The Occupied Territory of '67 After Oslo

If the reader is in doubt about what he has read in the preceding chapters, all he has to do is read this chapter and compare what it says with what is happening on the ground. Practical reality is what proves or disproves a statement, and what confirms or refutes an analysis. The Occupied Territories/67 at this historical stage—the years that witnessed the establishment of the Palestinian Authority under Yasser Arafat after the signing of the Oslo Agreement in 1993—constitute the true measure of the leadership ethics discussed earlier and the real test of the validity of the analysis that has characterized the book thus far. Here the author addresses the human mind and its desire to arrive at the truth, rather than its political positions or previous commitments. The book is not primarily intended merely to expose matters as they really are; it also seeks to contribute to an awakening that will lead us to a fundamental change in the way we understand matters and the way we deal with problems and overcome difficulties.

If the reader finds that reality has disproved the analysis, that the analysis was merely fantasy, and that the author failed to live up to the standards of honesty, then let him tell people that the author of this book attempted to fabricate things in order to malign the Palestine Liberation Organization and its leaders.

The Promises of Oslo

Shortly after signing the Oslo Agreement, the Palestine Liberation Organization told the Palestinian people that the agreement with Israel had opened the door to the establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, as well as the return of Palestinian refugees, the removal of Israeli settlements from the Occupied Territories/67, the release of Palestinian detainees from Israeli prisons, and foreign financial support, so that billions of dollars would flow into the central region (the West Bank) and the Gaza coast and the future Palestinian state would become the Hong Kong or Singapore of the region. On the basis of these expectations, the PLO called upon the Palestinian people to take to the streets to celebrate the victory that had been achieved and the harvesting of the fruits of the national struggle.

Many people, especially supporters of the agreement with Israel, took to the streets celebrating, either by holding dabke dances, raising flags, or driving their cars through the city streets. Thousands of people chanted in support of the young state and its leader, Yasser Arafat, while speakers took ample time to stir people’s emotions and hopes. The occupation forces did not interfere with the people or prevent their gatherings. They allowed them to celebrate in whatever manner they considered appropriate.

People waited for implementation of the agreement to develop, and residents of Gaza and Jericho eagerly awaited the great moment of redeployment, hoping to meet their leader and his victorious soldiers. As soon as the first Palestinian forces entered Gaza and Jericho, thousands of people streamed out joyfully to welcome them with kisses, embraces, and celebrations. People crowded around to take commemorative photographs, especially with Kalashnikov rifles. They rushed to offer assistance to the heroes of liberation, whether in the form of food supplies or furniture, and did not hesitate to prepare lavish meals in their honor.

Many people waited for the completion of redeployment in the remaining areas of the central region, and many were exhausted by Israeli delays in reaching detailed agreements on redeployment. Relief finally came for them with the Taba Agreement, which provided for the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the principal cities and its redeployment in new areas. The Israelis redeployed toward the end of 1995, allowing people who supported the agreement with Israel to take to the streets again in celebration. Large numbers gathered: approximately fifty thousand celebrants in Nablus and about thirty thousand in Tulkarm.

But the celebration was not completed, and the promises made by the PLO and subsequently by the Palestinian Authority were not fulfilled. As time passed, people came to see the reality of the agreements and realized that they had been led by many illusions and wishes and had fallen victim to media manipulation and the manipulation of emotions and feelings. It quickly became apparent that the occupation had not left the country, that the Palestinian Authority possessed none of the sensitive matters associated with independence, that the settlements remained and land confiscation continued, and that billions of dollars had not made every individual wealthy. They also soon discovered that some of those whose arrival had been celebrated as the arrival of liberators were attempting to extort people, rapidly enrich themselves, and establish authoritarian influence.

Many people were surprised by the developments and by the Palestinian frivolity, Israeli obstinacy, and corruption that had spread into different areas of Palestinian life. People had celebrated on the assumption that there had been a Palestinian revolution and great revolutionary leaders who did not lie, flatter, or mislead. For years they had believed that the men of the revolution were the purest of people, beyond suspicion and incapable of moral blemish. They were therefore shocked to discover that these men had not lived up to the expectations placed upon them. Many people felt profound disappointment and horror at the situation in which they found themselves. It had not occurred to many that a revolutionary leader could tolerate the establishment of a nightclub or liquor store, steal public money, or allow a celebrated revolutionary name to engage in social influence-peddling and sophistry. Nor had they imagined that such a person might seek sexual gratification, purchase something without paying for it, or build a house without paying the workers.

The people suffered another setback, adding to their frustration, regret, and pain. With time, it appeared to them that Palestinian policies in most areas were proceeding in the wrong direction. They began to realize that the issue was not a collection of mistakes that could be corrected, but a methodology—either deliberately adopted in advance or imposed upon those who practiced it. To clarify this, I will try to examine the various Palestinian policies that express the way the Authority operates. Before doing so, however, it is important to address the concept of security cooperation with Israel and its reflection in the structure of the Oslo Agreement, because it directly affects how the Palestinian Authority performs its functions and activities.

Security Cooperation

A public debate took place in 1997 over the continuation of security cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority because of the impasse in implementing the Oslo and Taba agreements. The Israeli side insisted that cooperation, which had begun at the start of Oslo, had to resume, while the Palestinian side argued that cooperation could no longer resume because the peace process had stalled and Israel had failed to implement several provisions of the agreement. One Palestinian official added a comment that carried a degree of rebellion against Oslo, saying that the Palestinian Authority was neither Antoine Lahad’s army nor responsible for defending Israeli security.

It should be noted that, according to the Oslo Agreement, security cooperation does not mean reciprocity. It means cooperation within boundaries that provide security for Israel and Israelis and sufficient security for the Palestinian Authority to enable it to maintain a level of activity adequate to perform its security duties toward Israel. For example, Arafat pledged in his letter to Rabin before the signing of the agreement in 1993 to combat terrorism and pursue terrorists, but Rabin did not pledge that Israel would stop terrorism or disarm itself of nuclear weapons. The agreement’s annexes also specify Palestinian security activities and the number of police permitted, but they never address limiting Israeli forces or reducing Israel’s responsibilities for external and overall security.

Under the agreement, the Palestinian Authority is responsible for pursuing anyone who attempts to threaten Israeli security from areas under its control and for providing Israel with security information enabling Israeli security services to eliminate what they call terrorism and terrorists. Israel has the right to demand the transfer of detainees and to enter areas controlled by the Authority militarily if it considers this necessary, pursuant to its responsibility for overall security. Israel had previously entered Authority areas in Gaza and Nablus, as mentioned earlier, without media fanfare or with only limited publicity. In contrast, Israel does not provide the Palestinian side with security information except when it is necessary to enable the Authority to strengthen Israeli security. This cooperation resembles a feudal lord feeding the peasants in order to preserve their ability to perform the work required of them.

Security cooperation did take place after Oslo between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. Some Palestinians received intelligence training in Israel, while others were trained by American intelligence personnel in the United States. Palestinian security agencies supplied Israel with abundant information, to the point that daily security reports were submitted to Israel. The Authority facilitated the arrest of some Palestinians by Israel and itself arrested members of the opposition accused of incitement or of threatening Israeli security. The Authority nevertheless refused to hand over Palestinian detainees in its custody to Israel. It used the security arrangements agreement to justify this refusal, arguing that Israel had the right to request the transfer of detainees within a short period unless a Palestinian court had already issued a judgment against them. The Authority therefore resorted to holding immediate trials for people it believed Israel would request and issuing rapid judgments against them. This procedure allowed the Palestinian side to avoid, from this angle, the charge of violating the agreements.

This concept of security cooperation expresses Israeli interests and requirements, and is the same concept that Israel imposed on some Arab states. Simply put, Israeli security doctrine says that Israel faces the danger of attack and annihilation despite its military dominance. If the Arabs want peace with it, they must first and foremost satisfy Israel’s security requirements. Put less diplomatically, Arabs who want to conclude peace agreements must accept the role of guarding Israel’s borders or the security of Israeli citizens, as required of the Palestinian Authority. Only then, according to the Israeli view, can discussion, dialogue, or negotiation over other outstanding or emerging issues begin.

This concept was reflected in peace agreements between some Arab states and Israel. Jordan, for example, was required to tighten its border surveillance with Israel, prevent infiltrators, and pursue those who succeeded in threatening Israel’s security. In the Camp David agreements, Israel imposed a symbolic Egyptian military presence on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal and insisted on early-warning stations in Sinai. Israel, however, did not establish demilitarized zones in the territories it had seized. At the same time, Israel continued to arm itself in a manner that guaranteed its qualitative superiority over the Arab states, with American support, while the United States continued to monitor Arab armaments and pressure Arab countries to limit or abandon some of their weapons programs.

The same concept also hangs over Israel’s peace talks with Syria and Lebanon. Israel wants the Lebanese army to act as a guard on its border and wants Syria to demilitarize the Golan in the event of withdrawal, with additional security arrangements for which Israel offers nothing in return. If we carry the argument to its logical conclusion, Israel wants Arabs to fight Arabs on its behalf and for its benefit, and wants Arab regimes to open their prisons to imprison activists or fighters hoping to recover Palestinian land. It created the South Lebanon Army for this purpose and pressured a number of Arab regimes until they appeared to be allied with Israel against those they call terrorists.

The same concept was reflected in the Oslo agreements and the agreements that followed them. Had there been no guarantees that the Palestinian Authority would perform a security role on behalf of Israel, the agreement would not have been signed. The security issue had always been the principal obstacle for Israel, since 1967, in seeking a solution to the problem of the Palestinian population—not the land—in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Israel tried to find an Arab partner who would take responsibility for administering the population’s affairs and devote its efforts to preventing resistance. Attempts were made to restore Jordanian administration to parts of the West Bank and perhaps Gaza as well. Israel also attempted, as noted earlier, to establish village leagues that could manage the population’s daily affairs, but these efforts failed. Finally, Israel found what it was looking for in the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Can Israel accept a situation in which the Palestinian side refuses security cooperation? The answer is certainly no. Israel undoubtedly considers the agreements devoid of substance if Palestinian security responsibility toward Israel is removed. In other words, it regards the agreement as void if the Palestinians refuse to carry out what they have undertaken to do in security matters. Does the Palestinian Authority have options?

At this time, in early 1998, the Palestinian Authority says that it is not an instrument in Israel’s hands and does not receive orders from it, and that it will not return to the previous security cooperation unless Israel fulfills its obligations, foremost among them stopping land confiscation and settlement construction. (This halt is not stipulated in any agreement the Palestinian Authority has signed with Israel.) Will the Palestinian side be able to stand firm, and what alternatives are available?

The Authority faces four possibilities in seeking a way out. The first is the Arab custom and tradition that the PLO had tried with Arab states and that had produced reasonably good results in many cases. This approach consists of soothing feelings, using gentle and broad expressions inspired by brotherhood, forgetting the past, seeking a future that will, God willing, be good, and invoking history and past glories.

The Authority tried this approach with the Labor Party. Some of its members began to understand its formalities but without being drawn into its consequences. The Authority did not succeed with Labor, and I do not think it will succeed with Likud.

The second possibility is to stand firm and insist on refusing security cooperation except in exchange for a complete Israeli withdrawal, dismantling the settlements, and establishing the state. This possibility will not succeed because Israel, regardless of who governs it, links progress in the peace process to progress on the security front. I do not see Israel now under such enormous pressure that it would be forced to meet all Palestinian demands at once. If the Authority tried to strengthen its resistance by encouraging the opposition to attack Israel militarily, Israel could very well begin applying military pressure against the Authority, reducing it to an empty shell incapable of doing anything.

The third possibility is a decision by Arafat to leave the areas controlled by the Authority and return to moving from one Arab capital to another. This possibility has several obstacles, including doubts about whether he would be accepted in permanent offices by any Arab state. There is an eye on Damascus and a hope that Syria might accept the organization’s return, but Syria’s experience with the organization does not make it an easy place for Yasser Arafat to return. There is also the problem of those who returned with Arafat, who could face expulsion and displacement, as well as the problem of the institutions and the huge number of employees receiving salaries from the Authority.

The fourth possibility, which I believe is most likely to shape Palestinian Authority policy, is acceptance of Israel’s security demands in exchange for a relative easing of Israeli pressure on the Authority—for example, reducing settlement construction, easing closures imposed on the occupied areas, especially on workers, or reducing media attention to Israeli actions that could embarrass the Authority before the public.

If we trace the PLO’s path over thirty years, as became clear in the preceding pages, we find that it never stood firmly on a position or established a ceiling beyond which it would not retreat. The organization issued slogans, held festivals, and made promises, but it always retreated and found reasons and justifications for retreating and failing to stand firm.

The PLO did not work for its future. Its policy was based on a number of tactics, maneuvers, and shifting alliances. It left itself and the Palestinian people without a strong back or a support on which they could rely in difficult times. It even squandered money and corrupted institutions. I do not believe it is capable of bringing the Palestinian people out of their predicament. It has left itself with only one option throughout, and the Authority that emerged from it will not depart from this pattern.

But the decisive question is: How far can the Palestinian Authority go in security cooperation with the Israelis? Oslo is clear in recruiting the Authority to serve Israeli security, and Israel insists on applying the model of the security zone in southern Lebanon, but without entrusting the Authority with heavy weapons. Yet this contradicts a people whose movement remains alive and continues to mature with time. The Palestinian people have not been defeated, the Oslo agreements are not convincing to them, and they are still seeking their homeland. This people has become more aware of its cause, better organized, and more capable of striking Israel. Will it accept a situation in which the Palestinian Authority becomes a guardian of Israeli security? Until the Israeli security requirements become clear as something imposed upon the Palestinian Authority, the reader can connect the chain of the organization’s steps over thirty years with the situation that has resulted on the ground, apart from the slogans. It should be noted that a number of security measures adopted by the Authority were, on more than one occasion, explained as defending the Palestinian national interest, since Oslo, in its view, expresses the Palestinian national interest.

Security Practices of the Palestinian Authority

The second annex to the Oslo Agreement, entitled “Protocol on the Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area,” states in Article 3:

• Paragraph (e): Establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli committee for security cooperation and coordination for the purposes of mutual security.
• Paragraph (f): A program for development, investment, and foreign financial and economic support. The two parties will cooperate and coordinate jointly and separately with regional and international parties to support these objectives.

Article 8 of the agreement provided for the establishment of a strong Palestinian police force while Israel retained responsibility for defense against external threats and overall security for Israelis.

In his letter to Rabin before the signing of Oslo, Yasser Arafat pledged to combat terrorism. He stated that the PLO considered the signing of the Declaration of Principles a historic event marking a new era of peaceful coexistence, free of violence and all acts threatening peace and stability. Accordingly, the organization condemned terrorism and other acts of violence and would assume responsibility for all members and employees of the organization to ensure their compliance, prevent violations of this commitment, and punish violators.

It was clear from these provisions and commitments that the PLO had accepted the Israeli concept of terrorism and would pursue those whom the Israelis described as terrorists. According to the Israeli concept, terrorists were people whom the PLO had previously regarded as fighters working for liberation. The organization’s pledge therefore represented a success for the Zionist concept of terrorism and terrorists.

The Taba Agreement, which elaborated upon Oslo concerning redeployment in the West Bank, provided in Article 12 that Israel would retain responsibility for defense against all external threats, including responsibility for protecting its borders with Jordan and Egypt and defending against external threats from the sea and air. It would also retain responsibility for general Israeli security and its settlements in order to protect internal security and maintain order.

Article 15 stated that both parties were to take the necessary steps to stop hostile acts and every form of terrorism. Paragraph 2 of Article 16 stated that Palestinians cooperating with the Israelis should not be subjected to harm or pursuit and that appropriate steps would be taken in this regard.

Security cooperation was no longer a prediction or an analysis of phrases; it had become a reality repeated by Palestinian officials and reflected in their actions. Following every act that fell within the former PLO’s concept of liberation and struggle, officials of the Palestinian Authority now issued condemnation, denunciation, and rejection and ordered their forces in the various security agencies to pursue the perpetrators on the grounds that they were terrorists who should be brought to trial. Whenever a Palestinian military operation against Israelis occurred, Palestinian officials, headed by Yasser Arafat, quickly announced their anger and condemnation and described those who carried out the operation as criminals and terrorists. Palestinians did not stop at having a representative issue a condemnation; each time, several people appeared before Israeli and international television cameras to express their feelings. Palestinian police forces then began pursuing those believed to be connected with the people they called terrorists.

The acts that the Palestinian Authority calls terrorism and for which it punishes those responsible as terrorists are of the same type as the Ma’alot, Coastal Road, and Savoy Hotel operations. The PLO considered those operations heroic acts, and a number of young people still celebrate them as expressions of pride.

The Palestinian Authority did not stop at adopting Israel’s concept of terrorism. It also took a number of measures that were themselves repressive and, in the author’s view, did not differ in form or substance from acts of the occupation. The following were among the principal measures.

Establishment of Security Agencies

The Palestinian Authority established several security agencies: the police, Preventive Security, Presidential Security (Force 17), General Intelligence, Military Intelligence, and the naval force. There were many security agencies, all actively recruiting personnel. The Authority surpassed Arab states in the number of agencies pursuing citizens and monitoring their movements. Naturally, this had a major psychological effect on citizens and on their willingness to interact with the Authority.

Why did the Palestinian Authority establish all these agencies when it needed only a police force and a police investigative unit specializing in criminal matters? Security for the Authority against external aggression was guaranteed by Israel under Article 8 of Oslo. It therefore had no need for intelligence agencies operating at an international level. Since it depended on Israel for security against external threats, it had no need for intelligence agencies to collect information about Israel. If it did so, it would anger Israel, which could easily discover what these agencies were doing through its agents placed here and there.

These agencies were in reality intended to monitor the Palestinian population, individuals and groups, so that the Palestinian Authority could fulfill its security commitments under Oslo. Otherwise, what need did the Palestinian people have for all these agencies? Israel and the United States were interested in a strong Palestinian intelligence service as a pillar of Israeli security. The Palestinian Authority naturally justified this in terms of what it called the Palestinian national interest, arguing that it was important to preserve the agreements with Israel and implement their provisions because of the future benefits that would result for the people.

It was noticeable that Palestinian society had begun developing new behaviors, particularly after the establishment of the Authority, resembling those prevalent in Arab countries. Palestinians increasingly hesitated to express their opinions and preferred silence except with people they believed they could trust. Phrases such as “Watch out for them,” “I have no interest in this; it’s none of my business,” and “These people are different from the Jews; they can’t tolerate criticism” became common. In other words, the culture that “walls have ears” began to spread. People became more cautious in expressing themselves, especially as they saw weapons shining before their eyes and in hands that could not always be trusted to use them responsibly.

State Security Court

On February 7, 1995, Yasser Arafat issued an order establishing a High State Security Court in Gaza, specializing in security-related cases. It was composed of officers who adjudicated crimes affecting security inside and outside the territory, including felonies and misdemeanors mentioned in Order No. 555 of 1957. Order 555 had been issued during the Egyptian military administration of the Gaza Strip and provided for several punishments, including the death penalty for security-related cases.

The order also relied on Article 59 of the constitutional system for the Gaza Strip issued in 1962, which gave the Governor-General of Gaza the authority to establish military courts to decide matters related to security. Their judgments could not be implemented without the Governor-General’s approval.

Through this order, military courts replaced civil courts in deciding security matters, and the order gave the Governor-General the power to approve judgments rather than providing for courts of appeal. Although this contradicted international standards and principles of justice, it was also, in the author’s view, a grave act against a people who had suffered for decades under military rule and its rulers. The court violated internationally recognized rights, including the accused person’s right to appear before a competent court, the right to defend himself through a lawyer or lawyers of his choice, and the right to appeal the judgment.

The court violated not only internationally recognized rules but also the principles of the Cairo Agreement signed by Israel and the PLO on May 4, 1994. Article 14 of that agreement stated that Israel and the Palestinian Authority would exercise their powers and responsibilities under the agreement while taking into account internationally accepted standards and principles of human rights and the rule of law. Article 6 stated that the Palestinian Authority would assume responsibility for the judiciary through an independent judicial authority. The State Security Court did not comply with internationally recognized rules and was not independent. Thus, in the author’s view, the judicial procedures of the Palestinian Authority were harsher than what Israel itself had required.

Amnesty International protested against this court and considered it a violation of the minimum basic standards for fair trials. (Bulletin entitled Midnight Trial, June 1995.)

At the local level, the Authority arrested attorney Raji Sourani, who served as director of the Gaza Center for Rights and Law, because of his public criticism of the court. He was arrested shortly after midnight on February 15, 1995. Nabil Shaath, one of the Authority’s officials, told him in a statement to the Jerusalem Post of April 30, 1995, that the State Security Court would be abolished if all opposition factions declared their commitment to the agreement concluded between the PLO and Israel.

Arbitrary Arrests

The Palestinian Authority appears to have been strongly influenced by the arrest practices of those who had previously persecuted the Palestinian people. It carried out mass arrests after every important event, especially events directed against Israelis, without taking the trouble to investigate carefully or establish justifications for arrest. Among the patterns of its arrest practices were:

• A — Various security agencies arrested Palestinians from different factions committed to Palestinian rights, with particular focus on Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Because of the lack of coordination between agencies, more than one security service sometimes raided Palestinian homes to arrest the same people.
• B — Some detainees were released after short periods while others were held for long periods without specific charges being brought against them. The author regards this as even more unjust than the occupation’s practice, under which an 18-day period could be followed by another month or two, within which a specific charge was supposed to be brought.
• C — People were arrested without legal warrants.
• D — Homes were raided, residents terrorized, property sometimes damaged, and family members sometimes beaten.
• E — People were held for long periods in secret locations without informing their families or allowing visits.
• F — People were arrested on the basis of political affiliation or political positions.

Interrogation

Palestinians in the security prisons of the Palestinian Authority were subjected to interrogation using several methods, including:

1. Beating with the hands or implements resembling ropes.
2. Suspension or stress positions (shabeh).
3. Prolonged sleep deprivation and placing detainees in uncomfortable sleeping conditions.
4. Restricting access to bathrooms.
5. Using obscene language concerning religion, honor, and affiliation.
6. Shaving some detainees’ beards and heads.
7. Using face coverings.
8. Recruiting informants and agents.

The intensity of torture in Palestinian prisons had decreased in the recent period, namely late 1997 and early 1998. Nevertheless, during this period there were still detainees from Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front–General Command. Several months had passed since their arrests without questioning or referral to court. Detainees and families protested the continued detention and made various appeals to different bodies, but the Palestinian Authority had not responded or released the detainees as of the time this book was prepared. The author expected the Authority to continue arresting Palestinian fighters and activists belonging to factions and parties that rejected the agreements with Israel even if the current detainees were released.

Palestinian detainees in Palestinian prisons also declared a hunger strike in protest against their detention in late March 1998. A popular campaign was launched in their defense and in support of their cause.

Trials

Trials conducted by the Palestinian Authority were unusual, particularly because they were being imposed upon Palestinians who had themselves suffered from injustice and persecution. They were secretive and rapid, and were conducted under disturbing circumstances, especially the proceedings of the State Security Court.

Amnesty International stated that all trials in the State Security Court were held secretly. All but one were reportedly held in the middle of the night, and proceedings were immediate. Each trial ended on the same night on which it began, and some reportedly lasted only a few minutes. (Bulletin entitled Midnight Court, June 1995, p. 11.)

The courts were held secretly, without notifying detainees’ families and sometimes without notifying the detainee himself, and in the middle of the night. For example, Raed al-Attar and Muhammad Abu Shammala were tried at midnight; their trials lasted several minutes and each received a two-year prison sentence for illegally training with weapons. Samir al-Jidi was tried at 1:00 a.m. and sentenced to fifteen years in prison.

Aziz al-Shami, who was arrested on the night of February 5, 1995, was repeatedly told while detained that he would be released. Instead, he was taken at night to court on the same day that members of his family had visited him, without knowing that he was to be tried. The court sentenced him to fifteen years, and his family learned of it only when Israeli radio broadcast the news. Muhammad al-Samri, arrested on March 21, 1995, was not allowed to see his family until twenty-eight days after his arrest. This occurred after his trial and seven-year sentence for transporting bombs for use against Israelis.

Sayyid Abu Musamih, editor-in-chief of Al-Watan, was sentenced to two years in prison twenty-four hours after his arrest. Two members of the Popular Front, Awni al-Kafarna and Taher al-Kafarna, were sentenced after forty-eight hours in detention. It is noteworthy that not all of these cases were wanted by Israel, which was sometimes used as the justification for the rapid trials.

There are many cases and there is not enough space to mention them all, but some of the victims named by the author are: Muhammad al-Sayyid, Khaled Mutlaq, Mansour al-Bahabsa, Muhammad al-Deirawi, Harith Abd al-Karim Abu Hmeid, and Ashraf Qandil.

These trials were welcomed by Israelis and Americans, who regarded them as a step toward successful negotiations with the Palestinian Authority. For example, an Israeli Foreign Ministry official told the Jerusalem Post on March 10, 1995, that implementation of autonomy was linked to what the Palestinians did to combat terrorism, including arresting suspected Palestinians and taking action against them. Yossi Sarid, the Israeli environmental minister, told the same newspaper on April 12, 1995, that Israelis had specific demands, one of which was trying terrorists, and that this had happened the previous day and was what should happen. If it became clear to Israelis that these measures were not a one-time occurrence but represented a consistent policy characterized by firmness and determination, he said, the prospects of completing negotiations before July 1, 1995 would improve.

The spokeswoman for the U.S. State Department announced on April 10, 1995, that she welcomed the steps taken by the Palestinian Authority and expected the Authority to continue in this direction against terrorists.

U.S. State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns also welcomed the actions of the Palestinian Authority after the sentencing of Samir al-Jidi and Omar Shalah at his press conference on April 12, 1995, saying that two major sentences had been issued against two criminals whom the Palestinian Authority believed had been directly involved in terrorist acts, and that it was necessary to continue applying this policy and for the Palestinian Authority to take seriously the need to prosecute those responsible for crimes. Several European countries, including Britain and Germany, also welcomed these measures and encouraged the Palestinian Authority to continue them because of their supposed contribution to peace and acceleration of negotiations.

Amnesty International, for its part, requested permission to attend the trials and inspect the files. It was promised access, but the promises were not fulfilled. The organization was not informed of trial dates, the files were not opened to it, and it did not receive records of the trials. (Bulletin Midnight Court, p. 2.)

Building and Unity

The Palestinian Authority promised the people in the Occupied Territories/67 that it would build a modern state based on democracy and justice. It promised to begin a comprehensive process of construction in all areas of life. Its argument focused on the claim that the Israeli occupation had destroyed everything positive during thirty years of occupation, undermined and fragmented Palestinian society, and deliberately destroyed the economy so that Palestinians became a labor force in Israeli factories. The occupation had also, it was said, morally corrupted the people and diverted them from their fundamental concerns relating to the liberation of their homeland.

The Palestinian Authority said that the occupation had spread corruption throughout the land and destroyed the infrastructure of Palestinian society in many respects, and that it had come to the country carrying the banner of independence and construction. On countless occasions Palestinian officials spoke of their aspirations, hopes, plans, and projects for a new life filled with giving, progress, freedom, and participation. They promised economic development through agricultural development, land reclamation, establishment of factories, development of tourism resources, and expansion of handicraft capabilities. They promised to improve social, health, cultural, and other conditions.

The United States and countries aligned with it, which worked to consolidate the Oslo Agreement, contributed promises and intentions to support the Palestinian Authority in its construction efforts and move the people of the Occupied Territories/67 toward a better life characterized by economic prosperity. To this end, the United States called several meetings of donor countries to discuss supporting the Palestinian Authority and distributing the required financial burden among different states according to their capacity. These meetings produced abundant promises and large figures that led the Palestinian leadership and part of the population to hope that relief and great benefit were near. The United States and its supporters did not limit themselves to conferences and promises; they also insisted upon a Palestinian life characterized by democracy and freedom, in which people and their rights would be respected. The Palestinian leadership was repeatedly told that it must respect human rights and organizations and institutions defending those rights. The United States and some Arab states appeared as though they were deeply concerned with the Palestinian individual and his comfort and welfare.

The media were always the faithful echo of the activities of the United States and European countries, conveying the details to the Palestinian people and repeating them morning and evening. Foreign and local media spoke of the new dawn awaiting the Occupied Territories/67 and the possibility of transforming the region into an area whose benefits would spread throughout the region, whether in industry and economic development or democratic life and human freedom. The media repeated the good news of these promises until people imagined that they would wake the next morning to find the land overflowing with milk, honey, flowers, freedom, and opportunity. Some people developed almost a hysteria of prosperity and anticipation of moving to a productive and consumer-oriented life resembling that of Western countries.

Did the Authority succeed in delivering what it promised? Did the march toward construction, freedom, and rapid progress begin? Did it establish the necessary institutions, and did it place its foot on the beginning of the road? Before answering these questions, I believe it is necessary to clarify some of the foundations of building societies and states and moving along the paths of progress and modernization. These foundations provide a basis against which the Authority’s efforts and policies can be judged. If we want to understand the result of Palestinian Authority policies and its method of operation, it is important to understand the theoretical framework from which they emerge or by which they can be explained. If we wish to proceed from sound foundations that prepare the ground for success, the first issue we encounter is the concept of freedom and authoritarianism and their relationship to human creativity and backwardness.

Freedom and Authoritarianism: A Struggle between Creativity and Backwardness

Construction at the general level requires great and sustained effort characterized by collective work and mutual cooperation. Achievement at the level of a society or state does not result from individual effort or from a person’s private vision and organization. It requires work commensurate with ambition and hope and encompassing both the moral and material dimensions: intellectual and emotional energies, physical capabilities, money, equipment, and similar resources. Above all, achievement requires a general will to work that is simultaneously individual and collective, together with an environment that opens the way to discovery, invention, and creativity.

Construction requires intellectual and physical efforts at the general level because it is supposed to occur within a broad public framework, its ultimate purpose being the public good. An individual vision is therefore not suitable as the starting point for general construction because it is constrained by the individual from whom it arises, including his life experience, philosophy in dealing with things and people, personal objectives, and so forth. If it is allowed to restrict the movement of general construction, that movement will reflect the characteristics of the individual vision rather than necessarily the ambitions and hopes of the people in the society or state. Consequently, the process of construction encounters many obstacles, takes on a personal rather than public character, and ultimately fails.

The experiences of many countries, especially Third World countries and the Arab world in particular, have shown that a personal vision does not succeed at the public level, no matter how perceptive or enlightened it may be. Many leaders, kings, and presidents tried to impose their visions on their peoples concerning progress in its various forms, including economic development and improving people’s material conditions. But their visions ultimately proved inadequate and did not achieve the desired objectives. If we set aside revenues from selling natural resources such as oil, which have little to do with the leader’s personal vision, we find that production levels in the Arab world have not improved relatively when compared with price levels and the cost of living. Arabs have not escaped material hardship, Arab technology has not developed sufficiently, and so forth. Indeed, over time the gap between the Arab world and the rest of the world, especially the developed world, has widened. The world’s lead in progress has accelerated geometrically compared with the Arabs, and the world has increased its exploitation of our resources, partly because of our desire to increase consumption. We have used our natural resources to improve consumer conditions and accelerate consumption. This is in addition to the defeats suffered by Arabs on various fronts.

The reason was the imposition of a personal vision—the vision of the king or president—on the course of affairs and its predictable inability to satisfy general needs. More precisely, it was authoritarianism, monopolization of opinion, and preventing others with different opinions from expressing themselves and participating. Many presidents and kings mobilized the resources of the states or societies whose destinies they controlled and directed them toward what they considered appropriate, while depriving others of meaningful participation in public affairs. They lavished material and status rewards on those willing to carry out their demands. Thus the issue ceased, in practical terms, to concern public achievement and became service to the private vision of the king or president.

Achievement at the public level requires everyone’s efforts—that is, participation by everyone, or opening the door to participation for anyone who wishes. Participation requires freedom. Freedom gives participation its meaning and makes it effective enough to produce tangible material results. Without freedom, participation has no meaning, and all slogans about citizen participation remain without tangible results.

Construction is an ethical act and requires ethical foundations or moral elevation. It is ethical because it is positive and works to embody human aspiration and hope. Only an ethical person, or one endowed with virtuous morals, can accomplish something ethical. Ethics can arise only with freedom. A free person is an ethical person. A person who is enslaved, pursued, or suspicious cannot carry out what is ethical even if he possesses a clear theoretical idea of ethical values.

A life of freedom makes a person sensitive to and understanding of the freedoms of others, and causes him to value and respect them. Within it, virtues expressing self-respect develop. Positive interaction among people prevails, while backbiting and conspiratorial behavior recede. Respect for time, promises, commitments, and obligations develops. It represents a stage of moral expansion translated into a reality that continually improves and develops toward the better. In such a stage, people are truthful, loyal, sincere in their work, active, self-reliant rather than dependent, and not lazy, because they invest their efforts and time in useful things.

The life of authoritarianism—the life of coercion, suppression, and the dominance of intelligence agencies—is a trivial life in which people lose self-respect. Whoever loses respect for himself cannot respect or value others. Pessimism, frustration, despair, and hopelessness prevail. Conspiratorial thinking, justification, manipulation, and projection flourish. People become liars and impostors seeking their private interests; they become hypocrites who continually seek proximity to the ruler’s men through praise, gifts, invitations to meals, and similar means. Candor and clarity disappear, while flattery and sycophancy become inseparable features of people’s behavior.

For this reason, developed countries, or countries seeking development, have worked to strengthen individual freedom and freedom for all because they understood that without freedom people would not be able to take initiative, create, or contribute effectively to construction. They understood that the aspiration toward social, economic, intellectual, military, and moral strength can only be achieved by strong people who possess themselves, sharpen their abilities, and refine their performance through mutual interaction and continuous activity. These states recognized that the individual ruler does not encompass the people; rather, the people expand the ruler’s capacity. They therefore opened wide space for the movement of opinion, access to information, and its use.

Accordingly, is it easy to believe someone who speaks about construction while failing to prepare the appropriate foundations for it?

Suppression of freedom is usually associated with acts that the suppressor wants to carry out without others knowing about or discussing them, or with ugly acts that he has committed and wants people’s tongues to remain silent about. On rare occasions, suppression of opinion or freedom of expression may occur for reasons of national security or a sensitive public interest. But such suppression is temporary and limited to a particular issue and soon ends without affecting freedom of expression in general.

Suppression of freedom is connected to corruption and wrongdoing. It is an act of concealment and hiding ugly conduct. Good management and good deeds do not require suppression and coercion because, if not done solely for God’s sake, they are a source of pride for the person who performs them, who is eager to publicize them by various means so that people will know his true nature, praise him for his work, and reward him, whatever the form of that reward. Wherever work is good, management rises, and achievement occurs, freedom of expression is expected to exist alongside construction, moral advancement, and material contribution. It also contributes to this process by providing the proper climate for cooperation, mutual trust, reassurance, and a sense of self-possession.

Freedom is dangerous to the corrupt person and his corruption because it exposes him, obstructs his policies, frustrates his plans, and mobilizes the public against him, placing his position at risk. Therefore, the corrupt person cannot be free or permit freedom.

He is not free because he is immersed in acts that he knows in advance are corrupt and ugly and that must remain beyond people’s eyes and tongues; he becomes their prisoner and is shackled by them. He does not allow freedom because freedom thrives and flourishes only in an atmosphere of goodness and good work. For this reason, freedom is an excellent indicator of the general conditions in which a society or state lives. Its presence can easily reveal the prevailing condition: it indicates a desire by the leadership and the people to progress and build, while its absence indicates corruption and factors of moral and material destruction. It also reveals people’s mood: when freedom exists, the mood is flexible, relaxed, and calm; when it is absent, it becomes unstable, tense, and sharp. Where freedom exists, trust prevails; where it is absent, suspicion and conspiratorial thinking prevail.

A free person is courageous because he does not fear his own actions or allow them to bind him. He is always prepared to hear another opinion and benefit from it. He does not fear criticism because he knows perfectly well that perfection is not a human attribute. He understands that criticism and accusations, when present, can motivate further work and reveal weaknesses in performance, deficiencies in decision-making, and shortcomings in policy formulation, thereby leading to more successful work. Such an official therefore works to provide means for expressing and communicating opinions and holds accountable anyone who obstructs or attempts to circumvent that freedom. If he is a president or king, he uses state institutions to serve citizens and facilitate their activities so that every person in the state becomes a participant in construction and an axis of progress. Wherever such a person governs, state institutions serve the nation, citizens cooperate with them, and there are no security agencies watching, tracking, pursuing, and terrorizing them. Under such a ruler, security agencies serve the state rather than the regime and safeguard citizens’ welfare rather than the dominance of a particular group.

By contrast, the suppressor of opinion normally protects himself with numerous security agencies because he is cowardly and lacks the courage to do good; instead, he is possessed by the cowardice of doing evil. He fears speech and trembles at whispers. He dislikes an atmosphere of cooperation among people. Suspicion surrounds him, conspiratorial thinking paralyzes his thought, he does not like to see two of his people in harmony, and he detests the existence of a party presenting new ideas. He cannot tolerate organizations or associations free of splits and conflicts. Consequently, he can only be aggressive, working in secret and striking in the dark, and can only lead his people toward problems and troubles that may explode into bloody conflict.

Wherever an authoritarian suppressor of opinion rules, he surrounds himself with soldiers, intelligence agencies, and intelligence agencies monitoring intelligence agencies, and so on. Under him, security agencies multiply, as do spies spying on citizens rather than serving them. Reports and personal files multiply. These agencies intimidate and frighten people, trust among them disappears, and mutual suspicion becomes a common factor. Warnings not to mention the ruler or his regime multiply, and the culture that “walls have ears” develops. The war does not stop with deploying spies. Such a ruler also ties people’s livelihoods to their behavior. A “good conduct” institution develops, humiliating the individual and citizen, and employment becomes tied to loyalty and implementation of his policy. If you are a supporter, your affairs are facilitated and your conduct is considered good; if not, the ruler’s curse falls upon you. The loyalist receives a certificate of good conduct, a job, and assistance with projects, while the disloyal person faces obstacles. Thus growing hatred among people develops, serving to prolong the ruler’s tenure.

The authoritarian suppressor even suspects his assistants and loyalists. He is so bad and cowardly that he suspects his own household and those who defend him. He therefore ensures that competition and personal conflicts exist among the leaders of his security agencies and that hatred prevails among senior assistants and ministers. This keeps them occupied fighting one another and ensures that no leader whose conscience awakens can act against the regime. To make it difficult for a leader’s conscience to awaken, the ruler floods him with special material grants so that the ruler becomes the master of the favor and the source of more of it. Thus the authoritarian continually involves his assistants in material or sexual corruption so that awakening becomes difficult for them.

This applies to a great extent to most Third World states. Their rulers are mostly authoritarian and allow only a very narrow margin of freedom of opinion. One may criticize the head of an institution, demand the restoration of an old building, ask for water pipes to be extended, or make similar demands. But they cannot tolerate criticism or alternative opinions on fundamental state issues, nor political opposition or political ideas different from their own. They therefore open the doors of prisons and eliminate or terrorize opponents, whether through livelihoods or physical harm. They are the cowardly type who always conceals what they do and hates hearing opinions contrary to their own.

Such rulers usually cover their actions with crude media propaganda focusing on what is described as their wise and rational deeds, courageous policies, and great achievements. They try to send people the message that they are the source of prosperity and that people’s welfare and food are tied to the rulers, and that people must acknowledge this and entrust their affairs to the ruler whose heart is broad and whose compassion is deep. They provoke people’s disgust and ridicule and cause them to lose confidence in the media and journalists.

Over time, rulers in the Third World succeeded in creating media gangs loyal to their regimes, so that there was no longer any intelligence need to impose a single opinion and exclude others. Media figures became tied to the ruler and formed gangs that took the place of intelligence agencies. The journalist became a censor of himself, his colleagues, and people with opinions. There was no longer any need for intelligence agencies to prevent publication; the newspaper editor did it on their behalf.

Authoritarians place responsibility for mistakes and corruption that surface on their agents and assistants, who ultimately pay the price so that the authoritarian ruler appears clean, at least in the media. Over time, the saying developed that the president or king is respectable and concerned, but the problem lies with his assistants or those around him who do not tell him the truth and commit wrongdoing in his name without his knowledge. This saying became widespread in many Arab countries. But it is one of the means by which the suppressor of freedom remains in power, removes accusations from himself, and excludes reform and reformers. It is fundamentally false. It is unacceptable because if the ruler allowed freedom of expression, people and the media would actively identify corruption and weaknesses, and through various forms of pressure they could improve the situation. But he rejects freedom in the first place because he would be its primary victim. It is also false because the morality of the assistants reflects the morality of the ruler: a courageous ruler relies on courageous people, while a cowardly ruler relies on cowards. If the assistants’ morals fall, that indicates a fall in the ruler’s morals; if the assistants’ moral stature is established, so is that of the ruler. If assistants conceal facts, it is because their master has become accustomed to conspiracy and corruption and has attached himself to people who share his habits and assist him.

For this reason, in states that value freedom of expression and opinion, the president bears responsibility for what occurs in the state and for the conduct of his assistants. He normally listens to opinions, and the press leaves him no room to hide behind arguments and excuses. The president is subject to evaluation and criticism, as are his assistants. Whoever is proven corrupt, immoral, or depraved has no opportunity to lead public work or continue carrying public responsibilities.

Consistent with the cowardice of the authoritarian ruler who monopolizes power, space is sometimes allowed for criticism of ministers or institutional officials. A trend appeared in Arab journalism and was promoted publicly: a person may criticize anyone and anything he considers appropriate, provided he does not touch the president or king. This fits perfectly with the limited democracy allowed around secondary issues that do not touch the foundations of the state’s organization and policy. In repressive states, one person in each country decides whatever he wishes. He appoints and dismisses; decides foreign policy and relations with other states; gives and takes; decides whom to trust and whom to rob; arranges marriages and divorces. He sometimes pretends to value consultation and holds meetings with officials and assistants, but in the end he is the decision-maker. What benefit is there in criticizing an institutional official who can be dismissed for corruption and replaced by someone even more corrupt?

Dealing with such naive arguments is an inseparable feature of authoritarianism. Faced with repression, coercion, and inability to express themselves, some people search for outlets to relieve accumulated pressure and amuse themselves with such arguments, even though they already know that the problem lies first of all at the top. This is neither strange nor unlikely because authoritarianism and the authoritarian’s morality are reflected in the people. They learn isolation and conspiracy and demean themselves to the point where one wonders about their ability to do anything, or asks, in colloquial terms, “What can I do?” A person who belittles himself becomes easy prey for enemies. Thus, under authoritarianism, society tends toward justification and projection. The mentality of justification continually searches for reasons for failure that do not include oneself, while the mentality of projection casts one’s disgust onto others. It is easy to see how our Arab peoples, including our Palestinian people, suffer from helplessness and dependency while being remarkably creative at producing external justifications that turn the defeated into a hero and the dwarf into a giant. They observe perfectly well how their defeats are strangely transformed into victories and their retreats before enemies into great achievements.

Under authoritarianism and repression, society as a whole, though not absolutely, becomes cowardly. The ruler plants fear and terror in people’s hearts to the point that they cannot resist or confront an ordinary official or employee. They are broken-winged; sorrow fills their hearts and bitterness dominates their psychology. They flee quickly, are drained of strength, and their mental powers are surrendered. It is therefore no surprise that enemies achieve quick and easy victories over peoples oppressed by their own rulers. If we examine the Arab situation, we see how hostile states, foremost among them Israel, achieved comfortable victories over the Arabs, and how Arabs were too weak and cowardly to stand against Eritrea when it occupied Yemeni islands in the Red Sea. Even on non-military fronts, authoritarian rulers kept the Arab nation backward, with its people struggling for a livelihood. Many things have indeed changed in the Arab world over the years, but this change resulted from the passage of time and mutual interaction among nations and did not represent real progress relative to other peoples. The scientific, technological, economic, and social gaps between Arabs and others have widened, making it necessary for Arabs to create new political environments through which they can make greater efforts to narrow the growing gap.

In short, an atmosphere of freedom expresses a mental condition and a rising life in the history of peoples. It expresses high moral character and a desire to advance progress. People within it possess strength and motivation for work and achievement; cooperation prevails among them and they can accomplish things. In an atmosphere where freedom is absent and individual rule and one opinion prevail, morality collapses, conspiratorial and self-interested thinking dominate, and people speak of victories while suffering defeat and of achievements while suffering sorrow and pain. Under freedom, people are courageous and capable of confronting difficulties and optimism prevails. Under authoritarianism, people become so cowardly that they fear themselves, become passive, retreat easily before difficulties, and live on wishes and illusions.

Authoritarianism is the negation of people’s abilities, or a refusal to acknowledge their existence, and the subordination of their individual and collective will to that of an authoritarian ruler who believes that his mind is the best mind and that his vision is a divine wisdom God has placed within him. Authoritarianism assumes that people are incapable and dependent, lacking initiative, and uses force and domination to suppress anyone believed to be capable and driven by his will toward challenge.

Authoritarianism assumes that the authoritarian ruler is the axis of movement in society or the state. He is the possessor of sound opinion and righteous action, the possessor of good and wise speech in work. He recognizes truth and reality, knows the entrances and exits, and knows the keys and locks. Because of his wisdom, as Plato was said to have suggested, he even knows suitable marriages and decides who should marry whom and who should divorce whom so that reproduction will be as efficient as possible and geniuses will be born. Above all, most authoritarians on earth believed, and most still believe, that they are delegated by God and that divine wisdom required their existence as one of the blessings God bestows upon helpless human beings.

For this reason, the authoritarian does not establish modern institutions operating according to impersonal rules that apply to everyone. Instead, he establishes institutions that take a modern form but are empty of impersonal substance and rest on personal foundations. He therefore does not establish objective criteria for assuming responsibilities or performing tasks in the state; he focuses on personal criteria that serve him. Wherever one looks in an authoritarian society or state, one finds connections and favoritism firmly established as the basis for filling official vacancies and government jobs. Personal connections reinforce the employee’s personal dependence upon the authoritarian ruler and constitute a basis of loyalty. A person who obtains a job without competence remains indebted to whoever gave him the job and the privileges that accompany it, and remains vulnerable to humiliation and to fulfilling demands and orders. Favoritism reflects the same values, leaving the person tied to values other than the objective values required by the job.

Authoritarianism therefore builds a hierarchy of personal loyalties and chains of dependence from the bottom to the top. For example, a school doorman is indebted to the teacher, the teacher to the principal, the principal to the education director, the education director to the assistant undersecretary, the assistant to the undersecretary, the undersecretary to the minister, the minister to the head of government, and the head of government to the person of awe and power. Each flatters the person above him and tries to prove his personal loyalty, and each is humiliated and cowardly before the person above him in the hierarchy.

It does not stop there. The competent person is also required to abandon his competence. The demand is not direct, but it is part of the system. A competent person finds himself a stranger or outcast if he does not fit the general atmosphere and eventually faces two choices: either adopt personal values or leave his job. The overwhelming majority of people under authoritarianism choose hypocrisy and abandon objective values. In most cases, a competent person does not obtain a job because of his competence but through the support of a connection or influential person.

Thus, objective foundations of accountability disappear, and personal foundations remain dominant. As long as this is the case, it is not important for a person to perform his duty; what matters is continually proving that his personal loyalty does not weaken or bend. It is therefore unsurprising to find institutions, employees, salaries, cars, and so forth without much usefulness or good results. The institution exists but is hollow. There may be a university, for example, with buildings, teachers, students, salaries, and degrees, but it is scientifically backward and unable to contribute to scientific progress or technological development. Or there may be an agricultural department intended to improve farmers’ conditions while the area of agricultural land shrinks over time.

Because of the focus on personal loyalties, the official cares about his personal interests more than the public interest. Indeed, the public interest remains marginal unless it can be used to serve his private purposes. He may focus on strengthening his personal influence and ambitions and seek to impose false prestige at work and outside it—a hollow prestige without practical substance that returns public benefit. He also focuses on personal invitations to meals, making speeches, and participating in festivals or public prayers.

How can a society governed by authoritarianism, carrying all these traits and values, progress? Such a society cannot move forward. Even if it appears to do so, it does so only in appearances, not in substance. It displays consumer goods and entertainment venues such as bars, liquor stores, brothels, and moral permissiveness, but does not display centers of production, scientific advancement, technological innovation, or social transformation toward collective work. An authoritarian society is a backward society; in theory and in practice it does not progress. It is the opposite of the human being, the opposite of competence, and the opposite of belonging to society or nation. No matter how much is said about progress or how many promises are made, it will not progress because it contains only backwardness and is capable only of entrenching it.

The Palestinian Authority and the Method of Construction

Where does the Palestinian Authority stand with respect to establishing the foundations of construction, and what steps has it taken to fulfill its promises of progress and national unity? Is there an intellectual foundation and a scientific methodology guiding the different efforts and creating connected channels leading toward a clear objective? The truth is that neither the Palestinian Authority nor Arafat himself issued an integrated vision of what matters should become or of the means that could be used. Everything that was issued appeared in press statements or nonbinding speeches containing vague phrases about democracy, construction, and good intentions. We have no coherent vision, action plan, or set of objectives, and no theoretical foundation from which to judge practical reality or policies operating on the ground.

We therefore have no choice but to examine some practical policies through which we can understand the Palestinian Authority’s policy and judge the intentions of those running it toward Palestinian society.

Freedom of Expression and Organization

When democracy or freedom is discussed in areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority, it must be remembered that the Authority is not a state but a form of autonomy restricted by agreements with Israel. Under these agreements, the Authority has no sovereignty and is not free to act independently of Israeli oversight and intervention. It cannot, for example, legislate on matters that might affect the agreement or conflict with any of its provisions. It cannot abolish a military order without consultation with Israel through a joint Israeli-Palestinian committee. Even the Palestinian Council, the legislative council, cannot issue legislation without the signature of the head of the Authority, and the head of the Authority restricts his signature according to what has been agreed with Israel.

Caution is therefore necessary when speaking of democracy. If democracy means electing a system of government or voting on a constitution independently of Oslo, it is impossible to apply such democracy in the Occupied Territories/67. If the speaker means pluralism within the Oslo system and the agreements that emerged from it, then democracy is possible. Political freedom is therefore restricted and cannot be treated as it would be in an independent state.

It is also important to note that democracy or political freedom in the Occupied Territories/67 could not receive serious Israeli or American support. Israel and the United States speak of the need to open space for freedoms, hold free and fair elections, defend human rights, and so forth, but they are not serious about these principles, as seen in their support for arbitrary arrests and unjust trials discussed in the preceding pages. These two states cannot support freedom in the Occupied Territories/67 resembling freedom in Israel or the United States because they know in advance that a free system could not produce agreements such as Oslo or Taba. Peace with Israel, the author argues, is achieved only with dictatorships because of Arab sensitivity toward Israel and the fact that Arabs have not yet accepted it. This is why the United States does not insist on human rights and freedom in Arab countries; and when it does insist, it focuses only on certain Arab states outside the American umbrella. Democracy in the Arab world threatens American and Israeli interests and leads Arabs to make decisions independent of American will. The same applies to the areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority.

Within this framework, we attempt to examine the Authority’s policies concerning freedom of expression and organization.

Since its establishment, the Palestinian Authority has tolerated opinions operating within its system while restricting other opinions that move outside the leadership’s particular vision. It followed traditional Arab methods of silencing opposition, such as direct threats, inducement, intimidation, harm, and defamation. It used the carrot for supporters and the stick, or the threat of it, for those who did not support it. It did not necessarily succeed completely, but it achieved part of what it wanted.

This policy was particularly evident with regard to freedom of the press and journalists. The Authority took several measures against newspapers such as Al-Nahar, Al-Watan, and Al-Istiqlal. It even took limited measures against Al-Quds, a newspaper considered supportive of Arafat’s policies. Al-Ummah, associated with the Popular Front–General Command, did not escape attacks either: its offices were raided twice and some of its materials burned. As for local radio and television stations, their owners know their limits and cannot exceed them. They do not have freedom to depart from the official rules of the game, under which democracy is defined as “constructive opinions” serving the national interest. This definition means that opinions outside peace with Israel and outside the leadership’s vision are destructive and unpatriotic and must be fought.

Official Palestinian radio and television are, politically speaking, propaganda organs. They glorify the leader, his wisdom, courage, and sound judgment and do not dare criticize him. On these two media outlets, it is permissible to criticize a minister’s or official’s policies, discuss social issues, criticize even American political positions, or discuss a problem in Iraq or Indonesia. But it is not permissible to directly address the leader’s policy or his vision of what conditions should be. Since he makes the fundamental decisions, freedom of expression on these outlets touches only secondary or marginal matters that do not affect overall policy.

Some newspapers ceased publication, including Al-Watan and Al-Ummah. Al-Watan was replaced after being banned by Al-Risalah, which began publication in Gaza. This newspaper was closed following the triple bombing carried out by Hamas members in Jerusalem on September 1, 1997. About two months later it was permitted to publish again, but its publication was prohibited for another month because its editors announced that they had been allowed to issue the paper. The Authority interpreted this to mean that they should publish without announcing that permission had been granted; because they had announced it, they deserved punishment. As for Al-Istiqlal, associated with Islamic Jihad, it had still not been allowed to publish.

Personal intimidation was also practiced to silence voices opposing agreements with Israel or criticizing the Palestinian Authority. For example, the author of this book was shot on August 20, 1995, and wounded by four bullets. The shooter was named Maher Mustafa Dandan from Balata refugee camp, allegedly acting at the request of the Palestinian intelligence service. Dr. Mahmoud al-Zahar, accused of holding a leadership position in Hamas, was arrested and subjected to multiple insults. Several Hamas, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Popular Front–General Command leaders were arrested. Some Palestinian detainees, such as Mahmoud al-Jamil and Yusuf al-Baba, even died in Palestinian prisons as a result of torture.

The repressive practices of the Palestinian Authority prompted Amnesty International to recommend that the Authority condemn torture, end impunity for perpetrators, conduct a comprehensive and public investigation into abuses, guarantee freedom for human-rights defenders, and halt State Security Court trials. (Amnesty International document MDE 96/62/15, September 1996.)

The important point is that the Palestinian public in the central region and Gaza began to question the Authority’s national character and seriousness in creating a bright future for the Palestinian people. The repression Palestinians had experienced under occupation continued, as did torture and mistreatment in prisons. At times the Palestinian Authority appeared even more repressive than the occupation, especially concerning freedom of expression and presenting detainees for trial under clear legal procedures. The occupation, the author argues, was not as severe toward freedom of opinion and expression as the Palestinian Authority, nor did it detain a person without following a clear legal pattern that lawyers and international bodies could examine. Nevertheless, treatment of detainees inside prisons was, in general, much better than the occupation’s treatment.

Palestinians began asking themselves about the value of slogans, festivals, and speeches about independence when they saw Palestinians arresting other Palestinians for the same reason for which the occupation had arrested people: confronting the Israeli occupation. Palestinian struggle after Oslo had become terrorism, and speech had become an act of stepping outside the national line.

Palestinian imprisonment was lighter in material living conditions than Israeli imprisonment, but Palestinian imprisonment was heavier psychologically than Israeli imprisonment. It is difficult for a person to endure seeing one Palestinian arrest another because he carries out resistance activities against the Israeli occupation or is suspected of supporting resistance activities. This is particularly difficult while the land remains occupied, refugees remain in camps far from their homeland, and settlement construction continues.

The issue of arrest and suppression also became repugnant to Palestinian society because it had become clear that the Palestinian Authority was attempting to satisfy Israel and the United States through its arbitrary actions. Israel and the United States repeatedly pressured the Authority to combat what they called terrorism and terrorists. Whenever a military operation against an Israeli target occurred, the Authority immediately arrested members of the organizations carrying it out to demonstrate that it was combating terrorism. It was imprisoning Palestinians as proof to the enemy of its commitment to Oslo and as a means of improving its negotiating position with Israel and the United States. It kept detainees in prison without specific charges or trials and turned them into hostages serving what was called the peace process.

Administrative Corruption

Almost no ordinary Palestinian gathering was free of political discussion, and during the Oslo period almost none was free of discussion of the administrative corruption practiced by the Palestinian Authority. A general feeling developed through people’s daily observations and personal experiences that the Authority did not adhere to sound administrative standards and used unscientific and improper methods in managing the country. The Authority tried to defend itself by saying that corruption existed everywhere, but this argument did not appear convincing to the public.

An official report from the Palestinian Control Commission issued at the beginning of 1997 pointed to financial laxity, negligence, and waste. The report stated that administrative inefficiency had caused approximately $300 million in public movable and immovable assets to be wasted. The Palestinian public was not surprised by the report but demanded an investigation and punishment of those responsible. The Authority formed an investigative committee, as did the Palestinian Council, known as the Legislative Council, but no administrative change occurred. Most members of the Palestinian Authority Council resigned as a result of the report, but Arafat did not bring about change.

Despite the report, people familiar with the situation were not satisfied with it because it did not mention the budget of the head of the Palestinian Authority. There was a special budget for Yasser Arafat whose funding sources were not all known. The media reported that a closed economic circle, managed by a small number of people for Arafat, controlled several commercial agencies for Israeli and foreign goods and generated large profits from them, including agencies for cement, construction steel, and petroleum products. Some media outlets, such as the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, reported that Arafat had private financial accounts in Israeli banks.

As noted earlier, Arafat did not live a life of luxury and comfort, but he needed money for political influence among Palestinians. Without money, Arafat could not secure the support of some people, and the public might turn against him and his policies. Some therefore questioned the oversight report about Arafat’s private budget, but the oversight body did not monitor the presidential office. This led people to believe, or suggested to them, that pointing to Arafat’s assistants as involved in corruption might be a Machiavellian method of diverting attention from Arafat himself.

In any case, public discussion did not focus only on financial matters but touched upon various aspects of administration. Here I attempt to clarify the principal features of administrative corruption.

First: Connections and Influence-Peddling

Connections and influence-peddling were among the most prominent features of corruption in the Occupied Territories/67. Such connections had long existed and were strongly related to Arab ways of life, customs, and traditions, but their frequency increased greatly after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. It became normal for a person seeking work or a job, or trying to complete an administrative task, to think about finding someone with influence. It was no longer surprising for people to ask who was responsible for completing an official transaction or administrative matter and whether that person had a connection, because such a connection was considered necessary to complete the task without major obstacles. A person needed someone to support him or exert pressure on his behalf to reach his objective. To be fair, not all Palestinian institutions relied on connections, and there was variation between institutions, but the general prevailing feature was that influence was a powerful qualification for obtaining a job or completing a task, often stronger than academic competence or professional ability.

This great expansion of influence-peddling goes back to the mentality of the former PLO and its successor, the Palestinian Authority. As explained earlier, the Palestinian leadership adopted a method of buying people’s loyalty and support and always worked to maintain enough money to achieve this aim. As long as support for a particular policy was valued as a qualification for employment, it was expected to outweigh all other qualifications. Academic, professional, and vocational qualifications are necessary when construction is the objective; but when the objective is political mobilization, buying loyalty, and influencing political positions, other standards replace competence. Influence-peddling is a personal method of filling jobs and positions. It fits perfectly with the mentality of political mobilization and the individual style of administration. It ties the person seeking influence to the intermediary and makes him perpetually indebted to that intermediary. He owes the intermediary his livelihood, job, position, and even the service provided to him, and knows in advance that continued enjoyment of what he received depends on not rebelling against the intermediary’s vision and indeed on following and serving it. This is why authoritarian states and individual rulers favor personal methods of building their institutions. Scientific methods do not create a feeling of servitude in the employee; competence remains the defining characteristic of his administrative identity, and this does not serve authoritarian interests. Connections do not bring in competent people but people willing to compromise themselves; if they bring in a competent person, they also assume that he possesses that willingness to compromise. A competent person may obtain a position but quickly lose it if he tries to perform his work scientifically and according to systematic principles. If a competent person obtains a position through influence, he already understands the rules of the game and knows that the limits of his job are determined by what the official wants, not by what the nation or public interest requires.

Influence-peddling contains an inherent meaning of violating other people’s rights and is completely different from someone intervening to defend another person’s legitimate right. It is direct intervention with officials to give one person a service at the expense of others who deserve it or have priority. It is a discriminatory practice against members of society and feeds on the foundations of fairness, equity, and justice. It is therefore a major corrupting and destructive phenomenon that eats away at society and turns many of its members either into opportunists or resentful people. It is a dangerous disease adopted only by a system that conspires against its people and seeks to destroy them for one purpose or another.

Violations of other people’s rights in the Occupied Territories are not limited to government employment; they extend to civil and private institutions. For example, banks opened in the country after Oslo relied on connections in filling many of their jobs. It is easy to find in any bank men and women known for their privileged social status and good economic circumstances. If one asks, one finds that most were supported by one influential person or another. The children of the poor, who may be among the highest achievers, receive very little opportunity.

As a result, many public positions and jobs are occupied by people afflicted by moral degradation and by violating the rights of others. Since most lack the required competence and feel an inner deficiency, they compensate by behaving arrogantly, proudly, or contemptuously toward others as a way of proving themselves. One may find, for example, a security officer displaying his weapon before people or manipulating it theatrically; someone in an argument may warn, “You don’t know who I am,” only to turn out to work in an Authority department; someone may drive an official car at high speed through a crowded street; or a senior employee may issue a traffic violation to a driver who overtook his car. In the end, connections bring in people who are often unethical and engage in unethical behavior.

Financial Manipulation

Financial corruption, as mentioned in the introduction, was very extensive and was estimated at hundreds of millions of dollars. It was not limited to plundering the public budget, embezzling, and wasting public funds; it also included deceiving and exploiting people and extorting them. Many members of the Palestinian Authority attempted to exploit their positions and their revolutionary image among some people to achieve material gains. They were helped by the sympathy of some people on one side and the fear of pursuit among others.

I do not deny the right of some returnees or people already inside the Occupied Territories to receive assistance and public support. A large number of our people undoubtedly made sacrifices with serious intentions of liberation and national salvation and were wonderful examples of sacrifice, devotion, and generosity. Those who believed they were being led toward a sacred objective and that liberation would inevitably come under the national slogans being raised should not be disregarded or denied recognition for what they did and gave. They should be treated fairly and receive the appreciation they deserve.

What I am discussing here are those who found in the popular image surrounding them and in their positions means of achieving personal aims at the expense of others. A significant number occupied important leadership positions and controlled institutions vital to Palestinian life. Most often, these people came from non-revolutionary backgrounds—that is, they had not participated in confronting the enemy—but from political backgrounds that emerged from offices, hotels, or unproductive theoretical discussions. Some had distinguished themselves through poor conduct while the PLO was in Beirut and Tunis; others were suspected of relationships with Israel.

Such people attempted to obtain things to which they had no right, such as buying goods without paying, building houses without paying workers, facilitating commercial deals in return for a percentage or specified reward, or pressuring wealthy people to pay a form of protection money. Such behavior—which cannot be generalized—aroused people’s feelings and affected their assessment of political developments and of the agreements with Israel as a whole.

Financial manipulation did not stop there. A number of Authority figures apparently became involved in smuggling and stolen goods. A wave of thefts, especially from Israel, spread through the country. Many people began making theft a profession from which they lived and earned large profits, cooperating with Israeli gangs in the process. Their hands reached whatever they could obtain, but they paid particular attention to stealing cars. A number of influential Palestinians found an opportunity to profit by facilitating the work of thieves and making quick gains. Naturally, this affected the level of moral conduct.

Some influential figures also engaged in local theft, stealing machinery and property, and even reaching into antiquities. An antiquities official was caught using a brigadier general’s car in an attempt to steal antiquities from a Palestinian tourist village. These people carried out their actions without accountability or punishment. Usually their actions were concealed; if a scandal spread, they were transferred to new workplaces, sent abroad for training courses, or promoted. At times it appeared that committing wrongdoing and immoral acts led to increased status or advancement. For example, an officer known for forgery and involvement in illegal commercial activity was “punished” by being sent abroad for an educational course. An officer involved in storming An-Najah National University was “punished” by being transferred to the area to which he wanted to move. An intelligence officer who built a house at no cost to himself and was found to have embezzled more than one hundred thousand dinars was transferred from Jericho to Gaza, and so on.

It was also observed that some influential figures built luxurious homes costing hundreds of thousands of dinars or even millions, as was the case with one senior Palestinian negotiator. Where did they obtain such enormous sums when they had previously told people that they had been revolutionaries in the mountains and valleys and had accumulated neither gold nor silver? How does someone suddenly become extraordinarily wealthy when he has undertaken no activity that could lead to such a result—such as discovering buried treasure or winning the lottery?

There was also obvious misuse of public funds and other people’s rights. For example, some officials routinely stole food allocations intended for a particular police or security center. Bribery clearly came to be regarded as an acceptable phenomenon for facilitating private matters. Official cars and mobile phones were used in ways that abused public money and offended public sentiment. Cars and mobile phones were distributed to a large number of Palestinian employees and used for private purposes.

The Palestinian people in the Occupied Territories/67 spoke of many cases of moral corruption, with particular emphasis on arrogant behavior intended to degrade others in favor of the fahlawi personality that tries to convince people it can accomplish great things while actually being hollow. Such behavior created barriers between ordinary people and influential officials in the Authority.

But it appears that the largest public form of financial manipulation occurred through employment. Following his policy of mobilization and using money to buy political support, Arafat appointed many people to nominal positions and jobs that had no actual duties. For example, he appointed hundreds of general directors in Palestinian institutions without giving them any real function. Most Palestinian ministries had dozens of general directors who did nothing except receive a salary at the end of each month. The same applied to many presidential advisers who also did nothing except receive salaries. The president often consulted no one and pursued his policies according to what he considered appropriate.

These redundant positions were numerous. In most institutions, one could find that very little work was being done and that a quarter of the existing staff would have been enough to cover it.

This manipulation was also evident in the numerous security agencies established by the Authority. These agencies employed large numbers of young people at low salaries with the aim of satisfying as broad a sector as possible and gaining political support. Many Palestinian youths thought that joining a security agency brought great prestige and gave a young man authority and clear responsibilities. A significant number of these young people did nothing, or spent their time monitoring people and writing reports about them.

A considerable portion of public money was therefore wasted in exchange for doing no work. Instead of investing this money in productive facilities benefiting the nation, the Authority undermined investment in favor of political patronage. Naturally, this pleased the United States, Israel, and donor countries because it was destructive to Palestinian social life and led to hatred and fragmentation.

Moral Corruption

People also spoke of a major increase in bottles of alcoholic drinks and beer along roadsides compared with the period before the Authority. It became easy to buy liquor, whiskey, and champagne, and those who consumed alcohol no longer needed to hide from public view. This was in addition to reports concerning honor, lax conduct in some offices, and the pursuit of sexual desires.

The Authority openly contributed to similar activities. For example, it established a nightclub called Zahrat al-Mada’in, a name referring to the city of Jerusalem. The senior Authority officials supervising it apparently could find no other name for an undesirable establishment than a name carrying special resonance in the Palestinian ear, as though they wanted to emphasize their revolutionary character even in nightclubs.

The circle of moral corruption expanded in a way that Israel sometimes exploited and commented upon. For example, Israel gave some Authority figures cards labeled VIP—“very important person”—and granted them the right to move around Israel. Apparently, some of them became accustomed to spending nights in Tel Aviv’s nightclubs to such an extent that one minister in Benjamin Netanyahu’s government called for imposing closures on these people rather than imposing closures on residents of the central region and Gaza after every military operation carried out by the Islamic movement. His reasoning was that these people would be distressed if they could not spend time in Tel Aviv, which would encourage them to fight what was called terrorism and terrorists seriously and faithfully.

It is very unfortunate, the author says, to hear an Israeli minister respond to a request by one of the mayors of Arab towns in the 1948 territory to release Palestinian funds seized after a Hamas military operation by saying that Palestinian money in Israel’s hands was better than in the Authority’s hands because Israel safeguarded it while the Authority squandered and wasted it. The minister dared to make this statement and no one in the Authority responded. The author’s interpretation is that no one responded for fear that the Israeli minister might respond with figures and details concerning their personal conduct.

Spies and Work within the Authority

It is not easy to accuse someone of espionage because such an accusation requires evidence, proof, and a trial. Here, however, I report what many people circulate and repeat in their gatherings. People generally believe that a number of individuals suspected of cooperating with the occupation and foreign states hold jobs and positions in the Authority. These people had previously been viewed with suspicion, but under the Authority they became influential. People are not talking about ghosts; they name suspects by name, position, and by reference to how they treated people under occupation. In every location, village, or city in the central region and Gaza, names of people accused of treason and espionage are heard in connection with important positions in the Authority. The names mentioned include ministers, security officials, general directors, and ordinary employees.

The Authority pursued some people accused of treason and conspiracy against the land and homeland, but its efforts remained limited. It arrested only a small number of suspects and often under grounds other than treason because, according to the author’s interpretation, Oslo and Taba prevented pursuit of Israeli collaborators. The pace of arrests suggested that the Authority was less interested in serious pursuit than in creating a favorable public impression of its national intentions. Thus, many individuals surrounded by suspicion were never questioned. The Authority’s arrests focused on suspected spies from ordinary, non-influential groups, while it did not investigate influential people accused of collaboration who might have been more dangerous than ordinary espionage suspects.

Events later demonstrated that Israel was penetrating Palestinian ranks seriously. For example, Israel sometimes broadcast news about discussions within the Authority’s council, known as the Council of Ministers, that had never previously been published. Sometimes it intercepted a minister’s car because it already knew that he was carrying someone who wanted to cross from one place to another where passage was prohibited. It intercepted the car of a Legislative Council member because it knew that the car had been stolen from Israel. It intercepted a vehicle belonging to Preventive Security because it already knew that the vehicle was carrying Hamas detainees wanted by its intelligence services. Members of one Palestinian agency working for Israel were exposed, and Israeli security forces were reported to have entered Tulkarm and arrested a member of Islamic Jihad.

There are many examples of security penetration, but the important point is that the Palestinian people in the Occupied Territories/67 began to doubt the Authority’s security performance and its ability to address Palestinian security matters. They also began to doubt its intentions because a number of suspected collaborators occupied important positions within it. These matters are not a subjective evaluation of the Authority’s situation so much as reflections of people’s impressions and opinions about the development of Palestinian security institutions.

Working in Israel

The issue of working in Israel and the development of the national view toward it has already been discussed. At the beginning of the occupation it was unacceptable for a Palestinian to work in Israeli establishments because this supported the enemy’s economy and created Palestinian economic dependence on Israel. For this reason, the PLO and Arab states attempted to allocate funds to create a Palestinian economy that would free Palestinian workers from dependence on Israeli employment. But these funds did not achieve their purpose, and the number of Palestinian workers in Israel increased during the period when funds were flowing in. The reason was financial and administrative corruption.

The economic vision intended to provide jobs for workers in the central region and Gaza failed. Palestinians did not achieve an economic boycott of Israeli products and did not formulate an economic model that would free them, even partially, from economic dependence. With time, some politicians and economists began defending the impossibility of separating the Palestinian and Israeli economies and arguing that it was better to continue as things were. But this position could not defend itself during the Iraq-American war, when Israel closed the crossing line and prevented workers from passing. A major economic hardship fell upon many people, and there was no public mechanism to help them. In such a situation, an observer cannot blame an individual for seeking work or even seeking a way to end the war so he can reach his workplace in Israel, because he has family responsibilities to fulfill. The blame falls on those who control policy and public funds.

The crisis became particularly acute after Oslo and the suicide operations that followed. Israel closed the Occupied Territories/67 after each bombing and prevented workers from working, citing security reasons. But the important issue here is not Israel’s reasons but the Palestinian leadership’s response. Instead of beginning to think seriously about changing its economic approach and spending of public money, the leadership turned to the world to pressure Israel to reopen employment. It appealed to the United Nations, the United States, and European states to allow workers to resume their jobs because the closure was starving people and driving them to oppose continuation of the peace negotiations. Matters had been reversed: work in Israel, once regarded as treason, had become a national demand for which resources and efforts were expected to be mobilized.

The Palestinian leadership told the people and the world that it was ready to establish a state because it had established educational, health, administrative, and other institutions through which it could manage state affairs. It said that, in the process of construction, it had reached a degree of maturity, development, and preparedness that would make statehood possible in a short time. But it did not say that it would establish a state dependent on employment in Israel and foreign aid. What kind of state would that be?

The national demand during the years following Oslo became focused on lifting the closures and allowing workers to work in Israel. That was the situation in simple terms. To what extent were we serious about our national demands? To what extent could our enemy respect us and our demands? Did we really want a state and independence? Would someone who wants a state leave his people dependent on others? And do we really want to weaken the enemy if our productive capacity supports its economy?

Settlement

While the world and the media spoke of peace between Israel and some Palestinians, Israel was waging an intense settlement campaign against the Palestinian people. Thousands of dunams were confiscated here and there in the Occupied Territories/67, residential buildings were constructed in several settlements, and money was allocated for additional settlement activities. As a result, the number of settlers increased, as did the concerns and dangers they imposed upon the Palestinian reality.

Settlement did not take place in isolation from the geography of the Occupied Territories/48. It was carried out in a way that gradually and smoothly created settlement and residential blocs integrated with Jewish residential areas. Settlements were therefore connected by bypass roads that surrounded Arab population centers, and they were economically and socially integrated with the Israeli economy and society so that settlers would not feel isolated, separated, or discriminated against. Settlement, as implemented by the Labor Party and now by Likud, therefore reflected one mentality: expanding Israel to encompass all of Mandatory Palestine, at least during this historical stage.

In other words, the settlement process amounted to the practical annexation of the Occupied Territories/67. It was a powerful movement toward imposing a practical reality more eloquent and stronger than laws and ceremonial decrees. Anyone following settlement on the ground could easily reach a clear conclusion about Israeli policy: it had not changed radically and remained committed to expansion according to its capacity to extend itself demographically, militarily, and according to international circumstances.

Israeli policy continued the approach of the 1970s and 1980s, reflecting pre-existing plans among the two major parties based essentially on an ideological premise of expansion according to capacity. But this policy took on a new tactical direction that provided greater flexibility for political maneuvering and practical implementation. Instead of relying on confrontation, which could be embarrassing domestically and internationally, the current “peace” process gave Israel an opportunity to act under a cover of reduced embarrassment and implicit acceptance by several parties. Because of this flexibility, the Labor Party under Shimon Peres was able to increase the settler population substantially, confiscate hundreds of thousands of dunams, and construct dozens of kilometers of bypass roads. Because of the same flexibility, Likud continued its policy without embarrassment or pressure proportionate to the scale of the danger facing Palestinians.

The current peace process imposed no restrictions on settlement and did not ask the countries of the world to pressure the parties to prevent changes on the ground. The Oslo Agreement addressed settlement as an issue to be postponed until permanent-status negotiations. It did not take into account that additional settlement activity could predetermine the outcome of future negotiations. Someone who intends to negotiate on an equal basis does not accumulate sources of negotiating pressure, particularly when he already holds the stronger hand; someone who wants a fundamental solution to a problem does not work to make that problem more complicated.

Nevertheless, the agreements that followed Oslo—Cairo, Taba, and Hebron—did not place restrictions on settlement, and increasing settlement was not a subject of discussion in any of them. The Palestinian side in the peace process remained silent about settlement activity except for some demonstrative and ceremonial acts, such as calling for gatherings on confiscated land or praying there. These actions served mainly to attract media attention and satisfy domestic emotional consumption. In the end, they did not produce tangible results that changed reality.

Even the United States, which had sometimes pressured Israel to stop settlement, no longer gave the issue priority in its regional policy. The financial pressure it had exercised on Israel to freeze settlement no longer appeared at this time. Instead, it provided financial assistance to the Labor Party after its election victory in 1992, while Labor continued settlement after signing Oslo with the PLO leadership. It was as though the United States was saying: if the concerned parties—the Palestinians—conclude an agreement with Israel without insisting on a settlement freeze, why should the Americans continue to pressure Israel? This is a logical position.

It is internationally understood that agreements bind their signatories within the limits of their provisions. They do not bind a party to any matter or action not clearly stipulated. For this reason, agreements avoid vague and ambiguous language that can bear several interpretations. On settlement, Oslo did not address the issue ambiguously; it ignored it altogether, as though it were not a pressing issue requiring immediate resolution. This neglect effectively gave Israel a free hand to alter the land as it saw fit, leaving Palestinians with little before the world except a moral argument. Historically, however, moral arguments and good intentions were unlikely to deter Israel from its practical policy. The world does not operate on moral arguments or good intentions.

In other words, the agreements with Israel gave Israel historic opportunities to continue its temporary expansionist project encompassing Mandatory Palestine by providing a cover of legitimacy for continued settlement and by confining the Palestinian population in the Occupied Territories/67 to population islands resembling an archipelago whose parts are separated by geographical barriers and security restrictions.

In June 1992, the Labor government announced a decision to freeze settlement for one year in order to improve the negotiating atmosphere between Israel and the PLO. Labor wanted to attract American financial support for housing projects for Jews who had immigrated from Russia after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The United States had previously refused to provide a $10 billion American credit facility that would make it easier for Israel to borrow to finance housing projects because the Likud government refused to stop settlement in the Occupied Territories/67. Circumstances changed when Likud lost the 1992 election and Labor won. Labor classified settlements into political and security settlements and promised to freeze political settlement. It refused, however, to freeze construction in Jerusalem on the grounds that the city was Israel’s eternal capital and continued constructing housing projects already far along in preparation. The United States announced at the time that it would monitor construction by satellite to determine whether the Israeli government was keeping its promises.

It later became clear that Israel had indeed frozen construction in approximately 8,000 housing units, including units for which construction contracts had not been signed, units for which contracts had been signed but work had not begun, and units in the early stages of foundation work. But the freeze did not prevent construction and settlement population growth. Statistics indicated that the number of settlers in the West Bank excluding Jerusalem increased from approximately 97,000 to 123,000 by the end of 1995. During the same period, the number of settlement homes also increased in settlements such as Ma’ale Adumim, Beitar, Efrat, Ariel, Kiryat Sefer, Alfei Menashe, Ali Zahav, Dolev, Beit Horon, and others.

Land confiscation did not stop under the Labor government. Some sources estimated that approximately 150,000 dunams (one dunam = 0.25 acre) were confiscated between the signing of Oslo and the fall of the Labor government, while other sources estimated that the figure was twice as high. Land was confiscated in Shuwayka, Irtah, Mikhmas, Qalandia, al-Janiya, Abu Ghneim, al-Khader, Artas, Beit Amin, and elsewhere.

Land was also confiscated for bypass roads, covering approximately 60,000 dunams. A 17-kilometer road was built around Jericho, along with two roads around Ramallah and al-Bireh and roads around Tulkarm, Nablus, Hebron, and Bethlehem.

After the fall of the Labor government and Likud’s assumption of power, settlement construction and land confiscation increased. While the Labor government carried out settlement and confiscation quietly, the Likud government saw no need to hide, especially since its election platform announced that it would not give up what it called the Land of Israel and would neither stop nor freeze settlement. It undertook large-scale housing projects and confiscated extensive areas of land in the central region and Gaza coast, and initiated the establishment of the Abu Ghneim settlement near Bethlehem.

Like Labor, however, the Likud government refrained from building new settlements and committed itself to expanding existing settlements, with the exception of Abu Ghneim, which it considered to lie within the boundaries of a united Jerusalem municipality under Israeli law. By the end of 1997 it had not established new settlements, but according to the author’s interpretation this did not constitute Israeli recognition that the land on which settlements could be built was not Israeli land. Rather, it reflected the immediate political requirements of a negotiating stage that might lead to peace and stability in the region.

Palestinian Reaction to Settlement

The Palestinian reaction to settlement was sharp in statements and diplomatic efforts, but selective. The reaction was not at the same level in every case; its intensity varied from one situation to another and according to the governing party. For example, there were no strong Palestinian protests over settlement expansion under the Labor government, but the reaction was strong when the Labor government under Rabin attempted settlement at Abu Ghneim. Under diplomatic pressure, Rabin decided to freeze, rather than cancel, settlement at the site. There was also a strong Palestinian reaction to land confiscation in the al-Musrara area of Jerusalem, and under American and United Nations pressure the Labor government abandoned the idea.

But Palestinian Authority protests against Labor’s settlement expansion were generally not heard, as though there were a special understanding with the American side that settlement activity would proceed according to classifications permitting continued construction. Palestinian protests over land confiscation for bypass roads were largely for domestic consumption. An understanding had been reached outside the Taba Agreement that Israel would not begin implementing Taba until the bypass roads, considered vital for settlers and for linking settlements to one another, had been built. The Palestinian side therefore knew in advance that the bypass roads would consume some land and that implementation of the agreement would not proceed without them. Nevertheless, Palestinian officials went out with the people to protest land confiscation and road construction, issuing statements about Israel’s bad intentions and the impossibility of continuing the peace process amid confiscation and settlement. Palestinian newspapers, naturally, printed these statements in large headlines and emphasized the danger threatening the peace process.

Protests against settlement under the Likud government appeared more intense, but they gained substantial momentum because of settlement at Abu Ghneim. The Palestinian side promised that negotiations with Israel would not resume until settlement at the site stopped, but the promise was not kept. Work at Abu Ghneim continued and negotiations continued. Protests over land confiscation took the form of sit-ins at confiscated sites, prayer there, and prayers for the destruction of Jews and those who supported them.

Despite protests and diplomatic efforts, the Palestinian Authority did not tell the people the truth about the agreements it had signed: they did not require Israel to refrain from confiscating land and building settlements or to freeze these activities. Nothing in Oslo, Cairo, or Taba required Israel to do so. The Authority never told people that it had accepted the bypass roads or that negotiations would continue despite settlement at Abu Ghneim. There was no frankness or clarity, consistent with the policy of the PLO leadership, which had always manipulated words and emotions as a domestic policy designed to distract people from seeing the reality of what was happening.

Conclusion

The Palestinian Authority worked to establish some institutions necessary for civil society at the time, such as institutions for standards, geography, statistics, passports, and similar matters. These institutions were related to managing people’s civil lives and were not necessarily connected to liberation, ending occupation, or building an independent state. Such institutions are useful both at the level of autonomy and at the level of a state. Despite the attractive language about state-building and the dreamy promises, however, these institutions suffered from corruption and administrative confusion.

Some money was spent in ways that benefited the public, such as helping patients with serious illnesses, paving roads in villages and cities, and employing some young people who suffered from unemployment. The problem, however, remained that corruption was more prominent than concern for the public good. Spending methods under the Authority appeared not to differ from those of the PLO. Some money went to proper purposes and some was used for political patronage and buying loyalties. Just as money had been wasted in the past, it was wasted now; and just as the previous period led to destructive consequences for the Palestinian people, the current period would lead to the same fate.

The author hopes that the Palestinian Authority will achieve the objectives it continues to announce to the people. But the issue is not one of personal hopes; it concerns objective matters such as the foundations of strength, dignity, and wisdom. These are the essence of ethical public work, which gives public action its meaning and turns promises into realities. When morality disappears, hopes become wishes and dreams become anxiety and sleeplessness. The people may judge whether they are on the right path. But the matter ultimately remains in the hands of those who see the error and remain silent about it, compromise with it, follow it, or work to change it.