank, and Jordanian King Abdullah I ordered his army to withdraw from the cities of Lydda, Ramla, and West Jerusalem. The Palestinian people was not responsible for the defeat, and we never begged anyone to fight on our behalf.

On the contrary, Palestinians formed the Army of the Holy Jihad, and requested weapons from the Arab regimes, but these regimes gave only enough to save face, not enough weapons to enable actual fighting. Moreover, Palestinians established the All-Palestine Government, declared independence, and formed a government, but Egypt destroyed the government and detained Hajj Amin al-Husseini, who was leading Palestinians at the time.

All this happened amid an atmosphere of Arab normalization with the Zionists. There were existing relations between King Abdullah I and Zionists like Golda Meir, who later became Israel’s prime minister. These relations also existed between them and Iraq’s Prime Minister Nuri al-Said and Egypt’s King Farouk.

It was logical for relations to exist between the Zionists and Arab regimes, because both parties share the same origin: colonialism, which manufactured the Arab regimes and had them, and still has them, at its command, and which established the national homeland for Jews. A slave does not rebel against his master out of fear for the privileges and benefits of preserving power.

The Palestinian people has nothing to do with the 1967 war, and never asked the Arab regimes to prepare for war or wage battles. The Arab regimes chose, in 1967, to hand a free victory to the Zionist entity in exchange for shedding Arab blood, and the crushing defeat that resulted is one whose calamities the Palestinian people — and the Syrian people with it — still suffers.

The Arab regimes had not recognized the Zionist entity, nor normalized with it, in that period, except for Jordan, which always maintained good relations with the Zionists. Some Arab leaders wanted to build their glories on the skulls of Arab soldiers, and some aspired to move their throne to Damascus, even at the expense of Jerusalem and the people.

The Arab regimes entangled themselves and entangled the Palestinian people. We were born displaced, born under occupation, and remain under it, and our generations bear the consequences of poor Arab conduct.

The 1973 war was not for the sake of the people of Palestine or for liberating Palestine — it was to remove the effects of the 1967 aggression, yet the effects were not removed nor did the occupation vanish. On the contrary, the Arab regimes lost further land, and negotiating with the Zionists became the price for withdrawal from lands occupied in that war.

Because of normalization and concern for the Zionists, one Arab king informed the Zionist entity that Egypt and Syria would wage war, without telling them the date of the attack because he did not know it himself. This means the Arab normalizers deceived the non-normalizers, some of whom later fell within the circle of normalization themselves.

The Arab regimes did not abide by the joint defense agreements, nor by Arab solidarity, nor by joint Arab action, and did not abide by the rules of boycotting the Zionist entity and the global companies cooperating with it. Since the early 1970s, Jordanian figures close to the royal court have been importing goods from the entity, agricultural matters and drip irrigation methods especially.

There are Gulf Arab states that allow Zionist goods to enter their territory, knowing in advance they are Israeli, exported under the names of Western companies. Even Zionist agricultural products entered Arab markets under the full knowledge of the ruling regimes. Commercial normalization existed, and sometimes political and security cooperation too, while the Palestinian cause remained as it was, indeed its bright star began fading, little by little.

Secret Arab contacts with the Zionist entity were not alone the cause of the Palestinian cause’s early decline — the PLO itself was a partner in the deterioration when it opened channels with the American Central Intelligence Agency and, under the table, with the Zionists.

It is well known that Palestinians affiliated with the PLO were opening negotiating channels with the Zionist entity since the early 1970s. Neither an atmosphere of normalization nor its absence resolved the Palestinian cause.

Oslo Activates Normalization

Normalization with the Zionists became active after the signing of the Oslo Accords between the Zionists and the PLO. Palestinians opened a wide door for the Arab regimes to bypass national and religious taboos, under cover the PLO itself provided. Palestinians drowned up to their ears in normalization with the Zionists, and began coordinating security matters in a way that exposed Palestinian security to danger for the benefit of Zionist security.

The Palestinians’ wager should not be on Arab regimes but on themselves and on the Arab peoples. The Zionist entity gave great attention to reconciliation with Arab regimes, hoping this would lead to normalization with the peoples, and acceptance of the entity as an inseparable part of the Arab-Islamic region. But the entity was surprised to find it had concluded agreements with leaderships disconnected from the Arab street.

The ball of rebellion against taboos rolled forward, and the Zionists began roaming freely across Arab arenas, buying land, especially in Jordan, which constitutes a grave danger to Jordan, Palestine, and the Arab surroundings generally. But in the meantime, the Zionists lost their wars against Arab resistance in Palestine and Lebanon.

They failed in South Lebanon and were forced to flee before the resistance’s blows in 2000, failed in their war on South Lebanon in 2006, then failed in three consecutive wars on Gaza.

The Zionists failed despite Arab normalization reaching the level of security cooperation with some Arab regimes aimed at eliminating Hezbollah, the Hamas movement, Islamic Jihad, and the various resistance factions.

Arabs were defeated when normalization was at a low pace, and the Zionist entity was defeated when normalization was at an escalating pace. It is likely the entity’s defeats will grow deeper the more the Arab regimes deepen their relations with it. This means normalization has not benefited the entity militarily or security-wise, though it certainly draws great financial profits for the entity.

It is true the Arab regimes have provided money to Palestinians, but it is legitimate to raise the following question: whose share of Arab money was greater — Jerusalem or the nightclubs of Europe? I would like an answer from the ordinary Arab citizen who understands nothing of political matters.

On another note, aid money does not help, according to the experience of nations that always wanted to improve their conditions through financial grants and aid — indeed, grants and aid encourage laziness and dependence on others.

Had it not been for financial aid, the Palestinian people would have worked, since long years ago, to exploit and cultivate the land and build a real resistance economy. But unfortunately there was no leadership well-versed in resistance economics, nor in building an economy suited to the conditions of people living under occupation.

The Palestinians’ wager must not be on Arab regimes but on themselves and on the Arab peoples. The Zionist entity gave great attention to reconciliation with Arab regimes, hoping this would lead to normalization with the peoples, and acceptance of the entity as an inseparable part of the Arab-Islamic region. But the entity was surprised to find it had concluded agreements with leaderships disconnected from the Arab street.

The Arab public rejects normalization, and only a small minority of hypocrites and material beneficiaries has accepted what the Arab regimes have accepted. The overwhelming majority of the Arab peoples reject accepting the Zionist entity, and are prepared to fight for Jerusalem and the holy sites if the opportunity arises.

This is the case for the people of Palestine as well. There are Palestinian politicians, academics, officials, and capitalists who have slid into the swamp, but the people still preserves its patriotism, belonging, and commitment.

Arab governments may slide into military cooperation with the Zionists, especially regarding Iran — this is not unlikely. But it is important to recall that Mussolini allied with Hitler in the Second World War, yet Hitler’s position could have been better had he remained without an alliance. An alliance between Arab regimes and the Zionists does not necessarily bring them good.

This is why I say: normalize however you wish, for this normalization of yours will generate greater Arab popular commitment to Arab causes. When the regimes fade from the scene, a vacuum occurs that only the peoples can fill.

Source: Translated from the original Arabic, “ماذا لو طبّعت أنظمة العرب علاقاتها مع الصهاينة؟” by Dr. Abdul-Sattar Kassem.