The Oslo Accord

The Oslo Accord is generally characterized by granting the Palestinians self-rule in some of the territories occupied in 1967, without their having any sovereignty. The agreement gives Palestinians the right to manage their daily affairs, such as education, health, transportation, and social affairs, and so on, and it lays down broad outlines for the basis of dealings between the self-rule authority and the Israeli occupation, while deferring a decision on the decisive issues of the conflict, such as the refugees, Jerusalem, and the settlements. What follows is a brief discussion of the agreement.

The Preamble of the Agreement

The preamble of the agreement states that the negotiating Palestinian team — which has not lost its representative character, placed in parentheses (in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East peace conference) (of the Palestinian delegation) — represents the Palestinian people. This text differs from what appeared in the Rabin letter recognizing the organization, in that Israel, formally and legally, refused to have the negotiating team be a representative of the Liberation Organization. Although it was, in practice, the Liberation Organization that was negotiating, no Israeli recognition of this was ever issued, and the current text in the Declaration of Principles constitutes a legal escape hatch for Israel to disavow the organization’s participation in the negotiations, should the need for disavowal arise. The preamble brought something new, particularly in its text: recognition of mutual legitimate and political rights. This is a new development in the Israeli position, which has come to recognize legitimate and political rights for the Palestinian people. The Israeli position had traditionally spoken of the civil, religious, and humanitarian rights of the Palestinians, and now moved to declare, in writing, political rights. This is a development from the Balfour Declaration, issued in 1917, which ignored the political rights of those it called the non-Jewish population.

But the preamble gave no indication of the meaning of these legitimate and political rights, or of the subjects they might ultimately encompass.

The Terms of Reference for the Negotiations

Article One speaks of the goal of the current Israeli-Palestinian negotiations being the establishment of a Palestinian self-governing authority for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 — that is, the terms of reference for the final status rest on these two resolutions.

A quick look at Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 shows the following:

A. The two resolutions make no mention whatsoever of the Palestinian people and its rights. Even when 242 says “refugees,” it does not follow this with “Palestinians.”

B. Resolution 242 affirms that the solution in the Middle East is a matter between states, and that recognition, like security, is a matter for states alone. The Palestinians are not a state and are not included in the resolution as holders of a political right. Those concerned here are the Arab states and Israel.

C. Resolution 242 does not provide for withdrawal from all the territories occupied in 1967, choosing the wording “withdrawal from territories…” leaving the matter open to interpretation and negotiation. In this, the resolution contradicts the general principle laid out in the preamble, which affirms the Security Council’s non-acceptance of the acquisition of territory by war.

D. The Security Council resolution insists on mutual recognition between states, the guarantee of security and freedom of navigation in waterways, and the guarantee of territorial integrity for every state in the region. All these matters favor Israel, since it is the one seeking recognition, security, and territorial integrity, and because the waterways are in Arab hands.

E. Resolution 338 merely affirms 242.

So what is the Palestinian people’s relationship to these two resolutions, and why do the leaders of the Liberation Organization insist that these two resolutions be the terms of reference for the negotiations? This, even though the statements and declarations issued by these very leaders describing acceptance of the two resolutions as betrayal — and grand betrayal — would fill books and volumes. This is in addition to the fact that the resolutions of the Palestinian National Councils before 1988 had rejected these two resolutions. The 1988 council, however, accepted the two resolutions alongside Resolution 181, issued by the General Assembly, which provides for the establishment of an Arab state over about 44% of the area of Mandate Palestine.

The Elections

The agreement speaks of elections to form the council of the transitional self-governing authority, within a period not exceeding nine months from the entry into force of the Declaration of Principles. The following observations should be noted:

A. Israel made a concession in this area, in that it accepted that the elections would be held “under agreed supervision and international observation.” Israel had insisted on being the supervisor of the elections, but conceded to holding elections whose supervision would be a matter of agreement. Of course, this is an unspecified formula, but it is, in any case, a formula different from the Israeli position, which had rejected non-Israeli supervision. As for international observation, it remains merely formal, so long as it takes place under an agreed-upon supervision. And this is exactly what happened during the elections, where the international observers were false witnesses.

B. Jerusalem was excluded from the electoral districts, and its residents were permitted only to exercise the vote, under Annex 1, which stated that the Palestinians of Jerusalem may participate in the elections without Jerusalem being a Palestinian electoral district, in accordance with an agreement between the two parties.

C. The inability of the 1967 displaced persons to participate in the elections will not negatively affect their future status. That is, the matter of negotiating their right to return to their homeland, or lack thereof, is unrelated to their participation or non-participation in the elections. And here the exclusion of the 1948 refugees from the scope of discussion becomes clearly apparent.

Geographic Jurisdiction

Article Four of the agreement speaks of the jurisdiction of the council of the transitional government authority extending over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with the exception of matters that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. This is a strange principle that one can grasp neither at its beginning nor at its end. It is unclear, ambiguous in meaning, and open to many interpretations. The experience of implementing the agreement has shown its lack of clarity, and the predominance of Israeli interpretations.

The West Bank is not defined by borders or geographic areas, nor is the Gaza Strip. What is the West Bank and what is the Gaza Strip? The Palestinians say it is the land occupied in 1967, while Israel says Jerusalem is not part of the West Bank, nor is the Jordan Valley, and perhaps not Tulkarm and Qalqilya and the strip of villages adjacent to the 1948 ceasefire line. Some Israelis say the West Bank is merely populated areas. The actual implementation of the agreement has shown that the geography is so ambiguous that implementation takes the population into account rather than the geography. That is, the geographic area given over, in practice, to the self-rule authority was not given as land, but as a population living on land.

The text excluded from the West Bank and the Strip those matters that would be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. What are these matters? They are mentioned in a number of places in the agreement. For example, clause three of Article 5 states that these matters include Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, and borders…. Article Four of the Agreed Minutes stated that the council’s jurisdiction would extend over the land of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with the exception of matters that would be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, namely Jerusalem, settlements, military locations, and Israelis.

It is clear that the proposal of the matter of geographic jurisdiction is not accompanied by a proposal on the matter of sovereignty, nor even accompanied by the possibility of putting the establishment of a Palestinian state on the negotiating agenda for a final solution. Will the jurisdiction be over islands of population, or over a real homeland? And will the jurisdiction have powers rising to the level of sovereignty, or will it remain within local legislation regulating daily life? There is nothing in the proposal that instills any kind of reassurance in Palestinian hearts; rather, the agreement offers them anxieties, questions, and confusion. Did the organization sign on to the whole of Palestine being a national homeland for the Jews, with the Palestinians remaining a mere minority? Or is there hope that Israel will act in good faith and grant us a wide portion of the occupied territories to dispose of as we see fit? I do not think that relying on good faith constitutes a good method for predicting the outcome of negotiations.

The Withdrawal

The agreement provides for withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area. Article 5 states that the five-year transitional period begins immediately upon withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area. Article 14 states that Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, as set out in the protocol attached in Annex 2. Annex 2 states that Israel will carry out a scheduled withdrawal, at an accelerating pace, of its military forces from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.

So far, the agreement is fine and suggests a genuine withdrawal of Israeli forces. But Annex 2 adds that the responsibilities of the Palestinian Authority, which will be agreed upon, do not include “external security, the settlements, the Israelis, foreign relations, and other mutually agreed matters.” If external security is to remain in Israel’s hands, along with responsibility for the security of the settlements and the Israelis moving about the country, then from where exactly will the Israeli forces withdraw? If the settlements are scattered throughout the country, and if Israelis move about in every corner, and if the borders with Jordan and Egypt and the sea are wide, then what land is left for the Israeli forces to actually withdraw from? If an Israeli decides to buy something in Nablus, will an Israeli patrol accompany him for protection? And if a person from Hebron confronts a settler in Kiryat Arba, will Israeli soldiers pursue him inside the city of Hebron? The substance of the agreement says yes. At best, the matter is left to the Palestinian police, and if they fail to carry out their duty of protecting the Israelis, Israeli forces intervene. This is what paragraph (e) of clause 3 of Annex 2 indicates. The paragraph provides for the establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli cooperation and coordination committee for purposes of mutual security….

The agreement does not leave the matter vague, and Article 13 makes it clear. The article speaks of the redeployment or repositioning of Israeli forces. This redeployment is what Article 14 calls a withdrawal. This article indicates that there is no genuine withdrawal from the occupied land; rather, according to clause 2, when repositioning its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces must be redeployed outside populated areas.

So what authority does the Palestinian police have under these circumstances? Article 8 states that, in order to guarantee public order and the internal security of the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the council — the council of the transitional government authority — will establish a strong police force. This means its function remains within a local framework, concerning the population’s daily life, while Israel will continue to bear responsibility for defense against external threats, as well as responsibility for the overall security of the Israelis, for the purpose of protecting their internal security and public order. That is, the security matter will remain in Israel’s hands, and the Palestinians will be mere instruments in Israel’s hands whenever overall security and public order require it. The matter appeared plainly in the second annex to the Agreed Minutes. The annex states that it is understood that, following the Israeli withdrawal, Israel will continue to bear its responsibilities for external security and for the internal security and public order of the settlements and the Israelis. Israeli forces and Israeli civilians may continue to use the roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.

Practical experience has shown that the Palestinian police, including the security apparatuses, play the role of guardian of Israel’s security, working to pursue Palestinians who try to carry out, or who carry out, actions against Israel. It plays exactly the role played by the South Lebanon Army. The Authority’s security apparatuses have pursued the mujahideen, arrested a large number of them, tortured a number of them, and some have died in Palestinian prisons. The Authority has handed over a number of them to Israel, such as Hassan Salameh and members of the Surif cell. The Palestinian Authority also continues to supply Israel with security information and to receive intelligence training at the hands of American and Israeli intelligence. The Israelis, foremost among them Shimon Peres and Benjamin Netanyahu, have repeatedly praised the security role played by the Authority’s apparatuses in Israel’s favor.

As for cases where the Authority fails to carry out its tasks, Israel does not hesitate to enter the self-rule areas. Israeli forces have entered the self-rule areas in Gaza without announcement, and entered the city of Nablus with announcement. It is true that Israeli forces remain outside the Palestinian residential areas, but their specter still exists and can appear at any moment.

Jerusalem

There is no mention of Jerusalem in the agreement, except as a subject to be discussed in the permanent status negotiations. As for the residents of Jerusalem, they have been permitted, as I said, to participate in the elections for the council of the self-governing authority. It is as though we have thereby accepted separating the people of Jerusalem from their own electoral district, and placed them on the path toward affiliation with an electoral district other than their own.

The Refugees

There is absolutely nothing in the agreement indicating a right of return for anyone, whether of the displaced or the refugees. But there is a reference to the arrival of some people who have been trained to be police officers. Paragraph (c) of clause 3 of Annex 2 states that the police force will be formed from police officers recruited locally and from abroad (holders of Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt). The article adds that those who will join the Palestinian police force coming from abroad must be trained as police and police officers. It has become clear that Israel will allow the arrival of some men of the Liberation Organization for the purpose of implementing the agreement, and it has also become clear that it will allow the return of several thousand on bases it sets itself, but it will not allow the return of hundreds of thousands as some Palestinian officials like to declare. The picture now appears as follows:

A. Israel has allowed the return of thousands of the deported, and will allow the return of others.

B. Israel will allow the return of some who lost their right to residency identity in the occupied land because their permits expired or because of their advanced age.

C. Israel will allow the reunification of some families, particularly the pressing cases among them.

D. Israel will allow the return of some of the organization’s leaders.

E. Israel will not allow the return of the 1948 refugees.

F. Israel will not allow the return of hundreds of thousands, because this contradicts the theory of Israeli security and Israel’s intention to turn the Palestinians into small islands of population.

The Taba Agreement

The Oslo Accord was followed by an agreement called the Cairo Agreement, which organized the detailed relationship between the Palestinian Authority in Gaza and Jericho, but it was superseded by the Taba Agreement, which organizes the relationship after expanding the scope of the redeployment of Israeli forces in the West Bank. The Cairo and Taba agreements drew their details from the Oslo Accord, which constitutes the basic principles governing the relationship between the Liberation Organization and Israel, and is thus considered an interpretation of the agreement for purposes of implementation on the ground. Since the Cairo Agreement has been superseded, it suffices here to note the most important points of the Taba Agreement.

The Council

The Taba Agreement establishes a Palestinian council elected directly by the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, including the residents of Jerusalem. The council, according to the agreement, exists for the purpose of enabling the Palestinian people to govern themselves democratically, and represents a beginning in the direction leading to recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just rights, which will in turn lead to the establishment of democratic Palestinian institutions (Article Two, clause 2). But the agreement does not say how democracy will function while the Palestinian people remain bound by agreements with Israel that regulate its various affairs, including the legitimacy of the council’s own decisions.

The agreement provides that the council will have legislative powers and executive powers… and that the council will be responsible for all the legislative and executive powers for all the responsibilities transferred to it, as set out in the agreement (Article Three, Article 2). That is, the council does not possess “the” legislative powers, but rather powers without the definite article, limited to those that will be transferred to it. For this reason, the agreement provides that decisions of the council’s executive authority must not conflict with this agreement (Article Nine, clause 3). The council’s legislative powers are defined in Article Eighteen, clause 4, which states that legislation — including legislation amending or annulling laws or military orders already in existence outside the council’s powers, and legislation conflicting with this agreement — is considered void. The agreement stipulates that no legislation takes effect except upon the signature of the head of the executive authority, and that the head of the authority will not sign any legislation that conflicts with this agreement. And per clause 5 of the same article, legislation is communicated to the Israeli side on the legal committee.

In practice, it turned out that the council is more a structure than an effective substance. It became clear, through the work of the council elected in January 1996, that it possesses no serious powers, and that the head of the Authority controls it completely and largely disregards its decisions. But council members have been active in the areas of mediation and clientelism and in criticizing the conduct of the self-rule authority’s departments, and some of them have tried, without positive result so far, to turn the council into a genuine legislative authority.

Individuals in the Agreement

The agreement addresses individuals in special positions, or who may be part of the agreement, such as collaborators with Israel. The agreement says, regarding these, that Palestinian collaborators with the Israelis must not be subjected to any harm or pursuit, and that appropriate steps will be taken in this regard (Article Sixteen, clause 2). As for Palestinians returning from abroad who have previously carried out actions against Israel, the agreement says that upon their return to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, they will not be subject to any accountability from the Israeli side for actions carried out against Israel before September 13, 1993 (Article Sixteen, clause 3). As for the Palestinian mujahideen, the two parties agree on the necessity of pursuing and punishing them. This is one of the pillars of the destruction of the Palestinian psyche. The collaborator and the agent have freedom, while the mujahid has prison and persecution. The agent has become a person of standing, while the mujahid is subject to pursuit, arrest, and torture. Article Fifteen, clause 1 states that both parties must take the necessary steps to stop any hostile actions and stop any form of terrorism and crimes against any person present in the areas of the other party, or attacks on his property, and that legal measures must be taken against anyone who carries out such acts.

The Land

The Taba Agreement divides the West Bank into three areas:

1. Area A, which includes the populated areas and constitutes about 4% of the area of the West Bank. In this area, the council holds the powers of internal security and order.

2. Area B, which includes the villages and constitutes about 26% of the area of the West Bank. In this area, the council holds various civil powers, while security powers remain in Israel’s hands.

3. Area C, which includes the rest of the West Bank areas and constitutes about 70% of the area. These are unpopulated areas, such as the Jordan Valley area, over which Israel exercises civil and security powers, and it is defined in the agreement as follows: Area C is areas in the West Bank outside Areas A and B, and, with the exception of matters that will be negotiated in the final negotiations, will be transferred to the council’s jurisdiction as set out in this agreement (Article Eleven, clause 3, c).

In any case, this is a temporary agreement, subject to development through the implementation of the phases of redeployment. It remains in effect until a permanent agreement is reached, which will lay down solutions for the deferred subjects — namely, Jerusalem, the settlements, the specified military areas, the Palestinian refugees, the borders, and foreign relations.

The Consequences of the Oslo Accord on the Palestinian Scene

The Oslo Accord has many consequences, some primary and some secondary, all of which affect Palestinian society inside and outside the country, and Palestinians’ internal and external relations. The agreement imposes itself on the overall web of relations, and on the mental and emotional makeup of the Palestinian, at both the personal and public levels, and conditions are bound to develop in ways that will affect the social and economic fabric as well. I cannot cover here all the existing transformations and expected future fluctuations, and I will limit the discussion to pivotal subjects carrying great weight in determining what currently exists, and which play a role in shaping future conditions. They can be summarized as follows:

First: taking over the administration of the population’s daily affairs

The Palestinian Authority’s taking over the administration of the population’s daily affairs is considered a fundamental development on the Palestinian scene, and there is no doubt that this development somewhat eased the psychological tension among Palestinians arising from official dealings with occupation soldiers. There is grumbling in the Palestinian street generally about Palestinian administrative corruption, characterized by the exploitation of power, mediation, and clientelism, and there is grumbling about administrative chaos and the burden of the fees imposed on transactions, but generally, a Palestinian can now argue for his personal right, or find a mediator to resolve a personal problem. There is a kind of psychological relaxation in Palestinian cities, despite discomfort over material matters such as taxes and fees. I will return to the matter of corruption.

On the other hand, it is clear that the men of the Authority are repeating the organization’s experience in Jordan and Lebanon. They behave with a great deal of arrogance, particularly since they have obtained new cars, mobile phones, and a distinguished social status among no small part of the Palestinian people in the central region and Gaza. The very same behaviors that led the Lebanese people, the Jordanian people, and perhaps the Tunisian people, to question the revolutionary nature of the Palestinian revolution are being repeated in Ramallah, Nablus, Gaza, and other Palestinian cities. These behaviors have been reinforced by the type of upbringing the Palestinian people underwent over time, which does not rely on examining the substance of matters but relies on conformity and resounding slogans. A large part of the people behaved in a way that gave the men of the Authority the illusion that they were great men making honorable history, and that they deserved the superior status in which they had placed themselves. Palestine is witnessing the very same behaviors that were one of the important causes of the fighting that broke out between the forces of the Liberation Organization and Arab forces, a fighting whose price was paid by the Palestinian people and other Arab peoples.

In any case, the Palestinians’ taking over civil affairs is considered an Israeli achievement, one Israel worked to bring about since 1967. Since the Allon Plan in the late 1960s, Israel has repeatedly proposed to Jordan, at times, and to the Palestinians, at other times, the administration of the population’s daily affairs in the occupied land. Israel was never interested in administering the population’s daily affairs, and regarded doing so as a burden it needed to be rid of, because it leads to direct, daily friction between the population and the occupation, and because it occupies it with matters that do not concern it. It saw that a self-rule administered by the Arabs or the Palestinians would relieve it of this burden, distance it from Palestinian population centers, and erase from it the image of an occupying state that harms it on the world stage. That is, self-rule, as I noted earlier, relieves it of its burdens without its conceding sovereignty over the land. It is merely an Arab administration within Israeli sovereignty, alongside Arab recognition of Israel’s security needs.

Second: carrying out repressive actions

The Palestinian Authority inherited from Israel the repressive actions directed against Palestinians, such as pursuing people, storming homes, preventing freedom of expression, closing newspapers, opening fire on crowds, and throwing the mujahideen into detention. After its arrival in Palestine, the leadership established a number of security apparatuses exceeding the number of security apparatuses in neighboring states, carrying out three basic functions: the first is pursuing Palestinians and preserving Israel’s security in implementation of the agreements; the second is neutralizing these apparatuses against one another through competition and rivalries among those in charge of them, so that the head of the Authority remains their master and arbiter. It is no secret that these apparatuses have exchanged gunfire with one another in Gaza, Jericho, Nablus, and elsewhere, and wounded have fallen among them. The third function relates to matters of civil security, such as pursuing thieves and resolving civil disputes among people, and so on.

The Palestinian Authority has planted numerous security apparatuses among the people, to the point that the Palestinian people have recently begun developing new behaviors similar to those prevailing in the Arab countries. In occupied Palestine, a culture of “walls have ears,” widespread among Arabs generally, has developed. In keeping with this atmosphere of intimidation, the Palestinian Authority established the State Security Court, which represents the true embodiment of occupation in its concept and practices. This court not only violates internationally recognized norms, but also violates the principles of the agreements with Israel. For example, Article 14 of the Cairo Agreement calls on “Israel and the Palestinian Authority to exercise their powers and responsibilities under this agreement with due regard for internationally accepted norms and principles of human rights and the rule of law.” Article Six states that the Palestinian Authority bears responsibility for the judiciary through an independent judicial authority. The State Security Court does not adhere to internationally recognized norms, nor is it independent. That is, the self-rule authority’s practices are more oppressive than what Israel itself requested, and Israel does not intervene so long as both the oppressor and the oppressed are Palestinian.

Israel insisted, since 1967, on handing over responsibility for self-rule to Palestinian collaborators who would be loyal in preserving its security and interests. The organization opposed this proposal, describing anyone who accepted it as a collaborator and a traitor deserving liquidation. If that is indeed the case, why did Israel hand over the leadership of self-rule to the organization? It has become clear that the organization is more effective in implementing Israeli demands, because it implements them under a national cover and with the support of a large number of Palestinians. Could the Village Leagues, had they taken over self-rule, have carried out the repressive practices the Palestinian Authority carries out? Of course not. It would have been expected that the head of the Village Leagues would have felt embarrassed to speak of arresting Palestinians, and he might have heard accusations of betrayal and collaboration with his own ears, but officials in the Palestinian Authority speak of security cooperation with Israel without any sign of shame or embarrassment appearing on their faces.

This situation is consistent with the state of security laxity that prevailed within the ranks of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the various factions, which led to the deaths of many Palestinians at Israeli hands. This laxity led to Palestinian frustration and defeats, and the current situation is marked by the infiltration and repression of the population’s ranks. In the past, Palestine’s sons were killed amid military statements that fabricated illusory victories; now they are repressed amid national slogans about the “achievements” the Liberation Organization claims to have made. The methods differ; the result is the same.

Third: economic dependency

The daily bread of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza now comes largely from Israel and the donor states. It is true that there is some work in the territory occupied in ‘67, but people turn into exhausted orphans if Israel closes the doors to work and the donor states decide not to give. The Palestinian people are exposed to the punishment of hunger at any time, and their basic needs are exposed to pressure whenever their enemy sees fit. The Authority uses this situation to serve its purposes in promoting the agreements with Israel, since it continually reminds people that respecting the agreements and staying away from actions that anger Israel makes it easier for them to work in Israel and encourages the donor states to give more money. For the sake of the public interest, says the Authority, it is necessary to pursue and suppress those opposing the agreement. It is economic pressure and dependence on others in order to guarantee Israel’s security.

This phase converges entirely with the phase preceding the agreement with Israel, in that it was not a phase of economic construction but a phase of buying loyalties. Before the agreement, the Palestinian people were left to search for their daily bread in Israel; now the Palestinian Authority uses work in Israel as a pressure card against the Palestinian people. It is clear that the phases are complementary and marked by a single approach, even if the language of description differs from one phase to another.

Fourth: the Zionization of concepts

Fundamental changes have occurred in the Palestinian struggle vocabulary since the signing of the agreements. It has become easy for a Palestinian to describe a military operation against Israeli targets as terrorist, and to label those who carry it out as terrorists. Other expressions have come into circulation, such as coexistence, moderation, and extremism. The Palestinian is now required to turn history upside down, to disown everything he studied, read, believed, and struggled for, and to embrace Zionist claims, searching for justifications and cosmetic covers for them.

The overturning of concepts began with officials in the self-rule authority, who are working hard to spread what they began. The officials started with a kind of embarrassment, but they soon shed it from their faces, and now speak with confidence and pride. If one were to compare the speech of General Antoine Lahad, commander of the South Lebanon Army, with that of an official in the Palestinian Authority, one would find no difference. Both sides speak of the well-being of the people, whether in Lebanon or in Palestine, and their pursuit of a life of safety and security that achieves the masses’ interest. Both speak of fighting terrorism and terrorists as a basic requirement for solving the people’s problems and preserving their achievements. In the end, both work toward the Zionization of the Arab mind, in a manner that serves Israel’s interest.

The Zionization of the Arab mind is the best means of normalization, because it works to overturn concepts and ideas and is not limited to mere administrative and economic measures. It is an educational process that overturns a person’s character and turns him away from his roots, heritage, history, religion, and beliefs, in favor of another party seeking to dominate him. This Zionization has benefited from the upbringing of slogans and dependency the Liberation Organization adopted before the agreements, which left the Palestinian susceptible to rapid influence by fluctuating events, owing to his inability to understand developments, connect them to one another, and draw independent conclusions.

Fifth: the tribal transformation

For the encirclement to be complete, the process of tribal transformation that the Liberation Organization began early on, and emphasized in the early 1980s, must be completed. Israel and the West generally are comfortable dealing with Arab tribes, given the flexibility and willingness to reach understandings they display in exchange for achieving tribal interests. It was the tribes that solidified their pact with colonialism and entrenched its foothold in the Arab homeland, which entrenched Arab fragmentation, facilitated the exploitation of resources, and made Arabs pliant, through their crushing defeats, to Western dictates. In Palestine, the family leaderships were Palestine’s leaderships before 1948, and proved their ability to draw in the masses through speeches, festivals, and promises, and to secretly sell land to the Jews. This is a comfortable leadership model, easy to deal with at the negotiating table, characterized by Arab demands that the holder of sovereignty considers at his own discretion.

It is important, for Palestine to be lost smoothly, that war be waged on the manifestations of modernity and free thought, by returning the Palestinian to his tribal mentality, whether embodied in a traditional tribe or in a factional “tribe” insisting on his subordination. The Liberation Organization succeeded in restoring the families to the forefront, and the Authority has succeeded in instilling tribal values even more deeply, through the currency of positions and the prestige and access to money that accompany them. The success is evident on the pages of Palestinian newspapers, which highlight family congratulations and felicitations, and it was clear during the elections for the Palestinian council that family roots and places of residence played a prominent role in determining the results.

The tribal mentality is a backward mentality that feeds on free thought and on religion, which governs relations among people with justice. And if there is a protection for the agreement with Israel, backwardness constitutes its best and most useful protection. There is nothing better for Israel than a mentality that serves it while believing itself victorious. There is no doubt that Israel is militarily strong now compared to the Arabs, but its military superiority remains under threat unless accompanied by Arab backwardness. Backwardness in Arab regimes and governments guarantees the suppression of positive phenomena in the Arab homeland at various levels and in all fields. Military power is neither permanent nor guaranteed. It is a power fraught with doubt and uncertainty and subject to fluctuations, but it stands in a better position if the opposing side develops habits and traditions that confine or eliminate the field of military competition.

The Present as an Extension of the Past

In the course of its justification for the negotiations and then the agreement with Israel, the Palestine Liberation Organization said this was due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, patron of the Palestinian cause, and the defeat of Iraq, which had been a major Arab power to be reckoned with. It is clear that this justification is merely a pretext to convince people of what is happening, but it is not true. The organization worked for many years to seek a peaceful solution to the Palestinian cause, and adopted various policies meant to gradually drive the Palestinian into a corner of severe frustration that would compel him to accept any solution. Those policies succeeded, and the Palestinian found himself empty-handed, with nothing to fall back on. He found himself without military capability, a good economy, Arab supporters at either the popular or official level, or even morale from which any good might be hoped. The Intifada was not spared corruption and corruption-spreading, and it convinced many people that the disappearance of masked men from the Palestinian street, or the disappearance of military patrols from the streets of cities and villages, constituted an acceptable solution to the Palestinian cause.

Sound logic says that whoever fails should leave his position and hand it to someone more capable, or to someone with the energy for renewal. The Palestinian leadership failed at every turn, and broke every promise it made to the people, and despite this, it remained enthroned, working to create justifications for what happened over the years, until defeats turned into victories. This leadership established various apparatuses within the Liberation Organization, but they were, for the most part, dependent apparatuses whose personnel and performance revolved around Arafat. The organization never established a court to try those who overstepped and those who failed; indeed, the organization never even evaluated developments except behind closed doors, without the Palestinian people ever hearing of lessons learned or a course corrected. Young men were killed for nothing, massacres were carried out against the people, serious moral violations were committed, and the people never heard of any accounting or punishment. Even the officers who fled the battlefield in Lebanon in 1982 were never held accountable; rather, they were rewarded.

If the failure was not prepared to relinquish his position of responsibility, then where were the revolutionaries whose revolutionary spirit would refuse to fall in line behind a failure? Why did Palestinian strugglers bow their heads and accept the existing distortions and the shortcomings that had occurred? The answer, of course, lies with whoever held the money, which was able to bend those around it to its will. Whoever refused the money and preferred to keep his integrity was among the first of the fighters, and met his fate early. Whoever accepted, however, had to accept the developments and go along with them, even if he whispered against them in secret. Among the Palestinian people there are those who know a veteran fighter and hear from him whispers about the existing situation. The prevailing view can be summed up as: this phase is very bad, and it is the development of a clear approach in the organization’s leadership, but there is nothing to be done, particularly since one’s livelihood would be put at risk if one opposed the leadership. And it is easy to find those who speak these thoughts in a whisper defending the organization’s policy fervently in public. They have been backed into a corner where they know they are contradicting themselves and not conveying the truth to the people, but they do not want to lose the material privileges they receive.

A policy that does not set a person morally free, does not give free rein to independent thought and the taking of initiative, and does not instill self-confidence and the bearing of responsibility, cannot but end in collapse. Results have their premises, and the harvest is of the nature of what is sown. What the Liberation Organization sowed over the years, it has reaped in the current phase.

What we have arrived at is not separate from the past; rather, it is its result and its logical development. And the Palestinian policies currently underway do not deviate from the policies of the past, but complement them and express a political continuity flowing from a mind that is fully aware of what it is doing. Was the Oslo Accord, then, inevitable? Yes — by the standards of the Liberation Organization’s policy. A policy of this kind can produce nothing but an offspring like Oslo.