The Lowering of the Liberation Ceiling

Alongside the overall actions being carried out by the leaderships of the Palestinian resistance in various arenas, it could be observed that adherence to the Palestinian liberation ceiling was not strong. The Liberation Organization set for itself a ceiling that it said its national struggle was directed toward achieving, and that its various programs would be devoted to attaining this end. The organization worked to rally the Palestinian people, wherever they were, behind its declared goals, and pledged to them adherence to those goals and to the requirements of the struggle whatever the sacrifices. But the course of events proved that saying is not like doing. Matters proceeded in a manner inconsistent with the proposals and hopes that had been built up.

The Liberation Organization launched slogans and mottos, issued books and pamphlets explaining its proposals and programs, and called on people of every category and background to hasten to join, support, and participate in the various factional and national activities. The organization, through all its factions, struck a sensitive chord that appealed to the Palestinian people in particular and Arabs in general: the liberation of Palestine and the restoration of Arab dignity torn apart by defeats. The Palestinian factions, Fatah in particular, found no great difficulty in mobilizing and drawing people in, given the deep resonance of the subject and its strong national, moral, and religious pull.

The Palestinian leadership did not hold fast to that moral strength embodied in its early promises, which expressed the aspirations and hopes of the broadest sections of the Palestinian people and the hopes of Arab peoples everywhere. This is, logically, the outcome of the conduct of Palestinian leaderships across the various Arab arenas and at the internal Palestinian level, since whoever disrupts the balances and behavioral standards must inevitably give up the very balances and standards that govern general policy. Holding to a lofty moral ceiling on the great questions inevitably collides with a low moral ceiling on matters of daily conduct. If someone is working toward liberation and toward mobilizing energies and efforts to achieve that goal, he is expected to be a moral example. But if he fails to act in a manner consistent with the loftiness of the goal, people are bound to desert him, regarding him as a liar working toward deception and toward interests other than the declared goals. Within the gap between the two moral levels, the leader, or the person concerned, finds himself forced to lower the ceiling of his hopes and promises. He easily discovers that his own moral makeup does not qualify him to lead a march that requires a moral level better than the one he himself embodies. And so he finds no escape from conceding the declared ceiling, arriving in the end at a convergence between the private and public moral levels. His insistence on achieving public accomplishments continues to decline in step with the decline of his commitment to sound morals. In this situation, politics, as it came to be defined among some Palestinian factions, becomes “the art of the possible” — meaning that insisting on achieving something no longer suited to one’s actual resources becomes untenable, and it becomes necessary to search for a way out within what is possible, within the existing political equations that express the will of others.

The pages that follow set out the sequence of Palestinian demands, gradually shrinking over time in step with what the state of the Palestinian leadership came to be.

The Legitimacy of the Palestinian Rifle

The Palestine Liberation Organization, established in 1964 by the Arab Summit convened that year, was struck by a violent event in 1967 following the fall of the rest of the country into Zionist hands. Further Palestinian dispersal ensued, and armed Palestinian resistance emerged stronger than before. The Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah) emerged as the leader of the armed struggle against Israel, the Arab Nationalist Movement evolved into the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other armed Palestinian movements emerged, foremost among them the Popular Struggle Front, al-Sa’iqa. Ahmad al-Shuqayri, the organization’s chairman at the time, resigned in the wake of this development, and was replaced by Yahya Hammuda. The Palestinian National Council then held its fourth session in 1968, and decided to reduce the number of its members to one hundred.

The most important development in this session concerned the method of representation, and the amendment of the Palestinian National, pan-Arab Charter, which became the Palestinian National Charter. In 1968, the Palestinian rifle became an accepted source of legitimacy, as the masses rallied around it, gave it their support, and joined its ranks. The voice of the rifle became louder than every other voice, and it was not unusual for the members of the Palestinian National Council to be drawn from the representatives of the various Palestinian factions or from their supporters.

The Palestinian National Charter brought certain amendments touching on some ideological aspects and on the methods of dealing with political and military developments. Ideologically, the phrase “Palestine is an Arab homeland” was replaced by “Palestine is the homeland of the Palestinian Arab people,” which is an integral part of the greater Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are an integral part of the Arab nation. In this there was a shift in certain priorities. Whereas the Arab nation had previously been the primary vessel encompassing Palestine and its people, the Palestinian people now became distinct, though still part of the composite of the Arab nation. The vitality of the unionist spirit was replaced by a structural staticism that did not overlook the Arab dimension but narrowed the space for its influence. In this there was a concession similar to the decisions of the Third Palestinian National Council, which focused first on the independence of Palestine and only then arrived at Arab unity. This amendment constituted a response to the spirit of Arab regionalism that had begun to surface in a number of Arab regions, and expressed a regionalist Arab current that competed with the nationalist current and viewed the idea of Arab unity as a narrow, interest-driven idea that would not lead to the good of the Arabs.

The idea of Arab nationalism suffered a major setback in the wake of the 1967 defeat, because the nationalist forces had received a crushing defeat at Israel’s hands, and appeared before the Arab masses and various non-nationalist parties and regimes to be nothing more than a foolish trumpet as skilled in defeat as it was in rhetoric and in playing with people’s emotions. This is in addition to the fact that Fatah, which had come to lead the Palestinian resistance movement, was itself a country-specific movement that saw in nationalist slogans a means of mobilizing people emotionally without taking practical steps to achieve the Palestinian aspiration toward liberation. It was clear, through its principles, which focused on non-interference in the affairs of Arab states and on not allowing Arab states to interfere in Palestinian affairs, that it was working to wage a Palestinian struggle that did not close the door to Arab assistance while preserving the country-specific character of Palestinian action.

On the other hand, the Palestinian National Charter insisted that Palestine was the homeland of the Palestinians and that it must be liberated, and for this reason it rejected the 1947 Partition Resolution and rejected the Balfour Declaration, and referred indirectly to Security Council Resolution 242, stating that the Palestinian Arab people, expressing itself through the armed Palestinian revolution, rejects all solutions alternative to the complete liberation of Palestine, and rejects all schemes aimed at liquidating or internationalizing the Palestinian cause. The charter even tied its position toward other states to their position toward the goals of the Palestinian people, stating that the Palestinian Arab people is the first and rightful owner of the cause of liberating and reclaiming its homeland, and determines its position toward all states and forces on the basis of their positions toward its cause and the extent of their support for it in its revolution to achieve its goals.

At the executive level, the National Charter left no room for interpretation, stating that armed struggle is the only path to the liberation of Palestine, and is thus a strategy and not a tactic. The Palestinian Arab people affirms its absolute determination and firm resolve to pursue the armed struggle and advance toward the armed popular revolution to liberate its homeland and return to it, and its right to a normal life there and to exercise the right of self-determination and sovereignty over it. It added that fedayeen action is the nucleus of the work for liberation, and that the energies of the Palestinian people would be mobilized to achieve the necessary cohesion between the masses and their fighting forces.

Matters were further clarified in the basic law of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian National Council, which stated that the goal of the organization and the council was the complete liberation of Palestinian land, that armed struggle was the method, and that the instrument was the Palestinian Arab masses inside and outside the occupied land, supported by and joined in their struggle by the Arab masses. It likewise recorded the rejection of Security Council Resolution 242.

Despite the amendments concerning Arab unity, the Palestinian National Charter, as well as the basic law of the Palestine Liberation Organization, remained committed to the matter of liberating Palestine, and to the principle that Palestine, within its complete boundaries as known during the Mandate period, is an integrated unit not subject to partition. It was also clear in insisting on the return of Palestinians to their homes and properties and in rejecting Jewish immigrants. The resolutions issued by the United Nations that infringed upon the Palestinians’ right to their homeland were rejected, and theoretical foundations were laid for reaching the declared goals, foremost among them the method of armed struggle.

The Palestinian National Charter was regarded as a constitution for the Palestinian people during the phase of national liberation. For this reason, rules were established to protect it from manipulation, foremost among them the process of amendment. The charter stipulated that amending its provisions required convening a special session for this purpose, and that amendment could only occur by a two-thirds majority. This provision was meant to regulate the amendment process and make it no simple matter, so that the charter would not be subject to whims, moods, and changes according to circumstance.

The Phase of Hesitation and Concession

After the 1967 war, the Arab countries, the confrontation states in particular, were toured by foreign delegations seeking a solution to what had become known as the Middle East question. Cairo, Amman, and Damascus were centers of global diplomatic activity and stops for those seeking to understand the various positions. Meanwhile, the Palestinian resistance was intensifying and growing, and the pace of popular mobilization around it rose at both the Arab and Palestinian levels. Palestinians flowed in to join the ranks of the fighting Palestinian factions, many Arabs volunteered, the Arab masses offered material and moral support, and various Palestinian institutions began to appear at the professional and functional level.

Meanwhile, the Palestine Liberation Organization held fast to its charter, and continued taking the necessary steps to push the confrontation with Israel to higher degrees. The organization voiced its opposition to all the ideas of the touring envoys calling for recognition of Israel in exchange for withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied in 1967.

This opposition became clear when King Hussein announced his plan in 1969, and when Rogers, the American Secretary of State, announced his plan, known by his name, for resolving the Middle East problem, in 1970.

King Hussein announced his plan in 1969 during his visit to the United States. The plan included Israel’s complete withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 in exchange for mutual recognition between the Arabs and Israel, the establishment of a comprehensive peace with freedom of navigation in waterways, as well as a just solution to the refugee problem. Israel rejected the plan for its part, and the Palestinian resistance factions, which controlled the Liberation Organization, rejected it in a joint statement.

In his plan, Rogers called on the parties concerned — Egypt, Jordan, and Israel — to implement Security Council Resolution 242 and to conclude a peace agreement between Israel and its neighbors. He said Israel should withdraw from land occupied in 1967, and that Egypt and Jordan would, in turn, recognize Israel and conclude a permanent peace agreement with it. His plan also included ending the war of attrition then raging between Egypt and Israel around the Suez Canal. Egypt accepted the initiative; Israel rejected it.

But the Palestine Liberation Organization rejected the initiative because it did not provide for complete withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967, and ignored the land seized in 1948. This is in addition to the fact that the initiative led toward recognition of Israel, which contradicted the resolutions of the Arab Summit Conference held in Khartoum in 1967. The initiative proceeded on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242, which works to liquidate the Palestinian cause and works to halt fedayeen action through ceasefire provisions. The Palestinian National Council endorsed this position at its extraordinary session held in Amman in 1970. The council affirmed its rejection of Security Council Resolution 242 and its rejection of the Rogers Plan, and its readiness to resist it with full force.

The Idea of the Secular Democratic State

At the very time when diplomatic activity was feverish and raising Palestinian questions, the Palestine Liberation Organization was discussing a new idea not found in the Palestinian National Charter — namely, the secular democratic state. The idea was put before the seventh session of the Palestinian National Council, and it was decided to refer it to the Executive Committee to prepare a comprehensive proposal on it. A decision on the matter was taken at the eighth session, held in Cairo on February 28, 1972. The council decided that the armed struggle of the people of Palestine was not against the Jews or against any faith, and that the people of Palestine were working to establish a Palestinian state free of Zionist colonialism, but a democratic state in which those who desired peace would live side by side, with equal rights and equal duties.

This decision constituted a clear shift regarding the population of Palestine, and represented a clear breach of the provisions of the Palestinian National Charter concerning the definition of a Palestinian and his natural right to Palestine. The decision abandoned the definition of who was a Palestinian Jew and its previous determination of who possessed the right to live in Palestine, to include those who wished to live there in peace. This was a clear signal of the acceptance of Jews as citizens in the secular democratic state that might be established in Palestine.

The issuing of this decision required amending some provisions of the National Charter, but this was not done, and the National Council approved it without amending its previous decisions. In this, the Palestinian National Council had taken a step toward abandoning its previous principles, given what the decision implicitly involved: a concession on the rejection of Zionist immigration during the period of the British occupation of Palestine. The Palestinian decision rejected Zionist colonialism, but no longer insisted that Jews not of Palestinian origin leave the country upon the establishment of a Palestinian state over it. In other words, the Palestinian National Council implicitly accepted the immigration of Jews to the country and their residence there.

In truth, the Palestinian decision implicitly involved acceptance of Zionist immigration, but this was not clearly disclosed by the Palestinian leaderships that had an interest in issuing it. The direction of these leaderships was clear and unambiguous when they interpreted the decision in a justificatory manner, as removing any impression that the Palestinians aimed to expel the Jews or throw them into the sea. For the leaders of the Palestinian factions, the democratic proposal meant that Arabs and Jews would live together in Palestine. One of them wrote that the democratic solution was opposed to Zionist racism and restored to Palestinians their rights while guaranteeing justice and equality for all. And this is precisely what the decision of the Palestinian National Council meant: it wanted Palestinians to return to Palestine, but without striking the chord of expelling or killing the Jews.

Despite this move toward implicit acceptance of Zionist immigration to Palestine, the Palestine Liberation Organization, through the decisions of the Palestinian National Council, continued to hold to Palestinian land and to reject anything leading to Palestinian concessions. At its session held in Cairo on July 7, 1971, the council decided on complete adherence to the full rights of the Palestinian people to liberate its land through the people’s armed struggle, and renewed its decisive rejection of all peaceful and capitulationist solutions… including Security Council Resolution 242…. The decision reflects the full rights to liberate the land, but does not say that this land, in its entirety, belongs to the Palestinians. That is, the decision left room to avoid a contradiction between the resolutions of the council’s eighth session and those of its ninth session. Since there had been acceptance of a secular democratic state, it was implicitly not expected either that all the land would belong to the Palestinians, since non-Palestinian Jews would be expected to share in the land.

The United Arab Kingdom Plan of 1972

Palestinian insistence on the whole of Palestine, and the linking of this insistence to the Arabs, became clear in the wake of King Hussein’s plan for a United Arab Kingdom. King Hussein announced his plan on March 15, 1972, calling for the establishment of a united kingdom comprising the Jordanian region and the Palestinian region — represented by the West Bank and any other Palestinian areas liberated from Jewish hands. King Hussein would be president of the kingdom, with Amman as its central capital; legislative councils would be formed, with the King remaining part of the legislative process and commander-in-chief of the army. Each of the two regions would enjoy a degree of decentralization, but without either having an independent identity.

The Palestine Liberation Organization felt that King Hussein’s plan came to crown the end of the war the King had waged against the Palestinian resistance in Jordan. Through his plan, the King was trying to bypass the Liberation Organization’s representation of the Palestinian people, to override the wishes of the Palestinian people, and to monopolize the solution to the Palestinian cause. The organization’s Executive Committee therefore hastened to call an extraordinary session of the council on April 6, 1972, in Cairo, and to call a popular conference to be held in Cairo as well. A large number of Palestinians were invited, and the resolutions of the popular conference were adopted as resolutions of the Palestinian National Council.

The popular conference concluded that it was necessary to return to certain fundamentals in dealing with the Palestinian cause — namely, a return to Jordanian-Palestinian cohesion, and the creation of an Arab front to confront what were called conspiracies. The conference rejected King Hussein’s plan and reaffirmed its previous rejection of Security Council Resolution 242. For despite the hardship the Liberation Organization was passing through, it found no justification for appeasement or for conceding its previous positions. It worked on various fronts to establish its standing and win support in the face of the King’s plan.

The Contingency of Palestinian Demands

But it appears that the priorities of the Liberation Organization were not always tied to a clearly defined strategy, so much as to contingent developments and global and regional shifts. This decisive rejection in the resolutions of the National Council’s tenth session was met by flexibility in the resolutions of other sessions. We observe this in the political and liberationist directives of the council after the 1973 war. New developments arose after the war, among them the Geneva Conference for peace in the Middle East, held in late 1973 under the auspices of the United Nations and the supervision of the United States and the Soviet Union, and attended by Egypt, Jordan, and Israel — and the disengagement negotiations that followed on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts.

Given the developments following the October war, the Palestinian National Council held a session to discuss the new developments, which produced various political positions indicating new developments in the concepts of Palestinian struggle and Palestinian demands. On one hand, the council affirmed its previous position rejecting Security Council Resolution 242, affirming that this resolution treats the people’s cause as a refugee problem and cannot be dealt with on any level. The council likewise rejected the Geneva Conference and whatever resolutions might emerge from it. Apart from that, the council’s new orientations emerged, including:

A. The establishment of national authority over any part of Palestinian territory. This was defined as a fighting authority working toward liberation and its continuation. Thus the concept of “national authority” entered the Palestinian political lexicon as something new. Whereas the focus had been on liberating the whole of Palestine, with no thought given to anything else, the policy of phases now entered the picture. This meant there was no objection to establishing an independent national authority over any part of Palestine that was liberated. This indicates that the Palestinian leadership had, over the years, become convinced — whether for objective or subjective reasons — that it was difficult to liberate the whole of Palestine at once, and so it accepted dividing the liberation process into phases.

B. The resolutions left no room to understand that there was a concession of part of the land of Palestine, so an additional, clarifying resolution came stating that the phased approach to liberation did not mean abandoning the proposal of the democratic solution — rather, that the organization would continue the struggle until the establishment of the democratic state. To remove any ambiguity, the council affirmed that the Palestinian entity, expressed through the independent national authority, would not under any circumstances be established in exchange for recognition of Israel and reconciliation with it on the basis of secure borders. It is an entity founded on the principle of liberation, not the principle of bargaining.

C. The resolutions spoke of a unity of struggle between the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples, and of Palestinian national unity, but did not refer to comprehensive unity and did not speak of the Arab unity stipulated in the Palestinian National Charter. The council put forward a new concept of unity, whereby it would only come about after the establishment of the independent national authority, and would include only the confrontation states — known to be Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. That is, the demand for Arab unity was set aside in favor of a limited “union” (as the resolutions put it), to be formed only after the establishment of the independent national authority — noting that the Palestinian National Charter had regarded the liberation of Palestine and Arab unity as mutually reinforcing factors, as I noted earlier.

D. The Palestinian National Council directed the Executive Committee of the Liberation Organization to work on the international stage to obtain the people’s rights and to find the paths leading to that, in a formula different from that of the aforementioned Geneva Conference. Specifically, the council asked the Executive Committee to present the Palestinian cause internationally within a framework rejecting Security Council Resolution 242, and defined for the committee a framework of action that would be either internationally specific or global, that would open the way for the Liberation Organization to participate as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and that the cause be presented in light of the United Nations Charter’s call for the right of peoples to self-determination, and in light of the resolutions issued by the United Nations affirming the Palestinian people’s right to equality and self-determination. The council instructed the committee that in its work it must not lose sight of the matter of the independent national authority, without conceding any part of Palestine or recognizing Israel and reconciling with it.

Verbally, it appears that the resolutions of the National Council remained committed to the Palestinian National Charter, except on the matter of Arab unity. But practically, it seems clear that the council had begun laying the groundwork for moving away from the provisions of the National Charter. It is understandable to establish an independent national authority on liberated land, but how can this authority be established through an international or global framework without recognizing the neighboring states, foremost among them Israel? How can this framework allow for the establishment of a Palestinian entity by forcing Israel to withdraw without anything in return? And how could Israel withdraw from the territories occupied in 1967 and leave itself under the threat of Palestinian arms? If we consider that the international framework would necessarily include powerful states supportive of Israel and providing it with military and material support, then the possibility of realizing the Palestinian resolutions is nothing but confused dreams and illusions.

Did the members of the council realize that their new orientation could only be achieved through real concessions, or not? I do not think they failed to realize this, especially since the matter is entirely clear and requires no exceptional mind for political analysis. From this, I believe that the council’s leadership at the time had begun laying the groundwork for a new political orientation, and the rest of the council’s members went along with it, whether through explicit or implicit acceptance.

This applies as well to the insistence on the United Nations resolutions concerning the Palestinians’ right to equality and self-determination. Did the members of the council realize that they were being selective in affirming some resolutions while ignoring others? There are resolutions concerning the partition of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state — does the United Nations accept the implementation of some of its resolutions while disregarding others? I do not think the council, at its twelfth session, was prepared to accept the Partition Resolution, since it insisted on liberating Palestine and establishing the democratic state, but practically speaking, it was heading toward this very outcome, and its demand for the implementation of United Nations resolutions constitutes evidence of that.

The Palestinian National Council opened a wide field before the Executive Committee of the Liberation Organization to maneuver and move at the international level. And thus began a new phase of Palestinian diplomatic activity. Many states recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization, which in turn established offices and diplomatic missions in many countries. The organization joined various international organizations and became an observer member at the United Nations. Political and diplomatic horizons opened before the organization, making it easier for it to reach world public opinion, particularly in Third World and socialist countries. This led to broad demands at the global level for securing rights, granting the Palestinian people the right to self-determination, and Israel’s withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967.

The Palestine Liberation Organization focused particularly on the countries of Western Europe and the United States, because these states are Israel’s principal backers. The United States received a substantial share of this focus, owing to its pivotal role at the global level and at the level of the Middle East. America provides Israel with all manner of support — aircraft, missiles, artillery, and huge economic contributions. And if there is any state capable of pressuring Israel to respond to the demand for withdrawal, it is only the United States. This is a logical matter, particularly since the organization saw the international arena as a field of struggle that might lead to the proposed phased solution. But it is not logical for the organization to seek, through America, to press Israel to withdraw from the territories occupied in ‘67 without the organization itself offering the required concessions, foremost among them abandoning the policy of phases and recognizing Israel and establishing good relations with it.

And this is exactly what happened, as the United States began, from time to time, to voice certain statements through some of its officials, indicating that the United States did not view the Palestinian cause as a refugee problem, but without going so far as to recognize the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination. Meanwhile, the United States offered a response to the organization’s attempts to draw closer to it and obtain its recognition. The United States, through its then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, said it made opening a dialogue with the Liberation Organization conditional on the latter’s recognition of Israel’s right to exist, recognition of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and renunciation of terrorism.

The American conditions were very heavy for the Palestine Liberation Organization, particularly since all the resolutions of the Palestinian councils contradicted these conditions, and popular sentiment still favored the liberation of Palestine and rejected making concessions. Despite this, it was clear that the Executive Committee exploited a clause in the resolutions of the National Council’s twelfth session, which stated the necessity of developing the tactics needed to reach the establishment of an independent national authority while continuing to work for the complete liberation of Palestine. The Executive Committee interpreted this clause in a manner that allowed it to hint that it would accept Security Council Resolution 242. That is, it confided to the United States that it would accept Israel’s existence. The organization made this conditional on recognition of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination.

The Liberation Organization made no progress on the American front, nor was it helped by the states that had recognized it and recognized the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination. In addition to this failure, the Liberation Organization faced a difficult situation in Lebanon, and all Palestinian forces became consumed in a grinding war, and so the resolutions of the thirteenth session of the Palestinian National Council, held in Cairo on March 12, 1977, came in keeping with the feeling of bitterness that had begun to hang over the Palestinian atmosphere. The Palestinian leadership had nothing new to say to the council, and so it emerged with resolutions that amounted to little more than a rehashing of previous resolutions calling for national unity, support for armed struggle, and rejection of Security Council Resolution 242.

But the thirteenth session took a decision to strengthen Arab solidarity, thereby dropping the language of unity and union, and the Palestinians fell in behind the Arab regimes that had begun speaking of Arab solidarity as a substitute for the slogan of Arab unity, whose time, they said, had passed. The session also responded to American demands by rejecting the American proposals aimed at Arab capitulation and the rejection of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

The spirit of rejection mixed with bitterness extended through the fourteenth session of the National Council, held in Damascus on January 15, 1979. This session came after Sadat’s visit to Israel and his refusal to heed the Arab call to reverse course and his signing of the Camp David accords. This session focused on the unity of the Palestinian people, the defense of the Liberation Organization, and the rejection of capitulationist proposals. The session affirmed adherence to United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 3236 and 3237. The first resolution recognized the Palestinian people as among the peoples possessing the right to self-determination, while the second granted the Liberation Organization observer status at the United Nations.

Regarding the Camp David accords, they were rejected by the council, which stressed the necessity of confronting and foiling them, considering them an American-Zionist conspiracy. It called on Arab states to stand against this scheme aimed at liquidating the Palestinian cause. It made clear that the organization’s position toward any Arab regime would be determined according to its rejection or acceptance of the Camp David accords. The council considered the United States, sponsor of the accords, hostile to the Palestinian people and its aspirations, and declared that the organization would resist American policy in the region in order to foil it.

The fifteenth session, held in Damascus on April 11, 1981, was not different in its stance from the one before it. This session reformulated previous resolutions in addition to further resolutions regarding the organization of the Palestinian situation. But this session added a new dimension by directing praise toward what it called the democratic and progressive Jewish forces opposed to Zionism present within the occupied homeland. It said the role of these forces was positive in that they recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination. The resolution made clear that contacts could not be made with parties that adopted Zionism as a doctrine and a practice. Thus the Palestine Liberation Organization began distinguishing among Jewish settlers in Palestine — some good, some malicious. With this stated exception, the Liberation Organization permitted contact with the “good” type without this incurring any consequences.

By the end of the fifteenth session, it appeared that the Palestinians, represented by their National Council and the Executive Committee of the organization, were inclined toward flexibility in dealing with what they might accept, or with previous positions. No radical concessions occurred regarding Palestinian demands, but some concessions here and there from previous positions occurred that could be considered preparatory. That is, the council did not wish to put on the table everything that might achieve something for the Palestinian people, however small, but it planted seeds that could develop in the future. This is consistent with the observation that Palestinians, as was the case before 1948, do not rush to accept what is offered to them that might achieve something for them all at once and in one stroke, but prefer to accept in installments and gradually over time.

By the end of the fifteenth session, it was clear that the Palestinian National Council had changed its positions on a number of issues, among them:

First: the position on Arab unity shifted from being a path toward the liberation of Palestine, to a union between the confrontation states, then to Arab solidarity, then to national unity.

Second: the position shifted from liberating the whole of Palestinian territory to establishing an independent national authority over any part of Palestine that was liberated, on condition that the rest of Palestine be liberated afterward.

Third: it also became possible to accept Jewish immigration to Palestine through the idea of the democratic state, after there had been a specific demographic equation the Palestinian position had insisted upon.

Fourth: it became permissible to establish dialogue or relations with Jewish forces among Jewish immigrants, those who came to be called the democratic forces.

Fifth: the position on United Nations resolutions evolved from acceptance of those resolutions speaking of the right to self-determination and the return of Palestinians, to acceptance of United Nations resolutions without a clear specification of which resolutions were accepted and which were rejected — noting that this includes the 1947 Partition Resolution.

The Phase of Recognizing Israel

The phase now underway began with the end of the fifteenth session of the Palestinian National Council. This phase came to be marked by the growing prominence of the role of the organization’s Executive Committee, and particularly its chairman Yasser Arafat, at the expense of the Palestinian National Council. Whereas the Executive Committee had previously waited for the National Council’s decision before acting, it began, little by little, taking the initiative upon itself, and only afterward trying to obtain the appropriate decision from the National Council. This phase was described precisely, and perhaps unwittingly, by one Palestinian magazine published in Jerusalem, which titled an article about the convening of the Palestinian National Council by saying that the Palestinian National Council was ratifying Arafat’s plan — this about three months before the council even convened.

It was observed after the fifteenth session that the Liberation Organization began focusing on the West, particularly America, to secure approval for proposed solutions preserving at least some Palestinian rights, and likewise on the Israelis, hoping there might be some among them who would support a solution involving the establishment of a Palestinian state. The organization’s leadership was not content to contact only those it called the democratic forces, but established contacts with others as well, including Shimon Peres, one of the leaders of the Labor Party. On the level of Western Europe, the organization tried to persuade European states to recognize the organization in exchange for the organization declaring its readiness to recognize Israel. But this did not happen, given that the resolutions of the National Council did not grant the Executive Committee freedom to explore this bargain.

On the American front, matters grew worse, and the American position remained as it was, according to the conditions set by Kissinger. As for Israel, it did not respond to any Palestinian hint, and appeared determined to deal a harsh blow to the Liberation Organization in Lebanon. And indeed, this is what happened. Israel attacked the Palestinian forces in 1982 and besieged Beirut, forcing those forces to leave Lebanon.

Certain political developments occurred on the Palestinian side during the siege of Beirut that gave indications of Palestinian orientations in the phase that followed. For example, Yasser Arafat showed, in writing, his readiness to accept all United Nations resolutions relating to the Palestinian cause, which meant he was prepared to accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 alongside General Assembly Resolutions 181 and 194. This orientation was reinforced when he met with Israeli journalists in Beirut and gave them interviews indicating a desire to achieve peaceful coexistence in the region through an international framework defining the elements of peace in the region. Arafat clearly expressed his conviction in the possibility of coexistence between Israel and the future Palestinian state, which meant that the organization had become prepared to recognize Israel, according to the clarification of Issam Sartawi, one of the aides to the chairman of the Executive Committee.

Perhaps these statements came under the pressure of the siege circumstances imposed on the Liberation Organization in Beirut, but it later became clear that they were a prelude to taking serious steps in this direction. This meant the emergence of a current within the organization abandoning the policy of phases and the liberation of the whole of Palestinian territory. For as long as the matter was tied to recognizing Israel, this entailed security, legal, and military arrangements guaranteeing the process of coexistence within a phase of peace.

The organization was not alone in trying to prepare the ground for the phase after Beirut. Immediately after achieving military victory in Lebanon, American President Reagan announced his plan for resolving the Middle East problem, known as the Reagan Plan. The plan included an affirmation of Israel’s right to exist and its right to secure, recognized borders. The Palestine Liberation Organization was ignored, and the plan stated that the solution to the Palestinian cause must come through Jordan. The plan considered Security Council Resolution 242 the basis for the solution. This plan was immediately followed by an Arab plan issued by the Arab Summit held in the city of Fez, Morocco, in September 1982. This plan affirmed the necessity of Israel’s withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied in 1967, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, and the placing of guarantees by the Security Council to preserve peace among all states — in other words, mutual recognition between Israel and the Arab states. The Palestine Liberation Organization, through the chairman of its Executive Committee, endorsed the Fez plan, which was in no way consistent with the resolutions of the Palestinian National Council.

But the Palestinian National Council later corrected course during its sixteenth session, held in Algiers on February 14, 1983. The council rejected the Reagan Plan and endorsed the Arab plan, stipulating that the resolutions of the Fez summit represented the minimum for the political action of the Arab states, which must be integrated with work in the interest of the Palestinian and Arab struggle and rights. In this, the National Council had violated its own charter before amending its provisions. It is worth recalling that the council considers the amendment process to have a special character requiring a special session of the council, and that amendment requires a two-thirds majority.

The session also affirmed the independence of Palestinian national decision-making, and that national decisions would not yield to pressures directed against them. This resolution came in keeping with a phase of weakness the organization was passing through after the war in Lebanon. It was also consistent with a number of resolutions affirming the sole representation of the Palestinian people by the Liberation Organization, and its commitment to the people’s established rights.

At the Arab level, the resolutions affirmed the necessity of cohesion with the Arab liberation forces, and called for achieving Arab solidarity. As for Egypt, the council held to its previous resolutions and rejected Camp David, and affirmed its support for the Egyptian people until Egypt returned to its place in the struggle.

This was followed by another activity on the part of the chairman of the Executive Committee of the Liberation Organization — namely, his surprise visit to Egypt, which had been boycotted by decision of the Arab Summit and by resolutions of the Palestinian National Council. In the wake of the events of the Beqaa and Tripoli in Lebanon in 1983, and the Palestinian-Palestinian fighting they witnessed, led by a wing of Fatah under Said Musa and another wing under Yasser Arafat, and the departure from Lebanon of the fighters loyal to the chairman of the Executive Committee, Yasser Arafat decided to visit Egypt, which was considered to be outside the Arab ranks and not committed to achieving legitimate Palestinian rights. Arafat justified his visit by saying he wished to thank President Mubarak, who had worked to facilitate the safe departure of his forces from Lebanon. No official comment clarifying the position on this visit was issued by the organization’s Executive Committee, and the following National Council overlooked the matter.

The seventeenth session of the council, held in November 1984 in Amman, brought nothing new, being more like a wound-licking session, particularly after the split within Fatah and the emergence of sharp disagreements among the factions participating in the organization, as well as amid escalating tension between Syria and the organization. The session was an attempt to present the Liberation Organization to the world as unified and capable of continuing despite harsh circumstances. Perhaps the most notable thing the session decided was adherence to the Palestinian National Charter. Through this resolution it appeared that a return to roots and an attempt to rebuild on new foundations had begun. But subsequent developments showed that the council had taken its decision in an attempt at an emotional appeal to reunite the ranks and contain the disagreements on the Palestinian scene.

The year 1985 witnessed a broad launch into a new phase of thinking. Over the two years 1983 and 1984, the organization failed to win the favor of the United States, which never offered any sign of drawing closer to the organization, despite the implicit signals issued by organization officials, and despite the organization’s approval of the Fez plan and Yasser Arafat’s visit to Egypt. The organization therefore took another step, hoping it might make dialogue with the United States possible. This took the form of an agreement concluded between the organization and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, called the Amman Agreement. This agreement was issued after intensive consultations lasting several months, on February 11, 1985. The agreement was announced on the basis of the Fez Arab conference and on the basis of United Nations resolutions, with recognition of international legitimacy. The agreement held to several principles: land for peace, the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination, working to resolve the Palestinian refugee problem according to United Nations resolutions, and then a comprehensive and final resolution of the Palestinian cause through an international conference attended by all the permanent members of the Security Council. The two parties agreed that the Jordanian and Palestinian sides would be represented at the proposed conference by a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

This agreement introduced several new proposals to the Palestinian scene, which came to be adopted, at least by the chairman of the organization’s Executive Committee who signed the agreement. On one hand, the agreement indicated that there was now official acceptance of international legitimacy that had issued Resolutions 181, 242, and 338 — resolutions that had always been rejected by the Palestinian National Councils. It also indicated that acceptance of an international conference meant readiness to accept Israel as part of the region, and agreement to international guarantees ensuring the security and borders of each party to the conflict. This is in addition to the organization’s readiness to abandon its slogan that it was the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and its demand to be a full and independent partner in any talks aimed at achieving a just and comprehensive solution in the region. Through the agreement, it had become prepared to share in representation.

America did not respond positively to this development, and Arafat faced a broad campaign against the agreement from within Fatah and from other Palestinian factions. As a result, Arafat began to slow down coordination with Jordan and to stall, which prompted the Jordanian government, a year after the signing, to announce the suspension of coordination with the organization. And so the agreement entered a phase of dormancy.

The Cairo Declaration (The Terrorism Statement) of 1985

At the very time the Amman Agreement was in effect, Arafat worked to improve relations with Egypt, visiting it several times. On one of his visits, he broke all the constraints regarding the resolutions of the Palestinian National Council and declared that the relationship with Egypt was strategic, and an agreement of cooperation and consultation between Cairo and the organization was signed. But more important than this was the issuing of the terrorism statement in the name of the organization’s chairman. On November 7, 1985, Arafat announced a statement in which he said he renounced terrorism (renunciation meaning disavowal and condemnation), and that the Liberation Organization condemned all acts of terrorism carried out by individuals or groups against innocents anywhere. Arafat pledged to take deterrent measures against violators, and called on the international community to press Israel to stop its terrorist actions.

It was clear that the statement was also directed toward America. Matters had begun to converge toward the organization’s accelerating pursuit of American understanding. This declaration met one of the American conditions that the Washington government had insisted, in word and deed, on having implemented since 1975. In addition to this, the declaration effectively meant abandoning those fedayeen and fighting actions that had been a source of pride for Palestinians. It was as though the declaration had conceded that Palestinians had indeed been terrorists and that they would stop practicing this trait. This ultimately led to a rise in confusion and disputes on the Palestinian scene — a result that remained attached to every political step Yasser Arafat took that moved away from the provisions of the Palestinian National Charter.

On November 9, 1985, Arafat announced his readiness to accept all international resolutions concerning the Palestinian cause and called for an international conference to be held. He then followed his announcement with another, in which he showed readiness to recognize Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, but on condition that the organization be included in an international conference. He said his declaration of recognition would remain held in reserve until the necessary steps were taken to convene the international conference. This declaration, too, met one of the American conditions required of the organization.

It is worth noting that Arafat had become the decisive decision-maker within the Liberation Organization, and there did not appear to be any opposition of consequence facing him within the Executive Committee, as though the committee’s members had delegated to him the authority to take the appropriate political steps. These declarations of his were not made on the basis of resolutions issued by the Executive Committee — indeed, the terrorism-renunciation declaration was not even discussed by the Executive Committee until about two weeks after it was issued. The outcome was ratification of the declaration.

In the face of these political steps by the chairman of the Executive Committee, the resolutions of the eighteenth session of the National Council appeared entirely inconsistent, confirming the absence of coordination or any search for agreement between the council’s resolutions and the mandated executive authorities. On one hand, the session, held in late April 1987 in Algiers, rejected Security Council Resolution 242, on the grounds that it did not constitute a suitable basis for resolving the Palestinian cause, and affirmed what previous sessions had decided — that the resolution treats the cause of Palestine as a refugee problem.

The session insisted on a full-competency international conference attended by the permanent members of the Security Council, with the Palestine Liberation Organization present. Strangely, the session defined relations with Egypt according to the resolutions of previous councils. Stranger still, the council did not address Arafat’s declaration renouncing terrorism or his readiness to accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and made no reference to the agreement he had concluded with Egypt in 1985. This prompted many Palestinians to reflect on the role the National Council was playing, or the role it had abandoned playing.

The Nineteenth Session — Algiers — 1988

Arafat’s political orientations did not mature at the level of the Palestinian National Council until 1988 — that is, during the Intifada. The Intifada caused a great shock in the region that led to wide-ranging political movement, and the organization found in it a great opportunity for a broader push into the arenas of international politics and to persuade Washington to change its position. The organization initially offered Washington a lure, in an attempt to test the waters and its inclinations, through a document that became known as the Bassam Abu Sharif document. Bassam Abu Sharif sent an unsigned letter to the American administration in which he recognized Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and Israel’s right to exist. Washington tried to get Arafat to sign the letter, but he refused.

But the signature came from the Palestinian National Council at its nineteenth session, held in November 1988 in Algiers. The council announced the Declaration of Independence, which included the establishment of the Palestinian state on the basis of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181. This was the first time a Palestinian National Council had gone so far as to accept this resolution, and to abandon a portion of Palestine estimated at about 56% of its area. This, even though the council gave no impression that it would insist on holding to Resolution 181; rather, it proceeded to recognize Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which condition recognition of the right of the states of the region to live in peace, and which implicitly determine that Israel’s borders include, at minimum, those existing on the eve of the 1967 war. That is, the council declared the state on foundations that it contradicted in its own political resolutions. Resolution 242 does not include Resolution 181, nor does it consider it a reference for resolving the Middle East problem or the Palestinian cause.

The organization demanded the convening of an international peace conference, and was diplomatically active, particularly since its recognition of the Security Council resolutions constituted a new launch in its diplomatic work and a good opportunity for Washington to accept the principle of dialogue with it.

Washington did not accept the resolutions of the Palestinian National Council and did not respond to what the Liberation Organization wanted to achieve — namely, negotiations between itself and the United States. This refusal came in an entirely improper manner, to the point that Washington refused to grant Arafat an entry visa to the United States in order to deliver an address before the United Nations General Assembly. This, despite the fact that the organization’s leadership had worked to meet Washington’s three demands through the resolutions of the National Council’s eighteenth session.

In any case, the General Assembly held its session at the United Nations headquarters in Geneva in order to enable Yasser Arafat to deliver his speech. In his speech, Yasser Arafat referred to United Nations Resolution 181 concerning the establishment of two states in Palestine, but he did not demand its implementation. Arafat said, specifically:

Successive American administrations know that the only birth certificate for the establishment of the State of Israel is Resolution 181, issued by the General Assembly on November 29, 1947, which the United States and the Soviet Union approved at the time, and which provides for the establishment of two states in Palestine, one Arab-Palestinian and the other Jewish. How, then, does the American government explain its position, which acknowledges and recognizes half of this resolution — the half concerning Israel — while rejecting its other half, concerning the Palestinian cause?

Although the Declaration of Independence announced the establishment of a Palestinian state according to United Nations Resolution 181, the chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization did not demand it. He did not even try to ask why America rejected the other half concerning the Palestinian state, and replaced the phrase “the Palestinian state” with “the Palestinian cause.” But he made clear before the General Assembly that the State of Palestine, should it come into being, would reject violence and would not threaten any other state or attack its territory. He pointed to the necessity of convening an international conference on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and guaranteeing the legitimate national and political rights of the Palestinian people, foremost among them the right of self-determination. As for the future form of the Palestinian state, Arafat said it would be within a confederal union with Jordan. He then condemned terrorism, which he tried to disavow from himself, saying that many leaders had been accused of terrorism by their tormentors, but had ended up, historically, as heroes and guardians of their peoples’ interests.

But Arafat’s speech did not win Washington’s approval, which announced immediately that it did not meet the American conditions because it was vague. Through the Swedish foreign minister, Washington made clear exactly what it wanted from Arafat. And Arafat did nothing but announce his acceptance of the American conditions to the letter, on television screens and before the whole world, on December 14, 1988. Arafat held a press conference in which he began by reading a text in English that included acceptance of the three American conditions: acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, recognition of Israel’s existence and its right to peace and security, and complete renunciation of terrorism in all its forms.

And so some Palestinians, foremost among them Yasser Arafat, finally submitted to a fait accompli, on the terms of an arrogant enemy that had provided full support to Israel across decades. Israel became, from the standpoint of the internationally recognized Palestinian spokesman, an accepted, established fact, and so ended a phase of refusing to submit to force and to the enemies’ will, in favor of agreement and falling in line with those seeking a solution within the international equation imposed by the West.

And the result was not a Palestinian state, nor was there any recognition by the enemies of the rights the Liberation Organization had been demanding. What was gained, in return, was limited to the opening of a dialogue — not negotiations — between the United States, through its ambassador in Tunis, and the Liberation Organization, through its ambassador in Tunis as well.

The dialogue was feeble and formal, and it was not long before the United States found a pretext to halt it. The United States was not serious, and perhaps wanted to appear before the world to be fulfilling the promises it had made to itself since the days of Kissinger.

It appears the United States was not serious about dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization, particularly since it remained committed to Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It is true that the organization recognized the two resolutions as a basis for convening an international conference on the Middle East, and it is true that the organization’s chairman and the National Council had recognized Israel, but this recognition was tied to the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination and to the demand for complete withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967. This linkage contradicts the spirit and the letter of the two resolutions mentioned. And since the Palestinians had, over time, gradually come to accept what they had previously rejected, it was to be expected that they would continue along this gradual path toward accepting more of the positions they had previously rejected.

The organization tried, through its diplomatic efforts, particularly through Europe, to soften the American position, but without success. The situation remained stagnant even after the end of the Gulf War, which heralded the Arab states’ acceptance of Israel’s old conditions — namely, that the solution to the Middle East problem could only emerge from direct bilateral negotiations between Israel and each of its neighbors separately.

As for the Palestinian cause, its resolution became possible through negotiation either with King Hussein or with the residents of the territories occupied in 1967.

The Idea of the International Peace Conference (Madrid) in 1991

American Secretary of State James Baker put forward his idea for an international conference to resolve the Middle East problem in the wake of the end of the American-Iraqi war. Baker proposed convening an international conference under the joint auspices of the United States and the Soviet Union, which was on the verge of collapse, with the attendance of Israel and the Arab parties, each separately, and the attendance of the Palestinians within a joint delegation with Jordan.

The Palestinian National Council met to discuss the matter in September 1991 and decided to participate in the proposed peace conference on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and in a manner encompassing complete withdrawal, including Jerusalem, and achieving the principle of land for peace and the people’s established national rights. The council made a halt to settlement activity a condition, along with the necessity of international guarantees for that, and the right of the Liberation Organization to represent the Palestinians as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, with the terms of its participation defined on an equal basis affirming its status as the reference authority, the coordination of Arab positions to ensure a comprehensive solution, and the affirmation of the phases of the solution to ensure a final solution in accordance with the resolutions of international legitimacy. The council made clear that, through its participation in the peace conference, the organization aimed to secure the right to self-determination and national independence, complete withdrawal from the territory occupied in ‘67, a resolution of the refugee problem in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 194, which promises return or compensation for those who do not wish to return, the establishment of the Palestinian people’s sovereignty over the land, water, and natural resources and economic and political affairs, and the provision of international protection for the Palestinian people until the exercise of the right of self-determination and the removal of the settlements.

The Americans worked actively to persuade the Arab parties to participate in separate delegations at the peace conference, and sent letters of assurance to the various parties, including Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization. The American letter to the organization came through its accredited men in Jerusalem. Some Palestinians described the letter as promising the establishment of a Palestinian state, and some said it recognized the Palestinians’ right to self-determination. But Yasser Arafat described the letter as positive, though not providing assurances on three fundamental issues: the matter of Jerusalem, withdrawal, and the right to self-determination. But he did not say how the letter could be positive if it did not touch on these fundamental subjects. In truth, this letter did not affirm American support for the establishment of a Palestinian state. What the letter said was that if the result of negotiations with Israel was the establishment of a Palestinian state, the United States would agree to that.

The Palestine Liberation Organization entered the negotiations, casting aside the resolutions of the Palestinian National Council — resolutions that were already in violation of the Palestinian National Charter. For example, the Palestine Liberation Organization was not represented at the conference as an independent party; rather, a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation was formed. It is true that the organization directed the Palestinian delegation in practice, but formally and legally it was not represented. This is in addition to the fact that the organization was not free to choose the delegation’s members; rather, this was subject to the acceptance of the United States and Israel. That is, the approval of Israel and the United States for the delegation’s membership was a basic condition for membership, and each of the two states had to approve every single name. Meanwhile, the building or expansion of settlements did not stop, and the process of building and confiscating land continues to this day.

The negotiations moved to Washington and proceeded in rounds of varying length. Self-rule was initially proposed to the Palestinians, and they agreed to it on condition that it be tied to legislative powers leading to the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state. But the Israelis rejected this.

Two shocks occurred during the negotiations that plainly displayed Zionist terrorism and the insistence on continuing it. The first was the deportation of about four hundred activists of the Islamic movement from the country, and the second was the Hebron massacre. Israel deported that large number of Palestinians on December 17, 1992, on the pretext that elements of the Islamic movement had carried out fedayeen operations against the occupation. It was the largest deportation since the events of 1948 and 1967, and it was carried out in a harsh, ugly manner. The event was a test for the Palestinian negotiator, who declared, through the Liberation Organization, that there would be no return to the negotiating table until the deportees were returned. The negotiator did not hold firm, and returned to the negotiating table without the deportees having returned.

The Palestinian negotiator was put to the test again after the Hebron massacre, which took place on February 25, 1994, and claimed the lives of dozens of Palestinians at the hands of a Zionist inside the sanctuary and at the hands of the Israeli army. The Palestinian negotiator declared that he would not return to the negotiations unless the Palestinian people in the territory occupied in ‘67 were placed under international protection. The negotiator did not hold firm, and returned to the negotiating table without protection being achieved.

So would the Palestinian negotiator hold firm on a position? It later became clear that the real negotiations were not taking place in Washington, but in Oslo, the capital of Norway. Secret negotiations were taking place between Israel, led by Shimon Peres, and the Liberation Organization, led by Mahmoud Abbas. It turned out that the organization’s threat to halt the negotiations meant nothing more than halting those formal negotiations taking place in Washington. The people were waiting to see what the leadership would do regarding the continuation of the negotiations, while the actual negotiations never stopped or paused.

The Palestinian negotiator, like the Palestinian people, was taken by surprise by an agreement between Israel and the Liberation Organization that came to be known as the Oslo Accord, announced on September 13, 1993. The agreement dropped all the Palestinian conditions and demands that had been spoken of from 1919 up to that moment. It was signed by Mahmoud Abbas, by delegation from Yasser Arafat, without referring back to the councils that the Liberation Organization itself considers legitimate, representative of the Palestinian people, and the holder of decision-making authority. It is worth noting that Israel and the Western states supportive of it accepted Yasser Arafat’s individual approval of the agreement and did not require the prior approval of the Palestinian councils. Israel agreed on condition that the provisions of the Palestinian National Charter relating to what Israel calls terrorism be annulled, calling for their removal, at a deferred date.

The Oslo Accord largely repeated what Israel had, over time, proposed to the Arabs and the Palestinians — namely, the establishment of Palestinian self-rule in Palestinian areas without the Palestinians having sovereignty over a single inch of land. The old Allon Plan included this proposal, as did Golda Meir’s statements in 1973, Menachem Begin’s plan in 1977, and Menachem Milson’s plan in 1981.

The Oslo Accord was considered a first step toward a permanent solution to the Palestinian cause, and so decisions on decisive issues such as the refugees, the settlements, the city of Jerusalem, and the borders were deferred. In this way, the Palestinian leadership accepted managing its daily civil and religious affairs without having sovereignty. Indeed, it also accepted not being free to manage even these affairs, but sharing decision-making with Israel. This is what the Cairo Agreement, signed on May 4, 1994, made clear — an agreement considered an interpretation of the Oslo Accord regarding limited civil powers. The leadership dropped from the agreement the demand for an independent state and the right to self-determination, and, beyond that, agreed to pursue and punish Palestinians who attacked the occupation and to throw them into prison.

The Oslo Accord, in its essence, is a Balfour Declaration for 1917. Balfour said that Palestine would be regarded as a national home for the Jews, with due regard for the religious and civil rights of the non-Jewish minorities. The Oslo Accord differs from that declaration in one respect: it regards Palestine as the State of Israel, rather than as its national home. This brings us back to what Churchill told the Palestinian delegation in 1920 — that they had to accept the Balfour Declaration because they had no other choice.

Despite accepting a self-rule devoid of sovereignty and limited in its civil powers, the Palestinian leadership, as it has done historically, obscures the facts and tries to create popular impressions far removed from the truth. The leadership still speaks of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, and the head of the self-rule authority has called himself the Palestinian president, and the heads of the self-rule departments have called themselves ministers. And there is no small number of people who, as has historically happened, applaud, believing that the leadership has achieved victories. The pages of newspapers are still filled with congratulations, felicitations, and expressions of thanks directed at the president of the State of Palestine and its ministers.

In any case, I will return to this subject in greater detail.