The Palestinian Opposition

Although Yasser Arafat’s leadership bears responsibility for developments on the Palestinian scene because it possessed the means to influence people and mobilize them politically and through the media, the Palestinian opposition also bears part of the responsibility. The organization’s leadership, represented by Yasser Arafat, possessed money and Arab and international support and enjoyed broad media backing. But this does not absolve the Palestinian opposition of responsibility, nor does it make it innocent of the situation in which the Palestinian cause found itself. Although some opposition factions say that they are part of the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), this book treats the leadership as Yasser Arafat and assumes that he was the one who determined the space within which the various factions could operate and whose views would be heard.

It is difficult for the author to determine precisely what constituted the Palestinian opposition and when it began to be known as an opposition. It is possible, however, to arrive at a definition once we move beyond the period of the national struggle up to the Oslo Accords, which will be examined in the following pages. It remains important to point to some of the stages in the disputes within the PLO so that the background of some of the opposition frameworks becomes clear.

I noted at the beginning of the book that the number of Palestinian factions increased after the 1967 defeat, reflecting different and divergent views about what Palestinian resistance should be. Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), led by George Habash, were at the forefront of these factions and represented two lines that inevitably conflicted or intersected: the national line and the Arab nationalist line. Tensions periodically emerged because each line had implications for the reality of the resistance. For example, in the late 1960s the PFLP believed that hijacking civilian aircraft helped the Palestinian national struggle, while Fatah believed that ill-considered steps of this kind could create embarrassment on both the Arab and international stages. As another example, the two movements experienced armed tensions for various reasons, resulting in casualties on both sides. It was not unusual for them to quarrel over the location of a position or military base, or over the affiliation of certain members.

The political tension between the two movements became particularly acute in 1974 when the PLO accepted the phased program that endorsed establishing a Palestinian national authority on any part of Palestine that could be liberated. At the time, the PFLP considered this a violation of the Palestinian National Charter and believed that the organization was moving toward compromise. As a result, the PFLP withdrew from the organization and became the leading force in a Palestinian opposition front. It later returned to the organization. Despite its return, it remained a focus for those dissatisfied with PLO policy in general and Arafat’s policy in particular.

There were some fronts or organizations that were not fully aligned with Yasser Arafat’s policy, or whose alignment fluctuated from time to time depending on circumstances. These included the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command and the al-Sa’iqa organization, funded by Syria, and, to a lesser degree, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which had split from the PFLP for ideological reasons. But these organizations were not highly effective in directing Palestinian policy, nor were they capable of coming to the forefront of events and organizing Palestinian affairs. The Fatah Revolutionary Council, led by Sabri al-Banna, split from Fatah at the beginning of the 1970s because it was dissatisfied with a leadership style it considered insufficiently “revolutionary.” But the movement was not a mass organization; it remained closed and followed a particular military pattern, and it was unable to establish a base from which an opposition could develop.

What was important about these Palestinian organizations, however, was that most depended on the PLO for their funding. Since Fatah under Arafat constituted the largest force in the organization and controlled its various institutions, Arafat controlled the funds that were essential for these organizations to continue. Some organizations did obtain money from outside the PLO, but their dependence on the organization’s funds increased over time, and with it their ability to oppose Arafat declined. The successive years of the 1980s appear to have witnessed verbal opposition to Arafat’s policies, along with Arafat’s tolerance of that opposition.

The various Palestinian organizations were angered when Arafat visited the Egyptian regime in 1983 following Palestinian-Palestinian fighting in Lebanon. Together with a new organization that had split from Fatah under the leadership of Saeed Musa, these organizations decided to establish a rejectionist front and formulate a new policy for directing the Palestinian people, different from Arafat’s policy. Some Arab states pledged to finance this front and provide the support it needed. But the front was too weak to do anything other than pursue Arafat with statements criticizing and condemning his policies. Arafat had become accustomed to such statements, which caused him neither concern nor anxiety. Even the Palestinian public had become accustomed to ignoring or not reading the statements because it assumed in advance that they contained nothing new; and even when they did contain something new, they were not taken seriously.

In any event, the rejectionist front lasted in the public mind for no more than a few months. It was unable to organize its ranks because of mutual suspicions among its leaders and an inability to coordinate. The inevitable result was its dissolution. The PFLP left it and returned to the PLO; by leaving, it lost its most important support and the front no longer had the capacity to continue except on paper. Even paper ceased to be useful after a while, and the front eventually disappeared.

The Marxist current in the Palestinian resistance movement was unable to lead the Palestinian people into a revolutionary phase resembling the movements that had emerged worldwide on Marxist foundations. These movements tried to imitate international experiences, but remained within a small framework that they could not transcend. There are many reasons for this, which there is no room to explain here. Among them were the Palestinian social and religious fabric, which does not easily accept an outlook that departs from belief in God; the distance from the nationalist idea, which might find an echo, or at least tolerance; and financial dependence on competitors in the Palestinian arena.

At the nationalist level, the nationalists failed to influence Palestinian policy despite their ability to influence the Palestinian communities in which they were present. Arafat continued to shape Palestinian policy without serious challenge despite losing popularity in a number of places. The nationalists, like the Marxists, failed to find loyal friends who would provide them with uninterrupted financial support. They also failed to establish an effective and influential media apparatus, and they were unable to build a strong popular and organizational base in the territories occupied in 1967. Perhaps the nationalist current was able to establish a popular base in the Levant countries more successfully than the Marxist current, while the Marxist current was much stronger in the Gaza Strip and the central and eastern areas than the nationalist current.

As for the religious current, it was absent from the political arena until the Palestinian uprising began in 1987. The Muslim Brotherhood did not directly enter the political arena and limited itself to criticizing the national movement and its leaders. During the 1980s it attempted to establish various social associations and frameworks and conducted activities that were largely preparatory. By “preparatory” here I mean a focus on calling people to the movement and returning to Islam, and preparing young people for a firmly Islamic life. The Islamic current emerged as a political force in 1981, when the Islamic Bloc was formed at An-Najah National University in Nablus and won the student-council elections against the national movement in its various formations. It should be noted that the national movement contested the elections divided into two blocs.

With the beginning of the uprising, the Islamic movement emerged as a force competing with the strength of the PLO and all its factions, which had formed the Unified National Leadership. Hamas was able to leave its mark on daily events and carried out a number of military operations against Israel, including the kidnapping of soldiers. Thus Fatah was no longer the only major force in Palestine; there was now a competitor. Some Palestinians claimed that the Israeli occupation had created Hamas and supported it so that it could take Fatah’s role. This accusation is not far removed from the attempts by the Palestinian leadership to fight any Palestinian individual or movement that could constitute an alternative leadership. But based on my knowledge of developments and some of their details during the uprising, I estimated that the occupation had initially turned a blind eye to Hamas when it was founded, believing that the movement would follow the approach of the Muslim Brotherhood, which in previous years had focused on criticizing the PLO and the various Palestinian factions, and believing that it would become a force for creating tension in the Palestinian street that might lead to internal fighting. The occupation wagered on reducing the intensity of the uprising by creating tense internal conditions, but it did not succeed in all its attempts.

After Oslo

Although disputes intensified on the Palestinian scene after the 1982 war and Palestinian fighting broke out, the Palestinian street experienced sharp polarization after the Madrid Conference in 1991, and the polarization intensified after 1993 following the signing of the Oslo Accords. The Islamic current was outraged by these agreements, and various Palestinian factions opposed them, including factions within the PLO. The country witnessed sharply divergent positions, and popular seminars, conferences, and lectures were held to explain the different points of view. Each side sought to affirm its position and mobilize the masses to support it.

The Oslo Accord continued, and the Palestinian opposition was unable to stop it or bring it down. Indeed, the opposition gradually softened its opposition, with some factions beginning to appear as part of a democratic process that permitted opposition from within. Is the Palestinian opposition serious in its proposals, and does it actually possess an alternative that it can offer the masses and work to achieve? This is what I attempt to answer in the following pages. I will address the various factions, foremost among them Hamas and the Islamic movement in general.

It is not easy to discuss the Islamic movement within the Palestinian circumstances of time and place, because this movement, whether under one title or another, has global extensions and is affected by a wide range of variables. An increase in its influence in one place does not mean an increase in its influence everywhere, and a decline in its presence in one area does not mean a decline throughout all areas. It is a widely dispersed movement with policies and aspirations that adapt themselves to international, Islamic, and Arab changes. In addition, each local presence adapts to local circumstances, but within the general framework that distinguishes the movement.

It is difficult to discuss the Islamic movement precisely within the Palestinian opposition understood as opposition to the peace project now under way, whose foundation is the Oslo Accord, and as adopting steps and policies intended to thwart this project in favor of an alternative project. Here we are not discussing the Islamic movement in the full breadth of its doctrinal, intellectual, organizational, and political positions, and so on. Rather, the discussion is limited to a particular political position: opposition to the existing peace project during a particular period, namely the period we are now witnessing, which began with the signing of the Oslo Accord.

Accordingly, the discussion here concerns the Islamic movement as an opponent of the peace process currently under way and as part of a broader Palestinian opposition. To make the picture clear, the discussion begins by explaining the different opposition forces, their orientations, and the position of the Islamic movement among them. It then moves to the methods of action and programs proposed by the various parties, followed by an assessment of what they have accomplished and failed to accomplish. This lays the basis for predicting the future of the Islamic movement as an opposition movement on the Palestinian scene and the future of the opposition in general.

Defining the Opposition

Analysts and politicians are not expected to agree on one precise definition of the term “opposition,” and definitions are likely to range from disagreement to overthrowing existing conditions by armed force. One person may define opposition as disagreement with certain policies; another may define it as disagreement accompanied by programs of mass awareness to mobilize people against them. Yet another may define it as disagreement accompanied by taking all necessary steps to bring down what exists.

In this paper, the following definition is adopted: opposition means disagreement with the Oslo Accord signed between the Palestinians and Israelis and with the agreements and measures that emerged from it, together with adopting policies that lead to steps to undermine the agreement in favor of an alternative project. Under this definition, several conditions must be present before a party or group can be described as opposition:

1. Disagreement with the Oslo Accord and what resulted from it. Under this condition, someone who accepted the Oslo Accord but later rejected what resulted from it is not considered part of the opposition.

2. Rejection of the agreements based on Oslo and the various measures resulting from it. This means rejecting the various legal, economic, and other projects arising from the agreement and treating all procedures based on it as part of it. Accordingly, accepting what emerged from Oslo means accepting Oslo, even if the publicly stated position is verbally the opposite.

3. Practical policies aimed at thwarting the agreement. The dissenter must have policies followed by practical measures intended to undermine or overturn the agreement. This makes the opposition theoretical and practical at the same time. Theoretical opposition alone means nothing more than maintaining a verbal position that produces no change. Policies and the measures that follow them differ in method, intensity, and direction. They may be mobilizing policies involving work among the public through media, leaflets, and seminars to build broad support for the opposition; they may be mobilizing and military policies; they may be military policies; and so on. Anyone who does not adopt policies accompanied by action is not classified as opposition.

4. An alternative project. The opponent must have an alternative to what is being proposed so that people have something around which to rally. Without an alternative, opposition becomes mere futility: a position seeking to overthrow an existing situation or stance in favor of nothing. Whoever has no alternative that can serve as a focus for mobilization does not fall within the definition of opposition used in this book.

Categories of the Palestinian Opposition

There are a number of groups on the Palestinian scene in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank that describe themselves as opposition—that is, they oppose the Oslo Accord and the agreements and measures arising from it. They can be classified into the following groups:

1. Opposition from within the PLO: Palestinian organizations that are part of the PLO but oppose the current agreements: the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

2. Opposition from outside the PLO, divided into two categories:

   • a. Islamic opposition: represented by the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
   • b. Factions with nationalist, Islamic-nationalist, or national orientations: such as the PFLP–General Command, Fatah–Temporary Leadership, the Arab Liberation Front, and al-Sa’iqa, now represented by the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party.

3. Independents: individuals with political commitments but without organizational affiliation. They do not form an organization, but possess political and social weight that can influence public opinion.

The definition of opposition given above does not apply to all these groups, but only to some of them. The groups that best fit the definition are Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Popular and Democratic Fronts. The nationalist and Islamic-nationalist groups, and so forth, do not fall within the definition if it is restricted to the territories occupied in 1967. These groups do not adopt policies or measures to confront Oslo there, although they have alternative policies and programs abroad. In other words, these organizations have fairly comprehensive platforms, but they have not entered the arena of competition or struggle here in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As for the independents, some put forward alternatives, but they lack the organizational or material strength to take steps capable of affecting the Oslo Accord or promoting an alternative project.

Accordingly, the real discussion of opposition forces in the territories occupied in 1967 is practically limited to four organizations: Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front, and the Democratic Front. Including the other organizations among the opposition is merely a theoretical exercise consistent with the idea of opposition in theory, but not in practice.

Position on the Peace Process

A detailed account of the positions of the opposition organizations toward the peace process would require many pages. For purposes of discussion in this book, however, the description is limited to the main features of each organization’s position, so that there is a basis for judging its policies. Moreover, details may not be useful here because of the large number of statements and leaflets issued and seminars held to explain each organization’s position.

A. Hamas

Hamas arose because, according to the wording of its charter, the balance had been upset, evil-doers had gained power, oppressors had prevailed, and homelands had been usurped, with nothing remaining in its proper place because Islam had disappeared from the scene. Its establishment was therefore intended to “confront falsehood, defeat it, and drive it back, so that truth may prevail, homelands may be restored, and the call to prayer may rise from their mosques announcing the establishment of an Islamic state, so that people and things may each return to their proper place; God is the One whose help is sought.” Hamas is described as “one link in the chain of jihad against the Zionists.”

There is one path to liberating Palestine: the path of jihad. Hamas says that the best and most correct method of recovering rights is force, in a world that does not look upon the weak with compassion and in which rights are not begged for but seized. Accordingly, the necessary sacrifices of life and wealth must be made, and what has been paid so far is only a small part of the required price.

The course of jihad requires a number of means, foremost among them Islamic education in creed and thought, followed by preparation and action. Hamas emphasizes social solidarity as a shield protecting the individual and the community, and cooperation with individuals, groups, and others on the Palestinian scene, provided their allegiance is not to “the communist East or the crusading West.” According to its charter, Hamas says that it “follows the path of goodness, bringing people closer rather than driving them away, uniting rather than dividing.”

As for its political positions, it considers Palestine to be Islamic waqf land forever, “until the Day of Judgment.” It describes Jews in highly hostile terms and regards them, along with Zionism, as a force seeking to destroy societies and morals and eliminate Islam. Accordingly, Hamas believes that all efforts must be combined to drive out the occupation, and considers any group, organization, or individual withdrawing from the struggle against Israel and its supporters to constitute a grave betrayal, citing the Qur’anic verse: “Whoever turns his back on them that day—unless he swerves for battle or joins another group—has incurred the wrath of Allah, and his refuge is Hell—what an evil destination.”

With regard to cooperation with others for the liberation of Palestine, Hamas does not impose barriers or obstacles, whether the others belong to an Islamic organization or not. Its cooperation with Islamic organizations, however, is based on doctrinal foundations. If it disagrees with other parties or organizations, Hamas does not rely on slander, confrontation, or defamation as methods of resolving the disagreement. It remains concerned with national unity and closing ranks.

The Hamas charter is unclear regarding Arab rulers. It does not define a position toward Arab rulers, but warns them of the imminent Zionist danger and calls upon them to adopt serious Islamic positions and open the borders to fighters to fight Israel. Hamas statements sometimes appeal to Arab rulers to adopt particular policies, and the movement itself sometimes sends messages to Arab rulers.

Hamas is clear regarding peaceful solutions. It says that peace initiatives and international resolutions concerning Palestine contradict Islamic doctrine, and that no part of Palestine may be relinquished because doing so would mean relinquishing part of the religion. International conferences, it says, would “enable the people of unbelief to establish themselves in the land of Muslims”; such conferences are described as a process of Zionizing the Arabs.

B. The Popular and Democratic Fronts

The Popular and Democratic Fronts are members of the PLO, but they do not believe that the organization currently led by what they call the “authoritarian leadership” represents the Palestinian people. They call for “rebuilding the institutions of the PLO on democratic foundations and restoring its status as the sole legitimate representative of our people,” and consider the organization to have lost its standing under the current circumstances. The departure of the authoritarian leadership from the national line has damaged and destroyed the organization’s institutions, requiring new struggles to establish democratic foundations and ensure popular representation for Palestinians.

The two fronts propose an alternative program to the actions of the Palestinian leadership and to the agreements it has concluded. It can be summarized as follows:

1. Upholding the right of return of Palestinians, the right to self-determination, and the establishment of a state with Jerusalem as its capital.
2. Continuing the struggle against the occupation and settlers.
3. Upholding the PLO while removing Arafat and withdrawing legitimacy from his leadership, and holding democratic elections in which the Palestinian people participate wherever they live.
4. Considering Arafat’s commitments under the agreements concluded with Israel null and void, while submitting the agreements themselves to a popular referendum covering the entire Palestinian people under international supervision.
5. Implementing international legitimacy resolutions, including the refugees’ right of return.

For the two fronts, the Oslo Accord amounts to rearranging the occupation and beautifying it; they insist that the option of the intifada should be maintained as an effective means of confrontation.

The two fronts also call upon all national, democratic, and Islamic forces and personalities inside the homeland and in the diaspora to unite on the basis of their proposed program and form a broad national front. They call as well for rejecting top-down formulas and sensitivities and working together toward a decision adopted democratically by the people.

C. Palestinian Islamic Jihad

It is clear that Palestinian Islamic Jihad has no respect for the PLO or its leadership. It regards the organization as a product of the Arab League, established at Egypt’s prompting in 1964. The organization’s leadership, in its view, is illegitimate, having been installed by illegitimate Arab leaders. As for Arafat, he should have resigned after his failure became evident, but instead chose to continue along a path leading the Palestinian people toward the abyss.

Islamic Jihad’s program can be summarized as follows:

1. Continuing jihad against the Jews while resisting the Oslo Accord and resisting the normalization of relations between Israel and the Islamic nation.
2. No participation in any elections for which the Oslo Accord serves as the ceiling.
3. The PLO is rejected in principle even if it is purged of agents.
4. Islam is the way of life, the source of strength, and the basis for continuing jihad.

Regarding its position toward factions and organizations, the movement seeks rapprochement with Hamas and to build bridges of cooperation with other factions with which it differs ideologically. Its position toward Arab governments is clear and unambiguous: most of these governments are unbelieving.

The Islamic group respects differing opinions and is always ready for dialogue. It will not raise arms against those who signed the Oslo Accord. It is opposed to “party isolation in all its forms,” but insists completely on maintaining its position and principle.

Assessing the Opposition’s Ability to Overturn the Oslo Accord

The principal opposition factions and organizations referred to above announced that they opposed the Oslo Accord and were working to overturn it. There were also other factions with some influence outside the country that do not fit the definition of internal opposition. These factions and organizations attempted by various means to achieve their objective, but so far they have failed. The Oslo Accord continued, and other agreements and practical measures were generated from it on the ground.

What did the opposition do, and what did it fail to do, that led to its failure so far? What is its fate and future if this failure continues? Since the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) is the backbone of the Palestinian opposition, it receives the greatest attention, but the other factions will not be excluded from the discussion. When discussing the future, the focus will be on the Islamic movement as a whole in light of expected developments.

Since the signing of Oslo, the Palestinian opposition has taken a number of steps, foremost among them:

1. Education and awareness: seminars, lectures, festivals, leaflets, statements, and so on. Many festivals were held, especially by the Islamic movement, as well as seminars and lectures explaining the Oslo Accord, clarifying its dimensions and objectives, and explaining the injustice inflicted upon the Palestinian people because of it.
2. Protests: strikes, writing slogans, setting tires on fire, and so forth. These activities sought to mobilize public opinion against Oslo and send a clear message of dissatisfaction to the Palestinian leadership.
3. Persuasion: opposition factions attempted to contact, directly and indirectly, Palestinians within Yasser Arafat’s leadership in order to dissuade them from proceeding with or supporting the agreement. Meetings were arranged for this purpose, while others occurred incidentally.
4. Military action: intended to destabilize Israeli security and stability, which might lead to Israel emptying the Oslo Accord of its substance and thereby undermining it. This was the factor that placed the greatest pressure on the agreement’s signatories.
5. Unifying opposition forces: creating a unified popular force against the agreement. Attempts were made both inside and outside the country. Factions abroad attempted at least to unify their political position by establishing the Ten Factions Alliance, while some forces attempted to align within frameworks such as the Democratic Union and the Palestinian Gathering. Despite these efforts, the agreement remained intact, and implementation of its provisions and those of the agreements that emerged from it advanced on the ground. It seems clear that opposition efforts are declining and that their popular momentum is fluctuating. Where, then, is the predicament—or predicaments—that the opposition has faced, and what explains its inability to overturn the agreement so far?

Reasons for the Opposition’s Failure

Many reasons have led to the Palestinian opposition’s failure to overturn the Oslo Accord and halt the peace process so far. Some are external, arising from outside factors, while others are internal, resulting from the opposition itself or deficiencies in its performance. The most important are as follows.

External Reasons

First: The forces participating in and supporting the agreement. The Oslo Accord enjoys broad Arab and international support, in addition to support from a broad segment of the Palestinian people. Most Arab states support Oslo, especially neighboring states such as Egypt and Jordan. Syria, which does not appear enthusiastic about the agreement, lacks room to act against it, particularly because it is negotiating with Israel.

At the international level, it is difficult to identify a state that stands against Oslo, even if it does not theoretically support it. The United States supports and sponsors the agreement, as do the European states and Russia. The rest of the world also supports it, with a few exceptions such as Iran, Libya, and Sudan. The international situation is generally conducive to the agreement’s success and the opposition’s failure. In addition, Israel is putting its weight behind the agreement in cooperation with the Palestinian leadership, which controls most of the sources of Palestinian power.

Second: Weak opposition funding. The opposition does not have sufficient sources of funding to cover the expenses of activities capable of overturning the agreement, while the other side possesses enormous material resources. Some opposition factions have no source of funding at all, while others have only weak financial resources. Forces supporting the agreement also tighten the restrictions on opposition funding in order to cut off every material resource. The United States and European states pursue every dollar known to be directed to the opposition, whether provided by states, organizations, or individuals, and also pursue individuals’ bank accounts if there is suspicion that they are close to or members of opposition factions.

Europe and the United States provide millions in support of the agreement, supply financial and economic facilities to the Palestinian side supporting it, and work to suffocate the Palestinian side opposing it.

Opposition to Oslo costs enormous sums, whether for institution-building, supporting individuals, or financing various activities. The opposition needs tens of millions of dollars annually to perform its tasks properly and effectively. Tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of dollars can cover only small gaps in the required expenses. The opposition possesses only a small portion of the money, with Hamas appearing to be in better condition than the other factions and movements. Some organizations do not even possess a thousand dinars, and some cannot finance a statement for public distribution. In the author’s assessment, the funding problem is the most important problem facing the opposition because it has paralyzed activity at both the institutional and individual levels and has even damaged the morale of activists in the various factions.

Third: The media campaign against the opposition. The media in general is on the side of the signatories of the agreement, whether local, Arab, or international. Very few media outlets support those who oppose the agreement. Some face closure, such as the newspapers Al-Watan and Al-Istiqlal, while others face interference, such as Al-Quds Radio. This media does not merely beautify the agreement and continually work to create public opinion in its favor; it also works to distort the image of the opposition, describing its members or organizations as terrorist elements or organizations and accusing them of establishing relations with parties or states hostile to the Palestinian people.

Fourth: Persecution. The opposition is pursued by many parties, at both institutional and individual levels, especially the Islamic opposition. The Islamic opposition is accused of terrorism and its members are subject to arrest and torture. Europe pursues them, as do the United States and many Arab states. Even the Palestinian self-rule authority pursues them. Some are arrested or killed or shot at; others are denied employment or have their livelihoods targeted.

Internal Reasons

First: The traditional method of opposition. The opposition devoted substantial effort to the traditional Palestinian method of opposition: festivals, speeches, statements, denunciations, memoranda, strikes, and similar activities. This method is tiresome at the popular level and does not find receptive ears, especially after the event has lost its initial momentum. It may work temporarily in the first days following an event, but its effect fades as the event loses its heat, and it may even backfire, producing the opposite results. The opposition devoted more effort than necessary to activities belonging to this method at a time when people had grown tired of statements and speeches and no longer cared about or listened to them; indeed, they might turn to criticizing the author of the statement or speech. We have tried this method for many years, since 1919: the country was lost piece by piece while we issued heated statements and resonant speeches. The same applies to religious sermons, especially the Friday sermon. People listen to the Friday sermon and leave the mosque as though they had heard nothing. Preaching and exhortation are no longer popularly accepted methods unless accompanied by action that lends them credibility.

Second: Inability to cooperate or coordinate positions. The opposition factions failed miserably to achieve even the minimum level of effective cooperation—that is, cooperation based on a program. Although they sometimes adopted similar or identical political positions, they did not translate them into joint action to confront the rejected Oslo Accord. Apart from issuing some joint statements on particular issues and holding some forums for discussion, there was practically no coordination or movement toward unity of action.

Part of this failure genuinely stems from ideological differences among several factions, which obstructed cooperation in other areas. The leaders of these factions were presented with a proposal to unify their political position and work together within a specific program aimed at overturning Oslo. The leaders did not object to the proposal, but they did not pursue it in practice. They said “yes” to the face, but in practice turned their backs.

The Palestinian Gathering experience provides evidence of this. Lengthy discussions took place about bringing opposition forces together in a single framework under a unified program to be presented to the people as an alternative to Oslo. But Hamas soon withdrew from the discussions without explanation or clarification; the PFLP regarded the gathering as a product limited to Nablus; and the DFLP worked with the PFLP to form the Democratic Gathering.

The Islamic Jihad, General Command, and Ummah Forum remained in the gathering, but these were very small forces with a weak presence on the ground. In addition, the head of the gathering did not perform the role required of him as chairman. Thus the Palestinian Gathering failed. Based on my personal experience, I assess that the Palestinian opposition factions are not genuinely interested in cooperating with one another. They suffer from a lack of mutual trust and mutual suspicion that reaches the level of accusation. I do not believe that people who outwardly tolerate one another while secretly exchanging accusations are capable of agreeing to travel the same road together. I also noticed that a number of opposition factions were closer to the head of the PLO than to one another. They preferred courting the self-rule authority and cooperating with it rather than cooperating among themselves; when they wished to meet, the meeting place was the self-rule authority, not anywhere else. This became especially clear when they quickly accepted the Palestinian Authority president’s invitation to hold a national dialogue.

Third: Failure to propose and pursue the alternative. Whoever rejects a program must put forward an alternative and pursue its implementation on the ground. The factions proposed alternatives, but they did not follow them through with implementation, depriving them of their ability to attract the Palestinian street. Our people have grown tired of statements and speeches and want to see something practical being implemented. Hamas and Islamic Jihad attempted to implement an alternative program through military action, but so far they have not convinced the Palestinian street, for several reasons, including:

• a. The absence of successful political investment in military action.
• b. Failure to sustain such action so that it would become a phenomenon rather than a series of isolated operations.
• c. The intense pursuit of members of both movements by many parties, including the self-rule authority.
• d. Limited material resources, both equipment and finances.
• e. Israel and the self-rule authority placing the burden of the economic hardship suffered by the people on the two movements.

Fourth: Unwillingness to take the initiative. The opposition remained reactive: commenting on the steps taken by supporters and implementers of Oslo and issuing statements rejecting what they did. It did not take the initiative in steps that would lead the street away from Oslo. The opposition, especially Hamas, did not take the initiative to lead the street socially, politically, and culturally. It remained enclosed within itself and within commentary on developments, to the extent that the opposition began discussing events within Oslo rather than outside it, such as discussing the law on political parties and elections.

Along the same lines, Hamas itself did not see itself as the leader of the Palestinian people. In practice, it limited itself to leading the Islamic movement connected to the Muslim Brotherhood. It did not address its discourse and efforts to the Palestinian people as a whole. When it did so, it was mainly for recruitment into its ranks rather than for giving outsiders a role in the public activities it led or in making certain decisions. It preferred to remain a Palestinian faction that did not see itself as capable of shaping general policy or moving toward that goal.

In practical terms, there is no Palestinian faction qualified to lead the Palestinian street as an alternative to the Palestinian Authority except Hamas. The other factions lacked the ability to take the initiative, except for the PFLP during a certain period. But the front lost that ability and was no longer capable of implementing its own political or military vision.

The Future of the Opposition

Under the prevailing circumstances, the future does not appear bright for the opposition. The opposition suffers from a poor situation that is primarily attributable to deficiencies in its practical orientation. I believe future developments will proceed along the following lines:

First: Hamas will retreat in favor of the basic thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood to meet the requirements of the circumstances of the uprising, which were characterized by confronting the occupation. The occupation still exists, but the political environment now is different and characterized by a Palestinian political presence. The movement must adapt itself again to this new environment. Hamas’s objective was to confront the occupation under the circumstances of the developing uprising; the situation has now changed, and therefore the movement’s confrontational outlook will adapt. In my assessment, the confrontational outlook will gradually turn toward the conciliatory outlook characteristic of the Muslim Brotherhood and toward the doctrine of taqiyya, which the group considers necessary to avoid violent conflict between Muslims and rulers. The group will return to caution and gradualism in influencing the Palestinian public.

Second: The Popular and Democratic Fronts will seek a political role on the margins of the self-rule authority rather than within it—that is, connected to the self-rule authority without becoming part of it—and their positions will remain theoretical and persuasive.

Third: A number of small factions that were not considered part of the effective opposition in this paper will remain guided by Syrian policy and follow its direction. If Syria stands firm, these factions will stand firm; if Syria’s position is shaken, these factions will not find themselves able to stand firm.

Fourth: Islamic Jihad will maintain its position of continuously confronting the occupation while trying to avoid Palestinian-Palestinian conflict. What will prevent Islamic Jihad from implementing its jihadist program will be its material capabilities.

For this reason, I expect the opposition’s standing among the public to decline and its level of support to decrease. Under the circumstances existing now, what could raise public support for the opposition is the failure of the self-rule authority to meet popular expectations: the greater the failure, the greater the support for the opposition. If the opposition continues at the same pace, without demonstrating seriousness or real alternatives, and the Palestinian Authority continues with its poor performance, it is expected that the Palestinian public will stop supporting the various organizations and move toward political disengagement while waiting for an alternative. Under these circumstances, frustration in the Palestinian street will increase, accompanied by a decline in moral standards and a pursuit of private interests at the expense of the public interest.

General Assessment

The days brought the people news of Oslo, and they came to understand the reality of the agreement. But they also brought news of the opposition, and they came to understand its reality as well. Of all the opposition factions, only Hamas worked seriously, but its activity remained incapable and insufficient to change the political situation. It carried out some military operations inside Israel and shook the Zionist entity, but it did not continue and began spacing its military operations farther apart. The movement nearly undermined the Oslo Accord and overturned the political balance in the region, but the United States quickly mobilized international opinion against it and hastily convened an international conference in Sharm el-Sheikh, attended by about thirty countries, to combat what was called terrorism, or specifically Hamas terrorism. Harsh recommendations were adopted that would besiege the movement, its members, and the funds that might reach it.

There is no doubt that Hamas suffered severe blows and that its members were subjected to pursuit, arrest, and economic and psychological pressure. Nevertheless, the other opposition factions did not assist it, except for Islamic Jihad, which provided limited assistance. Instead, the movement found itself in merely formal, protocol-level relations with the Palestinian Authority and, at times, in coordination intended to avoid problems. Some Hamas figures even began making lukewarm visits to the authority’s main offices in Palestinian cities. Some religious individuals who had been members of Hamas joined the Palestinian Authority. Although the movement denied that they belonged to its ranks, it faced difficulty making that claim credible.

As for the Popular and Democratic Fronts, the Palestinian street observes that their leaders drive cars bearing red plates, the plates used by the Authority’s vehicles. It is no longer a secret that these leaders have begun carrying requests to Arafat asking him to employ some members of the two fronts or finance certain necessities.

As for the factions based in Damascus, they continue to issue statements condemning the Oslo Accord.

The Opposition and Palestinian-Palestinian Dialogue

Regarding internal Palestinian relations, the issue of dialogue between the self-rule authority and some opposition forces emerged, particularly the factions operating under the PLO umbrella and Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Several dialogue meetings were held in which the parties exchanged speeches expressing their positions regarding the Oslo Accord and the Palestinian cause in general. The Palestinian press and other media discussed these meetings, and assessments ranged from pessimism to optimism. Some believed there was no point in dialogue, while others believed that a new dawn would begin on the Palestinian scene.

If we follow developments on the Palestinian scene after 1967, we find that Palestinian-Palestinian dialogue is neither new nor a recently invented slogan. Many dialogues took place during different political periods. Some consisted of words, while others involved bullets and artillery. Palestinian factions sat around discussion tables and exchanged views under various circumstances, and they also fought one another with artillery and machine guns, especially on Lebanese soil. Each type of dialogue had its own circumstances and justifications in the eyes of the participants.

Verbal dialogue among all Palestinian forces, or among some of them, took place several times over the previous three decades. Its declared aim was to reach a formula for action around which the participants could unite, thereby strengthening national unity and the Palestinian position in confronting challenges. Palestinians generally felt a degree of relief about this kind of dialogue and hoped it would achieve something tangible on the ground. But the passage of time revealed that dialogue was only temporary and transient; its effects quickly faded and were replaced by mutual accusations and confrontational arguments that sometimes reached the point of exchanging gunfire. Dialogue generally did not continue, nor did its results become a practical reality embodying the will of the participants as a group.

By following the events that were followed by dialogues, it is easy to conclude that dialogue did not actually arise because of a crisis suffered by the Palestinian people. For example, the Palestinian people experienced an acute crisis in 1983 because of the split within Fatah, but the parties concerned used weapons rather than words to resolve their disagreements. This created a psychological predicament for the Palestinian people and a dangerous fracture in the political structure, which increasingly affected the social structure. The Palestinian people also experienced a severe crisis after the Palestinian National Council meeting in 1988 recognized Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Instead of resorting to dialogue, the PLO consolidated its new political line without regard for the opposition’s opinion, increasing the fracture within the Palestinian people. The PLO itself created a crisis by signing the Oslo Accord, but it dismissed the opposition and allowed the disagreements to turn into confrontational positions. This confrontation was expressed horribly in 1994 when the Palestinian Authority opened fire on worshippers outside Palestine Mosque in Gaza. People were killed and wounded, but the Authority did not call for dialogue.

The overall situation confirms that dialogue did not arise on the Palestinian scene because the people were passing through a predicament or because they sought to establish a Palestinian strategy or plan of action. It is clear instead that dialogue took place because of a crisis or predicament facing the head of the PLO, Yasser Arafat, who was himself also head of the self-rule authority. Whenever Arafat found himself in a difficult position requiring the Palestinian people and its factions to rally around him, he called for dialogue, on the grounds that, according to him, he believed in democracy and in involving others in making decisions and directing Palestinian policy. He always surrounded his call for dialogue with a media spectacle and photographs of meetings crowned by kisses with opposition leaders.

Arafat called for dialogue in 1984 because of the predicament he faced after establishing relations with Egypt and the formation of the Palestinian Salvation Front. He held talks with some Palestinian factions and promised to carry out radical reforms in the way the PLO and its institutions operated. Through this step Arafat weakened the ranks of the Salvation Front and failed to fulfill his commitments to the leftist fronts that had negotiated with him. He also called for dialogue when the uprising erupted; its result was to pass his objective of recognizing the two Security Council resolutions while appeasing the opposition within the organization by declaring a symbolic independence that denied the possibility of implementing Resolution 242.

At this stage, the peace project adopted by Arafat is experiencing an apparent crisis accompanied by a major decline in support for Arafat and the Authority among the Palestinian street. The author notes that, in his view, the crisis is not in the peace project but in Arafat’s popularity. An increasing number of people in Gaza and the central and eastern areas are raising their voices in criticism of Oslo, the Authority, and Arafat personally, without concern for the security services that monitor and observe their words and actions. These voices grew louder after people discovered the reality of the Oslo Accord through its practical implementation. The agreement became exposed to the danger of collapse, which would also mean the collapse of the PLO project for which it had struggled for more than twenty-five years. Therefore, a political move was necessary to restore confidence in the leader and mobilize popular sympathy for him. It was expected that the Authority president would make a political move in an attempt to regain the initiative, improve his standing among the public, and establish Oslo as an established reality through which it would be possible to maneuver to improve the conditions of the Palestinian people. Factional dialogue was one of the options under consideration.

Through factional dialogue, the Authority could—or hoped to—achieve the following:

1. Manipulate people’s emotions by emphasizing the importance of national unity and closing ranks.
2. Improve Arafat’s popularity by portraying him as someone who is always taking the initiative to do good, listen, discuss, and satisfy some opposition demands.
3. Move beyond the financial-corruption scandals engulfing the Palestinian Authority and distract people with verbal issues of destiny and independence.
4. Distract people from the Oslo Accord and what it means in terms of Israel’s freedom to expand settlements, confiscate land, and create Palestinian islands that can easily be isolated from one another.

As for the Palestinian factions, although they were convinced that dialogue would not lead to significant change on the Palestinian scene in the long term, they quickly accepted the invitation. Several factions had sought over the years to hold continuous dialogues, but all their initiatives came to nothing; no dialogue took place without an initiative from Arafat. The factions were not expected to reject dialogue or impose preconditions or an agenda. The only anticipated absence was Islamic Jihad, which was absent from the first round but accepted the invitation the second time for reasons that remain unknown.

The various factions were not expected to take the dialogue seriously and insist on an agenda because they themselves were in crisis and believed that dialogue might also rescue them from their poor position on the Palestinian scene in Gaza and the central and eastern areas. These factions had failed to form a unified opposition front; each remained closer to the Authority than to the others. They were unable to seize the initiative to lead the Palestinian people and lacked a clear program to implement and practical steps to translate their slogans into reality. Consequently, they failed to convince the people that they constituted a viable and dynamic alternative. Some of these factions appeared to be courting the Authority, trying to draw closer to it, and seemed to be part of the Authority despite their verbal opposition to it. This caused some opposition factions to become objects of questioning and sometimes ridicule in the street. Moreover, some could not continue without financial support from Arafat.

Although the opposition factions planned to improve their circumstances through dialogue, the Palestinian street showed little interest in the dialogue and interpreted it as an attempt by the opposition participants to obtain a share of the cake. If anyone benefited from the dialogue, it was Yasser Arafat and the Authority. The factions defended their decision to enter dialogue as a matter of principle, arguing that dialogue among brothers must remain ongoing regardless of the extent of disagreements and contradictions in viewpoints. This defense is undoubtedly correct in principle, but it ceases to be correct when the premises of dialogue are essentially personal or factional.

In any event, if we summarize the history of Palestinian-Palestinian dialogue, it is preceded first by a crisis created by the head of the PLO, leading Palestinian factions to become angry and attempt to dissuade the organization’s president from his steps. The president refuses to retreat, so the factions decide to separate from the organization’s main body or freeze their membership and begin attempts to mobilize public opinion against what has been done. Historically, the opposition failed to mobilize public opinion or lead an effective opposition and remained on the sidelines while separated or while its activity was frozen. As it failed and the organization’s president continued his steps, the factions began to absorb the new reality and adapt to it. Because PLO policies moved from one failure to another, the organization’s president’s new measures encountered a predicament that surrounded him and placed him in an awkward position, pressuring him to make further concessions without compensation. Thus a crisis emerged that was heavily publicized, diverting the Palestinian people’s attention from the basic cause of the disagreements toward the new crisis facing the organization’s president. At that point, the organization’s president called for national unity, solidarity, and closing ranks. The desperate factions, unable to fulfill the call of national duty, announced that the national interest required working together.

The factions then began operating under the very ceiling they had previously rejected and for which they had frozen their membership in the organization. Their scope of action became the management of affairs under that ceiling. The organization’s president’s previous measures became an accepted reality, and the factions returned to their former state. After a period, the organization’s president took new measures that angered the factions, and the cycle began again, ending in a period of relief followed by further measures, and so on. Many concessions were made and caused crises, but over time they became accepted realities among the angry factions.

In other words, the current dialogue is likely to make the Oslo Accord a ceiling within which the struggle must take place. Oslo was previously rejected, but it now constitutes an unavoidable fait accompli that must be dealt with and whose negotiating conditions must be improved from within its premises. According to the historical development of the Palestinian cause, this portends a new crisis on the scene resulting from new measures taken by the leadership.

The issue here is not really the concept of dialogue, its usefulness, or its benefits. Dialogue among people is necessary and should remain in place, just as goodwill among people should remain despite disagreements. Living nations are those that continually engage in dialogue, believe in popular participation, and allow opinions to interact. Miserable nations are those that rely on tribal, paternalistic, and authoritarian thinking and imagine that their people do not understand, and that the benevolent father is the one who thinks and plans for everyone.

But dialogue remains futile if it is merely a tool for reaching an immediate political objective or overcoming an immediate crisis. This is not really dialogue; it is the exploitation of people’s emotions and feelings and their desire for national unity and reconciliation. It is manipulation of people’s emotions and will bring the people nothing but loss and disappointment, leading them increasingly into the mire of frustration.

If the Palestinian people are seeking serious dialogue that bears long-term fruit and establishes a lasting approach on the Palestinian scene, then serious and radical steps toward change are required. For example, secret budgets should be disclosed and incorporated into the general budget; corruption in the form of negligence, embezzlement, fraud, and favoritism should be fought. There should be collective leadership, with the principle of holding officials accountable and prosecuting them firmly established; the policy of patronage and wastefulness should be abolished; and the focus should shift toward production and development, and so forth.