Yasser Arafat

Why did Palestinian politics proceed in this manner for so many years? Was there no collective mind working to monitor and identify mistakes and correct them? Or did the entire Palestinian leadership move like a mob, unable to notice a mistake or give developments a moment of thought and reason? Or were the leaders absorbed in matters that removed them from prudence and the simplest rules of intelligence? To answer these and other questions, it is necessary to examine the performance of the foremost leader, Yasser Arafat, for this may provide a key to clarifying matters.

I will not delve here into the development of Arafat’s personal life, since that is of little concern to us in this book. Moreover, a number of writers have written about this subject, such as the English writer Kiernan in his book entitled Yasser Arafat. Instead, I will focus here on Arafat’s leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian people, which shaped the Palestinian trajectory and left its powerful imprint on the development of the Palestinian cause. After becoming familiar with Arafat’s leadership style, it may be possible to say that the development of the Palestinian cause was essentially an expression of Arafat’s pattern of decision-making. Understanding the various leadership styles within the PLO can only be achieved through understanding Arafat’s methods of formulating policy and making decisions.

Yasser Arafat occupied the leadership of Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization for a long period exceeding thirty years. Throughout this period, he remained the sole central figure capable of mobilizing people, making decisions, and exercising control. Other important figures appeared alongside him, but they remained dwarfed by him, unable to constrain his freedom to maneuver, attract support, and exert influence. Their role remained marginal and could move only within the framework of the policies he devised.

Yusuf Arabi appeared alongside Arafat, but he was killed under mysterious circumstances. Abu Ali Iyad also emerged, but he was killed in the battles in the forests of Jordan in 1971. Abu Iyad likewise emerged, but he was removed from the second leadership position, leaving him a leader without leadership. As for Abu Jihad, he did not present himself as someone who would correct the Palestinian course whenever signs of dysfunction appeared. In any event, he was assassinated by Israeli intelligence. Several other Palestinian leaders distinguished themselves through their intellectual or military abilities, but they were unable to advance to the highest position of leadership, such as George Habash, Ahmad Jibril, and Said Musa.

Over the years, the following leadership characteristics emerged in Arafat:

First: Toughness

Yasser Arafat was a tough, difficult, strong-willed man who possessed a high capacity for patience and determination. He had a powerful will that was difficult to shake or soften in the face of harsh events, the brutality and power of his opponents, or their conspiracies. He did not yield before harsh circumstances, the enormity of events, or the darkness of the future. Rather, he forged his path with vigor and strength, leaving his opponents, their conspiracies, and their various attempts to influence him or seize control of his decisions behind him.

Bullets did not frighten him, nor did bomb explosions, the roar of tanks, or statements and attacks by political parties and their efforts to distort him and his policies. It was extremely difficult for events to carve pain into his psyche or drive him toward weakness and humiliation. Nor did they deter him from what he had resolved upon or what he had concluded within himself was correct. It was difficult to shake his determination to work and continue along the path he considered appropriate, or to make him reverse the direction of his thinking.

He possessed strong resolve and did not concern himself with those he left behind or with what might happen after he left a particular place.

Second: The Ability to Maneuver

Yasser Arafat possessed a unique ability to maneuver, evade, and deceive. He was adept at circumventing, disguising, obscuring, sowing doubts and suspicions, escaping, and slipping away. He spent most of his time on what he himself called “tactics”—that is, searching for means, methods, and mechanisms that would get him out of difficult situations and into safety, or drag others into predicaments from which it would be difficult for them to escape unharmed. He was an exceptional maneuverer who could manage his affairs from day to day with considerable ease.

In exercising this ability, he relied on several prominent patterns:

A — A constant readiness not to tell the truth in a manner that made it difficult to refute him. He was skilled at evading the truth and circumventing it, and adept at avoiding honesty or stating facts as they were. Not telling the truth was a habit for him to such an extent that it became a fixed way of life, or a reality expressing a philosophy of work. Telling the truth meant revealing one’s cards, which meant descending into a weak position. For him, this was a pattern to be used against friends and enemies alike. Yet he used it against the Palestinian people more than against any other party, because others possessed intelligence capabilities that made it easy for them to discover things.

B — A readiness to use the courtesies that Arabs generally appreciate. He was skillful in using sweet words, already mixed with the warmth of kisses and embraces. Before discussing his subject, he would try to win over his counterpart, or whoever he was meeting among powerful and influential people, through the warmth of the encounter, cordial treatment, and sweetness of speech. This approach enabled him to continue maneuvering and walking through barbed wire without suffering painful or damaging consequences.

His method succeeded greatly with Arab leaders who suffered from psychological complexes associated with feelings of inferiority. Arafat was skilled at praise—or, in popular terminology, “inflating the head,” flattery, and giving his interlocutor the impression that he enjoyed absolute trust and profound appreciation. This approach largely failed with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. In his praise, Arafat never forgot to touch upon history, shared destiny, and the historic role played by the leader concerned.

C — A constant readiness to abandon feelings of pride and the desire to preserve one’s dignity. Pride and dignity sometimes lead to rigidity and insistence upon values and principles. He did not like to adhere to specific values or principles that might give him the character of someone who believed firmly in something or remained steadfast, or that might lead him to anger and sever his relationship with others. He was prepared to tolerate insults without becoming agitated by them, and to pretend that nothing had happened that diminished his dignity or offended him personally.

Arafat was repeatedly personally insulted in the Arab world by Arab leaders, yet he was prepared to absorb such matters and return once again to the source of the insult. He was also insulted by the Israelis, but he did not become agitated. Among the most notable things he was able to endure was removing his Palestinian keffiyeh when he entered Tel Aviv to offer condolences to the widow of Yitzhak Rabin. At times, the Israelis prevented him from traveling by his aircraft around the West Bank, yet he did not utter a word in protest.

But he did not display this characteristic when Palestinians were concerned. He was prepared to kill if he was subjected to a form of personal affront by a Palestinian or if someone attempted to challenge his authority or leadership.

Third: Love of Control

Yasser Arafat was fond of controlling others. He had a paternalistic, top-down leadership style and did not like hearing opposing opinions or criticism. He preferred to keep all the strings in his own hands without competition. In his internal policies, he demonstrated an extraordinary ability to hold onto matters and monitor various affairs and actions, whether at the level of individuals or Palestinian institutions. To this end, he adopted a number of policies, including:

A — Compromising His Associates

Arafat worked to entangle his associates in matters that made it impossible for them to rebel against him or escape his grip. He effectively used money as a weapon to restrain his associates and suppress any attempt by them to object to his policies. To a great extent, he exploited the baseness of human nature that can lead a person to surrender his convictions in exchange for money.

He always worked to ensure that his hand remained the upper hand and that the hands of his associates remained lower. The money used for this purpose was not in the form of salaries, dues, or wages. It went beyond that. It was a direct gift from Arafat intended to improve a person’s circumstances or take care of his affairs.

Arafat liked his associates to ask him for money, and he almost never refused anyone. He would quickly disburse the necessary funds, which would enter the expenditure records and remain as evidence that the person concerned had received money he did not deserve and had performed no work in return for it.

If an associate or confidant did not seek money he did not deserve, this would arouse Arafat’s surprise. He might consult the person concerned or encourage him in one way or another to ask for money. In other words, the associate had to become compromised by something, even if it involved a moral scandal.

Arafat had absolutely no liking for people who did not possess a degree of moral baseness, because people of self-respect retained their ability to oppose him and express their opinions. People with self-respect did not lower their eyes before others and did not owe anyone anything. Such people did not please him, and he preferred to get rid of them, whether through elimination, dismissal, transfer to a position far from the decision-making center, or by some other means.

Arafat kept special records on all his direct assistants and everyone who rose through the organizational hierarchy or the institutions of the PLO. He carefully recorded every shameful act committed by each of them. For this reason, he took pleasure in meetings when one of them expressed opposition or disagreed with him. He would quickly remind that person of his deed or of money he had received directly through Arafat’s signature.

He did not hesitate to expose the person in front of a crowd by various means. For example, he might expose someone at a public meeting by asking whether he wanted more money in addition to the amount that had been disbursed to him some time earlier. Alternatively, he might tell the person that he regretted being unable to issue the check and that the balance would be covered in the near future.

Arafat used this method with prominent members of various Palestinian factions and thereby succeeded in making their opposition merely symbolic, with the aim of presenting the democratic face of his leadership style. Prominent leaders depended on him to cover their expenses, and he knew exactly how to silence their opposition at the appropriate moment.

Over the years, it became clear that Palestinian leaders within the PLO and Fatah would abandon their opposition to a particular project or idea once they sat at the meeting table with Arafat. It became apparent that Arafat had these leaders by the throat and that they were incapable of strongly opposing, objecting, or expressing their views.

One might have judged that an Arafat-backed project would not succeed in the Executive Committee or Fatah Central Committee because of what members and those concerned had said before the decision-making sessions. Yet one would be surprised to find Arafat accomplishing what he wanted with the approval of those who had expressed their opposition.

Of course, the problem here lies not only in the leadership style but also in the people who were supposed to bear the responsibility entrusted to them.

For this reason, Arafat was careful never to go bankrupt. He always maintained a financial reserve with which he could preserve his leadership and his ability to make decisions without serious competition or challenges. The institutions of the PLO would fall into financial difficulty, as would Fatah from time to time, but he would not allow circumstances to drive him into such predicaments.

He was able to manage his finances and find someone to provide him with support. This is connected to the idea raised earlier: although the PLO was described as terrorist, it was not short of money as various revolutionary movements around the world had been. Perhaps the intention was that Arafat, rather than the PLO, should never go bankrupt.

B — The Fahlawi Style of Leadership

Arafat did not possess a sophisticated or wise leadership style, nor did he have the intellectual or practical capacity for one. It was clear that Arafat was very weak intellectually, and even very weak in the Arabic language. His ability to construct coherent sentences was limited, and he lacked the capacity to grammatically balance his words.

If the words were not written down, it was difficult for him to improvise coherent and balanced speech conveying a precise meaning. He would even make pronunciation and grammatical errors when reading written words.

His weakness in Arabic clearly reflected his weakness in thought. He was neither a thinker nor someone with a clear vision of matters. He appeared uninterested in educating himself and did not force himself to read or raise the level of his knowledge. Language is usually a measure of thought. The higher a person’s intellectual level, the more this is reflected in his linguistic ability, making him eloquent, competent, and fluid in his speech, statements, and discussions.

For this reason, from the earliest days of his leadership, he relied on the fahlawi style—a style based on tricks, quick evasive responses that avoid the subject, vague slogans, and attempts to make light of serious matters.

He relied heavily on his hands to excite his listeners, particularly ordinary people, and on repeating phrases and sentences that carried little meaning but stirred emotions and feelings. This approach found resonance in a society that was still largely driven emotionally and did not insist on scientific thinking and objective analysis of matters. Over the years, he was able to convince many people of his abilities and thereby attract mass support.

Arafat raised the slogan “Revolution until victory, until victory, until victory.” He raised slogans such as “O mountain, no wind can shake you,” “independent Palestinian national decision,” and “generals of the stones,” among others. All of these were hollow slogans, but they resonated with people who wanted to believe that they were achieving victories in an era of defeat.

Alongside the slogans, Arafat did not hesitate to speak of victories and defeats inflicted upon enemies. He could convince many ordinary people that he was moving from one victory to another. He even managed to convince his followers that they had achieved victory while leaving Beirut, prompting them to hold up their fingers in the shape of a 7, while departing soldiers fired their weapons into the air.

Because he was intellectually incapable and unable to use language to engage in sophisticated intellectual debates, he usually resorted to verbal bickering, insults, and belittling others. He used expressions that were unfit even for an ordinary street person and attacked the mothers and sisters of those upon whom he directed his anger.

He might describe some of his interlocutors, including his own associates, as mules, beasts, sons of dogs, and so forth. If someone argued with him and he did not like what was being said, he could easily silence his interlocutor. If he found that his interlocutor was courageous and would not accept humiliation, he could end the conversation in one way or another, such as claiming that he had a meeting or needed to travel.

But Arafat did not use these methods with those who were stronger than him.

C — Use of the Media

Arafat was highly skilled at using the media to keep his leadership alive in the minds of the Palestinian people. He was adept at moving from one event to another and excelled at bypassing events in order to create an event of his own. He was skillful at attracting the media and remaining on the news and television screens.

Here, he was not concerned with the outside world, which might not look respectfully upon his various media performances. Instead, he cared about the Palestinian people, whom he considered the foundation for the continuation of his leadership.

He did not believe that foreign public opinion could help him remain at the top of the Palestinian political hierarchy. The outside world was not emotionally moved by Arafat’s interviews or media performances. Indeed, some media organizations interviewed him on television precisely to cause harm to the Palestinian cause.

This was an opinion prevalent in the United States, where Arabs would say that American media organizations interviewed Arafat whenever they wanted to harm the Palestinian cause. On one occasion, a presenter from the American CNN network interviewed him and asked about the source of the money he spent here and there. His answer, before American society, was that he had worked in Kuwait and had been able to save the money from which he spent.

But the outside world apparently understood that fahlawi leadership could not lead its people to victory, and it did not regard Arafat’s leadership as a source of concern to Israel or the West. Consequently, the West, especially, did not hesitate to provide him with media support, even by portraying him as a terrorist.

The West understood perfectly well that leveling accusations against an Arab leader strengthened his position among his people, based on the idea that the West would not condemn an Arab unless he was devoted to Arab causes.

France even facilitated an effective media platform for Arafat through Radio Monte Carlo. Matters went so far that one of the Radio Monte Carlo correspondents received his salary directly from Arafat.

Local media, meanwhile, were generally highly loyal to Yasser Arafat, and some received direct financial support from him. The Al-Quds newspaper was an exception for a period, as it tended toward Jordanian viewpoints, but Arafat was able to influence it and change the way it presented matters.

Indeed, a fundamental change took place in Al-Quds, to the point that it appeared more supportive of Arafat and his policies than newspapers that received direct funding from him.

Arafat liked to see his photographs on the pages of newspapers, and he liked to see people cheering for him and describing him as the symbol, leader, and teacher. This gave him immense pleasure.

He detested seeing photographs of others or hearing the name of anyone else mentioned in the media. On one occasion, he even expressed his displeasure at the use of photographs of Abu Jihad after his death, when those photographs came to overshadow his own. He was uncomfortable with photographs of someone who had become one of the inhabitants of the graves.

D — The Rapid Elimination of Alternative Leaders

Following the general Arab pattern, Arafat viewed himself as the sole leader of the Palestinian people, and one who must remain alone. He could not tolerate the existence of rivals to his leadership and always worked to destroy them by various means.

He hated seeing a rival among the leaders of Palestinian national-movement factions just as he hated the existence of prominent leaders within Fatah. He continually worked to economically besiege the various factions, opened fire on them both in Jordan and Lebanon, and consistently worked to split them and encourage internal divisions.

He split the Popular Front, the Democratic Front, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front–General Command, and others.

Within Fatah, he worked to change the leadership by changing people’s roles or getting rid of them in favor of other leaders. This was in addition to the compromising operations he pursued in order to limit the danger of independent opinion.

Inside the occupied territories, he would work to create leaders and then “burn them out” after several years, bringing in a new batch of leaders awaiting their own turn to be discarded in favor of new leaders, and so on.

He did not trust leaders or personalities, fearing that they might gain access to the Palestinian people and assume the leadership role away from him. To this end, Arafat did not hesitate to pursue methods that could not be considered ethical by any standard.

It is clear that Arafat suffered from a lack of self-confidence and that he dealt with this weakness through conspiracies and attacks against potential sources of danger before they could become centers of attraction on the Palestinian scene.

Perhaps this was the fundamental reason for his continual development of a mentality of deception and maneuvering throughout the different stages of his life. Perhaps returning to the book by the English writer Kiernan entitled Yasser Arafat would be useful in this regard.

One indication of his lack of self-confidence was his treatment of his associates and confidants. He was generally unable to engage in logical debate based on scientific foundations, and so, as I mentioned earlier, he resorted to sharp speech, anger, and obscene language to conceal this weakness.

His associates came to recognize this, unless one of them wished to lose his position.

Arafat could not confront intellectuals and was not capable of matching argument with argument or evidence with evidence. He avoided scientific discussion and logical deliberation. He was not good at them and could not participate in them effectively.

He preferred to deal with people who were panting after status and money. He appeared to be aware of this Arab characteristic and exploited it effectively.

E — Lack of Luxury

Arafat was generally not accustomed to luxury. He spent his life in difficult places characterized by conflict and struggle, places that caused anxiety and strained the nerves. He lived in mountains and valleys and in tense locations such as Beirut and Amman, and spent much of his time moving from one place to another around the world.

He was not a man of palaces or resorts, and he did not know vacations or places of recreation and relaxation. If he did enjoy some of life’s pleasures, he did so only to a limited extent and discreetly, away from the general public.

But Arafat did not object to luxury—and even debauchery—among his associates, and he was prepared to lavish money upon them. A number of his associates became immersed in pleasures and entertainment venues in Beirut and elsewhere, without him holding them accountable or attempting to restrain or admonish them.

Rather, he assisted their disgraceful activities by remaining silent and providing them with more money. Despite the bad reputation their actions brought upon the Palestinian cause, he did not attempt to correct the course.

This situation continued after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, when many influential people became immersed in pleasures and frequented places of entertainment and amusement in Tel Aviv and elsewhere. It is well known that such places lead Arab patrons into the hands of Israeli intelligence.

F — Absence of Strategic Planning

Arafat had no vision and was not a man of philosophy about life. He did not attempt to plan for the future except insofar as his own leadership was concerned.

He did not build his actions and behavior upon pre-established plans with clear objectives. Instead, he managed matters one day at a time. What mattered to him was getting through the present day without suffering losses, or with the smallest possible losses, or perhaps with a small gain. What happened tomorrow was not important.

Tomorrow, according to his behavior, would bring new circumstances requiring what he called new “tactics”—that is, new maneuvers and new deceptions. For this reason, his associates sometimes described him as al-mutaktik, or al-taktakji—the “tactician.”

This fits perfectly with what was mentioned earlier about his mastery of maneuvers and deception.

For this reason, Arafat did not undertake any strategic construction on the Palestinian scene. He neglected educational, economic, military, and other issues in favor of getting through the crises of the day, leaving aside the various matters that required planning and institution-building according to defined plans and objectives.

This neglect had a major effect on the Palestinian scene. Matters deteriorated day after day, drawing upon the capabilities and moral energies of the Palestinian people.

The absence of economic planning pushed people toward Israeli farms and factories. The absence of an educational program led to moral disorder and the adoption of the leader’s traditions of maneuvering and deception, and to the belief that any action was permissible so long as it benefited the person who carried it out. Ethical transgressions and disorder in public life consequently developed.

The absence of strategic planning on the Palestinian scene was intertwined with personal considerations centered on the uniqueness of the leader and his authoritarian leadership.

Instead of working to create a cohesive Palestinian society, Arafat worked to cultivate mercenaries through the money at his disposal—people who knew what was right but carried out what they believed to be wrong in order to protect their own interests.

For Arafat, gaining the support of a group of people for his policies was far more important than building a university on scientific foundations. He was even always prepared to destroy any institution in order to ensure that his supporters remained in control of it.

If Arafat planned, his planning did not go beyond his own self-interest. He planned how to remain a leader and the holder of decision-making power, and how to confront his Arab and Palestinian opponents. But he never planned over the long term how to confront the enemies of the Palestinian people or how to liberate Palestine.

The public interest remained absent from his planning; and when it did appear, it was merely an appendage to his own interests.

Taken together, Arafat’s various characteristics created conditions conducive to the penetration of his ranks, meetings, and activities.

His focus on himself and his tendency to surround himself with people who demonstrated loyalty and were willing to become morally or financially compromised made him exposed to various intelligence agencies.

Every intelligence agency interested in the Palestinian cause and resistance was able to gain access to Arafat’s office or the offices of his close associates by possessing the personal qualities that Arafat liked to see in his assistants.

For this reason, there was no secret on the Palestinian scene, and Palestinian affairs remained an open book to a number of intelligence agencies.